

**INEC AND THE CHALLENGES OF MONITORING POLITICAL PARTY CAMPAIGN
FINANCING: A CASE STUDY OF UNIVERSITY OF BENIN**

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**BEING A RESEARCH PROJECT SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF
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CERTIFICATION

We, certify that this research project was carried out by **ANTHONY OYEDO OGBEIDE** in the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Benin, Benin City, Nigeria. It is adequate in scope and quality in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of Bachelor of Science (BSc.) degree in Political Science.

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DEDICATION

This project work is dedicated to God Almighty for His abundant grace in my life and for seeing me through my academic pursuit and aspirations.

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ABSTRACT

This study examined the role of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and the challenges associated with monitoring political party campaign financing in Nigeria. Campaign financing has become a major issue in democratic governance due to the increasing influence of money in electoral processes, which often affects transparency, accountability, and fairness during elections. The study aimed to assess the effectiveness of INEC in regulating and monitoring political party finances, identify the major challenges confronting the commission, and examine the implications of poor monitoring on democratic development in Nigeria. The study adopted a descriptive survey research design. Data were obtained from both primary and secondary sources. Primary data were collected through questionnaires administered to selected respondents, while secondary data were gathered from textbooks, journals, official reports, and relevant publications. The findings revealed that INEC faces numerous challenges in monitoring political party campaign financing, including inadequate manpower, insufficient funding, weak enforcement mechanisms, corruption, lack of transparency by political parties, and political interference. The study also found that excessive campaign spending and poor financial disclosure by political parties undermine free and fair elections in Nigeria. The study concluded that although INEC has the constitutional responsibility to regulate campaign financing, several institutional and political challenges limit its effectiveness. The study therefore recommended that the Nigerian government should strengthen electoral laws, provide adequate funding and independence for INEC, enforce strict penalties against defaulters, and promote transparency and accountability in political party financing. These measures would enhance credible elections and strengthen democratic governance in Nigeria.

CHAPTER ONE

BACKGROUND OF STUDY

Democracy is a system of government in which ultimate power rests with the people, who exercise this power directly or through elected representatives. Democracy is a system in which the government is controlled by the people. That is Democracy all over the world and in theory is seen to be the government of the people, by the people and for the people. What that means is that, in a democracy, the government is people's led., and as such, people are considered equals in the exercise of that control. However, unequal access to political finance contributes to an uneven political playing field. Campaign financing has been a major concern in Nigeria. Significant and unregulated campaign financing often create an uneven playing field in election contest. Large sums of money give certain parties and/or candidates undue advantage over others(vanguard newspaper 2022). Very often the candidates with the most money always win the election or party nomination process. Wide discrepancies in levels of funding between parties and candidates constrains opportunities for political competition and tend to disenfranchise challengers. Most often, the uneven playing field results from the fact that the ruling party or the incumbent candidate control political apparatus and uses it to its own advantage and to the disadvantages of challengers((Samphina 2022; NILDS 2022). The financial requirements for entry to electoral competition appear to be getting higher and higher, resulting in Political exclusion of those who cannot afford the cost.

Another concern has been that elected officials are becoming more accountable to those who finance their campaigns than to their constituents. Large corporate or single donor funding for parties and candidates dominates political decisions and political corruption is a national problem, posing a threat to the Nigerian economic growth, democracy, and the stability of the country. Nearly all major financial and corruption scandals in recent times have been linked to campaign and political financing (NILDS 2022; Africa Check 2022). The rapid growth of campaign expenditure in many countries has exacerbated this problem. The huge amounts of money involved in some election campaigns makes it impossible for those without access to large private funds to compete on the same level as those who are well funded. There is no doubt that political parties need access to funds in order to play their part in the political process. At the same time, the role of money in politics is arguably the biggest threat to democracy worldwide today. This threat is clear across all continents—from huge corporate campaign donations in the United States and drug money seeping into politics in Latin America, to corruption scandals throughout Africa and Europe. Evidence shows that large portions of the electorate around the world are left with the perception that their politicians are more concerned about money than about representing citizens' interests. In Nigeria today, sponsorship of a political party or candidate is effectively a business investment, which the investor must recoup the moment his candidate gets into public office. The very peculiar nature of Nigeria's socioeconomic environment characterized by hunger and literacy make the electors and indeed government agencies susceptible to manipulation by corrupt politicians who take

advantage of inadequate electoral laws which creates a leeway to unlimited access to political finance sufficient to destroy the electoral process. How political parties finance their campaigns is critical in any democratic election. Researchers at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria and the Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), University of Oxford, U.K. investigated how political parties in Nigeria finance their campaigns. The most important question was to what extent campaign finance determines electoral victory. The key results are: Candidates invest large amounts of their private savings to contend in the elections. This means that only individuals willing to invest large amounts of money become candidates. Money distorts the candidate selection process within parties and largely influences who wins the elections. Electoral laws governing how parties should secure and spend their funds are ineffective as there is a lack of knowledge about them. As a result such laws have limited enforceability Okunade et al (2009).

1.2 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

Nigeria's political history since independence from Britain in 1960 has been a cycle of authoritarian military regimes with episodic interregna of civilian governments. Reinter politics in Nigeria has been characterized over the years by the dominance of 'electoral machines' controlled by political entrepreneurs comprising largely of wealthy former military officers and their civilian business Cronies. The major political parties in Nigerian politics today are little more than grand agglomerations of the respective electoral 'machines' of the leading political financiers. Many Nigerian politicians are

‘sponsored’ by local and regional power brokers cum political entrepreneurs who finance their campaigns for public office. The ‘sponsorship’ is effectively a business transaction in which the patron recovers the ‘investment’ in the form of public works and procurement contracts, prebendal appointments of cronies to public offices and other forms of prebendal activity by the ‘client’ politician on assuming public office. In some cases where the patron and client failed to define with sufficient precision, the dimensions of the return on investment or the client balks at delivering per the agreed terms, the fallout has led to mass violence and political destabilization. Political party finance has been identified as a source of corruption in several countries. Political finance laws and regulation, through which political parties and candidates for political office declare their funding sources, are among the main instruments. Recent history has witnessed the pooling together of resources all over the world into a network of global awareness against unregulated use of money in politics. This Research is part of the debate and will attempt to concisely examine different types of political party financing in Nigeria, highlight the role of INEC and inadequacies that are inherent and proffer suggestions on the way forward.

1.3 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

The main objective of this study is to examine the role of INEC and challenges of monitoring political party campaign financing in Nigeria .The study also has the following specific objectives:

- 1 .To know the sources of funds for political financing.
2. To know the role of INEC in monitoring political campaign financing.
3. To know what political laws and finance regulations are available to political parties in Nigeria.
4. To know the challenges faced by INEC and other regulatory bodies in monitoring political campaign financing.

1.4 RESEARCH QUESTION

The following questions will be addressed in the course of this study:

1. What are the source of fund for political parties?
2. Does INEC monitor political campaign?
3. What political laws and finance regulations are available to political parties in Nigeria?
4. What are the challenges faced by INEC and other regulatory bodies in monitoring political campaign financing?

1.5 RESEARCH HYPOTHESSIS

The following hypothesis has been developed and would be tested in the Course of this study:

Ho: Monitoring of political party campaign financing in Nigeria does not have any significant challenge.

Hi: Monitoring political party campaign financing in Nigeria has very significant challenges.

1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

This study is necessitated by the urge and the need for the research, reader and organizations in general to understand the role of INEC and challenges of monitoring political party campaign financing in Nigeria. The following are the significance of study.

- 1.To serve as a reference material for student who will wish to conduct similar studies on this topic.
2. To serve as a guide to corporate individuals, organisation in furtherance to their research on the subject matter.

1.7 SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The study is restricted to the role of INEC and challenges of monitoring political party campaign financing strictly in Nigeria.

1.8 LIMITATION OF STUDY

To be able to get quick response from others a questionnaire will be issued. The questionnaire have it limitation that it depends on written answer subjected to pre-arranged questions. The structured nature of the questionnaire have the limitation that it may force the respondent to choose answers that they do not fully enclose.

There is also a problem of choosing a large size in order to save cost and time.

Other limitation include

1. Finance: Insufficient fund tend to impede the efficiency of the researcher in sourcing for relevant materials, literature, or information and in the process of data collection.
2. Time: The researcher will simultaneously engage in this study with other academic work. This consequently will cut down on the time devoted for the research work.

1.9 DEFINITION OF TERMS

1. CAMPAIGN FINANCE: This refers to all funds raised in order to promote candidates, political parties, or policies in elections, referendums, initiatives, party activities, and party organizations. The funds could also detract from the opponents of the

2. POLITICAL PARTY: This is an organization of people which seeks to achieve goals common to its members through the acquisition and exercise of political power.

3. ELECTION: An election is a formal decision-making process by which a population chooses an individual to hold public office.

4. POLITICAL CAMPAIGN: This is an organized effort which seeks to influence the decision making process within a specific group. In democracies, political campaigns often refer to electoral campaigns, where in representatives are chosen or referendums are decided.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The importance of theories in political discourse cannot be overemphasized. This is because it proffers empirically based general explanatory laws that are scientific in nature through synthesizing and integrating of empirical data for maximum clarification and unification (Raphael, 1978:2) For this research work structural functionalism will be used. The term structural functionalism originates from Aristotle's study of the ultimate causes in the nature or the actions in relation to their ends or utility. The second phase of the theory was developed by the French philosopher Baron De Montesquieu in the 17th century in his doctrine of separation of powers based on the notion of functions that are best undertaken separate from each other as a means of ensuring stability and security. Functionalism became important when Darwin's Theory of Evolution began to influence the thinking about human behaviour. In sociological discourse, structural functionalism has root in the works of Durkheim (1893), Parsons(1951) and Merton(1968). The above scholastic ideas became central to the emergence of the theory in modern social sciences. The ideas were later adopted and advanced by political scientists Almond & Coleman,

1960).^{34a} Emile Durkheim in the 19th century believed that societies were made of fragmented blocks that needed to work together for the entire society to function together (Durkheim, 1893). Durkheim (1893) further emphasized that societal bonds must work perfectly otherwise the society would disintegrate. Thus, since the mid 20th century, structural functionalism has become one of the most frequently applied theories in the area of social science particularly sociology and political science which was further advanced by Almond and Coleman (1960)

2.2 BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

Succinctly, structural functionalism has the following basic major assumptions. One of the major assumptions is that society has fragments of structures and their functions work independently and inter-dependently. Thus, there is a clear difference between the ideal function of any organization or societal component and its real function in the society. The second assumption is, there is a relation between a political structure and its function and it may be influenced by certain factors in its function or malfunctioning. The third assumption is, society or the political system should be studied using the real function it is performing and not the proposed or ideal function which may not be applicable in some given conditions. Furthermore, the theory suggests that the political system or the nature of a society determines the structure and functions of organisations and their systems and sub systems. For

example, an advanced democratic society might have a better structure that functions accordingly than a backward democratic or developing democracies.

CRITICISMS OF THE THEORY

Critics of structural functionalism view it as a translation of the Anglo-American political norms in methodological terminology.^{30c} Structural functionalism may be on the decline as a methodological and theoretical approach for the study of politics. However, the theory may not go down easily as it will leave a set of terms that are still used in political jargons.^{30d} Another criticism of structural functionalism is that its categories were too undifferentiated to be of real help in actual research. Also, the theory was criticised on the ground that it harbours ideological slogans of the liberal political scientists, especially American Behaviouralists that portrayed their methodology as scientific and value free. In other words, it was also value laden in nature and app

2.3 APPLICABILITY OF THE THEORY

Four approaches are useful in determining the applicability of structural functionalism. They are process, content, function and form. The processes of the government are elaborately different, discrete and easy to identify in developed countries but in simpler societies the same processes are rarely differentiated and discrete. The content and process are interdependent and derivative. In essence, taking the environment of our study and the organisation (INEC) as well as its functions it is easy to apply this theory

using the methods of its applicability by portraying the fact that Nigeria is categorized, based on this theory, as a simple or developing democracy where the processes of government are not clearly differentiated. An institution such as INEC which supervises the conduct of elections and political parties' activities has no clear distinguished processes between the process and the content. It is evident that the powers and functions of INEC are clearly identified and explained unambiguously, but the problem is the applicability of the process within the content and form of its institutional reality. This is where the theory explains the topic of the study. In other words, there is no clear diversification between the structure and the function in the case of INEC and its challenges of monitoring campaign finances in Edo state, Nigeria because the level of democratic play was still low

In applying this theory in the analysis of a political system, it is important to note that a political system comprises many structures, all working or performing certain functions to make the system work. For any political system to work, several activities need to be performed and certain institutions are created to perform some of these roles or functions for the society to keep the system going. Nigeria operates a political system and for the society to maintain itself, certain institutions also known as structures are created to perform certain roles or functions for the maintenance of the Nigerian society. Now, for the society to function well there is need to have the leadership, that is, the elected officers of the state, the president, Governors and all legislators. There is need for them to

have legitimacy also. All these are structures; there is also need to have the structure or institution charged with the role of organising elections for the leadership of the nation to emerge. That institution in the case of Nigeria is the Independent National Electoral Commission and the functions it performs is that of conducting elections into the various elective offices. There are also other structures or institution of the society through which political leadership is put in place for the society. The political parties and the people, called the electorates, the political elites, security agencies, civil society organisations e.t.c, also have different roles to play in the political system. The roles of INEC as an institution in monitoring campaign financing and other activities of political parties are the subject of this research using structural functionalism. The relevance of structural functionalism to the study is manifest in its suitability in explaining how INEC as an institution of the Nigerian political system has effectively monitor the campaign financing and other activities of political parties in Edo state Nigeria. INEC as creation of the government, is the institution (structure) that is charged with the responsibility of organising elections into various elective offices and also monitors campaign financing. In the course of performing its function, INEC has to collaborate with other institutions or structures, which also have role to play in the electoral process. In the course of performing their different roles, some intended or unintended, recognised or unrecognised consequences manifest which enhance or lessen the adaption or adjustment of the system thereby bringing about dysfunction in the system. These intended and unintended consequences as well as the dysfunctions are analysed in this research. It is

against this background that the theory of structural functionalism is chosen to form the theoretical base of this work.

2.4 CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION

Campaign Financing

It is important to stress from the on-set that there is a hiatus in research on issue of campaign are parts financing generally but particularly in Nigeria. Despite extensive studies on virtually all aspects of political parties, researchers appear to have paid little or no attention on financial issues, especially campaign finances (Fisher and Eisenstadt, 2004). In fact, studies hardly exist on our shelves on campaign financing of political parties and the implication for our political and democratic trajectory. That said, what then is campaign financing? The narrowest meaning of the term is money for electioneering (Duschinsky, 2006:189). Campaign financing has been defined by Ujo (2000), Walecki (2002): Ilo (2004) Obiorah (2004), Pinto-Duschinsky (2001 and 2004) Emelonye (2004). Kukah (2002) and (Ayoade, 2002) (Samuel,2023) as the use of money or the use of other material resources for political activities. It also embodies the sources or means through which political activities are sponsored in a given polity. Pinto Duschinsky (2004) modified us earlier thesis by posing that campaign financing is money for electioneering. Since political parties play a critical part in election campaign in many parts of the globe, and since it is difficult to draw a distinct line between costs of party organizations and their routine expenses, party

funds may reasonably be considered campaign financing. He goes on to argue that party funding includes not only campaign expenses but also the cost of maintaining permanent offices, carry out policy function of parties.

2.5 CHALLENGES FACING INEC IN MONITORING CAMPAIGN FINANCING

One of the prominent challenges facing INEC to monitor the finances of political parties in Edo state, Nigeria is lack of capacity by the electoral body itself. The INEC lacks adequate manpower and skilled staffs who will practically track the campaign finances and expenditures of political parties considering that all the parties are expected to have offices. This problem is further compounded during electioneering periods when all the parties engage in political activities at local state and national levels simultaneously. This demands a large pool of personnel (which the INEC presently lacks) to sufficiently watch how political parties raise their funds and the ways they spend them at all levels. How much candidates aspiring to contest for political offices have to pay to secure their nomination form is expensive. The amount for presidency slot by the PDP was N22 million, where the APC charged N25.5 million for nomination, per nomination form. One of the APC candidates in its primaries, General Muhammadu Buhari had to take a bank loan in order to pay for the forms (Vanguard, October, 17, 2014). For 2023 election, the high cost of nomination fees set by Nigerian political parties makes it evident that the commercialization of politics is quickly ingraining itself into the country's political ethos. The ruling All Progressives Congress (APC) set the price of nomination forms at N100

million (\$240,884) for the President, N50 million (\$85,470) for the Governorship, N20 million (\$34,188) for the Senate, N10 million (\$17,094) for the House of Representatives, and N2 million (\$3,418) for the State Assembly. People's Democratic Party (PDP), the largest opposition party, estimated that the cost of the forms for presidential nomination would be N40 million (\$68,376), the cost of the governorship would be N21 million (\$35,897), the Senate would cost N3.5 million (\$5,982), the House of Representatives would cost N2.5 million (\$4,273), and the State House of Assembly would cost N1.5 million (\$2,564) (Samuel, 2023). The implication of this political trend is that politics is inadvertently commercialized because if politicians have to borrow to pay the very exorbitant rates for their political registration to contest election on their platforms, they (the politicians) will source funds from any means including vile ones to pay in order to contest and it will be difficult for INEC to verify such sources logically, when they win elections into any public office, the tendency is to recoup the money they spend during elections, thus compounding, the phenomenon of political corruption in Nigeria. This development in the country ironic (Aluaigba 2002) because elected office holders seek to pursue their interest return into office. Another problem encumbering the effective monitoring of campaign financing by political parties relates to the elephantine privileged position ruling political parties usually occupy in Nigeria. A political party controlling power at the centre wields tremendous influence on the political landscape to the extent that it becomes a near impossibility to question t its leader, the ruling president and by the same token, the part does. This confusion definitely creates room for the diversion of

state resources (especially state funds) to serve the interest of the ruling political party to the disadvantage of other parties; this happens at all levels of government (Human Rights Watch, 2004). This kind of scenario is antagonistic to any effort at monitoring how state funds are utilized.

Inadequate legal framework is also another challenge facing INEC, despite the Electoral monitor campaign financing. Political parties and candidates often failed to disclose their campaign finance, making it difficult for INEC to track and monitor spending. Limited resources is one of the commonest problems virtually every organization faces and they lack of adequate resources. Causes hindrances to the conduct of free and fair elections in Edo state.. During the preparation of an election , the electoral body usually demands for resources that will enable the meet up ,but most times the money are usually paid in half. During the Nations general election they demanded for N93 billion but only N45 billion was approved by the National Assembly (Daily Trust, April, 14, 2014). The amount approved was a far cry from what the commission needed to adequately prepare for the 2015 elections in terms of procuring materials, training and emoluments for other staff, training of it staff in the political e expenses, of political parties during the campaigns were not properly monitored because of non availability of adequately trained staff to cover the entire vast country. The lack of funds coupled with other factors such as the dependence of the INEC on the executive where the president appoints the chairman of

the commission diminishes the will power of any ruling party. This makes the monitoring of campaign finances of political parties in Nigeria an uphill task.

INEC and the Monitoring of Campaign Financing in 2023 General Elections In an unprecedented manner and in consonance with its statutory functions, the Independent National Electoral commission (INEC) has trained and deployed campaign finance monitors in all the states of the Federation in Nigeria (Ojo, 2015). It is note worthy that the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in section 15(c) In addition, section 225 of the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria also gave wide powers to INEC on monitoring of political finance. For instance, section (a)Commission a detailed annual statement and analysis of its sources of funds and other assets together with a similar statement of its expenditure in such form as the commission may require. In the context of the 2023 election, INEC assigned observers to scrutinize the campaigns of political parties and candidates, ensuring adherence to all relevant laws, regulations, and codes of electoral conduct. To determine the amount of money spent by the parties and the candidates, it was painstaking to track the money spent on billboards, posters, and jingles in the media. Furthermore, political parties, candidates, and media outlets were given campaign finance tracking forms by INEC, which they were required to fill out and submit no later than six months prior to the general elections (INEC 2024: 122). Ojo, (2022) assets that monitoring campaign finance had been one of the weak points of INEC as the commission has hitherto demonstrated incapacity to perform this onerous

task. To him, in spite of capacity building and technical support from organization like IFCS the commission was largely limited itself to annual audit of the finances of the registered political parties. This lackluster performance has attracted wide of the reason Nigerian politics has become highly monetized or what some analysis have elections comes the merging of the political party monitoring and liaison Department with the Election monitoring and observation unit to form election and political monitoring Department, Ojo (2022) further stated that the current leadership of the elections and political monitoring (EPM) has taken a number of practical steps in order to enforce campaign finance regulation it is decided to held the power given to it in section 153 of the electoral Act 2010, as amended to issue subsidiary legislations, Regulations for political parties? There is a part of the guidelines which stipulated procedures for candidate financing. This section stated among other things that all candidates shall notify INEC of all fund-raising events at vast seven days before such event, disclose to the commission records of all contributions and other sources of funds for their campaign, as well as records of expenditure in a prescribed format issued by the commission and that all candidates shall submit detail audited returns of their campaign expenses to the commission within six months after an election. Idowu (2015), INEC has put structure in place to tackle expenditure, that structure did not exist in 2011, and much could not be done in that regard. The commission appears to be in dilemma when it comes to tracking and slamming candidates who exceed the stipulated amount fixed for campaign spending as it can only act after the action has been.. For we can only know

whether a person has over spent, when he or she has spent it. This shows that INEC can only work within the framework of the law. INEC does not have the capacity to handle the magnitude of electoral offenses.

Orji, Eme and Nwoba (2014) asserts that illegal practices have been orchestrated during all the elections conducted in the fourth Republic in Nigeria from. For instance, in 1999 those who eventually became its flag bearer turned in over N400 million (Saffu, 2003:23) held above the amount stipulated by the then existing electoral law. In its assessment report of the January 2003 primary elections, the transition monitoring Group a coalition of civil society organization bitterly complained that during the primaries by the PDP, the All Nigerian Peoples Party (ANPP) the All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA), there was wide spread bribery of delegates with sack stuffed with money to influence their organized fund raising ceremony to construct a new secretariat in Abuja. At the occasion, businessmen such as Femi Otedola and Aliko Dangote were reported to have contributed N1 billion and N3 billion respectively. While strabag, one of the construction companies in Nigeria donated N100, million. there was an anonymous donation of N100 million (Okocha and Taiwo, 2008). Despite the fact that these and other donations to politics parties contradict the electoral laws no action was instituted by the INEC to prosecute the ailing parties and individual either because the electoral body did not monitor the parties or lacked the mini and capacity to take legal action against them.

2.6 EMPIRICAL REVIEW

The Independent National Electoral Commission

The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) is the national electoral body in Nigeria which is responsible for the overall supervision and conduct of general elections in the country including other related procedures such as registration of voters, delineation of constituencies, setting dates for conducting for elections, registration and de-registration of political parties as well as supervision and monitoring of political parties and regulations of campaign activities and elections. It was established in 1999 with the resurgence of democratic rule in Nigeria after more than a decade of military rule. As a result of the failure of the previous electoral umpires, INEC was in the beginning established to be independent and transparent according to the Constitutional clause that established the Commission. The Establishment of the Independent National Electoral Commission The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) was established by the Nigerian military in 1998 under Decree No 17 of 1998. On 5th August 1998, the Commission was passed into law where it was stated that: “The Federal Military Government hereby decrees as follows: There should be a body known as the Independent National Electoral Commission to be referred to according to this Decree as the “Commission.” The Commission shall be a body that is corporate with perpetual succession, and may sue and be sued in its corporate name”. The Decree later became famously known as the Independent National Electoral Commission Establishment Decree 1998.

The origin of electoral commissions in Nigeria started from the colonial period when the Electoral Commission of Nigeria (ECN) was established to conduct the 1959 General Elections that led to the ushering of political independence. The entire First Republic (1960-1966) elections were conducted by ECN. The ECN was dissolved after the first military coup in 1966. In 1978, a new electoral commission was established named the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) by the military regime to conduct the 1979 General Elections. The FEDECO remained the electoral umpire in the country until after the military coup of 1983 which ended the Second Republic (1979-1983) in Nigeria and introduced another military rule for many decades (INEC, 2017). In 1990, the Military Regime of General Ibrahim Babangida established the National Electoral Commission (NEC) which conducted the controversial June 12, 1991 Presidential Election that was annulled by the same Military Regime leading to the emergence of what was called the “Aborted Third Republic” in Nigerian political history. The Military Regime of General Sani Abacha dissolved NEC and established the National Electoral Commission (NECON) in an attempt for another civilian rule that failed before the actualisation as a result of the eventual death of General Sani Abacha. In 1998, General Abdulsalami Abubakar’s Military Administration dissolved NECON and introduced the decree that led to the establishment of INEC as the current electoral body in the Fourth Republic (1999-date). On realizing the state’s domination and control of the electoral umpire and politicization of the body, the decree sought to make the Commission independent in structure and in terms of financing as the name implied. However, INEC was far from

being independent in terms of the conduct of elections particularly the 2003 and 2007 General Elections which were bedeviled with huge outcries of rigging and irregularities at both the local and international levels. The reasons behind such a negative phenomenon are explained in later sections. Powers and Functions of the Independent National Electoral Commission Section 225 Sub-sections 1-6 and Section 226 Sub-sections 1-3 of the Nigerian 1999 Constitution empower INEC to monitor and supervise all electoral and financial activities of political parties and their members according to its periodic discretion. In addition, Section 88 and its Sub-sections of the 2010 Electoral Act empower INEC to monitor and sanction parties financially in terms of its income and expenditure. Section 91 Sub-sections 1-7 empower INEC to set limits to maximum campaign spending for various elective offices at the federal, state and local levels and Section 92 Subsections 1-7 provide for INEC to sanction any party or person that violates the provisions of Section 91. Other Sections in the Electoral Act 2010 empower INEC to monitor and regulate all activities and finances of political parties and candidates that contest for any elective office. Thus, the above legal provisions bestowed much power on INEC over political parties and contestants but the problem was whether such powers were efficiently utilized or not.

INEC was expected, according to the decree that established it, to perform the following functions:

1. Organise, conduct and supervise all elections and matters pertaining to elections to, all the elective offices provided in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended or any other enactment or law;
2. Register political parties in accordance with the provision of the relevant enactment or law; Monitor the organisation and operation of the political parties including their finances;
3. Arrange for the annual examination of and auditing of the funds and accounts of the political parties and publish reports on such examination and audit for public information; Conduct the registration of persons qualified to vote and the preparation, maintenance and revision of the register of voters for the purpose of any election;
4. Monitor political campaigns and provide rules and regulations which shall govern the political parties; Ensure that all Electoral Commissioners, Electoral and Returning Officers take and subscribe to the oath of office prescribed by law; Delegate any of its powers to any State Resident Electoral Commissioner and carry out such other functions as may be conferred upon it by a decree or any other enactment or law.

The above functions have been undertaken by INEC since 1999 although some might not have taken place or were dismal in terms of implementation. From this One can simply conclude that the rules are fully operated and INEC is really independent, it has all the

powers to sanction a fair and credible election in Nigeria, but with this the elections are followed with lamentations of lack of credibility and series of litigation.

The Independent National Electoral Commission is headed by the Executive Chairman who is appointed by the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria after approval by the National Assembly. There are 12 National Commissioners with 2 drawn from each of the six geo-political zones (North-west, North-east, North-central, South-west, South east and South-south). The Commission comprises of seven (7) departments and thirteen (13) outstanding committees and state offices in the 36 states headed by a coordinator. The above explanation is presented in a chart for clarity of expression and conveniency of understanding.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter explain the method, and process, design that the researcher used to conduct this investigation. It gives a detailed description: The research design, area of study, population of study, sample size, and sampling technique, method of data collection, instrument for data collection, method of data analysis.

3.1 RESEARCH DESIGN

A research design is a methodical approach or plan that a researcher uses to address a hypothesis or question. It outlines the procedures, methods, and resources a researcher uses to collect, analyze, and assess data. An efficient research design improves the data validity, reliability and generalizability. In this study, a case study methodology was applied. A case study design entails a through and comprehensive examination of one or more examples in context of real-world situation. A case study design allows the researcher to concentrate on a particular case or cases, allowing for a thorough examination of **INEC and the challenges of monitoring political party campaign financing in Nigeria**. By using this method the researcher was able to identify subtleties and complexity that large quantitative investigation could miss.

3.2 POPULATION OF THE STUDY

The largest population, from which the sample is really drawn, is referred to as the population of study. It represents the larger area of interest that the researcher intend to look into. A greater range of characteristics such as age, location, occupation and other relevant attributes, can be present in the population of interest.

The base population of women and men in Edo state, is 1,495,800 according to National population census 2006; and according to demographic projection in 2024 was 1,757,000.(NPC 2006)

3.3 SAMPLE SIZE AND SAMPLING TECHNIQUE

Sample size is defined as the number of observation used for determining the estimation of a given population.

Sampling technique refers to a method used to select a subset of individuals or entities from a larger population for a research or data collection relevant to the research question technique to get the data.

This study adopted the Cochran (1977) sample size determination formula to calculate the sample size.

$$N = \frac{Z^2 \cdot P(1-P)}{E^2}$$

Where N=Sample population

Z= Statistics level of confidence(1.96)

P=Expected prevalence (0.50)

I=Constant

E=Marginal error(0.05)

$$\frac{= 3.8416[(0.050(0.50))]}{=384.16}$$

The sample size determined through the above formula was 390 respondent.

In this study, a non-probability sampling technique was used in selecting men and women from Edo state. Since it was a public opinion survey, respondent where selected for the study. This was necessary because of the unavailability of sampling frame.

3.4 INSTRUMENT OF DATA COLLECTION

The instrument for this research is a questionnaire designed by the researcher. The instrument is titled **“Questionnaire on INEC AND THE CHALLENGES OF MONITORING POLITICAL PARTY CAMPAIGN FINANCING.** The instrument will consist of two part. Part 1 is meant to elicit demographic information about the respondent, part 2 is made up of four sections meant to gather information concerning the

research topic and will be made up of 4 items each given a total of 16 items in the questionnaire. The respondent are married. The instrument is a 4 point rating scale, where the respondent is to tick either “strongly agree”, “agree”, “disagree”, “strongly disagree”

3.5 VALIDITY OF THE INSTRUMENT

To ensure content validity of the instruments, the researcher’s supervisor and two expert in the Department of Political science in Faculty of Social science, University of Benin, Benin city, Edo state validated the instrument. The experts carefully examine the relevance of the instrument in other to ensure that the instruments measure what it is intended to measure and to ascertain the appropriateness of the instrument.

3.6 RELIABILITY OF THE INSTRUMENT

In other to ensure the reliability of the instrument, the test split half reliability method was adopted. The questionnaire was conducted using respondent outside the target population. Twenty (20) female outside the sample size were administered the questionnaire within a period of two weeks. The score obtained from both exercise will be correlated using the cronbach’s Alpha statistic tool which was 0.641.

3.7 METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION

The researcher administered the questionnaire to the respondents who are expected to respond to all items by ticking one of the options from the response columns. Completed questionnaires were collected as soon as they were filled by the respondents.

3.8 METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS

Data analysis entails the consideration of the observation of data obtained into descriptive statements. It is simply concerned with how the researcher intends to process the data obtained and apply them in testing the hypothesis as well as to justify choice of the selected analytical technique.

The data collected from the respondent was analyzed using the mean (\bar{x}) standard deviation (SD), and two sample independent T-test. The mean and standard deviation were used to answer the data collected for the research question while a two-sample independent T-test was used to test the hypothesis at a 0.05 level of significance. The decision rule was based on the mean value of 2.50 such that calculated means (\bar{x}) equal to or greater than 2.50 was regarded as high extent while any mean (\bar{x}) less than 2.50 was regarded as a low extent.

CHAPTER FOUR

PRESENTATION OF RESULTS AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

This chapter deals with presentation of results and discussion of findings. The results of the analysis are presented in the order of the research questions that guided the study.

4.1 Presentation of Results

Research Question One: What are the source of fund for political parties?

Table 1: Distribution on the nature of source of fund for political parties.

S/N	Item	SA (%)	A (%)	D (%)	SD (%)	Mean	SD	Remark
1	Membership dues and registration fees are a major source of funding for political parties in Nigeria.	168 (47.2)	124 (34.8%)	76 (13.1%)	28 (5.0%)	3.72	.573	Disagree
2	Political parties in Nigeria rely heavily on donations and contributions from individuals and organizations.	124 (34.3)	212 (47.1%)	44 (9.2%)	20 (6.7%)	3.52	.580	Agree
3	Fundraising events organized by political parties provide significant financial support for their activities.	108 (33.1)	232 (52.6%)	24 (5.5%)	36 (8.8%)	3.34	.772	Disagree
4	The sale of party materials (such as uniforms, badges, or publications)	188	120	56	36	3.42	.642	Agree

	serves as a viable source of party income.	(50.2)	(32.4%)	(12.1%)	(8.1%)			
5	Political parties in Nigeria invest in business ventures or own properties that generate additional revenue.	132 (35.2)	124 (32.4%)	92 (20.3%)	68 (15.5)	3.50	.614	Disagree

Cluster mean=3.50 Criterion mean ≥ 2.5 is accepted; ≤ 2.5 is rejected

Source: Fieldwork, 2025

The result in Table 1 the source of fund for political parties with the mean rating ranging from 3.34 to 3.72 while the standard deviation also ranges from .573 to .772. The highest mean of 3.72 indicates that membership dues and registration fees are a major source of funding for political parties in Nigeria.. The mean 3.52 shows that Political parties in Nigeria rely heavily on donations and contributions from individuals and organizations.. The mean 3.50 shows that Political parties in Nigeria invest in business ventures or own properties that generate additional revenue.. The mean 3.42 shows that The sale of party materials (such as uniforms, badges, or publications) serves as a viable source of party income. The lowest mean of 3.34 indicates Fundraising events organized by political parties provide significant financial support for their activities.

Research question two: Does INEC monitor political campaign?

Table 2: Mean and standard deviation showing if INEC monitor political campaign.

S/N	Item	SA (%)	A (%)	D (%)	SD (%)	Mean	SD	Remark
1	INEC ensures that political parties comply with campaign spending limits.	92 (17.7%)	188 (36.0%)	48 (9.2%)	72 (13.8)	3.54	.579	Agree
2	INEC officers are visible and active during political campaign activities.	144 (24.0%)	156 (26.0%)	60 (10.0%)	40 (6.7%)	3.42	.575	Disagree
3	Political parties submit their campaign finance reports to INEC as required by law.	168 (28.6%)	122 (19.0%)	80 (14.3%)	40 (7.1%)	3.20	.535	Disagree
4	INEC's monitoring helps to prevent hate speech and campaign violence.	96 (20.7%)	124 (26.7%)	108 (23.3%)	72 (15.5)	3.26	.565	Disagree
5	INEC has adequate resources to monitor all political campaign activities nationwide.	132 (26.7%)	116 (23.4%)	64 (12.9%)	88 (18.0%)	3.12	.689	Agree

Cluster mean=3.50 Criterion mean ≥ 2.5 is accepted; ≤ 2.5 is rejected

Source: Fieldwork, 2025

Results in Table 2 reflects if INEC monitor political campaign in Edo State, with the mean value ranging from 3.12 to 3.54 while the standard deviation also ranges from .535 to .689. the mean of 3.54 shows that INEC ensures that political parties comply with campaign spending limits. The mean of 3.42 shows that INEC officers are visible and

active during political campaign activities. The mean of 3.26 shows that INEC's monitoring helps to prevent hate speech and campaign violence. The mean of 3.20 shows that Political parties submit their campaign finance reports to INEC as required by law. The lowest mean of 3.12 shows that INEC has adequate resources to monitor all political campaign activities nationwide.

Research question three: What political laws and finance regulations are available to political parties in Nigeria?

Table 3: Mean and standard deviation showing if political laws and finance regulations are available to political parties in Nigeria.

S/N	Item	SA (%)	A (%)	D (%)	SD (%)	Mean	SD	Remark
1	Political parties in Nigeria comply with the financial reporting requirements set by INEC.	212 (50.2%)	120 (30.2%)	48 (11.3%)	20 (8.2%)	3.10	.789	Disagree
2	INEC effectively monitors the sources of income and expenditure of political parties.	144 (38.2%)	196 (38.6%)	40 (13.5%)	20 (9.7%)	3.10	.789	Disagree
3	The law prohibiting foreign donations to political parties is adequately enforced.	13(37.8)	156 (33.5%)	44 (11.7%)	68 (17.0%)	2.80	.948	Disagree
4	The Political Parties Code of Conduct helps to promote transparency and accountability in party financing.	168 (48.9%)	184 (32.4%)	16 (12.1%)	32 (8.1%)	2.92	.886	Disagree
5	The Electoral Act (2022) clearly defines rules on campaign funding and expenditure limits for political candidates.	108 (35.2%)	140 (32.4%)	68 (20.3%)	84 (15.5%)	2.96	.832	Agree

Cluster mean=3.50 Criterion mean ≥ 2.5 is accepted; ≤ 2.5 is rejected

Source: Fieldwork, 2025

The results in Table 3 reflects the political laws and finance regulations are available to political parties in Nigeria in Edo State, with mean value ranging from 2.80 to 3.10 while the standard deviation also ranges from .789 to .948. The mean 3.10 indicates that Political parties in Nigeria comply with the financial reporting requirements set by INEC. The mean 2.96 indicates The Electoral Act (2022) clearly defines rules on campaign funding and expenditure limits for political candidates. The mean 3.10 INEC effectively monitors the sources of income and expenditure of political parties. The mean 2.92 The Political Parties Code of Conduct helps to promote transparency and accountability in party financing. The lowest mean of 2.80 indicates that The law prohibiting foreign donations to political parties is adequately enforced

Research question four: What are the challenges faced by INEC and other regulatory bodies in monitoring political campaign financing?

Table 4: Mean and standard deviation showing the challenges faced by INEC and other regulatory bodies in monitoring political campaign financing

S/N	Item	SA (%)	A (%)	D (%)	SD (%)	Mean	SD	Remark
1	INEC faces difficulties enforcing campaign finance laws and regulations.	168 (47.2%)	124 (34.8%)	76 (13.1%)	28 (5.0%)	3.72	.573	Agree
2	INEC lacks sufficient funds and manpower to monitor campaign financing nationwide.	124 (34.3%)	212 (47.1%)	44 (9.2%)	20 (6.7%)	3.52	.580	Agree
3	There is poor coordination between INEC, EFCC, ICPC, and other regulatory bodies on campaign finance oversight.	108 (33.1%)	232 (52.6%)	24 (5.5%)	36 (8.8%)	3.34	.772	Agree
4	Many political parties and candidates fail to disclose their true campaign expenditures.	188 (50.2%)	120 (32.4%)	56 (12.1%)	36 (8.1%)	3.42	.642	Agree
5	Political interference undermines the independence of INEC and other monitoring agencies.	132 (35.2%)	124 (32.4%)	92 (20.3%)	68 (15.5%)	3.50	.614	Agree

Cluster mean=3.50 Criterion mean ≥ 2.5 is accepted; ≤ 2.5 is rejected

Source: Fieldwork, 2025

The result in Table 4 reflects the challenges faced by INEC and other regulatory bodies in monitoring political campaign financing in Edo State with the mean rating ranging from

3.34 to 3.72 while the standard deviation also ranges from .573 to .772. The highest mean of 3.72 indicates INEC faces difficulties enforcing campaign finance laws and regulations. The mean 3.52 INEC lacks sufficient funds and manpower to monitor campaign financing nationwide. 3.50 shows that Political interference undermines the independence of INEC and other monitoring agencies. The mean 3.42 shows Many political parties and candidates fail to disclose their true campaign expenditures. The lowest mean of 3.34 indicates There is poor coordination between INEC, EFCC, ICPC, and other regulatory bodies on campaign finance oversight.

4.2 Discussion of Findings

Question one shows that Political parties gets their funds through various means which includes payment of Membership dues and registration fees, relying heavily on donations and contributions from individuals and organizations, Fundraising events organized by political parties provide significant financial support for their activities, The sale of party materials, and also investing in business ventures or own properties that generate additional revenue are the various ways political parties get fund to finance their activities

Question two shows if INEC monitor political campaign according the response gotten through the questionnaire it shows that INEC have monitored political campaign by ensuring that political parties comply with campaign spending limits, officers are visible and active during political campaign activities, and also ensuring political parties submit

their campaign finance reports to INEC as required by law through these various medium they have been able to monitor the activities carried out by political parties.

Question three shows that majority of the respondent disagree that political law and financial regulation are available. INEC does not monitor the source of income and expenditure, Law to prohibit foreign donation have not been followed, Parties do not comply with the law because INEC have been seen as a weak institution .

Question four shows that INEC is faced with lots of challenges that have not made them to fully monitor activities of political parties. These challenges includes the fact that INEC lacks sufficient funds and manpower to monitor campaign financing nationwide, there is poor coordination between INEC, EFCC, ICPC, and other regulatory bodies on campaign finance oversight, Many political parties and candidates fail to disclose their true campaign expenditures, Political interference undermines the independence of INEC and other monitoring agencies. These have made them not to be able to carry out the duty of monitoring political parties.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION

5.1 SUMMARY

Nigeria have been fraught with various levels of corruption, and has often puts the credibility of our elections to question. Apart from disempowering a lot of people it also raises a lot of moral issues relating to the sources of these funds. Although laws exist on political parties and campaign financing since the return of democratic governance in 1999, the challenge has constantly remained that of enforcement. The 1999 constitution and other regulatory laws such as the 2002, 2006, and 2010 Electoral Acts, all have explicit provisions which guide not just the funding of political parties, but clearly espouse the maximum spending limits of campaign finances for candidates for every political office. Besides, the Act also specifies the limits of contributions individuals and corporate organizations could make to a candidate

The roles of INEC include conducting elections, registering of political parties and campaign financing. In addition, the study submitted that lack of capacity, in effectiveness of Electoral Acts, non-disclosure of financial reports by political parties, lack of adequate manpower and trained staff among others are some of the challenges confronting Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) in Nigeria. Finally, the study uncovered the underlying challenges encountered by INEC in monitoring campaign

financing during elections it highlight the need for further reforms and improvements. Addressing these challenges is critical to ensuring the transparency and integrity of Nigeria's electoral process in Edo State..

Additionally, the Act also requires political parties to submit separate audited reports of campaign expenses to INEC six months after an election. However, these provisions have constantly been contravened to the consternation of INEC by individuals, parties, etc. For INEC to be able to monitor political parties campaign fund they must implement the Act that guides the activities of political parties.

5.2 RECOMMENDATION

Recommendations are put forward to the INEC, political parties, civil society organizations (CSOs) and policy makers for implementation.

1. The INEC is saddled with some many responsibilities and in line with this, the commission should be divided into three (3) commissions, one, Independent Election and Campaign Financing Commission (IECC) that will totally be in charge of monitoring campaign finances and expenses of all registered political parties. Second, Independent Electoral Prosecutions Commission (IEPC), that will prosecute offenders that defy constitutional provisions on campaign finances and other related electoral offences. They will be charged with the responsibility of arresting, charging and prosecuting offenders.

Third, another commission will be charged with the responsibility with registering political parties and conducting elections in the country.

2. The Electoral Act should be amended to strengthen existing mechanisms on campaign finances, where some gaps exist. Legislators should ensure that candidates that candidates that have exceeded their spending limits during campaign are prosecuted and upon conviction, are disqualified from contesting in future elections. Such a stiff penalty would dissuade politicians from flouting laws on campaign financing.

3. INEC and government should provide technical capacity to Election and Political parties monitoring (EMP) and campaign finance tracking department to adequately and effectively monitor campaign financing of all political parties across the country and to ensure transparency and accountability in the financial reports of parties. The capacity of INEC should be strengthened to deal with problems of campaign financing and adequately built to keep proper records of financial transactions.

4. The media and the civil society organizations (CSOs) have a key role to play in sanitizing and closing loopholes in campaign finance legislations. There is need to adequately train media practitioners in the provisions of the Electoral Act so that they can appropriately enlighten the public and also expose erring political parties and their candidates who violate the act. CSOs are also in a better position to monitor campaign financing of respective political parties and their candidates and bring to public knowledge.

5. INEC should be provided with adequate and well-trained staff to effectively monitor campaign financing across the country, in addition to proper funding and logistic support.

6. The above recommendations if taken into cognizance and implemented will not only go a long way in improving the roles of INEC in monitoring campaign financing but will also ensure sustainable electoral democracy and good governance in Nigeria.

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APPENDIX

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

UNIVERSITY OF BENIN, BENIN CITY

QUESTIONNAIRE ON

INEC AND THE CHALLENGES OF MONITORING POLITICAL PARTY

CAMPAIGN FINANCING IN NIGERIA.

Dear Respondent,

Request to fill Questionnaire

I am an undergraduate student of the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Science, University of Benin, Benin City in Edo State. I am presently carrying out a research study titled ‘**INEC and the challenges of monitoring political party campaign financing in Nigeria**’ Kindly help to complete the questionnaire as your frank response will help this research . It is purely for academic purpose and the information you provide will be treated as confidential and will be used only for the purpose of this research.

Thanks for your cooperation

Yours, faithfully

Anthony oyedo

Please, kindly respond to the items below by ticking () that which you agree with.

SECTION A:Demographic characteristic of participants

1.Sex: Male [], Female []

SECTION B:

KEYS

SA= Strongly Agree

A= Agree

D= Disagree

SD= Strongly Disagree

S/N	What are the source of fund for political parties	SA	A	D	SD
1	Membership dues and registration fees are a major source of funding for political parties in Nigeria.				
2	Political parties in Nigeria rely heavily on donations and contributions from individuals and organizations.				

3	Fundraising events organized by political parties provide significant financial support for their activities.				
4	The sale of party materials (such as uniforms, badges, or publications) serves as a viable source of party income.				
5	Political parties in Nigeria invest in business ventures or own properties that generate additional revenue.				
2	Does INEC monitor political campaign?				
1	INEC ensures that political parties comply with campaign spending limits.				
2	INEC officers are visible and active during political campaign activities.				
3	Political parties submit their campaign finance reports to INEC as required by law.				
4	INEC's monitoring helps to prevent hate speech and campaign violence				
5	INEC has adequate resources to monitor all political campaign activities nationwide.				
3	What political laws and finance regulations are available to political parties in Nigeria?				
1	Political parties in Nigeria comply with the financial reporting requirements set by INEC.				

2	INEC effectively monitors the sources of income and expenditure of political parties.				
3	The law prohibiting foreign donations to political parties is adequately enforced.				
4	The Political Parties Code of Conduct helps to promote transparency and accountability in party financing.				
5	The Electoral Act (2022) clearly defines rules on campaign funding and expenditure limits for political candidates.				
4	What are the challenges faced by INEC and other regulatory bodies in monitoring political campaign financing				
1	INEC faces difficulties enforcing campaign finance laws and regulations.				
2	INEC lacks sufficient funds and manpower to monitor campaign financing nationwide.				
3	There is poor coordination between INEC, EFCC, ICPC, and other regulatory bodies on campaign finance oversight.				
4	Many political parties and candidates fail to disclose their true campaign expenditures.				
5	Political interference undermines the independence of INEC and other monitoring agencies.				