

**SOCIO-ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY ON
THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY FROM UMARU MUSA YAR'ADUA'S
ADMINISTRATION TO GOODLUCK EBELE JONATHAN'S
ADMINISTRATION (2009-2015)**

BY

SILVIA ONYEBUCHI GEORGE

ART1701010

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

FACULTY OF ARTS

UNIVERSITY OF BENIN

BENIN CITY

JANUARY, 2023

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**A PROJECT SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
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CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that this project was carried out by **Silvia Onyebuchi George** with Matriculation number **ART1701010**, in the Department of History and International Studies, University of Benin, under my supervision.

DR. (MRS) Enibokun Uzebu-Imarhiagbe
Project Supervisor

DR. Frank Ikponmwosa
Head of Department

Date

Date

DEDICATION

My dedication goes to my Heavenly Father, who has been with me all through the way, to my supportive parents, especially my mother who continually goes out of her way to provide for most of my wants, and to my late aunt who watches me beyond with a proud smile. My special dedication is also extended to my lecturers in the University of Benin for their steady impact of knowledge.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my immense appreciation to the Lord almighty, the source of all I am, and the one that has kept me intact throughout my stay in the University of Benin. His grace has not failed me to this very point and I am what I am because of His love and mercy over my life.

My utmost appreciation also goes to my project supervisor, Dr. Mrs Enibokun Uzebu-Imarhiagbe, for her guidance and thoughtful aid throughout this project work. My appreciation also goes to the lecturers of the department of History and International Studies, who reshaped my ideas on the intricacies of life especially in regards to the outside world and in extension, the international system.

My life has been able to be what it is by the wonderful efforts poured out with love from my parents who gave me a chance to breath and to experience the wonders of life. To them I owe my greatest thanks, I am grateful.

Last but not the least, my gratitude is extended to Mr Ikenna Okpara, your assistance will never be forgotten and it is mostly by your aid, that I am able to successfully complete my project work. *Daalu.*

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

The detection and prevention of terrorist attacks have become one of the most pressing global policy priorities. The number of countries now passing anti-terrorism laws is on the rise, and they are, as a consequence, developing strategies, organizations, initiatives, programs, and measures to deal with terrorism effectively.¹ Nigeria has been recognized as a nation where the activities of terrorist organizations thrive. Despite the domestic terrorism all throughout the country's history, it was only during the Jonathan administration that Nigeria became internationally recognized as a country conducive to terrorist activity. This was due to the rise in terrorist activities and the severity of such attacks during the administration. Therefore, this study attempts to highlight the effects of the Boko Haram insurgency on the Nigerian economy from the Umaru Musa Yar'adua administration to the Goodluck Ebele Jonathan Government (2009-2015).²

Goodluck Jonathan was the vice president to President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua, the 13th president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. On the 9th of February, in the year 2010, because of President Yar'Adua's poor health, the Nigerian Senate moved to make Goodluck Jonathan the Federation's acting

president. On May 5, 2010, President Yar'Adua died, and per the Nigerian Constitution, Goodluck Jonathan was sworn in as president. Goodluck Jonathan, now President, finished the rest of the years in his predecessor's term and won the 2011 general elections; however, he ultimately lost the 2015 presidential election. Jonathan's administration faced many security challenges and internal disorders, particularly Boko Haram terrorism.³

As claimed by the 2016 Global Terrorism Database (GTD), there were 2,888 terrorist cases in Nigeria, from January 1980 to December 2015. More specifically, 297 incidents occurred between 1980 and 2008. The vast majority of cases (2,591) happened from 2009 to 2015. The severity and intensity of the terrorist attacks that rocked Nigeria from 2010 to 2015 were also unprecedented. The first three weeks of 2012 saw more than 253 people killed in 21 attacks. As a result of 164 terrorist attacks between July 2009 and January 2015, an additional 900 people were killed.

A few months into the presidency, the terrorist organization Boko Haram bombed the United Nations building in Nigeria's capital city, Abuja. Several years later, Boko Haram abducted 276 girls from the Chibok Government School. As a result of the administration's failure to act, and the resulting negative press, terrorism in Nigeria became a matter of international concern. During Jonathan's administration, the primary focus of terrorist activities was the four northern states of Borno, Kano, Bauchi, and Yobe. These were the areas where Boko Haram

concentrated its efforts. President Jonathan declared a state of emergency in three northeastern states (Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe) on May 14, 2013, because of the rise in security challenges coming from the terrorist activities of Boko Haram. These northeastern states included two of the areas where the organization operated.⁵

The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of Boko Haram terrorist activities on the Nigerian state and the responses of the Nigerian government. The central phenomenon in this study is the lived experiences of people exposed to Boko Haram attacks in the Northern state of Nigeria, with regard to the social, political, and economic effects of Boko Haram terrorism on the people of Nigeria. Specifically, this study is concerned with the economic impact of Boko Haram terrorist activities on the Nigerian state

1.2 AIM AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The study aims to examine the effects of Boko Haram insurgency on the Nigerian Economy from the Umaru Musa Yar'adua Administration to the Goodluck Ebele Jonathan Government; while the objectives include:

1. To examine the emergence of Terrorism in Nigeria.
2. To examine the nature and manifestations of Boko Haram insurgency from Umaru Musa Yar'adua Administration to Goodluck Ebele Jonathan Government.

3. To examine the economic impact of Boko Haram terrorism on the Nigerian state.

1.3 SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The study will cover the operational mode of Boko Haram terrorist activities in Umaru Musa Yar'adua Administration to Goodluck Ebele Jonathan in Nigeria and government responses from 2009 to 2015.

1.4 METHODOLOGY

In the course of the study, relevant materials will be obtained from two sources. Primary and Secondary Sources.

Primary sources will be utilized in the course of this research; the primary sources will be of two categories, government gazettes, and oral interviews. Materials will be consulted in the University of Benin Library. Oral interviews will be conducted with experienced individuals such as opinion leaders, and security personnel within my reach. Secondary Sources such as textbooks, journals, newspapers, and monographs will be consulted in some University and public libraries. Information obtained from these sources helps to guide and supplement the materials obtained from primary sources. These sources will provide data for a historical analysis of the effects of the Boko Haram insurgency

on the Nigerian Economy from the Umaru Musa Yar'adua Administration to the Goodluck Ebele Jonathan Government.

1.5 LITERATURE REVIEW

There exist previous works in the form of books and journals and articles that are related to this study. They provide useful insight into the study. They include the following:

Ahmadu Sani Mbaya, in his work titled, *“Effects of Insurgency on the Physical and Socio-Economic Activities in Maiduguri,”*⁶ asserts that the activities of the insurgency constitute a serious threat to the lives and properties of residents in Maiduguri. He further suggested that the physical and economic implications of their activities cannot be quantified and the social costs are enormous and that despite the state of emergency that was declared by the Federal government in the affected states the killings, bombing of structures, and kidnapping by the insurgents continue unabated. Therefore, he finally posits that “it is against this background that the article is carried out to determine the effect of the insurgency on Physical, social and economic activities of the residents of Maiduguri, with the view to proffers physical planning measures that would reduce the problems to the barest minimum.”⁷

Mohammed Shuaibu in his article titled, “An Analysis of the Macroeconomic Impact of Insecurity on Nigeria: A Dynamic Modeling

Approach,”⁸ the author examined the impact of insecurity on selected macroeconomic variables using a dynamic modeling approach to analyze time series data for the period 1960- 2014. The author suggested that the impact of insecurity cannot be downplayed in short-term macroeconomic policy formulation and implementation, especially in terms of the external sector. And that we conclude that the impact of insecurity is relatively higher on external sector and fiscal variables compared with domestic policy variables.⁹

Uche Ezenwile, in his book titled, *The Effects of Insurgency on Nation Building in Nigeria (2009 – 2014)*.¹⁰ The author x-rayed the relationship between insurgency and nation-building in Nigeria between 2009 and 2014. He further emphasizes that the gaps between the North and South, Christians and Muslims increase by the day. Unfortunately, the era of suspicion and lack of trust is back in the country, this unpleasant situation has made many southerners and Christians to leave the war zone in droves.¹¹

Yonah Alexander, book, titled *International Cooperation in Combating Terrorism: The Next Phase*.¹² Asserts that in view of this terrorism calamity, the international community has taken extended steps to reduce the risks and bring them under manageable levels. In support of these efforts, the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies (a consortium of universities and think tanks in over forty countries) provides academic forums to stimulate discussions in this area of public concern. The latest seminar on “International Cooperation in Combating

Terrorism: The Next Phase?” was co-sponsored by the Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies, the International Center for Terrorism Studies, the Inter-University Center for Legal Studies, and the University of Virginia School of Law’s Center for National Security Law and held at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies on September 27, 2013.¹³

In Abiodun Joseph Oluwadare’s article, “Boko Haram Terrorism in the Lake Chad Basin Region: Implications for Sub-regional Security”¹⁴ posits that terrorist activities in the Lake Chad Basin region of Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon, have impacted negatively on the security, socio-political and economic situations in the area. This article investigates the evolution of insurgency and the factors leading to its growth in the region. It also examines its socio-political, economic, and security implications. Nigeria, in the center of the imbroglio, has had no respite from terrorist activities for a long time Boko Haram has carried out many gun attacks and bombings in many strategic places, including the United Nations building in Abuja, the federal capital city. There have been similar attacks in Cameroon, Chad, and Niger, including a massive attack in Bosso in the Niger Republic with 26 soldiers killed in 2016. This article concludes that the wave of terrorism in the sub-region has a connection to the wave of global terrorism. To stem the tide of insurgency in the sub-region, this paper recommends that governments at all levels should create an enabling environment for investment and industrial growth. It also suggests that the

security of lives and properties should be given utmost priority. This article examines the evolution, manifestations, and course of the Boko Haram insurgency in the sub-region, exploring the implications for national and international security, socio-economic order, political stability, and sustainable development of the area.¹⁵ It will suggest ways to curtail the Boko Haram insurgency and probable future insurgencies in the sub-region.

Babatunde Felix Obamamoye's book, titled *Insurgency and Nigeria's Relations with Her Immediate Neighbors in the Twenty-first Century*,¹⁶ maintains that Terrorist acts metamorphosed into an insurgency in Nigeria when the Boko Haram terrorist group ferociously challenged the territorial integrity of Nigeria and proclaimed authority over 14 local governments. Consequently, Nigeria orchestrates a counterinsurgency strategy that incorporates her contiguous neighbors. It is against this background that this article interrogates the rise of insurgency in Nigeria and its influence on Nigeria's relations with her immediate neighbors. The article argues that the insurgent uprising reinvigorates rapprochement between Nigeria and the nearby states. It concludes that cooperation in this context for national security is inexorable for mutual survival.

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Michael Ugwueze, an article entitled, "*The United States National Interests and the fight against Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria*"¹⁸ was an attempt aimed at understanding the relationship between the United States'

national interests in Nigeria and the fight against Boko Haram terrorism. It raised the pertinent question of why the United States is involved in the fight against Boko Haram terrorism. Using a qualitative approach, the article discovered that the United States' national interests remain largely unchanged and its averred condemnation of foreign terrorism incontestable, and therefore, responsible for its involvement in the fight against Boko Haram terrorism. However, since the designation of the group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the United States, its members appear more determined, ferocious and coordinated in their attacks against the Nigerian State.¹⁸ To this end, the work recommended that the global community should see the fight against the Boko Haram scourge from the prism of international terrorism and thereby contribute immensely to arresting it.

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Solomon Effiong Udounwa, in an article titled Boko Haram: Developing New Strategies to Combat Terrorism in Nigeria,²⁰ asserts that Nigeria is currently faced with internal security challenges posed by the group “Jama’ atulAlhul SunnahLidda’ watiWal Jihad,” also known as Boko Haram. Boko Haram’s objective is to establish Islamic rule in Nigeria through the imposition of Sharia law throughout the country. Boko Haram’s insurgency is fueled by Nigeria’s history, geopolitical structure, ethnoreligious composition, and socio-economic disparities.

The Nigerian government's strategy in the past three years has focused on the employment of kinetic solutions to end the insurgency with some successes. To overcome its present security challenges, the Nigerian government would need to refocus its efforts on a people-centric, community-based, intelligence-driven, whole-of-government approach to better police its borders, enhance interagency cooperation, improve the capacity of the security forces, and reform the criminal justice system. The government's efforts should also aim to advance socio-economic development and leverage international assistance to end the insurgency.²²

Mike Eshioke Okemi's article entitled, "*Boko Haram: A Religious Sect or Terrorist Organization*"²³ asserts that "Terrorism is a globalized phenomenon confronting the international community. It has grown both in strength and trend and its impact is felt in different parts of the world including Africa. This impact has lately been felt in northern Nigeria due to the activities of Boko Haram creating growing concern with the level of loss of lives recorded. In Nigeria, the group is usually referred to as a religious sect partly due to uncertainty as to its classification or designation or fear the group has created. When for example, President Obama referred to the group as a terrorist organization, President Jonathan countered his statement by saying its members are not terrorists. The media too refer to the group as a sect probably due to fear, especially with the killing of a Television reporter and the bombing of media houses. Boko Haram at

its inception was an Islamic group. With time, it became a sect due to its own beliefs or practices which has separated it from pure Islam. This article believes that the group at birth in 2001 was a religious sect but has over time, graduated into a terrorist organization, especially with its adoption and use of terror tactics. This article examines the term terrorism and the various tactics employed by terrorist organizations worldwide.²⁴

I will consequently, do a comparative analysis between Boko Haram and well-known terrorist organizations in terms of motivation, ideology, existence, grievances, tactics employed to address grievances, etc. for proper classification as a terrorist organization, an international one, or a local terrorist organization. The article will then attempt to suggest ways by which their activities can be curtailed and eliminated.

Generally, this research shall employ a host of texts from sources that shall emerge in the course of the research, as all books; articles reviewed have been able to cover only some parts of my research. Therefore, this proves to a reasonable extent that a proper study has not been carried out on the effects of the Boko Haram insurgency on the Nigerian Economy from the Umaru Musa Yar'adua Administration to the Goodluck Ebele Jonathan Government. This research seeks to fill that vacuum that has been created for a long while by various scholars.

1.6 CHAPTERISATION

The research comprises a total amount of five chapters.

CHAPTER ONE- BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

This chapter features an introduction, outlining the aim and objectives of the study, reviewing related literature on the subject, and explaining the sources of data that will support the study.

CHAPTER TWO- BRIEF HISTORY OF BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY

This chapter concentrates on the overview of the origin of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, the chapter narrates the evolution and nature of Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria.

CHAPTER THREE- NATURE OF BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY IN UMARU MUSA YAR'ADUA/GOODLUCK EBELE JONATHAN GOVERNMENT

This chapter examines the manifestations of Boko Haram insurgency in the northern region of Nigeria under Umaru Musa Yar'adua/Goodluck Ebele Jonathan Government, and how it altered the vision of development of the government Goodluck Ebele Jonathan. The chapter captures cases of Boko Haram destruction in Nigeria under Goodluck Ebele Jonathan.

CHAPTER FOUR- IMPACT OF BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY ON THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY

This chapter examines how the activities of Boko Haram brought about major disasters on the Nigerian economy and its impact on the country's infrastructural development. The chapter also elucidates the various efforts by the Goodluck Ebele Jonathan government in curbing the menace of the Boko Haram terrorist group.

CHAPTER FIVE- CONCLUSION

This is the concluding part of the entire research

ENDNOTES

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20. *Ibid.*,p.18 21. *Ibid.*,p.29
22. Mike Eshioke Okemi, "Boko Haram: A Religious Sect or Terrorist Organization", *Security Research Institute Conferences*, Vol.2, No.4, 2012,p.ii

23. *Ibid.*,p.3

CHAPTER TWO

BRIEF HISTORY OF BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY

2.0 INTRODUCTION

Nigeria is Africa's most populous country and among its most diverse with over 400 ethnolinguistic groups.¹ The government is affected by several conflicts based on overlapping ethnic, religious, political, and regional divisions including over resources in the Niger Delta, Christian-Muslim divides in the middle of the country, and most recently, the rise of Islamist groups in the north, most importantly, Boko Haram. Boko Haram ('Western education is a sin') was founded around 2002 in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state and the largest city in Northeast Nigeria.² At least at its inception, the main tenet among its followers was regime change in Nigeria as they believe the democratic and secular rule is in contradiction to *Shariah*. *In this chapter, I shall be examining the historical background of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria.*

The North-Eastern Region

The North-East Region of Northern Nigeria consists of 19 out of 36 states of the federation. It is clustered into three geopolitical zones North-West, North-East, and North-Central. The North-east region of Nigeria is one of the six geopolitical zones in the country. It consists of six states namely: Borno, Yobe, Bauchi, Adamawa, Gombe, and Taraba.³ It is a vast and extensive region that

extends from Lake Chad in the North-east corner to beyond Toro near Jos in the South-west corner, and from Jama`re bordering Kano in the Northwest corner to Wukari in the South-east. It is inhabited by people of different ethnic groups, but the major ethnic groups are Hausa, Fulani, and Kanuri.⁴ It is also home to many minority groups such as Shuwa Arabs, Mumunye, Chamba, Marghi, Kaka, Manga, Tera, Jukun, Wurkum, Tiv, Bachama, Mambila, Lungudu, Waja amongst others.⁵ The North East region has an estimated population of 22.3 million people who are predominantly Muslims. It shares common international boundaries with Niger to the west and north, the Republic of Chad to the North-east, and Cameroon to the South-east.⁶

The people in the region share almost similar socio-economic, cultural, and linguistic affinities with nationals of the neighbouring countries dating back to the pre-colonial era. With colonialism, the ethnic groups were divided by artificial boundaries created by the colonial governments. Regardless of these artificial boundaries and extinctions, cooperation still exists among the border communities.⁷

2.1 ORIGIN OF BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY IN THE NORTH EAST

The radical Islamic youths who assembled at the Alhaji Muhammadu Ndimi Mosque in Maiduguri ten years ago seem to be the source of Boko Haram. A branch of this youth organization, which was not yet known as Boko Haram, pronounced the city and the Islamic establishment to be intolerably corrupt and

irredeemable in 2002. The organization announced that it was beginning a hijra, or exodus, in the manner of the Prophet Muhammad's migration from Mecca to Medina. It moved from Maiduguri to a village called Kanama, Yobe state, near the border with Niger, to set up a separatist community run on hard-line Islamic principles.⁸

Its leader, Mohammed Ali, espoused anti-state ideology and called on other Muslims to join the group and return to life under “true” Islamic law, to make a more perfect society away from the corrupt establishment. Following a neighbourhood argument over who had the right to fish in a nearby pond, the group got into a fight with the police in December 2003. A squad of officers was overpowered by the group, and the members seized their firearms. This confrontation led to the army's siege of its mosque that lasted into the New Year. The siege ended in a shoot-out in which most of the group's seventy members were killed, including Mohammed Ali.⁹

Because of the unique title locals gave the group—the Nigerian Taliban—it attracted media attention in Nigeria and scrutiny from the U.S. Embassy. The fact that many of the group's members were the sons of prominent and rich northern Nigerians further attracted the attention of the country's media. One was allegedly the son of the then-Yobe governor Bukar Abba Ibrahim, though they may not have all come from the top levels of Nigerian society. The U.S. embassy in Abuja concluded that the group did not pose a global threat and probably had

no connections to international jihadist organizations, according to a State Department cable that was made public by Wikileaks.¹⁰

The few survivors of the “Nigerian Taliban” returned to Maiduguri, where they settled back with others from the youth group that had originated at the Ndimi mosque. The leader of this Maiduguri group, Mohammed Yusuf, then embarked on the process of establishing the group’s mosque in Maiduguri. The Ibn Taimiyyah Masjid was erected on property owned by Yusuf’s father-in-law, Baba Fugu Mohammed, north of the town’s center, close to the railroad station. The organization spread into neighboring areas, including Bauchi, Yobe, and Niger states, after the authorities abandoned it. The group’s neighbors in Maiduguri dubbed the group Boko Haram, which roughly translates as “Western education is forbidden” in Hausa.¹¹

Observers say the group constructed a “state within a state,” with a cabinet, its religious police, and a large farm. It attracted more and more people under its roof by offering welfare handouts, food, and shelter. Youths from Nigeria without jobs and refugees from Chad’s border warfare made up a large portion of the group’s audience. At this point in the group’s history, it is unclear where the money comes from. According to representatives of Borno’s religious establishment, Yusuf obtained funding from Salafist sources in Saudi Arabia after making two hajj pilgrimages during this time. Donations from affluent northern Nigerians during this time were another potential source of support. After a group

of kids said they were taken by the group to an al-Qaeda training camp in Mauritania, the State Security Services detained a wealthy northern businessman in 2006. The businessman claims that his contributions to the cause were a sincere effort to help, an obligation of wealthy Muslims to give charitably.

Sheikh Ja'afar Mahmoud Adam, a well-known and well-liked imam who frequently gave sermons at the Ndimi mosque in Maiduguri was slain while offering prayers at the mosque he headed in Kano on the night of the 2007 presidential elections. The killing was a mystery for some time, but it is now acknowledged that it was carried out on the orders of Mohammed Yusuf. Sheikh Ja'afar had started condemning the group for its rigid beliefs and anticipating conflict with the government. Because Yusuf and his supporters could no longer be persuaded to rejoin the mainstream of the northern Islamic establishment, the death is today regarded by some as a turning moment in the growth of Boko Haram.

Much bloodier events soon followed. The group's run-in with the law in July 2009 was eerily similar to what had happened six years earlier. Traveling en masse to the funeral of a fellow member, the group was stopped by police traffic officers, who were enforcing a tightened restriction on motorcycle helmets, and an argument ensued.¹² The circumstances are unclear, but a member of the group is reported to have fired on the police, injuring several officers. The group then attacked police stations in Yobe and Bauchi, where they killed a large number of

officers. Yusuf published multiple sermon videos in which he directly threatened to use violence against the government and the police. They attracted a sizeable audience and were distributed on DVD.

These incidents prompted the government of Bauchi to crack down on the group, arresting more than 700 members. The police in Maiduguri encircled the sect's mosque, but some sect members managed to escape, and for three days they controlled the town. They roamed the city acting independently, fighting police when they came across them and killing Muslim and Christian civilians indiscriminately.¹³

The police eventually regained control of Maiduguri, and then embarked on a bloody purge of the group's members and anyone they suspected of being a Boko Haram supporter or sympathizer. Dozens of people were rounded up and executed without trial, including Yusuf's father-in-law. Mohammed Yusuf was arrested by the army and handed over to the police, who killed him within hours. Police officials denied that he had been executed, saying he had been shot while trying to escape. Videos clearly showing the execution of young boys and other alleged Boko Haram members by the police, including BujiFoi, a former commissioner for religious affairs in the state government, have been posted on YouTube. Those members of the group who were not killed or arrested fled, some say out of Nigeria. They entered another incarnation, that of famous Islamists on the run.

Following these incidents, the police and the army started gathering information from Maiduguri's imams and traditional leaders about those they believed to be Boko Haram supporters or members. If these people had retreated, their property would have been seized and distributed to the traditional chiefs so they could keep it or gift it to their followers. An unknown number of people were denounced at this time and later disappeared, presumed executed by the police. According to a local Maiduguri journalist, there may have been more than 100 cases of this kind of disappearance. The police deny such accusations.¹⁴

Little was documented about the locations of the Boko Haram members who left Maiduguri in the years 2009–2010. However, the group's insurgency surely brought its members to the attention of Sahelian rebel organizations and international jihadist organizations. In January 2012, security sources in Nigeria told Reuters that they had discovered "several dozen" Nigerians who had been attending rebel training camps in Algeria at the time. This information, according to sources who spoke with the author, was derived from reports from human intelligence assets inside such camps. Members of Boko Haram allegedly got training in a Tuareg insurgent camp in Mali, according to the UN Security Council. Reporters were informed by Niger's foreign minister that Nigerians had received training at rebel camps "around the Sahel region." It is believed that the group's leadership, including Abubakar Shekau, Mohammed Yusuf's right-hand man, relocated to a hideout in northern Cameroon.¹⁵

Midway through 2010, Boko Haram resurfaced in Maiduguri and began a campaign of assassinations. Hit-and-run attacks against police checkpoints in Borno and Yobe marked the beginning of this campaign. The preferred strategy of the organization was to carry it out on a motorcycle, with the pillion rider killing the police officers and taking their firearms. Additionally, gunmen broke into the residences of local authorities who had helped the police by identifying Boko Haram militants. If they refused to leave, those who had occupied the homes once owned by fugitive Boko Haram militants were also put to death. Numerous people were killed on Christmas Eve 2010 when up to six bombs exploded in two neighborhoods of Jos, Plateau state, close to churches and a market. At the time it was not assumed to be a Boko Haram attack; it was thought to be a nasty twist to the long-standing ethnopolitical conflict there.

At the time, it was not believed to be a Boko Haram attack but rather a bad development in the region's protracted ethnopolitical struggle. Then, on New Year's Eve 2010, a bombing inside a famous outdoor fish market and restaurant on the grounds of the Mogadishu barracks, just outside Abuja, resulted in the deaths of ten people. Despite being just next to a military base, the market was largely frequented by people and had minimal security. At first, it was unclear if Boko Haram was responsible for either bombing. Boko Haram was not connected to a bombing that occurred three months earlier at a celebration in Abuja commemorating the 50th anniversary of the nation's independence.

Charges of preparing that attack are leveled against a prominent member of the Militant Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), who is detained in South Africa. However, early in 2011, an FBI investigation found that the bomb at the Mogadishu barracks was made using the same methods as devices in Jos, which raised suspicions about Boko Haram. These assaults demonstrated the group's readiness to target weak points and kill civilians. To convince the government that it could reach them in Abuja, it began its bombing campaign in the already tense city of Jos.¹⁶ The group's assassination operations in Maiduguri expanded beyond the initial scope of police and other authorities during the first few months of 2011. For instance, a pharmacist in Maiduguri was killed in a robbery that occurred in February 2011 and was not thought to have any prior link to the group's treatment by the police. Cash and a large number of medical supplies were taken from his shop. In an interview with this author, a senior member of the group who went by the name "Abu Dujana" said that anyone the group designated as an "enemy" would be killed, though he was unable to specify what the pharmacist had done. Additionally, according to Abu Dujana, the group had not ruled out employing suicide bombers in its assaults.

The group began to rob banks, cash-in-transit convoys, and successful businesses, not only in Maiduguri but also in Bauchi, where the group remains strong. The group claims it is permitted to do this by the Quran, as the money it takes is considered to be the "spoils of war." A source who has followed the

group closely states that the group is thought to have made approximately 500 million naira (about \$3 million, or £2 million) from such robberies, but such claims are unverifiable. In June 2011 Boko Haram bombed the national police headquarters in Abuja. A car laden with explosives drove into the compound of Louis Edet House, a block of offices previously thought secure in Abuja's government zone, by following a convoy of senior officers through the gates. The car's driver is thought to have intended to park it close to the front stairway as the senior officials entered, but security personnel diverted him to the building's back, where the device exploded in the parking lot.¹⁷

At the time it was questioned whether the bombing was meant to be a suicide attack because the bomber might have been delayed in Abuja traffic, but in August 2011 remaining doubts were removed when a man drove a car into the UN compound in Abuja and detonated a massive bomb, killing twenty-three people and wounding scores more. The attack launched Boko Haram onto world news and established it as a militant group with the technical, and doctrinal, capacity to produce suicide bombs. The organization released a martyrdom video made by the driver of the car.

Security intelligence analysts at Stratford say building successful suicide weapons, like the ones used at the United Nations and police headquarters, is very difficult. They claim that two successful detonations are strong proof that Boko Haram is being trained by an outsider. The type of explosives the group uses is

common in mining and construction, according to Reuters. There are plenty of sources of such explosives in northern Nigeria. The way the group contacted the outside world also changed about this time. A journalist colleague in Nigeria says the group tightened its telephone discipline, collecting the numbers of journalists it wanted to contact, rather than having journalists call contacts they had made in the organization. A Boko Haram spokesman with the nom de guerre of “Abu Qaqa” began contacting journalists to claim attacks. The government later claimed that it had captured him, but Boko Haram said that another member had been captured and that Qaqa is still active. The purported leader of the group, Abubakar Shekau, Yusuf’s former right-hand man, also began to post videos to YouTube at this time.

North-eastern Nigeria has experienced practically weekly attacks by militants detonating bombs in churches or other places since August 2011. The group has also widened the scope of its attacks, shifting from direct acts of retaliation against the state to encompass various forms of power. This expansion includes targeting newspaper offices and setting fire to schools. Twelve public schools in Maiduguri were burned down during the night in March 2012, displacing as many as 10,000 students from their studies.

According to reports, three purported Boko Haram terrorists were murdered while attempting to set a school on fire. The group has told journalists that these attacks are in retaliation for the arrests of several Islamic teachers from traditional

“Tsangaya” Quranic schools in Maiduguri. In the Tsangaya educational system, clerics instruct kids in memorizing the Quran. These schools, some with just a few students and others with many, are found not just in Nigeria but also throughout the whole Sahel. The youngsters, known as Almajiris, travel from rural areas to the city. Many beg during the day and give their money to the teacher, or *mallam*, who runs the school. The group also says that it is attacking the government school system in retaliation for what it says is the government’s attack on the Tsangaya system as a whole. Additionally, there have been more allegations of Boko Haram beheading in public. It is believed that these might be internal purges of moderate members or members in the group who have been arrested and can therefore no longer be trusted.

Big attacks included bombings on Christmas Day 2011, when bombs were detonated in three states, Niger, Plateau, and Yobe, killing forty-five people. In January 2012 three groups of gunmen and suicide bombers coordinated attacks on three government buildings in Kano the police headquarters, the office of the immigration service, and the State Security Service. More than two hundred people were killed. The militia has also kept up its participation in the long-running war in Plateau state between indigenous tribes and Hausa/Fulani "settlers.". Most of the violence in the area has not had a connection to Boko Haram, but in February 2012 a suicide car bomb was detonated at a Jos church.

Another suicide bombing occurred a few days later, in March, at St. Finbar's church in Rayfield, Jos, close to the government building.

The offices of the This Day newspaper in Abuja and Kaduna, the Catholic chapel at Bayero University in Kano, and a cattle market in Yobe have all recently been the targets of deadly bomb and rifle attacks..¹⁸

2.2 CAUSES OF BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY

An imbalance between the North and the South: Historical events over the past 60-70 years started the slide into poverty and inequality that eventually led to the formation of Boko Haram”. Boko Haram means “Western education is forbidden”. Western schools were being actively opened in the south, while Christian missions were not supported by Muslim leaders in the north. Insurgents have launched scores of attacks on schools. One of the most outrageous acts was the abduction of the Chibok girls on April 14, 2014. The children are still missing. The imbalance, both economic and educational, between the regions has remained to this day..¹⁹

Politics: There have been accusations of political sponsorship of the sect. Numerous reports, especially in the Nigerian media, claimed that some powerful politicians finance the terrorists to weaken the government. Some claimed the sponsors were inside Nigeria. Others, however, believed the sect could have been backed from outside the country. The talk about internal sponsorship calmed

down following the general elections in Nigeria, as a result of which the country saw a democratic power change.²⁰ With the new leadership, the attacks have remained, and in some periods even intensified. This led experts to conclude that terrorism in the northeast is not likely to be linked with political powers inside the country.²¹

Weaknesses in the Military: The Nigerian writer and political analyst Chris Ngwodo thinks that the national army has been neither designed nor trained for this challenge.

“The Nigerian military is a classical fighting force. It just has found itself out of its depth when it comes to dealing with an irregular fighting force such as Boko Haram.”²²

After decades of dictatorship, the army’s defensive and security strategies were developed to protect the regime rather than the citizens, he notes. Nigerian soldiers often complain that they lack the appropriate weaponry to fight against terrorists. While soldiers say that Boko Haram has more sophisticated equipment, the military officials insist the army has brand new equipment and accuse soldiers of cowardice.²³ Within one year hundreds of soldiers have been tried by courts-martial and dismissed from the forces for alleged mutiny. Corruption in the military is also blamed for its lack of success.

There is speculation that the money that should be spent on arms is being diverted. Under ethnic and religious opinions, It is widely believed that Boko Haram fighters are (at least predominantly) Muslims. However, all the Islamic scholars have been saying that Boko Haram has nothing to do with Islam. They openly disagree with the sect and are outraged that terrorists use religion to justify atrocities and to cause division in society. The dreaded sect has attacked or attempted to attack several mosques during prayers. Many Muslims, like Christians, have become victims of mass murders. This indicates that Boko Haram is not just a non-religious issue.²⁴

The poor response by the Government: Numerous analysts believe that the Nigerian government has been either inadequate or slow in its response to the terrorism challenge in the country. Some associated the government's failure with the corruption problem.²⁵ Others link the ineffectiveness with the following reasons: refusal to accept international help (especially after the Chibok girls' kidnap), the actual inability to admit the failure, negotiating (or not negotiating with terrorists), etc. other causes include failed government, Poverty, Religious fundamentalism, illiteracy among the youths, government action and inaction, injustice in society and to stop westernization or western civilization, etc. ²⁶

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CHAPTER THREE

NATURE OF BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY IN UMARU MUSA YAR'ADUA/GOODLUCK EBELE JONATHAN GOVERNMENT

3.0 INTRODUCTION

The conflict between Boko Haram and the Nigerian government was highly intractable and brutal. The first half of 2013 was marked by continuously shifting interests; evolving and self-reinforcing nature of the intractable conflict was exacerbated by a myriad of false political calculations.¹ As a result, Nigeria has been undergoing “unprecedented levels of fear, pain, and deprivation”. Civilian massacres and mass abductions are attributed to Boko Haram, and the frequency of violence and the extent of damages degree are ever-increasing.²

3.1 UMARU MUSA YAR'ADUA/GOODLUCK EBELE JONATHAN GOVERNMENT

When the Jonathan administration took office in May 2010, the Boko Haram issue was already present. Since assuming office, Jonathan has taken a number of measures to try and address the issue, including establishing a special joint military task force to defeat Boko Haram, placing numerous closed-circuit televisions throughout the Federal Capital Territory, where Abuja is located, and

appointing Ambassador Usman Gaji Galtimari to lead a committee with the express purpose of addressing Boko Haram.³

Onouha asserts that;

But nothing has worked. After the death of Yusuf, Boko Haram embarked on a resurgence. However, where this help will come from is unclear. If the Jonathan government looks for international assistance, there are only a few countries with the capability to help. The African Union is totally out of the picture, as it lacks capacity in these areas. The U.N. has little or nothing to offer. I think countries like the U.S., Israel, and the United Kingdom, among others, will be of great assistance, says Onouha. This leaves Nigeria in a Catch. Without foreign assistance, the government will have a difficult time eliminating Boko Haram. But if the government of Nigeria does invite foreign forces into the country, it could help the terrorist organization attract more Nigerians. The attack on the U.N. House in Abuja is likely a strategic move by the sect and its international collaborators to draw foreign forces into Nigeria and possibly make the country ungovernable.⁴

Ten primary schools were targeted between February 21 and March 1 in different parts of Maiduguri. Boko Haram only coordinated at least twenty-one strikes in September 2012, and they targeted critical cell towers for Nigeria's wireless telecommunications. In November 2012, two coordinated suicide attacks on the Protestant church within the army cantonment at Jaji in Kaduna state killed up to fifty worshippers.⁵ The Movement for Unity and Jihad in Western Africa (MUJWA), al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and Ansar al-Dine are

thought to have formed an alliance with Boko Haram in the northern Mali region since April 2012. In June 2012, the State Department added several of the group's members to a terrorist blacklist, including its new leader Abubakar Shekau.⁶

In May 2013, President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency in Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe states, stated that many parts of northern Borno were “under the direct control of Boko Haram.” Due to internal strife and dwindling outside grassroots support, Boko Haram essentially dispersed back inside the three north-eastern states at the beginning of 2013.⁷ In some restricted regions of Borno state, the group developed a focus on absorbing local control. Car and suicide bombs virtually stopped during this time, but as Boko Haram fighters returned from Mali with more experience in kidnappings, there was an upsurge in foreigner abductions. These attacks, however, remained infrequent.⁸

During the latter part of 2013, attacks appear to have become more brutal. Boko Haram abandoned attempts at acquiring local control and fled to the hinterlands, where the group was relegated to conducting guerrilla attacks. These attacks continue to be focused in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states, and this shift has set the stage for the return to prominence of vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices.⁹ Violence linked to Boko Haram has caused the deaths of more than seven hundred people only in 2013, making it one of the bloodiest periods since the insurgency took off in 2010. The group now frequently attacks schools when they are occupied, killing teachers and pupils.¹⁰

3.2 GOODLUCK EBELE JONATHAN ADMINISTRATION AND MAJOR ATTACKS UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF SEKAU

The emergence of Sekau as the leader of Boko Haram heralded the ruthlessness of the sect. Nigeria witnessed the first suicide attack under his watch, and this attracted reproach and public opprobrium to the group. Boko Haram's ferocious and violent attacks since the inception of Sekau as the leader are enumerated below;

- On Friday, January 28, 2011, Boko Haram killed Borno State governorship candidate on the platform of All Nigeria's people's Party (ANPP), Alhaji Modu Gobi, and his brother. A 12-year-old boy and four police officers also lost their lives.
- Ahmed Abdullah, a well-known Islamic cleric, was assassinated by the sect on March 13, 2011, at his mosque in Gomari.
- On April 1, 2011, there was an attack on a police station in Bauchi less than 24 hours before the National Assembly elections.
- The Maiduguri office of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) was bombed on April 9, 2011.
- On April 15, 2011, several people were killed in Maiduguri.
- Another Muslim cleric was killed on April 20, 2011, in Maiduguri, and several police officers were ambushed.

- The same day, 14 prisoners were released during a risky jailbreak in Yola, the capital of Adamawa State.
- May 29, 2011, witnessed the killing of 15 people in Bauchi at the market located next to the barrack.
- June 6, 2011, witnessed the first suicide bombing in Nigeria when a suicide bomber drove a car laden with explosives into the police headquarters in Abuja, the Federal Capital, and detonated it. Many people were killed and scores were injured.
- Twenty-five people died on June 26, 2011, when an explosive was thrown into a drinking joint in Maiduguri.
- July 3, 2011, witnessed another bombing of a drinking joint when a bomb was thrown into it in Maiduguri. Twenty people lost their lives in the incident.
- Another prominent Islamic cleric, Liman Bana, was killed on August 12, 2011, on his way home after observing his prayers at Ngala mosque.
- The United Nations Headquarters in Abuja, the federal capital was bombed on August 26, 2011, by a suicide bomber, 21 people died in the attack while several sustained injuries.
- In September 2011, Yusuf 's brother-in-law, Babakura Fugu, was killed to thwart a peace process initiated by former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo less than 72 hours after having a meeting with Obasanjo.

- On October 26, 2011, Modu Binbute, a politician, was killed outside his house in Maiduguri.
- Borno and Yobe States witnessed a series of bombings on the 5th of November 2011. Sixty-seven people lost their lives to these attacks, and government offices and police headquarters were razed.
- On Christmas day – 25, December 2011 - three suicide bombers attacked St. Theresa Catholic Church, Madalla in Niger State, the aftermath of the attacks left 35 people dead, and several others were injured.
- On January 6, 2012, the group assaulted Christ Apostolic Church in Jimeta, Yola, Adamawa State, murdering 16 people, including the pastor and his son, and injuring dozens more.
- On January 20, 2012, the group inflicted horrific terror on the city of Kano in Kano State. More than 162 individuals died, while many more suffered various injuries. Between 50 and 100 suspects were set free when they attacked police stations and immigration detention centers. The State Security Service (SSS) office and the zone 1 police headquarter were also attacked by sect members. A journalist with Channel Television, Eneneche Akogwu was also killed in the attacks. Several police formations in the city were also attacked including Fegge police station, Farm center police station, Naibawa, and Jedijedi police posts, and also the immigration office in the city was attacked too.

- On February 26, 2012, Boko Haram attacked the Church of Christ in Nigeria (COCIN), a suicide bomber drove a car laden with explosives into the church killing four people.
- St. Finbarr's Catholic Church in Rayfield Jos, Plateau State was attacked on March 11, 2012. Eleven people lost their lives in the attack including a pregnant woman, while 22 were injured.
- On April 29, 2011, Christians who were worshipping at Bayero University, Kano theatre was attacked, 15 people were killed including a professor, and many were injured.
- The motorcade of Taraba State police commissioner Mr. Mamman Sule was attacked in Jalingo, the state capital by a motorbike suicide bomber. The attack killed 11 people and injured more than 20 people.
- On June 3, 2012, Boko Haram suicide bombers struck two churches in Bauchi, leaving 38 people injured and 15 dead.
- On June 8, 2012, a suicide bomber detonated his bomb at the gate of the Borno state police headquarters, killing five people, scores were also injured.
- There was a suicide attack at the Christ Chosen Church of God on Rukuba Road in Jos on June 10, 2012, two people were seriously injured.¹¹

3.3 NIGERIA MILITARY AND CORRUPTION IN JONATHAN ADMINISTRATION

Military corruption undermines the nation's ability to defend itself and contributes to the conflict in two ways. First, the lack of accountability in the defense industry motivates related actors to maintain a manageable level of domestic insecurity. This level of instability provides reasons to continuously increase the budget allocation. Circumstantial evidence indicates the Nigerian army allegedly collaborated with Boko Haram.¹² In the continued conflict, information from Nigerian security agencies was being passed in advance to help the insurgents conduct violence. The military's Joint Task Force (JTF) was withdrawn in various locations in three states, just before the start of intense operations carried out by the paramilitary group in those regions. Moreover, it was alleged that federal security agencies were colluding with Boko Haram even more directly.¹³

Boko Haram insurgents could import weapons by circumventing the federal agencies' security clearance of arms and ammunition through the border. The second factor of corruption is widespread embezzlement. The national police and military received inadequate pay, subpar retirement plans, and welfare benefits while significant amounts of the defense budget seeped into the coffers of high-ranking officials, opening the door for corruption through bribery and looting. Moreover, the Nigerian military does not invest enough in the surveillance and

intelligence technologies required to counter threats posed by criminal activities.¹⁴ The poor working conditions of Nigerian security forces contrast with Boko Haram militants' relatively better equipment and benefits. Therefore, government military forces lacked the capacity and were unable combat the evolved insurgency movement.¹⁵

Moreover, the dynamics of political competition also make the government hard to work as one legislative body and show a strong political will to conduct policies. Politicians from the opposition parties as well as the president's opponents sought to reveal President Goodluck Jonathan as weak and ineffective. In March 2012, Sheik Ahmed Datti, the appointed mediator by Boko Haram, resigned from office, accusing the government of untimely public disclosure of information about confidential details of the meeting. The embarrassing media attention at a premature stage of the dialogue was created by official cracks exploited by fifth columnists who successfully sabotaged mediation efforts.¹⁶

3.4 EFFORTS OF JONATHAN'S ADMINISTRATION IN CURBING BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY

The turning point occurred when Boko Haram and the government recognized that they were in a negative-sum situation and they would not be able to achieve even a zero-sum victory. It was no coincidence that the negotiation

attempts were the most active in 2012 when Boko Haram's deadly attacks spread beyond its core region and expanded its range of targets.¹⁷ Although failed negotiation attempts often increase distrust and suspicion about each party's true commitment, short time gaps between the talks during the period of late 2011 and early 2013 indicate the cost of continuing the high level of violence was too expensive for both parties, ripening the moment for negotiation.¹⁸

As the violence spread out into the west and the south, and confrontation became more and more intense, Boko Haram became a major threat to national security. The state of national insecurity had underscored the imperative for the Nigerian government to intensify efforts towards negotiation. Moreover, the 2015 presidential election shifted the interest dynamics toward negotiation. Continued attacks by Boko Haram dimmed the incumbent president's chances of re-election by preventing Jonathan's administration from demonstrating its capacity to control its territory.¹⁹ To secure his second term, President Jonathan reached out to his counterpart by adopting a rather conciliatory approach instead of clinging to fundamental differences and mutual hatred. Boko Haram has also lost too many of its militants in confrontations with the Nigerian military. Exhausted by the bloodletting, some factions have advocated settling the conflict.²⁰

Nigerian military activity surged in the area leading to the deployment of Boko Haram; seeking to avoid heavy losses in confrontations with military personnel, Boko Haram adapted by turning to guerilla-style tactics. Vehicle-borne

improvised explosive devices are perfectly suited to Boko Haram's current needs. If deployed effectively, such attacks can instill terror in the population and undermine confidence in Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan's government.²¹

However, Boko Haram's distrust of the government reached its peak in 2013 and heightened the threshold of negotiation. The government's designation of the group as a terrorist organization significantly depreciated the value of potential gains through negotiation by increasing the costs of failure. The militants, and especially Boko Haram's leaders, now have to risk being captured and sent to trial. Therefore, Boko Haram is further escalating the conflict despite continuously increasing costs, which action was previously perceived as a mutually hurting stalemate.²²

While Boko Haram's sophisticated tactics, expanded target of victims and operation area, and increased cruelty caused several casualties and drove it away from its initial position, political considerations regarding the 2015 election created the notion of a mutually hurting stalemate. Although President Jonathan had the motivation to continue the conflict until the election date as well, Boko Haram operation undermined the popularity of Jonathan's government as well as the legitimacy of the newly inaugurated government. Additionally, losses on Boko Haram's side have damaged the group seriously. However, the Nigerian government crossed the Rubicon concerning mediation as an option by labeling Boko Haram as a terrorist

group. An opportunity once created by a mutually perceived hurting stalemate can now only be achieved at a much higher cost.²³

In northeastern Nigeria's Borno, Yobe, and Adawama states, a state of emergency was reinstated after being temporarily withdrawn in May 2013. It was then twice renewed, in November 2013 and April 2014. 8,000 soldiers were sent on a military operation to Boko Haram safe havens, and harsh raids against the "terrorist" organisation proceeded. In June 2013, the civilian population also formed a militia, the Civilian JTF (CJTF), to support the JTF operations in Maiduguri. They attacked the hideouts of suspects and hand them over to the military. Once voluntarily organized civilian vigilantes now receive stipends from the government. In 2014, the military re-launched "Operation Flush Out" to remove Boko Haram insurgents from the three states reinforcing its heavy-handed approach.²⁴

The Nigerian military forces have killed and captured many of the Boko Haram militants. Therefore, since late 2013, heavy military measures have diminished Boko Haram's ability to conduct the coordinated campaigns carried out in major urban centers in 2011 and 2012. Boko Haram, however, has not yet been entirely subdued and has altered its methods to use guerilla warfare, which is far more difficult to suppress. Additionally, since then, it has carried out increasingly deadlier attacks against civilian communities. The developed insurgency movement has thus far eluded military control..²⁵

The Nigerian government passed Nigeria's Terrorism (Prevention) Act in 2011 to assist in curtailing the incidence of terrorism. The Act indicts any person who, directly or indirectly, provides funds with the intention or knowledge that they will be used to commit an offense for an act of terrorism. However, the effectiveness of the anti-terrorism legislation in 2011, given the ongoing terrorist atrocities, is a "moot point." Following that, the Nigerian security force later designated Boko Haram and Ansaru as terrorist groups on 4 June 2013 and prosecuted hundreds of suspected Boko Haram and Ansaru members and collaborators. This designation allowed the government to impose prison sentences of a minimum of 20 years on group members or supporters.²⁶

On June 21, 2012, the U.S. State Department designated three senior Boko Haram members, Abubakar Shekau, Abubakar Adam Kamar, and Khalid al-Barnawi, as terrorists. Later that year, Shekau received a reward of 50 million naira, and each of the other 18 commanders received a reward of 10 million naira (ICG 2014b: 37). In November 2013, the U.S. State Department designated Boko Haram, as a group, and its offshoot Ansaru as "Foreign Terrorist Organizations," legally enabling the U.S. to take various counter-terrorism measures including asset freezes and the imposition of travel bans on their members and affiliates.²⁷

It should be noted here that the government had not only failed to control the Boko Haram insurgency movement and protect civilians, but it had also further escalated the conflict in every aspect including ends, means, costs, parties,

and commitment. As a result, a series of counter-insurgency measures have exacerbated the conflict's intractability rather than resolving it.

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CHAPTER FOUR

IMPACT OF BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY ON THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY

4.0 INTRODUCTION

Terrorist acts and insurgency can cause ripple effects through the economy of a nation, and this has negative impacts. The most obvious is the direct economic destruction of properties and lives, but terrorism and insurgency in any country indirectly affect the economy by creating uncertainty, xenophobia, loss of tourism, and insurance claims.¹ The same can be said in Nigeria, apart from the direct loss of lives and property in the Northeast region where Boko Haram attacks are predominant, commercial activities declined drastically, people migrated from the region to other parts of the country in their numbers, and foreign citizens who are businessmen from nearby neighboring countries like Chad, Cameroon, and Niger were reportedly repatriated to their countries of origin.²

4.1 EFFECTS OF BOKO HARAM ACTIVITIES ON NIGERIA

Below are some of the effects of Boko Haram insurgency and terrorism have had on the Nigerian economy, especially the northeastern region.

4.1.1 Forced Migration, Repatriation, and Displacement of People

Due to the danger to life and property posed by Boko Haram's activities, a significant number of people have fled to the northern part of Nigeria.³ The

majority of affected individuals, who happen to be natives of the North of the country, seek refuge in internally displaced persons (IDP) camps while Southern businessmen conducting businesses in the North relocate back to the south. According to a 2015 report from the International Organisation for Migration,⁴ approximately 1,188,018 people, comprising 149,357 households, have been internally displaced in the northeastern states of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, and Yobe. Additionally, another 47,276 people, comprising 5,910 households, have been displaced in the northern states of Plateau, Nasarawa, Abuja, Kano, and Kaduna, bringing the total number to 1,235,294 internally displaced persons as of February 2015.⁵

The IOM report went on to say that Boko Haram activities are responsible for 91.98 percent of the IDPs from the northeastern region, while community and tribal conflicts are responsible for 7.96 percent, and natural disasters are only responsible for 0.06 percent. The majority of these migrants from the North are young farmers who have abandoned their source of income for safety sake.⁶

In addition to the displacement and relocation of people and businesses from the north-east to other parts of Nigeria, foreign nationals of neighbouring African countries such as Chad, Cameroon, and Niger were being repatriated to their home countries because they constitute members of Boko Haram. Evidence suggests that not all of the above-mentioned nationals who have been repatriated are members of the terrorist group, Boko Haram.

Some of the repatriated nationals who had business in cities like Maiduguri, Damaturu, and Yola were repatriated, which affected the economic activities in these cities. In this circumstance, the economy of the north-east will be significantly impacted if foreign nationals who make a significant contribution to the development of the Northeast through their economic activities are returned to their home nations. In any case, the insurgency is a factor that has prompted forced migration in the northern area of Nigeria and increased poverty and hopelessness.⁷

4.1.2 Shortage of Food and Hunger

When compared to other parts of Nigeria, the northern region has a reputation for high agricultural production, and agriculture accounts for about 5% of Nigeria's GDP and employs about 35% of young people between the ages of 18 and 35⁸. However, agricultural production has begun to show signs of strain as a result of Boko Haram's unabated attacks in the region. By the second quarter of 2014, the annual grain flow in Borno had decreased from 294940 tons to 94500 tons.⁹

In 16 of Borno's 27 LGAs, game, forests, grazing reserves, parks, orchards, river basins, and lakes have all been affected, and over 470,000 livestock have been killed or stolen. Major crops like millet, cowpea, rice, and maize saw a significant drop in production, and the number of fish that were harvested decreased significantly by 80%.¹⁰ In some parts of the north, the security situation

has affected farmland production and that has led to some increases in food prices.¹¹

Farmers' perceived fear of being attacked by insurgents is largely to blame for the impact of terrorism on agriculture. Outside of that, insurgents have made farmlands their hideout, and they then target the agricultural sector for their daily supplies. Due to restrictions on human mobility and attacks on storage facilities, agricultural production suffers greatly. Other factors, like transportation, have become riskier and this has put additional pressure on economic outputs and added costs. The overall impact has manifested in food shortages, increased prices of food items, poverty, and hunger.

4.1.3 A barrier to both domestic and international investment

In many regions of northern Nigeria, the activities of Boko Haram have a significant impact on investment and business. When compared to the southern part of Nigeria, poverty is more prevalent in the northern part. High levels of foreign direct investment (FDI), particularly in the oil industry, may have contributed to the wealth gap. As FDI in the south expanded, it plunged in the north because of insurgency in the region. According to a report released in 2013 by the Kano State Chamber of Commerce, business activity in Kano had decreased by 80% since 2012.¹² In this context, the chief executive officer of the manufacturing company Boussac textile, which is located in Kano state, stated in a 2013 interview with the press that "a lot of projects are being canceled in the

region because people are scared." The fact that factories can become targets makes them terrified; Workplace commuters can also become targets.¹³

On a macro level, insurgency in the north negatively impacted the FDI in Nigeria. According to Townsend (2013),¹⁴ In 2012, foreign direct investment (FDI) in Nigeria decreased by 21%, going from \$8.9 billion in 2011 to \$7 billion in 2012. Townsend argues that the fear of insecurity in Nigeria is primarily to blame for the sharp drop in FDI during this time. The economy is impacted in a variety of ways by the decline in FDI.

First and foremost, it has a direct effect on trade, economic expansion, and the development of any economy. Second, it boosts the economy by adding capital from within the country, resulting in increased output. Thirdly, it encourages GDP (gross domestic product) expansion. Taking this into account, a decline in FDI leaves the Nigerian economy vulnerable owing to the high codependency ratio between the inflow of FDI, the Nigerian oil sector, and the country's GDP, although one cannot allege that the drop in FDI is wholly caused by the insurgency.¹⁵

However, as the activities of Boko Haram progressed to the capital territory Abuja, there was a general fear that it may spread further to the South and, as such, foreign investors were wary about investing in Nigeria for fear of losing their investment.¹⁶ Due to insecurity and fear of attack, approximately 73.3 percent of businesses in the northern states of Borno, Yobe, Kano, and Sokoto

have partially closed.¹⁷ This addresses an enormous deficiency in both human and monetary capital in the northern economy.

4.1.4 Distraction, economic misappropriation, and corruption

Another terrible impact of Boko Haram's activities on the socio-economic development in Nigeria is the disproportionate attention and increased security vote by the Nigerian government.¹⁸ The government is heavily engaged in the rhetoric of fighting terrorism rather than allocating resources to development projects. This has led to microeconomic instability, distortion, and leakages in the Nigerian economy, as well as the associated issue of infrastructure decay and hyperinflation.¹⁹

Concerningly, the fight against terrorism, has provided prominent politicians with an opportunity to embezzle funds intended for fighting insurgency by diverting those funds elsewhere. Sambo Dasuki, a retired Nigerian army colonel who served as the National Security Adviser (NSA) to the then-president of Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan, has been the subject of an investigation since December 2015 for allegedly diverting an enormous US\$2 billion that was intended for the purchase of 12 helicopters, four fighter jets, and other ammunition for the Nigerian military's fight against Boko Haram. Numerous additional Nigerians who benefited from the infamous deal have been named in Dasuki's prosecution by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), the Nigerian anti-corruption agency. Because of the arms deal, which is now

known as Dasukigate, nobody knows for sure if the Nigerian government is actually fighting Boko Haram or if politicians are just using this armed group to make money.

Whatever the case may be, the fact of the matter is that taken as a whole, the activities of the group also appear to be fostering more corruption among Nigerian political elites.²⁰

Efforts Made by Goodluck Jonathan Administration to Curb the Menace of Boko Haram (2010 -2015) Terrorism Preventive Act and the Office of National Counter-Terrorism Coordinator

The persistent threat posed by Boko Haram was inherited by the Goodluck Ebele Jonathan administration from his predecessor, Late Umar Musa Yar'Adua. Nigeria's security situation continued receiving international condemnation as a result of the video posted by Aljazeera captioned "Nigerian security forces shooting unarmed detainees and civilians during the 2009 uprising", as a result of this, The United States Department of State then referred to the violations of the United Nations' fundamental human rights committed by Nigerian security personnel.²¹

On June 3, 2011, the GEJ administration established the Terrorism Preventive Act (TPA) and the office of national counter-terrorism coordinator to restore Nigeria's international security profile and put an end to the Boko Haram threat, which has continued to attract international attention.²² However, a few

months after these security measures were implemented, on August 26, 2011, Boko Haram attacked the United Nations (UN) Headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria, killing many people and destroying property. As a direct consequence of this, Nigeria's international security profile and Boko Haram menace largely gained the attention of the international community, resulting in a variety of responses from the United Nations and other countries of the world.²³

4.1.5 Declaration of State of Emergency in the Northeast States of Nigeria

On January 1, 2012, Goodluck Ebele Jonathan's administration declared a six-month state of emergency in the states of Yobe, Plateau, and Borno to improve Nigeria's international security profile, which had received much condemnation from the international community. International borders in the affected areas were also temporarily closed. These states were thought to be transit points for Boko Haram groups.²⁴ Another state of emergency was declared by the same administration on May 13, 2012, in the states of Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe. Extra security forces were sent to the area to fortify the endeavors made by the military to recover Nigeria's worldwide security profile, battered by the Boko Haram danger.²⁵

Extension of Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and Lake Chad Basin Commission in 2012

One of the singular initiatives taken by the Nigerian government in partnership with neighboring nations to enhance its international security profile

is the extension of the MNJTF and the Lake Chad Basin Commission to combat the Boko Haram threat. Nigerian, Chadian, Cameroonian, Benin Republic, and Niger security forces make up the Multi-National Joint Task Force. Combating the terrorist group Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin, particularly in Nigeria, was their primary objective. However, their operation did not receive official approval until it was authorized by the African Union (A.U.) in 2014.²⁶

Despite this effort, the international community continued to condemn Nigeria's security situation at the end of 2012, describing it as "spiraling violence" in the Human Rights Watch Report.²⁷ Nigeria's international security profile was shaped by this, and at the end of 2012, the Global Terrorism Index ranked Nigeria as the seventh most terrorized state in the world.

4.1.6 Implementation of the National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST) in 2014

The Goodluck Ebele Jonathan administration created NACTEST to combat the growing threat posed by Boko Haram and raise Nigeria's international profile. In April 2014, it was considered for implementation as a policy framework for counter-terrorism.²⁸ The national CT strategy is developed around five main work streams, each with specific medium and long-term objectives. The five pillars include:

ForeSTALL, Secure, Identify, Prepare and Implement:

- a. ForeSTALL aims at reducing the risk of radicalization;

- b. Secure entails the process of raising the security posture of the country in the face of terrorist threats;
- c. Identify aims at pre-emption through detection, early warning as well as the strengthening of the judicial system;
- d. Prepare seeks to mitigate the risk of terrorist attacks by increasing the capability of the Government to react to such an occurrence; and
- e. Implement, which aims to foster coordination/cooperation at the operational and strategic levels both within and beyond national boundaries.

The frequent deployment of Nigeria Police and Military personnel to the affected states in the Northeast gave the Boko Haram group more access to ammunition as Nigeria's security forces were sometimes overpowered by the group. More so, the frequent declaration of State of Emergency by the administration resulted in civilian isolation and vulnerability, and as a result, many schools were shut-down, markets became closed, most of their major roads were blocked, internal displacement of people increased and Boko Haram attacks became an almost daily activity.

In essence, the various efforts made by Goodluck Ebele Jonathan administration between 2010 and 2015 towards combating the Boko Haram menace were to no avail as they did not yield any significant positive results. In 2012, 2014, and 2015, Nigeria was ranked 7th, 4th, and 3rd respectively in the list of the most terrorized countries in the world by the Global Terrorism Index (GTI). More so, Security Threats Index (STI) rated Nigeria 10th, 12th, 11th, 11th, 7th, and 5th in 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015 respectively in the list of the

most security-threatened countries in the world.³⁰ Similarly, Global Peace Index (GPI) rated Nigeria 137th, 142nd, 146th, 148th, 151st, and 151st in 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015 respectively in the ranking of peaceful and secured countries in the world^{31 -38}.

In a nutshell, all the foregoing rankings gathered from various annual global security index reports revealed that the efforts of the Goodluck Ebele Jonathan regime towards combating the Boko Haram menace did not improve Nigeria's status in the annual global security rankings between 2010 and 2015.

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CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 CONCLUSION

This study is intended to analyze the effect of Boko Haram terrorist exercises on the Nigerian state and the reactions of the Nigerian government. The investigation reveals that Boko Haram has left many problems in Nigeria and that its formation was intended to introduce Sharia law. However, the terrorist organization's actions and reality do not reflect their primary goal. It would appear that they are accomplishing political, personal, and selfish objectives under the guise of religion.

The group's atrocities resulted in the loss of billions of Naira in property, the displacement of millions of people, and the deaths of thousands of people, including suicide bombings, the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), shootings, and targeted assassinations. The group still holds control of large areas in the Lake Chad region. The difficulties posed by the insurgent group include not only the brutality of the terror campaigns or the sect's stated goal of establishing an Islamic State but also confusion regarding the precise causes of the violence. There is still no exact cause of this insurgency. The high rates of poverty, unemployment, low literacy, youth idleness, out-of-school children (including the Almajiri phenomena), bad governance, and the region's religious and political views are all possible causes.

In a society ravaged by armed conflict in the form of incessant violent attacks, and bombings of people, investments, and infrastructure, there is no meaningful development. This is a fundamental fact and for a nation like Nigeria, which is endowed with enormous deposits of natural resources, to reap the benefits of those resources, peace, and security must be maintained. Because it is specifically connected to the shores of the Lake Chad Basin and is bounded by Niger, Cameroon, and Chad, the North-East region is an important location for business ventures and economic transformation that could be beneficial to the entire nation. As a result, sustainable security and peace processes and a package that could allow businesses in the region must be used to address the past and ongoing destruction of the region's businesses and economic activities.

Government forces and local security actors like the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) need to ensure the safety of farmers, marketers, fishermen, and other businesses in the region to boost the region's economy. Bribe collection by the security forces along roads and highways of the region must be addressed to encourage businesses and prices of the existing commodities and services should be stabilized. Banks should be asked to open more branches, increase their hours of operation, and make sure they have enough employees to promote economic activity in areas where security has improved, like state capitals. The aid organizations working in the region should improve their support around

agricultural and entrepreneurship-based projects and programs, as this will continue to boost the economy of the area.

5.2 RECOMMENDATION

Based on the findings, this research work recommends the following:

1. Instead of chasing Boko Haram members to each other's borders, the Nigerian government must urgently integrate its resources and militarily collaborate with neighbouring nations to completely end their activities. They will be able to eliminate the Boko Haram group in their subregion thanks to this.
2. The Nigerian government must initiate and implement policies that will provide employment opportunities for the nation's army of unemployed youth, Boko Haram will be less likely to recruit idle individuals as a result of this.
3. Instead of working from the Federal Capital Territory (Abuja), Nigerian legislators should work part-time jobs directly from their senatorial districts and constituencies. They will be able to experience the direct effects of terrorism in the communities, particularly in North-East Nigeria, as a result of this, and they will be able to propose an urgent and immediate solution to the problem.
4. To prevent the country from over-relying on imported military hardware, which has hampered the operation and may continue to hamper similar

military operations elsewhere, Nigeria needs to channel more funds into the country's military industry.

5. Sufficient moral help and government assistance ought to likewise be made accessible to officials and men of the Nigerian military, particularly those at the front of the activity against Boko Haram. Videos and audios from the front lines that have been leaked show that Nigerian soldiers are generally dissatisfied with their treatment due to neglect, corruption, and the misuse of funds meant for their welfare.
6. For any theoretical consideration, Boko Haram as a group provides an intriguing insight into the development of terrorist organizations. It provides a fertile ground for a serious academic discourse that would be distinct from this paper because the patterns of its evolution are distinct.

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