Independence

This study examined auditor independence and earnings management. A total number of 39 commercial and insurance companies of Nigeria Exchange Group out of which four insurance companies had incomplete data which restricted our research to 35 companies. About 175 firms were observed from 2020-2024. Jaque-berra test probability value was used on our broad objective out of 4 specific objectives. Our dependent variable was based on modified discretionary accrual model used as earnings management of firms which is the error term and our independent variables were collapsed into 4 which are audit fees, audit tenure, non-audit fees, and audit firms rotation as auditor independence. We used the panel least square regression technique with other statistical tests which are descriptive, correlation analyses to investigate the variables. The study found that audit fee has a positive and significant relationship with earnings management, audit tenure and non-audit fee have no significance but are positively related to earnings management while audit firm rotation is negatively insignificant with earnings management.

The Executive, Legislative, and Judicial arms of government comprise the three branches of government in Nigeria. As the third branch of the government, the judiciary’s main responsibility is to dispense justice. In order to critically assess the judicial branch of government and the laws governing judicial officers in Nigeria, this research will concentrate on the process for the appointment and removal of judicial officers in Nigeria by the executive. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended) expressly grants executive authority to nominate, dismiss, and execute disciplinary measures against judicial
officers. Judicial officers are those people who occupy any judicial post that is specifically mentioned in the Constitution. Unfortunately, there have been some disagreements on which branch of government has the authority to name, suspend, and remove judicial officers from office. According to the provisions of section 292 (1) (a) (ii) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 (as amended), there have been attempts by some Governors to remove senior judicial officers, in particular the Chief Judge, based on a resolution passed by a two-thirds majority of the relevant House of Assembly. Having looked into the appointment of judges in other jurisdictions, it has been noted that while the appointment of judges is done by the Executive, which is similar to the position we have under our laws in Nigeria, it is my opinion that the NJC should recommend, followed by the approval of the National Assembly before the president can appoint them. It is also my opinion that the members of the NJC should not be appointed by the executive so as to ensure an impartial nomination of persons that should constitute the Bench.
However, the removal of judicial officers should not be subject to the wills of the executive but rather, the judiciary should have among its members an independent body tasked with investigation, discipline and dismissal of judicial officers as it relates to misconduct. This is because the retirement age of judicial officers is constitutionally provided for, hence, the decline and removal of judges on the grounds of misconduct should be done by the judiciary to ensure the independence of the judiciary