DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY

ÀYÀNMỌ IN YORUBA ONTOLOGY: NEW PERSPECTIVE ON THE DEBATE OF FREEDOM AND DETERMINISM.

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This study examines the Yorùbá concept of àyànmọ (destiny) as a possible solution to the enduring Western philosophical debate between free willist and determinist. The research aims to: conduct systematic assessment of Western metaphysical discourse on free will and determinism with Yorùbá ontological understanding of human agency and destiny; demonstrate how the traditional Western problem may be less inflexible when approached through the àyànmọ framework; explore opportunities for combining Western analytical rigor with Yorùbá practical wisdom; and contribute to comparative philosophy by showing how engagement with non-Western traditions mirrors hidden traditions in Western approaches. The research employs hermeneutical and critical analysis methodology, drawing upon Gadamerian concepts of "fusion of horizons" to conduct cross-cultural philosophical investigation. The approach combines interpretive understanding with rigorous evaluation, investigating the historical development and cultural embeddedness of concepts within both Western and Yorùbá frameworks while sustaining standards of logical coherence and practical relevance. The study reveals that àyànmọ, etymological meaning "that which one chooses and becomes fixed," presents a cultured understanding of agency through progressive pluralism that recognizes multiple levels of agency operating at the same time. The ori's prenatal choice creates parameters within which incarnate freedom functions through character development (ìwà), creating nested orders of agency that preserve both cosmic order and moral responsibility. The Yorùbá hierarchical ontology, extending from Olódùmarè (Supreme Being) through the òrìṣà (deities) to human beings, situates personal destiny within broader cosmic relationships. This framework addresses deterministic concerns about constraining circumstances while maintaining space for genuine moral achievement, demonstrating that Yorùbá philosophy offers valuable resources for contemporary philosophical discourse on human agency and moral responsibility
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co-supervisor

A CRITIQUE OF HUME’S EMPIRICISM IN HIS EPISTEMOLOGY

Faculty
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David Hume's notion of impression and idea distinguishe between two types of mental content. Impressions are direct, vivid sensory experiences, such as seeing a bright light or feeling pain, while ideas are weaker copies of these impressions that appear in memory or imagination. This work explores fundamental questions about human perception, knowledge, and reality. Hume's distinction between impressions and ideas challenges traditional views on how we acquire knowledge, making it relevant to debates in philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science. The analytic method in philosophyfocuses on breaking down complex ideasinto simplercomponents toachieve clarityand precision.The critical methodin philosophyinvolves evaluating and questioning existing beliefs,ideologies,and assumptions.This topic addressesthe problem of howhumans acquire knowledge and the reliability of our thoughts and perceptions. Hume's distinction between impressions and ideas challenges the notion of innate knowledge, arguing that all ideas stem from experience. This project employs analytic/critical method critical, The method in philosophy involves evaluating and questioning existing beliefs, ideologies, and assumptions. the finding of this project is that the empiricist stancecan be summarizedwithout toomuchcaricature in two simpleslogans rooted firmly in the sensory realm“seeing is believing” and “noting in the mind that is not first been in the senses
Supervisor(s)
co-supervisor