LEGISLATIVE ACCOUNTABILITY IN NIGERIA: LESSONS FROMTHEUNITEDSTATES OF AMERICA

Democracy is universally acknowledged as the most acceptable form of government, because it provides the opportunity for participation of the people in the running of their affairs within a given society. Again, it advances an open, responsible, and accountable government. Since 1999, Nigeria has practiced presidential democracy with three main institutions, comprising of the Executive, Legislature and Judiciary. The Legislature is the most representative as it has the institutional mandate to project the interests of the various constituencies in the country. By virtue of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria1999, (herein 1999 Constitution), the Legislature performs three principal roles of law making, oversight of the executive arm, and representation. Upon election by the electorate, the principle of representation requires legislators to be accountable to their constituents in the performance of their constitutional duties. In Nigeria, there is no consensus of opinion on whether legislators after being elected into parliament, constantly engage their constituents in policy decisions, until the next set of elections. The aim of this study was to examine legislative accountability as envisaged under the 1999 Constitution. The study focused mainly on the representational role of the National Assembly and its different models by evaluating its effectiveness. Thus, several issues of legislative accountability were interrogated. The study adopted the doctrinal research methodology, using secondary data. The study examined whether there are enough constitutional mechanisms for the electorate to hold legislators accountable. The study analyzed the accountability mechanisms that are available to check the excesses of legislators, provided under the 1999 Constitution. These are free and fair elections, recall, minimum sitting days’ requirement, sanctity of party label, presidential veto, judicial review, internal mechanism of suspension, and the absence of immunity from criminal trial for legislators. Since Nigeria’s constitutional practice is modeled after that of the United States of America, the study undertook a comparison of the American system in the context of the accountability mechanisms in order to draw useful lessons for Nigeria. The study found that the mechanism of recall is ineffective in enhancing legislative accountability due to its cumbersome process as provided in the 1999 Constitution. The study also found that elections as a mechanism can only be effective if they are free and fair, which is hardly the case in Nigeria. It also found that although there are a number of mechanisms available in the 1999 Constitution to ensure accountability by the Legislature and its members, recall and periodic elections are the only formal accounting tools at the disposal of the electorate. The study proffered a detailed roadmap to legislative accountability. Consequently, the study identified novel measures such as roll-call, visible and recorded votes, which can be adapted from the constitutional practice of the United States of America to promote effective legislative representation cum accountability in Nigeria. The Study recommends that these novel measures found in the U.S should be adopted in Nigeria in other to enhance legislative accountability