

**AN ASSESSMENT OF NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY PRESIDENT
MUHAMMED BUHARI, 2015-2023**

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**A PROJECT SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND
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CERTIFICATION

This is to certify this project was carried out by **OGECHUKWU IRENE IBEH** in the Department of History and International Studies, University of Benin, under my supervision.

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Date

Date

DEDICATION

To God Almighty for his loving kindness and affections towards me; giving me life, good health and strengths to deliver this project.

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Sincerely, from the depth of my heart, I want to appreciate God Almighty for keeping me this far, the inspiration and strength and for been my source of hope. I am also grateful to my project supervisor, Dr. O. Oriakhi for her kind patient and constructive correction in the course of this work. Also special thanks goes to my Head of Department Prof. J. C. Nwaka.

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CHAPTER ONE

BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

Introduction

The international system is symbiotic in nature, leading to the notion that no country can exist as an island. Since Nigeria gained independence and became in charge of its internal and external affairs, this showcase that Nigeria became a participating and active member of international system.¹ The rise and birth of Nigeria Foreign policy became inevitable. The pursuit of an Afrocentric foreign policy, with goals of emerging as Africa's foremost state, has continued to guide Nigeria's foreign policy aspirations to date.² However, Nigeria's efforts have been truncated by certain challenges which arise from poor leadership, corruption, developmental hindrances, the country's image crisis, ineffective representation of Nigerians in diaspora, and the seeming lack of will to engage the principles of reciprocity as it relates to its external relations.³ In a bid to restore the domestic and external environment of Nigeria; President Muhammadu Buhari took over the mantle of Nigeria's leadership from President Goodluck Jonathan and immediately undertook so many diplomatic visits as President-elect even before his official inauguration. After his being sworn-in on May 29, 2015, he undertook more visits to further launder the image of the country and diversify her foreign revenue sources.⁴ It

is against this backdrop, this study examines an assessment of Nigeria's foreign policy under President Muhammedu Buhari, 2015-2023.

From independence, when Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa pursued a non-aligned foreign policy with a mix of Afro-centrism, the country had been atrophied by the Nigerian civil war under Yakubu Gowon between 1966-1975. As expected and in continuation of the policy of Afro-centrism, the Muritala Mohammed and Olusegun Obasanjo's regime between 1975 and 1979 pursued a radical foreign policy aimed at emancipating African states from the clutches of apartheid and colonialism.⁵ During Ibrahim Babangida's regime from 1985 to 1993, the country's foreign policy took a sharp turn by being primarily pro-western, which led to the acceptance and the domestication of the International Monetary Fund-led Structural Adjustment Programme and economic diplomacy in Nigeria.⁶

On the other hand, Sani Abacha chose to pursue an isolationist foreign policy from 1993 to 1998, resulting, ultimately, in Nigeria's trifling engagement with the rest of the world. Olusegun Obasanjo's regime from 1999-2007 decided to re-open Nigeria to the world after the isolationist policy of the Sani Abacha government's military junta. Olusegun Obasanjo's foreign policy was hinged on shuttle diplomacy which was aimed at economic relations, shared development and cooperation. On the other hand, Umaru Musa Yar'Adua and Goodluck Jonathan's foreign policy was open, and encouraged harmonious and liberal relations with other countries around the

world.⁷ Their strategy was also complemented by the efficacy of citizen diplomacy. Muhammadu Buhari's foreign policy between 2015 to 2019 was also hinged on improving relations with neighbors and maintaining ties with the United States and China among other countries in the world.

As a Head of Government under a military government, General Buhari pursued a radical foreign policy which led confrontation with Nigerian neighbours. President Buhari assumed shuttle diplomacy with several different states immediately after assuming office in 2015. He was referred to as "Jet-Setting President". This was attributed mainly to the fact that he spent a quarter of his first 100 days in office in different states across the world. The president, upon inauguration, assumed the obligation of being Nigeria's chief diplomat and foreign policy officer in order to re-launch Nigeria into the international community. This is mostly attributed to the international environment Buhari found himself.⁸ This situation was characterized by dwindling oil prices, terrorism and counter-terrorism wars, nuclear deals and neoliberalism among others. It is on premises of the aforesaid that this study seeks to understand the change of foreign policy direction of president Muhammad Buhari civilian regime between 2015 and 2023. And, more specifically, it attempts to understand the nature of Nigerian foreign relations under president Muhammadu Buhari's civilian administration between 2015 and 2023; the purpose Nigerian foreign policy under president Muhammadu Buhari's civilian administration between 2015-

2023; Nigerian strategic relations with other states; and, finally, the positive and negative outcomes of Nigerian foreign relations under President Muhammadu Buhari's administration within the period under study.

Aim and Objectives

The aim of the study is to examine the socio-economic and political impact of Nigeria's foreign policy under President Muhammadu Buhari administration.

- i. examines the historical antecedence of Nigeria's foreign policy.
- ii. examines the nature and operational mode of President Muhammadu Buhari administration foreign policy posture.
- iii. examines socio-economic impact of President Muhammadu Buhari administration foreign policy posture.
- iv. examines the challenges faced by President Muhammadu Buhari administration foreign policy posture.

Scope of the Study

The study will cover the effects of President Muhammadu Buhari administration foreign policy on economic, trade and investment, socio-cultural and socio-political activities, from 2016 to 2023.

Methodology

The reliability and authenticity of any research are contingent upon the methodology employed, particularly the systematic procedures for gathering,

processing, and analyzing data. This research adopts a historical research methodology, and throughout the study, data will be sourced from secondary sources.

Secondary Sources: This project shall rely on secondary sources. These sources include textbooks, academic journals, articles, newspapers, and documentaries. These will be sourced from the Internet, and online libraries.

Literature Review

There is much academic work on the impacts of Nigeria's foreign policy. There are however, certain literatures that deal with the outcome of the Buhari administration's foreign policy posture, to start with is

Adebisi, Pius Ademola "*Nigeria's Foreign Policy under Buhari's Administration, 2015-2019: An Analysis of Achievements and Challenges*,"⁹ posits that the Nigerian foreign policy under the Buhari's Administration, 2015-2019, has been subjected to public scrutiny like other spheres of governance under the Administration. Having taken a critical look at the Administration's foreign policy forays, some critics have come to the conclusion that the Buhari's foreign policy during his first term as a democratic leader was not only colorless, but also lacked in substance. The author therefore concluded and recommended that, for the country to be a vibrant international player, its political leaders must intensify the efforts to rebuild the country's economy through diversification; project its image on the global

stage; play leadership roles where necessary especially in West Africa and Africa and fight corruption.¹⁰

Aishatu Aminu Haruna work titled “*The Conduct of Foreign Policy as a Pursuit of National Interest: A Focus on President Buhari’s Foreign Policy Initiatives 2015 – 2018*,”¹¹ examines President Buhari’s foreign policy initiatives vis-à-vis his stated domestic objectives in the last three years. The author asserts to what extent has this foreign policy directives been determined by the domestic environment and how much has it impacted positively on the internal objectives. The author further reiterated that the foreign policy of any sovereign nation is essentially the gamut of her relations with other countries and international organizations aimed at actualizing her national domestic objectives however defined. President Muhammadu Buhari assumed office as an elected civilian President of Nigeria on May 29, 2015 on the promises of restoring internal security hat had severely deteriorated particularly in the North Eastern part of the country as a result of the insurgency of Boko Haram; fighting corruption which has almost become a way of life in the country; and revamping the economy that was facing a serious crisis as a result of the fall in the international price of crude oil the nation’s economic livewire.¹²

Akumah Brown Ihechiluru, work titled “*Nigeria’s Foreign Policy under President Muhammedu Buhari’s Administration: A Critical Analysis*,”¹³ The work is an overview of “Nigeria’s foreign policy under President Muhammadu Buhari’s

administration: a critical analysis”. It undertakes a conceptual clarification of foreign policy and explains foreign policy to mean the extension of the national interest of a state which it pursues in her relations with other countries in international arena. The specific objectives of the work were to sought whether economic determine the foreign policy of Buhari’s administration; whether security determine the foreign policy of Buhari’s administration and whether corruption determines the foreign policy of Buhari’s administration. This work adopted Structural–Functional theory. The author concludes that Nigeria should restructure and look inward in her foreign policy calculation in their economic and human empowerment in international arena, to make Nigeria a free corrupt nation, boost her country economy and reposition the Nigeria security apparatus towards facilitating national security, regional integration and bilateral relationship with the rest of the world.¹⁴

Olawale Olufemi Akinrinde, “*Nigerian Foreign Policy under President Muhammadu Buhari: A Reflection*,”¹⁵ asserts that President Buhari, on assumption of duty, inherited a battered Nigerian foreign policy and national imagery. The recurring issues of terrorism, kidnapping, banditry, and more prevalently, national corruption dealt the Nigerian foreign policy and external relations a great blow. The culmination of the implications of the aforementioned national issues and contradictions for Nigerian foreign policy came in the wake of most developed states’ refusal to sell ammunitions to the Nigerian government in its counterinsurgency and anti-terrorism

campaigns. Relying on descriptive qualitative research technique, the author critically examines the extent to which the prevailing internal national paralysis had affected Nigerian foreign policy and external relations under President Muhammadu Buhari's administration between 2015 and 2019. Findings elicited through In-depth and Key Informant Interviews and analyzed thematically through content analysis, further reveal that Nigerian foreign policy under President Muhammadu Buhari has been heavily counter-productive as exemplified in previous administrations.¹⁶

Bello, Ismail, *"An Appraisal of President Muhammadu Buhari's First Term Foreign Policy Agenda,"*¹⁷ The author appraise how the administration has performed in its first term from 2015-2019 with regard to these three cardinal foreign policy principles. The research found that President Buhari's trips across the world capital are in tandem with the administration's foreign policy goals for the implication on national development. Considerable effort has been made towards the fight against insurgency by raising a multinational coalition to tackle the menace of terrorism, which had negatively affected Nigeria's image on the International scene. This was made possible with collaboration with Chad, Cameroon and Niger to form Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) which played an important role in degrading Boko Haram Insurgency. As for economic development, the president's trip to China has brought about considerable infrastructural development and Foreign Direct Investment from other world capitals, which help the government in exiting the

recession. The author concluded that there is a need for the administration to follow up on agreements signed during this foreign trip to engender national development effectively.¹⁸

Lysa D.A. Boma, “*Nigerian Foreign Policy and Global Image: A Critical Assessment of Goodluck Jonathan’s Administration*,”¹⁹ examines whether or not Nigeria’s foreign policy under former President Jonathan contributed in improving the image of Nigeria globally. The author reveals that Nigeria's foreign policy over the years has been greatly sabotaged by inconsistencies and ambiguities. The findings also shows article that more than external challenges, it is the internal challenges that are dampening Nigeria's attainment of positive international image and national transformation. The author therefore recommended that major reorganization of the Foreign Service such that positions of the Ambassadors and other key positions will no longer be politicized and the government should integrate professional international public relations practitioners in its interaction with the international community in order to effectively boost the global image of the nation.²⁰

Saadu Adamu Adamu & Muhammad Abdullahi, “*Foreign Policy and National Interest: A Case of Nigeria’s Role in Commonwealth of Nations*,”²¹ examines the participatory role of Nigeria in Commonwealth as dictated and guided by her national interest. The authors observes that Nigeria-Commonwealth relations affect the nation’s foreign policy objectives in variety of ways as reflected in decolonization,

anti-apartheid struggle, defense, trade and investment, scientific and technological support and research, democratization, human rights, political crises, tackling corruption among others. The authors therefore conclude that for Nigeria to manifest and assert her true status in the international system in order to actualize her core national interest, she must be able to harness her numerous human and natural endowments for sustainable development and stability.²²

Hysaint Eiguedo-Okoeeguale, “*The Dynamics of Cultural Diplomacy: A Discourse of Indo-Nigerian Socio-cultural Relations from the 1960s to the Present*,”²³ interrogates the dynamics of cultural diplomacy and focuses on the socio-cultural aspect of Indo-Nigerian diplomacy. The author argues that since the beginning of the relations between Nigeria and India, the social contacts have been on the increase thereby reinforcing cultural diplomacy and establishes that as creations of British colonial rule, both countries possess certain social and cultural legacies that foster unity between them. The author argues that culture works as an element that can be projected beyond national boundaries as an instrument of diplomacy. The article provides an opportunity to explore the common heritage of the two countries and how the heritage influences and shapes the contours of their foreign policy goals. It is organised in five parts excluding the introduction and conclusion. The first part explores the concept of culture and cultural life in India and Nigeria. The second examined cultural identity and national interest, while the third aspect focused on

advancing national interest through culture. The fourth and fifth parts discussed Nigerian audience and Bollywood as well as the impact of Bollywood on Nigerian literature.²⁴

Oluyemi O. Fayomi, in his work titled *“Nigeria’s National Image and Her Foreign Policy: An Exploratory Approach”*²⁵ Appraises the relationship between Nigeria’s national image and her foreign policy since independence. In doing this, He embarked on a historical and analytical examination of the contradictions that are embedded in Nigeria’s foreign policy and their fundamental link to the country’s domestic crisis. The author later observes that Nigeria’s foreign policy over the years has been grossly sabotaged and undermined by image crisis both nationally and internationally. He also argues that Nigeria’s role expectations at different “concentric circles” of her foreign policy have generated multiple role perceptions, thus leading to unintended role conflict. The direct implication of this is confusion and dissonance in the domestic institutional and constitutional mechanisms that impel foreign policy formulation and implementation. Consequently, the author concludes that resolution of the distortions embedded in the country’s foreign policy is the only panacea to resolving her national and international image crisis. It therefore, canvasses an imperative need for Nigeria to transform her convoluted foreign policy, redirect her diplomatic compass and re-align her foreign policy architecture to reflect the demands of a globalizing world.²⁶

As a matter of fact, the existing literatures contain a lot of gaps that this study will fill. For instance, the existing literature, though talk about the nature of the dynamics of foreign policy in Nigeria since inception; they fail to examine the manifestations cultural diplomacy under President Muhammedu Buhari Administration; 2016 - 2023. Therefore, this study will fill in the gaps in the existing knowledge of the manifestations and impact of Nigeria's foreign policy under President Muhammedu Buhari Administration, 2016 – 2023.

CHAPTER OUTLINE

CHAPTER ONE: BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

This chapter examines the blue print of the entire research work; this chapter covers the introduction, aim and objectives, scope of the study, methodology, literature review, chapter outline and endnotes

CHAPTER TWO: BREIF HISTORY OF NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY

This chapter surveys the historical antecedence of Nigerian foreign policy. The chapter examines the various administrations of Nigeria head of state and how their foreign policy posture influences the socio-political and economic activities of the Nigeria state.

CHAPTER THREE: FOREIGN POLICY UNDER PRESIDENT MUHAMMADU BUHARI

This chapter inspects the historical background of President Muhammadu Buhari foreign policy posture and how he influences the foreign direct investment on the Nigerian economy.

CHAPTER FOUR: SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT PRESIDENT MUHAMMADU BUHARI FOREIGN POLICY

This chapter examines the socio-economic impact of President Muhammadu Buhari foreign policy, the chapter identify the impact of President Muhammadu Buhari foreign policy on infrastructure, construction of railway line, exportation of goods and services and others numerous to mention

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

This chapter gives a general overview of the entire research work. The chapter first identify the summary of the study and later conclusion the work with the gap which the research will fill.

Endnotes

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26. Ibid., 182.

CHAPTER TWO

BREIF HISTORY OF NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY

This chapter is an attempt to investigate the historical development of Nigeria's foreign policy. Nigeria's foreign Policy since independence has not experienced noticeable changes in its core principles and objectives. What is noteworthy is the *modus operandi* employed by succeeding governments in the country.¹ At the very best, such continuities and discontinuities are cyclical, oscillating back, and forth in consonance with the dictates of peculiar circumstances both internal and external under which each succeeding administration in the country had to operate.²

Nigerian Foreign Policy 1960-1966

Since the country's independence in 1960, Nigeria's foreign policy has been officially different in terms of method of formulation, implementation, character traits and style of political leaders and composition and extent of involvement of various stakeholders, as well as the domestic and international situations and circumstances that they had to deal with. With respect to the 1960-1966 period, it is difficult for anyone to say that the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) played a creative role in foreign policy formulation.³ Aluko observed that the MEA was no more than a mere administrative machinery for Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. Balewa

retained sole control of foreign affairs from independence till July 1961 and again from December 1964 till the January 1966 military coup. Even after Mr. Jaja Wachukwu had been appointed External Affairs Minister, the Prime Minister continued to remain a super-Foreign Minister exercising full and constant control over foreign affairs in a manner that had no parallel in any parliamentary system.⁴

Nigerian Foreign Policy 1966-1975

Under Gowon's regime (July 29, 1966 till July 29, 1975), the country did not appear to have a well-articulated foreign policy. Even though the country's presence and impact in international politics during this regime was fully engaged, especially after the outbreak of the war, the regime however did not have the touch of drama that underlined Murtala's, but was certainly effective given its set objectives all of which bothered on enhancing Nigeria's global status and respectability.⁵ Of the foreign policy style of General Gowon, Joe Garba commented, who emerged as Foreign Minister in the post-Gowon government, One of the things that bothered of General Gowon's style was personalization of Nigeria's diplomacy "the Ministry of External Affairs seemed to have been frequently bypassed. Selected cases in point to substantiate Joe Garba's assertion includes how General Gowon spent lavishly to please Nigeria's neighbours; bestowed largess on countries even as far away as Grenada and Guyana often without regard for or recourse to consultation, unilateral

recognition of MPLA in 1975 without much consultation as the Ministry was effectively sidelined.⁶

The Period of Astonishing Dynamism in Nigeria's Foreign Policy 1975 – 1979

This period is often characterized by scholars as the golden period in Nigeria's foreign policy". On 29 July, 1975 Brigadier Murtala Ramat Mohammed assumed the leadership of Nigeria through a bloodless coup. Previously he was the minister of communications in Gowon's Government. Mohammed was known to be a bold soldier. His administration was dramatic and vigorous from beginning to end. As a precursor to a vibrant foreign policy, the Mohammed Regime embarked on a cleaning exercise domestically, intended to rid Nigeria of rotten eggs that populated the civil service.⁷ The Nigerian novelist of international repute, Chinua Achebe in tribute to the dynamism of the new leader enthused.

The new ruler's reputation for ruthlessness was sufficient to transform in the course of only one Nigeria, the style and habit of Nigeria's unruly capital. That character of one man could establish that quantum change in a people's social behaviour was nothing less than miraculous. But it shows that social miracles can happen.⁸

To put the Nigerian foreign policy on a new pedestal, the administration set up a committee with the membership drawn from the universities, the mass media and the military to reassess Nigeria's foreign policy system, substance and apparatus. At the end of the exercise, no new foreign policy objectives and principles different from

what Balewa government had put in place came on stream. However, the overall policy dynamics were overhauled.⁹

The Angolan crisis provided the leadership with the opportunity to demonstrate their new orientation in Nigeria's foreign policy. As Dauda avers, antecedent to the Angolan crisis was that Portugal withdrew from Angola in November 1975 without an established central government in Angola. There nationalists groups: the popular movement for the Liberation of Angola, MPLA, the National Front for the Liberation of Angola, FNLA, National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, UNITA , all competing to capture political power. The Angolan crisis was inherited by the Muhammed's administration and for four and half months, it continued with the policy of Gowon's administration in trying to reconcile the three nationalist groups to form a national government. Pressure from two different directions mounted on the government. The United States government wanted Nigeria to maintain its neutrality and to support the moves for a national government, and from Nigeria, citizens both within and outside government circles wanted the government to recognize the MPLA. General Mohammed published the text of what he regarded as President "Ford's (of America) overbearing directives to the Head of State".¹¹ He equally, pushed the text of a replay to the United States, rejecting completely this fatuous attempt by the Ford administration to insult the intelligence of African nations and scorn the dignity of the Blackman. Nigeria backed

the MPLA and gave the movement “13.5 Million Naira” and military supplies to the MPLA government and galvanized diplomatic support among African States on behalf of MPLA.¹²

Ibok and Akinyemi note that the Nigerian foreign policy which dramatically became radical brought Nigeria on a coalition course with the United States, to the extent that, twice, Henry Kissinger, the then United State’s Secretary of State was refused permission to visit Nigeria. The diplomatic pressure mounted by Nigeria resulted in victory for the Nigerian position at the 1976 Extra – Ordinary Summit of the OAU held in Addis – Ababa to discuss the Angolan problem. The way and manner the Angolan crisis was handled demonstrated that there was a change in both the style and context of Nigeria’s foreign policy.¹³

First, there was no attempt to wait for an OAU consensus to emerge before taking a decision. Nigeria was prepared to declare a position on an issue and lobby to create an African consensus around that position. Secondary, Nigeria was prepared to confront the United State over an African issue, an unprecedented feat for Nigeria’s foreign policy. Thirdly, the open grant of financial and military assistance to the MPLA marked a radical break from past experience where such aid was small and not openly given. It also marked the escalation of the confrontational involvement of Nigerian in Southern Africa.

From the Angolan decision flowed other decisions. In 1975 Nigeria barred the annual meeting of the international press scheduled for Lagos because it admitted white delegates from South Africa. Furthermore, there was active involvement in the Zimbabwean crisis. This resulted to the recognition of the patriotic front which was allowed to open an office in Lagos. South – West African People’s Organization, SWAPO was also allowed to open an office in Lagos.¹⁴ The leader of the Soweto Students Representative Council Tsei Machimini came to take up permanent residence in Lagos. The net effect of all these was that Nigeria became the Mecca for Liberation fighters in Africa. The assassination of Muhammed in an abortive coup on February 13, 1976 did not brought about a change in Nigeria’s foreign policy. His successor, Lt. General Olusegun Obasanjo, had earlier in a maiden speech promised to maintain the status quo. He kept his words. When Nigeria realized that the British Petroleum (Britain then under prime minister, Margret Thatcher) was selling oil to South Africa, Nigeria Nationalized the outfit, renaming it African Petroleum; the Barclays Bank was also renamed Union Bank. This decision was also in consonant with the recalcitrance of Britain over the Rhodesian question in which Britain was opposed to changes that were to lead to a truly Rhodesian independence. This period also coincided with the leading position of Nigeria against the apartheid regime in South Africa. To assert her position, Nigeria led the withdrawal of Africa countries from the Montreal Olympics in 1976 in protest against the participation of New

Zealand which had sporting link with South Africa. Nigeria, Otubanjo notes, also hosted the first international conference in Africa on action against Apartheid in Lagos in 1977.¹⁵ Under Murtala Muhammed/Otubanjo regime, Nigeria assumed the role of her manifest destiny in Africa. The period was indeed Nigeria's shining movements in her foreign policy. This was because the country influenced events in Africa South of the Sahara, being widely consulted by respectable world leaders.

Nigeria's Foreign Policy down the Valley

On first October, 1979, the Military handed over the mantle of leadership to Civilians under the Presidency of Alhaji Usman Shehu Shagari. It is widely postulated that foreign policy under Shagari's administration was unacceptable and abysmally low. Nigeria practically dropped her radical posture in the pursuit of foreign policy. Many factors were said to be responsible for this:

The oil crisis of 1981 made it necessary for the government to strengthen and deepened its relations with the Western powers. This was imperative to reschedule debts and maintain the credit lines open.¹⁶

This situation remained so because domestically, the opposition was not well coordinated and hence strong enough to change the hands of the government on its chosen foreign policy.... This had serious implications for the conduct of the country's foreign policy. Bassey Ate maintains that, as a result of Nigeria's economic and hence political dependence on the United States and Britain, Nigeria ruling strata

were compelled to identify and comply with Western position with regard to Africa, thereby jeopardizing the national as well as collective African interest.

The situation was such that Nigeria became an effective instrument in the hands of the West used to divide African opinion on major African issues. The Chadian crisis is which Nigeria played along with the West readily comes to mind. Before Shagari took over power from Obasanjo, the latter's administration had waded into the crisis, mediating for peaceful end to the crisis. Shagari's administration changed the course and sent troops to Chad, but later withdrew the troops without achieving any substantial results, it was afterward discovered that the withdrawal was influenced by the West. Libya which moved in with troops to savage the situation was later frustrated by Nigeria:

The plan to frustrate Chadian/Libyan merger through the aegis of the OAU was reinforced by efforts at the wider diplomatic levels. The then Foreign Minister professor Ishaya Audu visited France on 26 January, 1981 and cried to correlate Nigeria's Chadian Policy with that of France. During the visit the Foreign Minister attacked the Libyan presence in Chad, as posing security threat to Africa and suggested that France and Nigeria should coordinate their objectives and pool resources.... Nigeria, the Minister disclosed was in regular contact with other anti – Libyan State such as Sudan and Egypt. He denounced Libyan demand that French troops should withdraw from African States such as Central African Republic, Senegal and Gabon, insisting that such troops were there on the invitation of those governments and affirmed that Nigeria was interested in cooperating with Finance in the field of Ministry equipment and nuclear power.¹⁷

African problems were no longer to be solved by Africans as envisaged by Gowon and later reaffirmed by Muhammed and Obasanjo. This was to have a devastating consequence on Nigeria, as Africa countries hitherto dreadful of Nigeria soon began to regard the country with contempt. Cameroon demonstrated this disrespect when according to Dauda (2006:46); on May 16, 1981 Nigeria was shocked with the sad announcement that five Nigeria Soldiers on routine patrol duties on the Nigeria – Cameroon borders along the Akpa Yafi River in Cross River State were ambushed and killed by Cameroonian gendarmes. Cameroon did not offer apology to Nigeria, and in spite of the public outrage the Shagari administration only demanded a within 7-day apology from Cameroonian government, with the alibi that Nigerian government response to the predicament was consistent with the nation character of the country's African policy. Shagari however did not explain to Nigerians whether the country's foreign policy was to allow Nigerians slew by her neighbors with impunity.

But Shagari contradicted himself when in January, 1983, perhaps, because of the biting economic crisis decided to expel three million illegal alien largely Africans from Nigeria. Expectedly, Nigeria received the most vicious condemnation from across Africa. Most bizarre was the hash response even from the West. The little effort made by the Shagari administration to lead a global crusade for reparation was

resented because Nigeria had already fallen into diplomatic doldrums and her voice was no longer much respected in the international arena.¹⁸

General Muhammadu Buhari, (1983-1985)

General Muhammadu Buhari, (1983-1985) had an unyielding personality and was responsible for the contempt with which Nigeria was treated in the West Africa sub-region as well as the disdain Britain evidently had for the country in that period. Undoubtedly, General Buhari drove his own personal idiosyncrasy (as a tough-minded and disciplined military officer) to the extremes, forgetting that diplomacy is a delicate game of esoteric rules and procedures by which other countries understand and accept a country's views and the projection of its interests.¹⁹ It was therefore not surprising that Nigeria got a lot of bad publicity from around the world and particularly her neighbours for his actions. This ranged from seizure and detention of a British aircraft and its passengers and crew in a diplomatic tit-for-tat for the reason that the Buhari government was incensed by Britain's involvement in the attempted abduction of Alhaji Umaru Dikko from London, a Nigerian political exile accused of having threatened to attack the Buhari government, closure of Nigeria's land borders and refusal to reopen them in spite of repeated entreaties from concerned Nigerians and neighbouring states that were hardest hit by the policy, and expulsion of millions of West Africans in 1985 who were declared illegal aliens.²⁰

These decisions were out of tune with the declared Concentric Circles framework enunciated by his Foreign Minister, Agboola Gambari, which underscored Nigeria's foreign policy as giving priority to relations with Nigeria's neighbours. The iron-will of General Buhari prevailed on virtually all issues and thus denied the country's foreign policy of the expertise and finesse that Professor Gambari (an acclaimed expert in International Relations) could have brought into it. The MFA was put aside in major decisions and was often left to do the necessary damage control after the government would have already taken and implemented bad decisions. Friday Okai, Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abuja, in line with the above reported that in both military and civilian administrations, counterbalancing forces cease initiation in formulation of foreign policy and only depend on the Ministry for implementation.²¹

General Ibrahim Babangida foreign Policy

General Ibrahim Babangida, military President from 1985 to 1993, appointed Professor Bolaji Akinyemi, who was reputed for his immense intellectual acumen and practical experience in International Relations, as External Affairs Minister. General Babangida allowed Professor Akinyemi the latitude to work because he apparently needed him to help boost the country's diminished prestige and to bring international credibility to the junta's foreign policy.²² General Babangida, alongside the MFA, was involved in securing Namibia's independence; sustaining Angola in its war to

consolidate her independence; paving the way for the realization of majority rule and final dismantling of apartheid in South Africa; quelling the crisis in the Liberian civil war; re-establishing diplomatic relations with Israel broken in 1973; attending to war-torn Liberia and the Sierra Leone crisis reinstating deposed President Ahmed T. Kabbah to power. However, once General Babangida consolidated his grip on power, he promptly relieved Akinyemi of his post and took effective control of the direction of foreign policy by appointing people who were more amenable to his own vision into the post. Ambassadors Amedu, Obisakin and Okai in explaining why General Babangida allowed his first Foreign Minister such latitude for initiative, observed that the military by training and orientation deals less with politics or international relations. According to Okai, “foreign policy is not their strong point, it was just recently introduced in their curriculum hence conventionally the military had depended on the public service (MFA) for advice and guidance”. Ambassador Omogiade added that although the military worked closely with the MEA, the personality of military political heads somehow predominantly impacted foreign policy decision-making and implementation.²³ In contrast, Fawole averred that since powers to make decisions were unregulated and unchecked by any law or constitution, the military ran foreign policy as they chose.

General Sani Abacha (1993-1998) Foreign Policy

Under General Sani Abacha (1993-1998), foreign policy was crudely mishandled. Due to his extreme personalization of decision-making, Abacha rendered organizations and institutions (including the MFA) literally impotent and irrelevant. His personal stubbornness prevailed in policies and he executed a reactive foreign policy. The regime was incapable of foreseeing the devastating effects of some of its decisions, such as the hanging and its timing of the "Ogoni nine" just before that year's Commonwealth summit. These diplomatic blunders happened because General Abacha underrated the importance of consultations with the MFA. Abacha's ignorance was further demonstrated in appointing an acrimonious and combative Tom Ikimi, to replace a veteran career diplomat, Alhaji Baba Gana Kingibe as Foreign Minister. Tom Ikimi is reported to have frequently shunned the advice of experienced Foreign Service officers of the MFA and functioned as a rubberstamp to General Abacha's wishes, evidently because he lacked capacity to provide useful policy advice.²⁴

General Abdulsalami Abubakar Foreign Policy

General Abdulsalami Abubakar (June 1998-May 1999) was more amenable to advice even though he enjoyed similar authoritarian powers that military rule could confer. He appointed a career diplomat, Ignatius Ollisemeka as Foreign Minister whom he allowed the latitude to apply knowledge and expertise to garner goodwill for Nigeria. By means of his competence, the international community started to

warm up to Nigeria again. President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua (May 2007-May 2010) was largely a very reclusive and quiet President who also was not physically healthy during most of his time in office. This meant that the Presidency did not play a very strong role in foreign affairs. Ufot Inamete argued that A non-adequately assertive leadership of the MFA also meant that the Ministry was not able to use the low key role of the Presidency to play strong roles in the foreign affairs. Also the low-key executive role logically meant low-key legislative role.³⁷

Conclusion

The fundamental principles and objectives of Nigeria's foreign policy invented by the first Prime Minister of Nigeria, Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, have remained unaltered irrespective of the rapid turnover of governments. Although Nigeria has had civilian administrations, it was the first time that the nation was witnessing more than a decade of civilian rule at a stretch. Both the Civilian and Military governments have pursued foreign policy objectives with different emphasis. The difference between civilian and military regimes in pursuit of the foreign policy goals is clear.

The Balewa, Shagari, Babangida, Abubakar, Obasanjo, and by extension, Yar'Adua all could be lumped together as governments whose foreign policy pursuits lacked the expected bite, although Obasanjo's Presidency stands out in the category. Gowon, Muhammed/Obasanjo, Buhari and Abacha had more assertive foreign policy

pursuit with each taken a different course. The Gowon, and Muhammed/Obasanjo regimes' pundits had it that the enormous oil wealth that Nigeria suddenly got swallowed into largely accounted for the foreign policy vigour. Buhari's regime was cut short. Abacha operated under a hostile internal and external environment, yet he braved all odds. What has, however, remained intriguing about Abacha is that one only wished he were alive to accomplish his mission in the midst of the intense antagonistic global milieu, which he had to grapple with.

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CHAPTER THREE

FOREIGN POLICY UNDER PRESIDENT MUHAMMADU BUHARI

The nature of Buhari's foreign policy is more of Afro-centric rather than global since Nigeria has made Africa the center piece of her foreign policy under president Buhari, especially through economic incorporation within the auspices of ECOWAS.¹ During his campaign for election to the presidency, Muhammadu Buhari promised to confront head-on three primary issue of insecurity (Boko Haram Insurgency and Banditry), corruption and economic underdevelopment.²

Prior to his election as president, Boko Haram had taken over large areas of Nigerian land, declaring an Islamic state within the country's borders. Apart from Nigeria, Boko Haram terrorism has taken on a transnational dimension with its presence in Nigeria and other neighboring states. The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), which was tasked with combating the Boko Haram insurgency in the Lake Chad region has been fairly effective despite its efforts to limit Boko Haram's activities in Nigeria.³ With Multinational Joint Task Force member states launching attacks on the group, Boko Haram quickly turned its attention to the neighboring

states for daring to assist Nigeria in the fight against them, thus, giving the Boko Haram operation a worldwide dimension.⁴

The Boko Haram sect, afterwards, overran the MNJTF's stronghold in Baga, Borno State, and went on to commit one of the most horrific crimes against humanity when it killed the residents of Baga town and took charge of the town's economy. On June 3, 2015, President Muhammadu Buhari made his first abroad trip after taking office, to the Niger Republic.⁵ The president of Cameroon also attended the conference, which was part of an Anti-Boko Haram summit aimed at discussing the regional operation against the terrorist group. President Mahammadu Buhari of Nigeria pledged his country's commitment to assisting Nigeria in combating the mounting challenges posed by Boko Haram, which has continued to undermine regional peace and stability. It was also agreed that the MNJTF headquarters be moved from Nigeria to N'Djamena, Chad, and that a Nigerian would be appointed as the organization's commander.⁶ On June 4, 2017, the conference was followed by a visit to Chad, which was followed by a bilateral meeting with President Paul Biya of Cameroon. Despite the fact that the Benin Republic has not been directly affected by the Boko Haram's insurgent activities, Buhari paid a visit to the country, which was reciprocated by Benin President Boni Yayi, who pledged troops to the MNJTF to combat terrorist activities in the country.⁷

According to Onapajo and Waddington, President Buhari's shuttle diplomacy with his West African neighbors played a critical role in limiting Boko Haram's ability to strike in Nigeria and retreat to these neighboring countries as a shield against Nigerian forces. This diplomatic relationship between these ECOWAS states has considerably helped to curtail Boko Haram's activities. President Muhammadu Buhari made it a cardinal objective of his foreign policy to pursue Nigeria's national interest by maintaining good relations with its immediate neighbours.⁸ As a result, Nigerian foreign policy on counter-insurgency under President Buhari's presidency has considerably improved, resulting in the technical containment of the activities of Boko Haram to the Lake Chad region only as against what it used to be before the rise of Buhari's when the terrorist acts of the organization had extended to Nigeria's Federal Capital.⁹

The purpose of Nigerian Foreign Policy under President Muhammadu Buhari

It should be noted here that Nigerian foreign policy under President Muhammadu Buhari has had some aim and motives. Despite the various political interests and social dynamism of Nigerian foreign policy, particularly in relation to Nigerian socio-political problems that have caused the country to remain in a state of perpetual unrest in economic, political, security, and other social aspects of life, the major goal of Nigerian foreign policy, according to Akinbolola, has been to promote her National Interest.¹⁰ Combating Terrorism, Fighting Corruption, and Improving the

Economy were the three cardinal points on which President Buhari based his campaign promises. As previously stated, foreign policy in a democratic government goes through many stages of conception and execution. The main goal of President Buhari's foreign policy is to improve relations with neighbors in order to jointly fight Boko Haram, which has taken on a multinational or transnational dimension, to partner with the US and other world powers in order to support the government in fighting terrorism by providing needed manpower and intelligence, and, most importantly, to improve the economy and fight corruption.¹¹

Bilateral and Multilateral Relations under President Muhammadu Buhari

Findings have further revealed that President Muhammadu Buhari's electoral success can be ascribed, partly, to the prior government's failure to maintain serious bilateral and multilateral relations with other state across the world. The recent political and democratic progress of Nigeria can be linked to President Buhari's condition of obligating bilateral and multilateral relations. In particular, President Muhammadu Buhari, unlike his predecessor, had somewhat better bilateral relations with the United States, despite the enmity between the Obama and Goodluck administrations over the handling of the Boko Haram insurgency, particularly the kidnapping of Chibok girls and military human rights abuses. The Buhari administration began relations between the two states with a high-level diplomatic encounter between Obama and Buhari at the Oval Office on July 20, 2016.¹²

President Barack Obama pledged that the United States will support Nigeria's government in combating Boko Haram's growing danger and combat violent extremism. President Buhari also asked the Obama administration to help the government fight corruption, which has continued to plague the country. He also asked for help in rebuilding the economy, which included energy sector reforms to prevent oil theft. The meeting was followed by a meeting with Vice President Joe Biden, during which it was agreed that the US would assist Nigeria in fighting corruption, ensuring economic stability, and developing policy, with a special focus on Nigeria's northern region, which is the epicenter of the Boko Haram insurgency. The trip also afforded President Buhari opportunity to meet Treasury Secretary, Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch and Bob Work the Deputy Defense Secretary.¹³

With regards to the fight against corruption which forms part of President Buhari's foreign policy, nothing appears to have changed as the United States Department of Justice had filed a civil case for the seizure of \$144 million related to corrupt proceedings by former Nigerian petroleum minister Diezani Alison-Madueke. According to reports, the Department of Justice has charged the former minister and two collaborators, Olajide Omokore and Kola Aluko, of fronting for the former Minister through oil lifting contracts that were handed to them without proper procedure.¹⁴ The Department of Justice is seeking confiscation of these assets in order to help the people who have been victimized by this corrupt activity. According to

Campbell, US government officials saw Buhari's victory as a way to boost the government's anti-corruption efforts and, to a larger extent, enhance bi-lateral relations. This action is tied to a cooperative agreement between the Buhari government and the US Department of Justice (DOJ) undertaken to fight corruption and also aid Nigeria in recovering loot held in the US and other western countries.¹⁵ Although, the Donald Trump's administration also showed support towards Buhari's administration in the fight against Boko Haram by proposing military equipment shipments to Nigeria, Nigeria had previously been blacklisted under President Jonathan, which resulted in a request for military equipment being denied. Twelve Embraer A-29 Super Tucano aircraft were included in the proposed deal. Senators in the US Congress have also approved the proposed arms sale, which were previously banned by the Obama administration, citing the Leahy statute, which prohibits the US from supplying guns to countries whose military has committed human rights violations. Nigeria and China, on the other hand, have a bilateral relationship under President Muhammadu Buhari.¹⁶ Nigeria has been attempting to establish a balance of power in economic and diplomatic relations with China, which has been dubbed the world's fastest expanding economy and second largest economy in the world. Both countries are important demographically and geographically in their respective continents. With China's aggressive expansion in commercial, technological, and economic affairs, Nigeria has emerged as a key factor in Africa in light of China's

new strategic expansion. Nigeria is regarded as a major market due to its large population. Nigeria and other African countries, on the other hand, see China as a development partner because of the infrastructure loans it gives at cheaper interest rates than those offered by Bretton Woods institutions (World Bank and International Monetary Fund). A wide spectrum of analysts and scholars have underlined China's prominence.¹⁷

Although, it has been argued that while the United States is the most important nation on the global arena, China is the de-facto leader of the global economy in the twenty-first century. President Muhammadu Buhari visited China less than a year after taking office, after an invitation from Chinese President Xi Jinping. The purpose of the visit was to strengthen trade, diplomatic, and economic ties between the two countries. The visit resulted in the signing of a framework to improve infrastructural development and industrial activities in Nigeria between China's National Development Reform Commission and Nigeria's Ministry of Industry, Trade and Investment. In the aftermath of the visit, a number of loans were granted to Nigeria specially to finance the deficit of 2016 budget, infrastructure loan for trains, among others.¹⁸

The rail project was intended to address the country's infrastructure deficit, as well as offer the much-needed jobs for the population and, most significantly, stimulate the Nigerian economy. By signing a contract that allows Chinese currency

Yuan to be used for transactions in Nigeria, the government took a major step toward undermining the hegemony of the US dollar in the market. This will make it easier to include Yuan in the country's foreign reserve, as well as enabling banks to accept Yuan transactions from both foreign and domestic investors.¹⁹ Aliko Dangote was also given \$2 billion by the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China to help fund his cement factories. Apart from their economic ties, Nigeria and China harbour good diplomatic ties. China recently expressed its full support for Nigeria's bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. Chinese parliament speaker Zhang Dejiang stated this during a meeting with his Nigerian counterpart Yakubu Dogara, as part of an effort to reform the UN and accommodate countries from other regions.²¹

On the matter of Taiwan, which China refuses to recognize as a separate country but rather as a province of China, President Muhammadu Buhari recently reassured China's foreign minister of the country's commitment to the "one China policy." This policy assures that there is only one country known as China, and that Taiwan and mainland China are inextricably linked. In line with this approach, the Nigerian government ordered the Taiwanese embassy to relocate from Abuja to Lagos, thus downgrading diplomatic relations with Taiwan.²² It does, however, maintain minor economic and consular links with Taiwan, which will be based in Lagos. The minister of foreign affairs, Geoffrey Onyeama, made a policy statement,

stating that "Taiwan will cease to enjoy any privileges because it is not a country recognized under international law." When asked about the country's justification for a trade relationship, the minister stated that "the Chinese Government does not oppose trading with Taiwan as long as there is no formal contact with the government that suggests recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign country". The decision of Nigeria can be justified in the sense that Taiwan has less economic clout than China. Nigeria-Taiwan economic contacts, which include seafood, industrial equipment, natural gas, and other food products, totaled \$800 million in 2016, compared to \$6.4 billion in Nigeria-China trade relations in the first half of 2016. Finally, it may be said that under President Muhammadu Buhari, Nigeria-Sino relations have reached new heights, with bilateral commercial and diplomatic relations between the two nations refining dramatically.²³

Effects of Nigerian Foreign Policy under President Muhammadu Buhari

Since President Muhammadu Buhari took office in 2015, the Nigerian internal and external situations have gone through a series of ups and downs that have been disconcerting. As a result, both the positive and bad effects of President Muhammadu Buhari continue to be a significant topic of discussion. President Buhari's international policy is not devoid of domestic thinking and action, as foreign policy is essentially a consequence of domestic policy. Nigeria's foreign policy used to be Afrocentric, with Africa at the center of her foreign policy. This enhanced Nigeria's

image in the international community, notably its focus on decolonization of Africa as a whole and the abolition of apartheid in South Africa. Nigeria's influence in the African continent may not be as evident as it once was, but President Buhari's sub-regional overpowering presence in West Africa is undeniable.²⁴

Here, the international dimension of Buhari's three-point program, which includes dealing with insecurity and seeking international cooperation to combat it, battling corruption and seeking the restoration of Nigeria's looted assets, and efforts to rebuild the economy with the help of trading partners shall be examined. President Buhari has leveraged Nigeria's regional power to interfere in political crises in Gambia, Mali, Cote d'Ivoire, and Guinea Bissau, restoring relative tranquility and political stability to those countries. President Buhari's foreign policy stance also contributed to the blocking of Morocco from becoming ECOWAS' 17th member state. Morocco, after all, does not belong to the West African sub-region of Africa, but the Maghreb and Arab North African sub-regions. Buhari's position on ECOWAS's recent virtual Extraordinary Summit on structural reform, where he asked for a severe decrease in the number of ECOWAS commissioners from fifteen to five, was equally welcomed and commended.²⁵ He also informed that each Community member state should foot the bill for its commissioner; after all, Nigeria is the financial backbone of ECOWAS, contributing more than half of the Community's budget. The land border restriction between Nigeria and ECOWAS, which lasted over eight months, had a

negative impact on all countries involved, including Nigeria. The shutdown of the Nigerian land borders hindered the movement of individuals, products, and services into Nigeria, including input requirements for commerce and industry, resulting in hyperinflation of goods and services in the country. Despite the policy's goal of reducing instability and encouraging domestic rice production by stopping the smuggling of small guns, ammunition and foreign rice into the country, smuggling remained due to the country's porous borders.²⁶ The cost of the border closure to the country was larger than the expected advantages, as it deepened the country's economic slump. Additional factors included the COVID-19 epidemic and the resulting lockdown, as well as the drop in oil prices.²⁷ In order to pursue a foreign policy based on goods and services and security for all, President Buhari began his official international trips by visiting Niger and Chad, followed by Cameroun, Guinea, and the Benin Republic, in order to re-energize the brotherly relations and, in particular, to solicit their support in the fight against international terrorism. Following the trips, the Multinational Joint Task Force was formed, with troops from Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and Cameroon. Saddled with the goal of degrading and eliminating the Boko Haram, the battle lingers on in what appears to be no effective synergy among the troops of the Multinational Joint Task Force's member states.²⁸ The Chadian attack on Boko Haram last year, headed by the Chadian President, was

typified by the lack of collective participation among the Nigerian, Niger, and Cameroonian troops.²⁹

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CHAPTER FOUR
SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT PRESIDENT MUHAMMADU BUHARI
FOREIGN POLICY

The Buhari's administration was under no illusion that it could solve the multiplicity of problems confronting Nigeria without concrete engagement with the international community. Though not comparable in terms of frequency and number of times as was with President Obasanjo in his first term of office, nonetheless President Buhari's equally embarked on high-power 'Shuttle Diplomacy' in his first year of assumption of office.¹ The purposes of the shuttles, which have been at both bilateral and multilateral levels are tied to solving the domestic challenges of economic recovery, insecurity and fight against corruption. Shortly after assumption of office, the President undertook a tour of member-states of the Lake Chad Basin Commission in West Africa that are equally affected by the activities of Boko Haram.²

For the purpose, the President also visited France because of France's interest in West Africa, as a result of the close affinities with her former colonies. The visits were meant to seek collaboration, cooperation and the assistance of the various governments in tackling the Boko Haram menace. In line with the government's determination, the Boko Haram terror issue featured prominently in the president's discussion with the US authorities on his official visit to America.³ In the final analysis, the contacts made with various governments yielded result in the mould of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). At present, the Boko Haram terrorist group has been seriously decimated, with its existence hinged only on attacks on 'soft' targets. In the attempt to tackle Nigeria's economic problems, the president has been visible on the world stage, attempting to sell Nigeria as a haven of business opportunities to governments and corporations around the world. Indeed, the president has left the space wide open by not discriminating against any part of the world, either on the basis of ideology or religion.⁴ In the search for FDI, the president has made both bilateral and multilateral visits to Europe (France, Germany, Britain), the US, China, United Arab Emirate, Saudi Arabia, amongst many other countries.

Some of the efforts have generated visible results, for instance, "the secured commitments for investments worth \$6billion from the Chinese government and private companies most of whom signed Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) with the Nigerian government as well as private companies".⁵ While the economy is still in

a terrible state, especially in the period of recession, there are signals that with the monetary and fiscal policies of government, in addition to the giant strides the government has made in establishing contacts and building the confidence of foreign investors, the Nigerian economy is on its way to recovery in a relatively short while.⁶ Finally in this regard, the Buhari's administration aggressively sought the commitment and cooperation of the international community in fighting high-level corruption at home. Specifically, the government continually canvasses and lobbies foreign governments, especially in the West where most monies carted by Nigerian government officials are stashed. The cooperation of the foreign governments is sought in the area of refusal to provide safe havens for stolen wealth from Africa.⁷ Furthermore, the government is on an aggressive campaign of repatriation of stolen wealth that are already stashed abroad. The president's trips abroad are meant to win the loyalty of the foreign governments in this regard. One of such shows of support came from the government of the United Arab Emirate as demonstrated in the signing of a bilateral agreement that details the willingness of the UAE to facilitate the extradition of wanted persons, and seizure of stolen assets among others. Akwaya stated that in the quest for a corruption-free Nigeria, the president played a visible role in the London 2016, Anti-Corruption Summit, where emphasis was laid on erecting a strong global coalition against corrupt practices.⁸

While the Buhari administration displayed elements of determination and commitment in deploying foreign policy to solve the various challenges at home, the government has equally been alive to its responsibility to the sub-region, in line with the underlying principles of the national interest. This is evidenced in the material and technical support provided for the following countries during their elections; Benin Republic, Burkina Faso, Chad and Guinea Conakry. Most recently, the Nigerian government played a significant role as a leading member of ECOWAS to solve an impending political imbroglio in Gambia.⁹ The group ensured that the recalcitrant former President Yahya Jammeh vacated office for the democratically elected President Adama Barrow. From all indications, Nigeria, Senegal, Liberia and Ghana, under the auspices of ECOWAS, would have implemented a forceful removal of Yahya Jammeh from office. Equally important in the foreign policy drive is the extent to which President Buhari is willing to make Nigeria relevant in international politics.¹⁰

In most international forums, the president leads the Nigerian delegation, thereby creating visibility for the office of the President of Nigeria and by extension, enhancing the country's image. In this regard, the President has attended and addressed, the UN General Assembly, the African Union Heads of State and Government meeting, the Heads of State and Government Meeting of ECOWAS, the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, the COP21 Climate Change Summit,

the China-Africa Conference, the Nuclear Security Summit, among numerous others.¹¹ Akwaya, stated that

Despite the commendable efforts so far made on the foreign policy arena, especially as they relate to achieving positive outcomes in the domestic policy pursuits, the Buhari administration is relatively weak in terms of the pursuit of a concrete diplomatic agenda. It is an irrefutable fact that diplomacy is one of the most critical instruments of foreign policy, hence, the need to accord high level of importance to Nigeria's diplomatic practice.¹²

A recurring albatross of Nigeria's diplomatic practice is the lack of funds experienced by many of the diplomatic missions in various capitals of the world. This unacceptable practice hinders the capacity of the missions to carry out their responsibilities effectively and efficiently, with negative consequences on the efforts made by government from home. The government appears to be addressing the challenge by shutting down some of the diplomatic missions that are considered unviable perhaps so that funds can be made available to the diplomatic missions in capitals presumed to be of strategic importance to Nigeria's national interest.¹³ This position may appear logical on the surface, it however impedes government's efforts in taking advantage of opportunities across the globe. With the dynamic nature of globalisation, there is a sense in keeping diplomatic relations with as many state actors as possible, for the possibility of the strategic importance of a state may arise at short notice.

Moreover, given the itinerant nature of the average Nigerian, government must be conscious of providing representation in as many countries as possible. A related development in this regard is the slow pace of appointing Ambassadors and High Commissioners to head the various diplomatic missions. As a critical element of foreign policy pursuit, the diplomatic machinery must be fortified to the highest level. A situation in which the appointment of the country's highest representatives take too long to be finalised does not bode well for the relationship between Nigeria and the country starved of the highest level representative.¹⁴ It is therefore imperative for both the executive and legislature to harmonise the processes of nominating, confirming, and approving Nigeria's highest ranking representatives abroad.

United State Relations and Assistant under Civil Administration of Muhammandu Buhari

U.S.-Nigeria ties improved after Nigeria's transition to civilian rule in 1999, and they remain robust. President Trump's phone call to President Buhari in 2017 was his first to any sub-Saharan African leader; in April 2018, Buhari became the first sub-Saharan African leader to meet with President Trump at the White House. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Tibor Nagy visited Nigeria during his first official trip to the region, in 2018. He expressed interest in seeing Nigeria play a larger role in peacekeeping and democracy promotion in Africa, and described Nigeria as a focus country for efforts to increase U.S. commercial activity in the region.¹⁵ Bilateral engagements include the U.S.-Nigeria Binational Commission

(BNC), a mechanism for convening high-level officials for strategic dialogue that was launched in 2010.

The most recent BNC, held in January 2020 in Washington, D.C., centered on bolstering U.S.- Nigeria commercial ties.¹⁰⁴ A separate U.S.-Nigeria Commercial and Investment Dialogue (CID) aims to enhance bilateral trade and investment, with an initial focus on “infrastructure, agriculture, digital economy, investment, and regulatory reform.” The United States maintains an embassy in Abuja and a consulate in Lagos, and the State Department supports “American Corners” in libraries throughout Nigeria to share information on U.S. culture.¹⁶ Nigerians comprise the largest African-born population in the United States, according to U.S. Census data, and remittances from the United States are a source of income support for many Nigerian households. U.S. human rights and governance concerns periodically have raised challenges for bilateral ties. As noted above, the State Department imposed visa restrictions on individuals found responsible for undermining the conduct of the 2019 general elections.¹⁷

In September 2020, the State Department imposed additional sanctions on unnamed Nigerians for “undermining the democratic process,” citing gubernatorial elections in Kogi and Bayelsa States in late 2019 that featured reports of violence and fraud as well as forthcoming gubernatorial polls in Edo and Ondo States, which have seen rising tensions ahead of elections scheduled for late 2020. In 2019, as noted

above, the State Department placed Nigeria on the Special Watch List pursuant to the IFRA for governments that tolerate or engage in severe violations of religious freedom.¹⁸ In its 2020 Trafficking in Persons (TIP) report, the State Department additionally designated Nigeria pursuant to the Child Soldiers Prevention Act as having government or state-supported armed forces that use child soldiers, a designation that could carry restrictions on U.S. aid in FY2021, subject to a presidential waiver and exceptions. The State Department also downgraded Nigeria to the Tier 2 Watch List in the 2020 TIP report, meaning the country does not meet minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so. A further downgrade to Tier 3 status could carry restrictions on certain types of U.S. assistance.¹⁹

Nigeria routinely ranks among the top recipients of U.S. foreign assistance globally. The State Department and USAID allocated \$451.4 million in bilateral aid for Nigeria in Fiscal Year 2020, nearly 90% of which supported health programs. The Administration requested \$472.1 million for Nigeria for Fiscal Year 2021, a rare case in Africa in which the Trump Administration's aid proposal exceeded the previous year's allocation. These totals exclude emergency humanitarian assistance and other aid provided through global programs those not allocated by country in annual State Department Congressional Budget Justifications or funds managed by other U.S. agencies. The State Department and USAID allocated \$468.6 million in humanitarian

funding in response to the Lake Chad Basin crisis in Fiscal Year 2019, including \$346.9 million for Nigeria.²⁰

Nigeria is a focus country under the President's Malaria Initiative (PMI) as well as Feed the Future, an agriculture development program. U.S. assistance under the Power Africa initiative has supported gas and solar power generation, off-grid energy projects, and regulatory reform. U.S. Security Assistance and Military Sales U.S. security assistance to Nigeria has sought to bolster peacekeeping capacity, enhance maritime and border security, combat transnational crime, support civilian law enforcement, and strengthen counterterrorism efforts. Nigeria participates in the State Department's Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (SDTSCP, an interagency effort to build regional counterterrorism capabilities and coordination), but has not been a top recipient of funds under the program. Nigeria also has benefitted from the provision of U.S. training and equipment to the Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) coalition in the Lake Chad Basin. In addition to funds administered by the State Department, DOD has notified Congress of roughly \$50 million in planned security assistance for Nigeria under its "global train and equip" program, currently authorized under U.S.C. 333considerably less than amounts provided to other Lake Chad Basin countries.²¹ Nigeria has received additional DOD assistance through regional programs. U.S. concerns with human rights abuses by

Nigerian security personnel have constrained U.S. security assistance, including counterterrorism aid. Ota and Ecoma stated that:

In 2014, the Obama Administration blocked a transfer of U.S.-manufactured military helicopters from Israel to Nigeria due to human rights concerns. U.S. security cooperation increased after the 2015 inauguration of President Buhari, who pledged to curtail and investigate abuses, and the following year, the Obama Administration sought congressional approval for the sale of 12 A-29 Super Tucano attack aircraft to Nigeria.²²

The Obama Administration froze the sale in early 2017, however, after a Nigerian jet struck a camp for displaced people during a bombing raid. The Trump Administration revisited that decision, and in late 2017 approved the sale, over opposition from some Members of Congress. President Trump has appeared to downplay human rights concerns regarding the Nigerian military. The aircraft are now in development, and are due for delivery in 2021.²³

The Buhari's Administration and China's Financial Aids to Nigeria

Before considering the President Buhari's administration and China's financial aids to Nigeria, it is proper to emphasize that Nigeria has been a beneficiary of several grants and loans coming from different countries and financial institutions. These include the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan, the International Monetary Fund, the World Banks, the European Union, France (through the Agence Francaise de Development), Germany(KfW), Indian Development Bank, etcetera.²⁴ Suleiman, Amaefule, stated that:

Between 2010 and 2015 Nigeria received \$3billion grant from the US government for military assistance, anti-terrorism and defence and security etc. the British gave Nigeria £140 million in aid supporting Nigeria energy privatization in 2015 and £2705 million supporting health, education and poverty reduction programmes; Spain helped to build photovoltaic electricity plant to generate 100 mw in the Nigeria's city of Kano.²⁵

The World Bank has supported Nigeria with the tune of \$96.28 million from 2001 to 2010 to fight HIV infections among others. However, a lot of factors usually made it difficult for such grants to achieve the desired results in Nigeria. One of which is the conditionalities attached to these loans by the lenders. The second is the low amount of grants given by the lending bodies or countries, which are quite insufficient for massive developmental projects.²⁶ Third there is the issue of misappropriation of such monies by most handlers. Now back to Buhari's Administration. On 29th May, 2015 Nigeria sworn in a new President from the opposition party in person of President Muhammadu Buhari. The event was so spectacular not only because it was the first time such a thing had happened in the country but also because the government came with the blueprints to fight corruption, build the economy, among others, which it found a true partner in China to achieve. Thus, in his quest to fix the economy beginning with the closing of the infrastructural gaps, the President has been working intimately with China.²⁷ On April 27, 2018 both countries signed a \$2.5 billion currency swap deal to boost local currency liquidity to Nigerian and Chinese industrialists. President Buhari has also sought and in most cases obtained loans

from China. According to a Press Release by the Presidency dated 15, April 2016 after the President's first visit to China since assumption of office in 2015, the President praised China for the additional investments worth over \$6 billion his visit was able to attract to Nigeria in different areas of the economy.²⁸ Thus:

1. In the power sector, North-South Power Company Limited and Sinohydro Corporation Limited signed an agreement value at \$478,657,941.28 to construct 300 megawatts sola power in Shiroro, Niger state; (2). In solid minerals sector, granite and marble Limited signed the shanghai Shibang and an agreement valued at \$55 million for the construction and equipping of granite mining plant in Nigeria; (3). A total of \$1billion is to be invested in the development of the Greenfield expressway from Abuja-Ibadan-Lagos under an agreement reached by the infrastructure bank and Sinohydro Corporation Limited. (4).²⁹ For the housing sector both companies mentioned above also signed a \$250 million deal to develop an ultra-modern 27storey high rise complex and a \$2.5billion agreement for the development of the Lagos metro rail transit red line project (5). \$1billion agreement for the establishment of a Hi-tech industrial park in Ogun Guangdong trade one in Igbesa, Ogun state; (6). The agreement by Ogun Guangdong free Trade Zone and the CNG (Nigeria) for the construction of two 500MT/day float gas facilities valued at \$200million; (7). An agreement valued at \$363 million for the establishment of a comprehensive farm and downstream industrial park in Kogi state; (8). Others under negation were the

\$500million project for the provision of telephone broadcast equipment and a \$25 million facility for the production of prepaid smart meters between Mojec Investment limited and Microstar Company Limited.³⁰ Similarly, in the recent concluded 2018 Forum on China African Cooperation (FOCAC), Nigeria signed more than \$10 billion agreements with others still under discussion by various parties. Among those that have been signed, in agreements or MOUs are as follows:

1. The agreement between the China National Petroleum Corporation, which has agreed to secure funding for the Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation, Ajaokuta-Kano (AKK) gas pipeline to cost \$2.8 billion; (2) The agreement entered by the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Investment with Shandong Ruyi International Fashion Industry for \$2 billion, for a first-ever cotton value chain; that is from cotton growing to ginning, spinning, textile manufacture and garment with Katsina, Kano, Abia and Lagos states as the chosen locations; (3). The MOU between the Chinese conglomerate, Capegate Integrated worth \$1.5 billion for energy and organic fertilizer that will cover Abuja, Niger, Nasarawa, Kaduna and Kano to generate: 30MW of electricity, 500,000 tonnes of organic fertilizer, 60,000,000 litres of oil from pyrolysis, create up to 10,000 jobs, 400 garbage collection trucks, various types of city sanitation equipment and one million (1,000,000) waste bins to be deployed; (4). An agreement between the NNPC, the Nanni Good Fortune Heavy Industries Group and Capegate Group for a \$400 million investments across six states to allow for: 90 litres

of ethanol, 64 MW of power, 72 tonnes of sugar per annum, 10,000 tonnes of animal farm per annum, 5,5000 direct employment;³¹

5. The Nanni Industries and Capegate Group submitted an MOU to the NNPC for an investment in 15,000 hectares of cassava ethanol in the South-West, and another project of the same value and scale in the South East; (6). Among other agreements that the NNPC signed was one with Obax-Complant Consortium and another with Capegate-Nanning Consortium that targets 10 bio-fuel complexes nationwide;(7). An MOU between the Edo state Government and China harbor for the construction of Benin River Port; the Benin Industrial Park and a 550 barrels per day modular refinery; (8).³² A funding MOU between Huawei Technologies and the Federal Government of Nigeria, represented by Galaxy Backbone for the training of 1,000 Nigeria government officials to acquire basic ICT knowledge and skills forwarded to the Ministry of Justice; (9). Huawei also plans the annual training of 10,000 Nigerians in ICT, with a wider and deeper training of 5,000 out of this number, who upon certification by Huawei will be employable anywhere in the world; (10) An MOU signed between Khromemonkey Nigeria Limited and Shezen Right Net Technology Limited to set up Amanbo Nigeria, a business-to-business-Consumer (B2B2C) platform and postal that would enable Nigeria exporters to trade with Chinese importers and vice-versa; (11).³³ \$1 billion loan agreement for the rolling stock of the newly constructed rail lines as well as road rehabilitation and water supply project;

(12). An agreement on sum of \$328 million for Information and Communication Technology infrastructure Backbone Phase II (NICTBII) project (Shaban, 2018; Olowolagba, 2018 and Vanguard, September 8, 2018) So far, the financial aids from China have been able to execute some projects in Nigeria since the assumption of President Buharis in office in 2015. This as reported by Shaban include: the West Africa's first Urban rail system valued at \$500million in Abuja; the 180km rail line connecting Abuja and Kaduna which was commissioned in 2016. Others that are at their various stages of completion which Nigeria leveraging on the \$3.4billion Chinese funding to complete are the upgrading of airport terminals, the Lagos-Kano rail line, the Zungeru hydroelectric power project, and the Fibre Cable for the internet infrastructure. Also financed by the Chinese aids was the new Portharcourt Airport International Terminal commissioned by President Buahri in October 2018.³⁴ In recognition of these laudable achievements, President Buhari while commending his China counterpart noted that since "independence no country has helped our country on infrastructure development like the Chinese. In some projects, the Chinese help us with 85 percent payment and soft loans that span 20 years. No country done that for us as far as I can remember".³⁵

The chapter socio-economic impact of President Muhammadu Buhari foreign policy underscores the goals and interests of the political actors and other key stakeholders in pursuing Nigeria's policy direction. Despite, the public outcry on the

regular international travels of the president many positive things have happened. The first political decision taken by President Buhari was to visit the Nigeria's neighbors to have their cooperation, collaboration for collective security. It aligned with his concentric cycles mantra of foreign policy direction. It was made possible and achieved through the formation of Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) with the soldiers from Nigeria, Chad, Niger Republic, and Cameroon in 2016.³⁶ The MNJTF was largely successful in weakening and defeating the Boko Haram insurgents. The shuttle diplomacy by former President Buhari resulted in an improvement of diplomatic relations between Nigeria and foreign powers especially; United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Switzerland. This brought to recognition and inclusion in Western and global affairs in the areas of anti-corruption campaigns and Open Government Initiative. More so, within the period under review, relations with Asian power houses China and India received attention and boost.³⁷ By and large, Nigeria-China relations was more strategic and contributory economic growth and national development. In this aspect, Nigeria benefitted from Chinese loan, currency swap initiative, and foreign direct investments in the areas of banking, mining, defense, construction, COVID-19 drugs assistance and cultural diplomacy.³⁸

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CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

From the foregoing, it appears Nigeria's foreign policy under the civil administration of Mohammadu Buhari lacks national interest orientation in itself. Therefore the nation had even gone against the public opinion of her citizens in the attempt to protect the selfish interest of some politicians in Nigeria. One can understand today that the giant of Africa has remained the toothless baby giant. It is the time to change the foreign policy ideology of the country to be in line with the national interest and economic potentialities of the nation.¹ Therefore, one may wish to say that Nigeria lacks nothing both in human and material resources.

The thrust of Buhari's foreign policy is to make Nigeria a free corrupt nation, boost her country economy and reposition the Nigeria security apparatus towards facilitating national security, regional integration and bilateral relationship with the rest of the world. In achieving this thrust the Buhari foreign policy embark on bilateral talks with China, France, United States of America, United Kingdom etc to strengthen its security apparatus, boost economic growth and repatriate stolen wealth starch in foreign account.² Despite Buhari effort in enhancing both domestic and external environment in order to restore the myriad of challenges facing Nigeria get stuck on worst security challenges, worst economic policies, target of opposition, lack of respect to the rule of law and delay in dispensation of corrupt public office holders.

It is in the aforementioned findings that the researcher deemed it necessary to suggest solutions that will assist in boosting foreign policy of Buhari administration in order to enhance both domestic and external environment friendliness among Nigeria and other countries of the world.³

In the four years of Buhari's presidency, from 2015 to 2019, the government has been able to considerably maintain various bilateral and multilateral connections with Nigeria's neighbors and the rest of the world. These have also aided the government in its war against the Boko-Haram insurgency, which, unfortunately, has taken on an international dimension. Conflicts, on the other hand, have accounted for more than half of the issues confronting the Nigerian state, as a pathological situation and dangers to societal cohesion and national security.⁴ Farmers-herders' conflicts, violent militancy, the Boko-haram threat, electoral conflicts among political candidates and parties, and a slew of other issues now threaten the Nigerian state's corporate existence, owing to successive governments' failure to adopt pragmatic conflict prevention and management techniques over the years. As a result, the Buhari administration's capacity to create critical diplomatic and commercial ties with China, the United States, and a plethora of other countries increasing economic influence in the global economy is hinged on this issue.⁵ This relationship has supplied the government with much-needed funding and foreign direct investment to help offset the effects of the infrastructure deficit. Nigeria has acquired more worldwide respect

under Buhari's government, which can be ascribed, in part, to President Buhari's charisma, incorruptibility and commitment to fighting corruption and insecurity in the country.⁶ This was demonstrated by President Buhari's invitation to the G7 conference shortly after he was sworn in. President Buhari has taken the lead in negotiations for the peaceful return of the Gambia's democratically elected government.

President Buhari was also nominated to lead the African Union's anti-corruption campaign in the region. Unlike his predecessor, President Buhari was able to strengthen relations between Nigeria and the United States, resulting in increased collaboration in the fight against Boko Haram and the endemic corruption in Nigeria. However, there is more to do with regards to the three fundamental challenges that informed the emergence of the Buhari's administration.⁷ Since how a state is perceived by others and how much of respects and importance is accorded to it, is a function of the internal dynamics of such a state, the Nigerian state under the President Muhammed Buhari's administration would need to address frontally the challenges of insecurity, corruption and the dwindling economic prospects in the state. Although, considerable efforts had been made so far, they had not been enough to translate to efficacious foreign policy objectives for the Nigerian state.⁸ This explains why many states still perceive the Nigerian state is a haven of insecurity, corruption and crimes. It is therefore incumbent on President Buhari's government to mitigate this internal discontentment for better projection of an efficient state-foreign policy.⁹

The Buhari's years have witnessed the golden era of Nigeria's international appointments. Buhari visited 53 countries in eight years on official assignment and 36 trips for unofficial and medical trips. The development only succeeded with Buhari's endorsement and advanced lobbying irrespective of any party and sentimental considerations.¹⁰ The appointments of Amina Mohammed (Deputy Secretary UN), Prof. Tijjani Bande (President UNGA), Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala (DG WTO), Dr. Akinkunmi Adesina (President AfDB), and Muhammadu Barkindo (Secretary OPEC) among others. Former President Buhari himself was elected Chairman of ECOWAS Head of Governments and has won many awards for anti-corruption, COVID-19 Champion, and recognitions by other international organizations.¹¹

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