NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (R2P): A STUDY OF THE IMPLEMENTATION AND NON-ENFORCEMENT OF THE 3RD PILLAR OF R2P PRINCIPLES IN THE LIBYAN AND SYRIAN CRISES (2011-2024) IN PERSPECTIVE

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ABSTRACT

The human rights law, which evolved over the years has necessitated adrift in international law towards humanitarian intervention. Hence in the Post-Cold war era, increasing global consciousness of human rights relations has come to the front burner of the international community as never before. Therefore, the issue of intervention in another state for humanitarian protection purposes has been very contentious. Consequently, humanitarian intervention has been transformed accordingly. The doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is the aftermath of many years of diplomatic bargaining on how and under what situation or circumstances the international community can intervene in another sovereign state to protect the lives of citizens. The doctrine of R2P was advanced by Kofi Annan, the then UN Secretary General and propagated by states in the international community, NGO's prominent individuals to address the issue of mass atrocity crimes occasioned by intrastate conflicts usually perpetuated by dictatorial governments. It emphasised the sanctity and the immunity of sovereign human rights, as well as the moral obligations of the international community to intervene in extreme cases of convulsions that boggled human existence, conscience and reasoning and consequently altered the general understanding of sovereignty by giving a novel redefinition of the concept as 'responsibility to humanity'. Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine is a three major pillared consensus paper that was created and authorised at the New York World Summit meeting in 2005 by all member states of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) to act as a structure, standardized operational framework, mechanism or guideline for preventing the occurrence or commitment of mass atrocity crimes by state leaders against their own people. The research problem under investigation is focused on the accomplishment of the application of the third pillar of R2P principles which is that "United Nations Security Council (UNSC) are legally permitted to use military force as a last resort to prevent atrocity crimes globally". Unanimity was achieved for a forceful military intervention in Libya. Contrarily, fragmentations due to core national strategic interest of the permanent five UNSC members states has hampered the collective execution/implementation of the third pillar of R2P belief in Syria. Utilizing political realism, game theory and chicken game as a framework to operationalize the literature; the main aim of this qualitative and quantitative case study is to investigate the instrumentalities of R2P in enforcing peaceful resolution of crises in Syria since the civil war started in 2011. The research question of this study evaluated the enforcement of R2P third pillar principles in Libya and Syria since 2011-2024 to prevent atrocity crimes. This research study used both primary and secondary qualitative structure to source, collect, examine and analyse vital information on R2P principles. Descriptive coding design was used to code the data and similar words, phrases and philosophical values or perspectives were analysed and created into patterns and themes for a proper analysis. The research outcomes reveals that the complications and disparities of implementing the third pillar of R2P doctrines in Libya and its non-enforcement in Syria notwithstanding the humanitarian crisis particularly meted on the vulnerable civilian casualties and mass displacement of the population has resulted in the non-intervention in Syria to save the civilian populations and lack of will to implement international relations policy objectives between states to unanimously resolve crises in the UNSC floor which is a failure of the doctrine and what the future holds for R2P is now questionable. It is therefore recommended that there is need for the R2P doctrine to be fine-tuned and restructured and should in case the UNSC is hamstrunged to acts where action is required to perform its duties as in the case of Syria, imposition of arms embargo on major warring parties and actors as an alternative international

bodies, groups or regional organisations shall be considered, accommodated and empowered enough to be effective to enforce the tenets of R2P third pillar in order to safeguard and protect mass civilian population lives against mass atrocity crimes and for the overall maintenance of international peace and security according to the UN Charter.

Keywords: UN Security Council, Libya, Syria, Sovereignty, Responsibility to Protect

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 PREAMBLE

The “doctrine, of Responsibility to Protect (R2P); is indeed a three-pillared document that emerged from the World Summit meeting in 2005 within the United Nations. The principle was developed as a guideline for forceful military intervention and protecting civilians in failed or failing states. The doctrine is that all state governments must protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and other crimes against humanity” (Gholiagha, 2015:1074). The tragedies in Rwanda, Srebrenica and Kosovo, gave the R2P concept momentum and impetus which prompted Kofi Atta Annan, the then acting Secretary General of the United Nations (UN) to issue a challenging question to all member states of the United Nations stating clearly and definitely that “humanitarian interventions are unacceptable and considered a knock and violation on the principle of sovereignty” and inquiring how the UN should "respond to mass atrocities, particularly after the failings of the UNSC [United Nations Security Council] in Rwanda, Srebrenica and Kosovo?" (UN Department of Public Information, 2012:1).

Responding to Annan’s speech, in 2001the Canadian government created the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which established the guidelines for protecting the citizens of member states (ICISS, 2001). In 2004, Annan endorsed the “emerging norm of R2P” through the panel on *High-Level Threats, Challenges and Change* (UN Department of Public Information, 2012:1). Koffi Atta Annan confirmed the idea and existence of a concerted international obligation and further postulated that the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) should be a constituted and daring body only as a last resort, if mass atrocities and killing to exterminate people have been confirmed to have been committed and a state has

manifestly failed or neglected in its commitment to safeguarding its people, either voluntarily or involuntarily.

The panel identified some basic criteria and instrumentalities to legitimately authorize the use of force by the UNSC: (a) the seriousness of the threat, (b) the last resort option, and (c) a proportional response (UN Department of Public Information, 2012). In addition, all member states of the UN approved the conventional doctrine of R2P and unanimously agreed that if a state has manifestly refused to meet its duties, then all member states in the international community must protect the threatened people of mass atrocity crimes when all peaceful means have been exhausted. In the case of Syria in 2012, she eventually met the requirements of a failed state according to the three pillars of R2P. After exhausting all peaceful means (i.e., diplomatic pressure, early warning, arbitration, mediation sanction and Humanitarian intervention), the international community, via the UNSC and the UN Charter (1945:2) should have acted collectively in a "timely and decisive manner" at the beginning of this crisis.

According to the UN Security Council (2011:3-4), the three pillars of R2P are as follows:

1. “The State carries the primary responsibility for protecting populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing, and their incitement.
2. The international community has a responsibility to encourage and assist States in fulfilling this responsibility.
3. The international community has a responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian, and other means to protect populations from these crimes. If a State is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the international community must be prepared to take collective action to protect populations, by the UN Charter.”

In this work, the researcher will examine the enforcement of Pillar 3 which is the utilization of force for humanitarian protection purposes in the Syrian crisis when all diplomatic and nonviolent efforts have failed to answer the proposed research questions. The forceful application of Pillar 3 has been a highly controversial concept of the R2P amidst the Syrian debacle. “Russian and China used their veto power to block all resolutions proposed by the West on Syria” (Grover, 2015). Grover opined that “this gamesmanship was a tactic that would hinder on the use of force, whereby no peace will be achieved as an option”. Kolmašová (2016) further explained that a lack of consensus on what constituted an adequate response, as well as limited prospects of a successful outcome, have prevented an international response to the humanitarian crisis in Syria.

The UNSC was ideologically divided into two axes along the frontlines. The permanent three comprise the USA, U.K, and France (FR) against the permanent two which includes Russia and China, couldn't form a formidable frontier to obtain a vote of unanimity, specifically following the sad Libyan incident. After holistically analyzing the dejected and apologetic intervention in the Libyan fiasco, Kolmašová came to the inevitable conclusion that “the Libyan case had two fundamental differences from the Syrian case: (a) The Russians and Chinese callenged the West on what they believed to be regime change; and (b) no regional support for the Gaddafi regime. If Pillar 3 were to have legitimacy and legality, one of the main criteria was to achieve consensus among the permanent five members (P5) within the UNSC: The United States, United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia. The UNSC needed to act collectively to maintain peace and security. All other member states rotate on the UNSC; however, they did not have permanent statuses, and thus have no *veto power.”*

Roberta Coen (2015) noted that invoking Pillar 3 of the R2P doctrine required that all permanent members, either through abstinence or actively voting for implementation, agreed on the merits of

the intervention. However, although there was unanimity of purpose attained in the Libyan catastrophe of 2011, gaining similar consensus on the use of Pillar 3 in Syria (2011) became difficult. Scholars such as Mahesh Senadeera (2023) and Gabriele Lombardo (2015) have identified political interest as a reason behind non application of R2P in Syria. To Mahesh Senadeera (2023), the commonest challenge with R2P which is also political in nature is the complex balance of power system where powerful states choose or not choose to intervene on the basis of strategic interest. At the group level this power politics interplay with the ability of the members of the Security Council to make collective decisions for the protection of world civilians. Gabriele Lombardo (2015) opined that the UNSC was handicapped in adopting a resolution for a forceful intervention since Russia and China already issued no veto. Meanwhile, R2P is the philosophy advanced within the international society as the principle for mediation and intervention to protect the civilian population at risk of mass atrocity crimes and other related crimes against humanity.

It was at the Global Summit in 2005, that the UN members generally recognized states and agreed on the imperative of responding collectively to crises situations involving mass atrocities. Consequently, The R2P beliefs arose as a regulation for the UN to respond collectively to crises that imperilled world peace and security. There were four major problems areas addressed by the World Outcome Document (WOD): which includes (a) sustainable development (social, economic, and other related fields), (b) peace and collective security, (c) human rights and the rule of law, and (d) strengthening of the UN by enhancing its authority to respond to the challenges of time. Peace and collective security, where a major part of the common intent and purposes of the UN Charter, and are at the core of the R2P doctrine (Tsagourias, 2020).

Furthermore, the stated shared interests of the UN Charter (1945) showed the need for maintaining international peace and security. Chapter 1 of the UN Charter explains the "common purposes and interests" of the UN, and the common theme is to maintain peace and security (Lee, 2012). The R2P doctrine emerged as the vehicle through which the UN fulfilled its obligations under the UN Charter (1945) to maintain peace and security within the international community. However, the controversy lies in the fact that in the antecedents and the historical dynamics of international relations, the state has an absolute right to sovereignty as well as the R2P dynamics of concentrating on the fundamental human rights of civilians as being sovereign. On the whole, this contradiction between state sovereignty of non-interference which the UN Charter preaches and the intervention system which R2P preaches raises complexities and complications that have hindered the forceful implementation of Pillar 3 in nearly all the ongoing global impasses or wars, especially in the case of Syria (Tsagourias, 2020). Moreso, the present state of affairs or status quo in the system of international relations has seen the world in 'an appellation' of nation-states comprising of boundaries, though it is the civilian populace that makes up these countries, which the R2P principles are concerned about. Taking a critical look at this concept, the R2P principles have vigorously contended with state sovereignty as the centrifugal focal point in international relations, thereby shifting the focus to the individual (Tsagourias, 2020). Lee (2014) explained that "the major purpose of R2P is to undermine the principle of exclusive sovereignty and the notion that no other state has the right or responsibility to interfere in how it treats its people, especially by force. Individual rights, particularly basic human rights, should not be minimized by the notion of state sovereignty. Power specifically within the international realm of "real politiks" obscures any challenges to state sovereignty, even if it means capitulation to mass human atrocities.

Grover (2015:1115) explained:

> At what point those human rights violations (threatened or actual) are egregious enough to warrant UN Security Council involvement via the use of authorized threats of or use of force to prevent and/or end such international atrocity crimes is of course very much coloured by political and strategic State interests. Hence, as we all know, the international community has since World War II tolerated many mass atrocities of varying scales in diverse States on more than one continent

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The third Pillar of R2P principles indicates that when all peaceful and diplomatic means are crippled and drained to resolve a particular crisis, such as we have in the case of Syria, then using force as an instrument for engagement by the UNSC as a viable last resort, or option. Using force as an intervention tool however, has been so disputed between member's states of the UNSC especially relating to Syria. Several research enquiries showed that enforcing Pillar 3 in Syria was very contentious and complex. For instance, Bailey (2014) posited that" implementing Pillar 3 in Syria is contentious because there are no belligerent acts on both sides". Children (2012) "stated that Syria was not a good candidate for Pillar 3 because the four criteria needed for success (i.e., an international mandate, a coalition of the willing, regional support, and a credible opposition force) were not present." Coen (2015) explained that "the only way to protect the civilians in Syria was to classify them as refugees, thereby making them eligible for protection under R2P."

Numerous researchers have furnished a distinct viewpoint on implementing Pillar 3 in the Syrian crisis. Grover (2015) "argued that the implementation of R2P by threat or force is justified when it comes to the purposes of the UN Charter" (1945). Vanhullebusch (2015) articulated that "military intervention through Pillar 3 should be implemented through regional organizations, as

backed by the UNSC". Kolmašová (2016) "suggested that the failure to act in Syria was not a failure of R2P but of the imperfect actors and institutions charged with its implementation".

The war in Syria has set the peaceful coexistence and security of the Syrian people along with the nations immediately in the propinquity of this crisis in danger. Death mass dispersion and migration of people from Syria created apprehension and border pressure in Europe, Jordan and Turkey. Internal displacement generated inhumane living conditions. The use of chemical weapons further worsened the agony of the Syrian people. Coen (2015) suggested that "the world was witnessing the greatest refugee crisis since World War II, where conflict, violence, and human rights violations have displaced millions of people, primarily due to the ongoing civil war in Syria. In addition, the number of fatalities was at least 560,000, with 6.7 million refugees and 6.2 million people who were internally displaced". According to the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P), "Syria had the largest number of people forcibly displaced by any conflict in the world; as of 2020, an estimated 12 million Syrians continue to remain in dire need of humanitarian assistance" (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 2019).

Although R2P was guided by the three pillars to prevent/stop mass atrocities in states with leaders who fail to meet their responsibilities to protect their citizens, the achievement of consensus to implement Pillar 3 within the UNSC has allowed the crisis to manifest (Bellamy & Williams, 2006: 497). Norooz (2015) cited several areas in the world where civilian populations were at risk of mass atrocities and living in failed states. In the circumstance, as stated by the provisions of Pillar 3 of the R2P doctrine, Syria is a failed state with a breakdown of law and order; therefore, the challenge is a lack of study on policy by the UNGA to implement by enforcing Pillar 3. When the UNSC could not unanimously reach a consensus, and when all efforts at mediation and arbitration have been depleted, thereby permitting the crisis to persist

unabated. Besides, the literature further suggested that "a gap exists in implementing Pillar 3 of the R2P doctrine". On the whole, the problem that this study anticipated to analyse, is the inability of the UNSC to forcefully implement Pillar 3 of the R2P doctrine in total, which allows the use of force to safeguard civilian populations at risk from further hardship and mass atrocities. The study resolved this gap by examining whether or not the R2P doctrine failed in Syria, determine how the non-enforcement of Pillar 3 in Syria have been impacted by the existence or otherwise of viable policy alternatives to achieving consensus in the UNSC on implementing Pillar 3 on a case-by-case basis.

1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The objectives of this study are as follows:

1. To investigate the instrumentalities of R2P principles in enforcing peaceful resolution of crises in sovereign states.
2. To evaluate the successes and failures of R2P's implementation in the sovereign state of Libya
3. To assess the humanitarian impacts of the crisis in the sovereign state of Syria

1.4 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The following are the research questions:

1. What are the instrumentalities of R2P principles in enforcing peaceful resolution of crises in sovereign states?
2. What are the successes and failures of R2P's implementation in the sovereign state of Libya?
3. What are the humanitarian impacts of the crisis in the sovereign state of Syria?

1.5 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES

Ho^1 there is no relationship between R2P principles and peaceful resolution of crises in sovereign states

Hr^1 there is a relationship between R2P principles and peaceful resolution of crises in sovereign states

Ho^2 there is no relationship between R2P successes and solving the crisis in the sovereign state of Libya

Hr^2 there is a relationship between R2P successes and solving the crisis in the sovereign state of Libya

Ho^3 there is no relationship between humanitarian impact and solving the crisis in the sovereign state of Syria

Hr^3 there is a relationship between humanitarian impact and solving the crisis in the sovereign state of Syria

1.6 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The significance of the study is to fill a gap in the literature by understanding and promoting policies and procedure that allows for the proper implementation of Pillar 3 when consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter (1945), specifically in terms of the maintenance of the international peace and security. If all other diplomatic and peaceful means of mediation, negotiation and arbitration have been exhausted, the UN still must proffer a workable committed solution to mass atrocity crimes being committed. Some world Leaders and people demand alternative policies and strategies allowing for the UN general assembly to systematically organize regional organizations, powerful regional states, alliances or coalitions of the willing to implement or enforce Pillar 3 with a majority of support from UN/UNSC members' states,

notwithstanding a veto or not from a P5 member. The policy strategy and impact may revolve around being able to circumvent the UNSC when it's unable to obtain consensus on enforcing Pillar 3 to prevent mass atrocity crimes from manifesting as it has been in Syria.

1.7 SCOPE OF THE STUDY

The study would cover time when the Syrian crisis began in 2011 to 2021. It is hoped that this time frame would allow the researcher to deeply investigate the pillar 3 of the R2P in Syria, whether or not it is applied in Syria as it was in the case of Libya and whether or not it has positive or negative outcomes in Syria**.**

1.8 CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION

Collective security: Collective security is a system of maintaining world peace and security by concerted action on the part of the nations of the world (Thakur, 2016).

Exclusive sovereignty: Lee (2014) "explained exclusive sovereignty as the idea that a sovereign state has autonomy within its territory and that no other state has the right or responsibility to interfere in how it treats its people, especially by force of arms".

Internally displaced person (IDP): IDP describes an individual who has not crossed an international frontier, but has fled their home, for whatever reason (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2014).

Jus cogens: Lappin (2014) defined the actions of using chemical weapons on the Syrian population, as *jus cogen*s norms that amount to a crime against humanity, from which no state may derogate in its actions.

Just war theory (JWT): Parsons (2013) "stated that war under certain conditions can be morally justified. There are three principles parts of JWT: (a) *jus ad bellum*, the justice of resorting to war; (b) *jus in Bello*, just conduct in war; and (c) *jus post bellum*, justice at the end of war". Norooz (2015) explained that "JWT needs two conditions to be satisfied, to justify intervention: (a) the right reasons and (b) mass loss of civilian life".

Nation-state: The term nation-state conjoins the political entity of a state to the cultural entity of a nation from which it derives its political legitimacy to rule and it's status as a sovereign state (Guibernau, 2013).

Popular sovereignty: Grover (2015) referred to "sovereignty being derived from the people, not something automatically given to those in charge. Popular sovereignty is in direct contestation with the notion of state sovereignty because power lies with the people, instead of the regime".

Refugees: This term describes people who have crossed an international frontier and are at risk or have been victims of persecution in their country of origin (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2014).

Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Doctrine: R2P is the enabling principle that first obligates individual nation-states and then the international community to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.

Sovereignty: Sovereignty refers to the right of each state to manage domestic affairs free from external interference (Bailey, 2014). Article 2(4) of the UN Charter (1945) described sovereignty as "territorial integrity and political independence" (as cited in Bailey, 2014:. 109).

State responsibility: State responsibility is defined as the obligations a state has to the international community to maintain peace and security (Borelli, 2017). Internal focus is the responsibility on the part of the state to protect its people, while external focus is the

responsibility of the international community to act when the host state is unwilling or unable to do so (Bailey, 2014).

Westphalian system: This global system is based on the principle of international law that each state has sovereignty over its territory and domestic affairs, to the exclusion of all external powers, and that each state is equal in international law (Teschke, 2002).

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 THE CONCEPT OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

Several scholars have attempted to give a concise definition of humanitarian intervention, yet there is no unison. Hood (2015:616) stated that although several scholars have attempted to define humanitarian interventions, "consensus for a universal definition has proven difficult." Hood (2015: 616) further articulated some examples of these definitions: (a) The doctrine of humanitarian intervention is defined as the responsibility imposed on the international community to protect nationals of another state from inhumane and cruel treatment within their state, (b) Humanitarian intervention is meant to protect fundamental human rights in extreme circumstances; it is not meant to protect or promote civil and political rights, and (c) The use of armed force by a state (or states) to protect citizens of the target state from large-scale human rights violations there."

Humanitarian intervention refers to armed interference in one state by another state (s) with the objective of ending or reducing the suffering of the population within the first state. It refers to a state of using military force against another state when the publicly declared aim of the military action is ending human rights violations perpetrated by the state against which it is directed (Marjonovic, 2011). It is the use of force actions across state borders by a state, or group of states, aimed at preventing or ending widespread and gross violations of the fundamental human rights of citizens of another country without the permission of the state in whose territory force is applied (Holzgrafe and Keohane, 2003).

Humanitarian intervention first began to appear in the international legal literature after 1840. Two particular interventions were most directly responsible. The intervention Greece by England;

France and Russia's intervention in 1827 to stop Turkey massacre and oppression of the Greek's revolt for independence; France's intervention in Syria in 1860 to protect the Maronites. In 1876, Russia also intervened in Turkey in response to Ottoman bloody response and massacre of Bulgarian insurgents against Turkish rule (Brownlie, 1979). Such gross human violations included genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, crime against humanity and other atrocities involving loss of lives on a massive scale; interference with the delivery of humanitarian relief to endangered civilian populations; the collapse of civil order entailing substantial loss of lives in situation where it is impossible to identify any authority capable of granting consent to international involvement to help restore order (Catter and Trimble, 1999).

Murphy (1996:11-12) described humanitarian intervention as "the threat or use of force by a state, group of states or international organization primarily for the purpose of protecting the nationals of the target state from widespread deprivation of internationally recognized human rights, whether or not the intervention is authorized by the target state or the international community." The classic nature of Murphy's definition makes us to submit that, the intervention with the consent of the target state can rightly not be referred to as humanitarian intervention, but rather, humanitarian assistance whether arms were deployed or not. And if done with the consent of the target state, it is our submission that territorial sovereignty of that state is not violated.

John Stuart Mill observed that "a government which needs foreign supply to enforce obedience from its citizens is one which ought to exist, and the assistance given to it by foreigners is hardly anything but the sympathy of one despotism with another" (cited in Walzer, 1977).

Blackford (2014:7), "defined humanitarian intervention as "the threat or use of force across state borders, without permission, by a state or a coalition of willing states, aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of fundamental human rights." Humanitarian

intervention arose as the foremost plan to fight against mass atrocity crimes after the armistice which ended the cold war. During the 1990s (precisely in the 20th century). Various national confrontations existed which were believed to be a danger to the peace and security of the universal system.

Gholiagha (2015) contended that the 1990s were characterized by both successes and failures to protect individual human beings from mass atrocities and severe human rights violations. In Somalia, Rwanda and Kosovo, the UNSC adopted resolutions recognizing the necessity for interventions based on some type of humanitarian claim

Gholiagha (2015: 1076) further explained the following:

> Resolution 794 justified the use of force in Somalia on humanitarian claims. In Rwanda, Resolutions 918 and 925 authorized UN assistance but fell short to call the crisis a 'genocide' due to the reluctance of the U.S. and some European states. In addition, in Bosnia, Resolution 819 which called for the protection of civilians in the town of Srebrenica, by establishing a haven, saw over 7000 men and boys killed

The twist in the shackles of episodes started unfolding when the UNSC resolved to defend the Kurdistan civilian population in Northern Iraq in 1992. Gholiagha (2015:1075) found that "Resolution 767, which was the first resolution that the Security Council avowed, ensured that grave violations within the country or severe emergencies can be evaluated as a threat to peace or international security." Uday Saddam Hussein Al Majid al Tikriti used biological and chemical weapons on the Kurdistan population, thus violating their fundamental human right to safety and security. Nonetheless, these acts, by Saddam didn't come bereft of aftermath outcomes for Saddam Hussein, which ultimately caused anxiety within the international community of states.

Gholiagha (2015) also found that questions started to emerge from these humanitarian interventions by the international community and the focus was on consensus.. The intervention

in Kosovo by Yugoslavia, a unilateral action led by North Atlantic Treaty organization NATO, was interrogated seeing that it lacked UNSC authorization of the act. Similarly, the action, of the Somalia conflict was christened 'Operation Restore Hope' enhanced humanitarian claims, and was consentaneously endorsed with one accord by the UN Security Council(UNSC), but was carried mainly as a NATO alliance operation led by the US. In Rwanda, there was very little international political will, after the events in Somalia, and the reluctance by the international body to forcefully intervene led to the Rwanda genocide against the Watutsi (Tutsis).

Orford (2013:94) explained that "humanitarian intervention is not a doctrine that "responsible states" wanted to adhere to because it was capable of uncontrollable abuse." The impending matter in question amid former rivalries of the Cold War hostilities started to resurface, casting doubt on questioning the lawfulness of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Oxford, further "explained that "both the Brezhnev doctrine and the Reagan doctrine both sought to protect the right to intervene on behalf of their social ideological beliefs and were both met with scepticism and protest. In short, the literature has shown that some emerging states have identified humanitarian intervention, in terms of imperialism and colonialism".

Lee and Chan (2016:181) deduced the following:

> "Based on the history of abuse by Western powers during the ages of imperialism and colonialism, where the Westphalian ideologies of state-centred sovereignty in international relations lie at the centre of international relations, humanitarian intervention should not be used to impose regime change. Colonialism has hurt the reaction, to the use of force as an intervention tool, by China and India. Lee (2015) explained that through their historical trauma and postcolonial colonial identity, "the use of force by powerful states against inferior states has caused China and India much consternation."

In Somalia, Ruanda and Kosovo, the UNSC adopted resolutions acknowledging the necessity for interventions predicated on certain types of humanitarian claims. Resolution 794 justified the use of force in Somalia on humanitarian grounds. In Rwanda, Resolutions 918 and 925 authorized UN aid but refused to call the crisis a 'genocide' due to the unwillingness of the United States of America and some other European states. Again, in Bosnia, "Resolution 819—which called for the protection of civilians in the town of Srebrenica by establishing a 'safe have resulted in the deaths of over 7,000 men and boys' (Gholiagha, 2015).

2.2 THE CONCEPT OF R2P

In December 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was created by the Canadian government in reaction to the question put forward by the then Secretary-General of the UN Kofi Annan. After the humanitarian crises in the late 1990s, Annan presented the UN members with the question of when, how and why responding to humanitarian crises would be by the principles and purposes of the UN (UN Charter, 1945:1). The ICISS (2001:1) found the following:

> That sovereignty not only gave a State the right to 'control' its affairs, but it also conferred on the State's primary "responsibility" for protecting the people within its borders. It proposed that when a State fails to protect its people either through lack of ability or a lack of willingness the responsibility shifts to the broader international community.

This framework of R2P doctrine thus established the guidelines for the use of military force as a last resort and the intervention tool to protect citizens at risk of mass atrocities. The doctrine of R2P set of beliefs includes three principles that guide the international community in protecting civilian populations who are vulnerable to or currently at risk of suffering mass atrocities. There

are just a few well-accepted theories on protecting individuals where their human rights are rightly considered to have been violated.

Marrone (2015) “examined the impact of R2P regarding human security and human rights, where the global community has a responsibility to protect civilians during conflict and post-conflict”. The doctrine of R2P has been advanced from other theories that have embraced the protection of vulnerable populations and their fundamental human rights viz: human security, humanitarian intervention, and global governance.

Hobbes (2010), Locke (1947), and Bodin (1992) explained “their thoughts on social contract theory, and the League of Nations (1920–1946) attempted to avert conflict and maintain peace and security” (as cited in Shapiro, 2010). The main purpose behind the R2P doctrine is to hold nation-states answerable to the international community for the maintenance of international peace and security. This, however, was not the first attempt by the international community to hold nation-states liable for such a despicable act. The R2P doctrine was the theory that emerged within the bounds/confines of the most recognized international authority the United Nations (UN) to address those contraventions of peace contrary to the common intent purposes and principles of the UN General Assembly (2005).

The Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 accepted nation-states in a world where every nation was governed either by an absolute monarch, tribal chief, or a theocratic hierarchy (Patton, 2019). Westphalian sovereignty was based on the concept of a sovereign state, governed by a sovereign ruler, that was based on establishing prejudice in international affairs against interference in another nation's domestic business” (Patton, 2019:91). Nonetheless, the world has developed to include governments that are more typical of the people, including political bodies like the U.S. Congress, parliament, Senate etc., disregarding, if they are democratic systems, monarchical,

republics, despotic rule of dictatorship, or some other type of political entities. Consequently, the nation-state became the major means by which people identified and recognised themselves within the international society. The Treaty of Westphalia stood as the precursor to future international treaties, and to the development of international law in general (Patton, 2019).

Philosophers Thomas Hobbes and John Locke were some of the earliest seminal thinkers to believe that nation-states, or the sovereigns thereof, had some type of responsibility to protect their citizens (Shapiro, 2010). Hobbes (2010) "believed in the rights of individuals and the equality of all men, and he subscribed to the notion that the contract that exists between men and the prevailing authority, only holds, as long as the authority can provide protection" (Shapiro, 2010). Differing from Hobbes (2010), Locke (1947) "believed that rulers only derive their authority through the consent of the people, as power is delegated and can be removed for violating the terms of that trust" (Shapiro, 2010). However, these early philosophers accepted that the protection of individual fundamental rights was a major part of the 'social contract' between the predominant sovereign authority and their people.

The League of Nations which was in force between (1919 to1946) is one of the most popular attempts by the international community at cooperation and collective security to maintain international peace and security across the world. The three main objectives of the League were (a) to ensure collective security, (b) to assure functional cooperation, and (c) to execute the mandates of peace treaties (Tsagourias, 2020).

Despite early successes recorded, the League of Nations failed to prevent the invasion of Manchuria by the Japanese military, the annexation of Ethiopia by Italian forces in 1936, and that of Austria by Hitler in 1938 (Aleksovski and Bakreski, 2014:276). The powerlessness of the League of Nations to prevent further world conflict, the alienation of part of its member states,

and the generation of the war itself added to its demise from 1940 (Mingst and Karns, 2012:21.). Although the League of Nations sought to prevent conflict through cooperation and collective security, the crises that led up to World War II helped to return some nation-states (i.e., Germany, Italy, and Japan) to the traditional system of defensive alliances and power blocs (Oudenaren, 2009:3). By the end of World War II, the Triumphant Allies' were determined to create a new organization, the United Nations (UN), which had many structural similarities to the League of Nations. Summarily, after World War I, the international community established the 'League of Nations for nation-states to have a forum to ventilate and communicate their grievances to each other to avoid conflicts that might lead to another world war (Yurtsever and Hmaidan, 2019).

On June 26, 1945, the United Nations (UN) was created by the Allies after their victory in World War II. The preamble of the UN states the common purposes and principles of the organization, which bore many similarities to that of the League of Nations. The first sentence of the UN Charter (1945**:**2) cites the goal is "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind." The League of Nations deliberated upon the avoidance of a repeat of a devastating war." Each one of the documents discusses the maintenance of peace and security through cooperation and collective security. The UN Charter (1945) "charged the UNSC with providing that collective security". Chapter 7 of the Charter specifically "discusses the actions available to the UNSC when there are breaches of the peace". After the Cold War, as discussed earlier, those breaches of the peace began to be recognized more in the form of individual fundamental human rights. The mass atrocity crimes committed in Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda and Kosovo rekindled the beginnings of a change in thinking where individual sovereignty, at most times, would challenge the notion of state sovereignty. These events resulted in a ferocious argument about the rationale of the responsibility of the

international community to forcefully intervene in another sovereign state with the guise of protecting civilian populations, according to the common purposes and principles of the UN Charter.

Walzer (1977) posited Just and Unjust Wars as a challenge to the arguments made both by realists and by international lawyers within those debates, urging that the commitment to state sovereignty and the prohibition on the use of force in international relations must give way in situations where those principles hamper the defence of human rights or self-determination (Orford, 2013: 83). After these crises in the 1990s, the Department for International Development in Security recommended the development of a more effective international system. The two points of emphasis were the following:

> (a) Since the Cold War, the UN plays a vital role in promoting global security, and despite taking on a larger role in peacekeeping and peace building, there have been failings in preventing/stopping 'large-scale ethnic cleansing and genocide; and (b) The international community must act to protect ordinary people from catastrophic suffering and violence. Although protecting citizens is the primary duty of each state, the international system must be able to respond when states fail in their responsibilities to protect ordinary people" (UN Charter, 1945: 17).

Soon after these crises of the 1990s, (20th century) the ICISS (2001) submitted the R2P report to Kofi Annan. This report was designed to address those failings mentioned by the Department for International Development to protect "ordinary people" from mass atrocities.

The R2P was universally accepted by the members of the UN at the 2005 World Summit (UN General Assembly, 2005). At the world summit, leaders endorsed and adopted the outcome document. Through the UNSC, the members of the international community will assume the Responsibility to Protect through peaceful and diplomatic means. When such peaceful means fail,

notwithstanding, the UNSC must be ready to take 'collective action in a timely and decisive manner', according to the UN Charter (1945). The major theoretical proposition for R2P is the 'protection of civilian populations in failed or failing states, where human rights and human dignity have been violated'. The R2P doctrine states that "the international community has an obligation to the civilians living inside failing states, as opposed to and subjected to the traditional notion of sovereignty. Additionally, the use of force to protect civilians may be required if all other peaceful means have been exhausted" **(**ICISS, 2001**)**.

The shifting of paradigms from state-centred to individual-centred rights, based on the common purposes listed in the preamble of the UN Charter (1945), lies at the core of the R2P doctrine. Grover (2015) argued that the implementation of R2P by threat or use of force is justified when it is consistent with the purposes of the UN Charter (1945). It shows that the UN, by the R2P principles, placed the rights of individuals above the rights of single-state sovereignty, where states have failed, neglected or are unable to fulfil their responsibilities to accordingly sustain and maintain international peace and security.

The crisis in Syria continues unabated to create tension in the international community and if unattended, it is most likely to lead to more mass migration, poor living condition, internal displacement, and excessive fundamental human rights violations that has violated the peace and security in the region, and subsequently creating more instability and chaos within the international system. Theoretically, the R2P charges individual states and the international community to maintain peace and security, as outlined in the three pillars of the R2P doctrine and by the common purposes of the UN Charter (1945). Grover (2015) articulated that all member states must protect fundamental rights as stated by the common interests of the UN Charter (1945). According to the terms, conditions and definitions of the R2P doctrine, Syria

should be classified as a failed state. Haven't exhausted most, if not all, peaceful means to end this crisis. Implementing Pillar 3 and allowing the UNSC to use force should have been the next step according to the letters of R2P principles taken to end the suffering of the Syrian civilian population. The UNSC established precedence with R2P doctrine in the Libyan crisis, and despite similar circumstances, hovering over them however, the reaction by the UNSC in Libya and the subsequent reaction in Syria was very different.

The R2P principles created expectations for nation-states to uphold their responsibilities to provide safety and security for their citizens. If a state manifestly fails in these same responsibilities, then that responsibility should be taken over by the international community.. Additionally, if all peaceful means have been exhausted, then the UNSC's use of force is deemed justifiable; this establishes that forceful interventions should not reside only in cases of self-defence (UN Charter, 1945). Crises that place civilians at risk due to mass atrocities and have repeatedly disrupted international peace and security, such as the situation we have in Syria beginning in 2012, fall under the canopy of Pillar 3 measures.

2.3 INSTRUMENTALITIES OF R2P IN ENFORCING PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF CRISES IN SOVEREIGN STATES

2.3.1 The Pillars of R2P

The three pillars of R2P as stated in the 2009 report by the then UN Secretary-General; Kofi Annan on the issue and which is set out "in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document (WSOD)" (Jennifer, Welsh, 20 10) and the inter-governmental agreement to the doctrine, outlined the Protection Responsibility of States, as seen in paragraph 138 of the 2005 (WSOD), the UN members state unanimously agreed to "uphold the responsibility to protect its population from genocide, a war crime, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity"

to prevent mass atrocity crimes (Welsh, 2010). On International Assistance and Capacity – Building, the international community commits to assisting states to fulfil R2P before crises break out. Such measures include "granting development assistance, aiding states 'security sectors and building mediation and dispute resolution capacities." (United Nations Sec. Gen. Report, 2009). The Timely and Decisive Response, concerning paragraph 139 of the WSOD report, is "a well-timed and collective reaction by the international community" (Micheal, 2009). These pillars refer to Chapter vi, which is (pacific measures) while chapter vii, refers to (the coercive use of force on erring states who deliberately neglect or refuse to provide protection and fulfil their obligation to their citizens in case of mass atrocity crimes. It suffices to note that these three-pillared approaches are intended to reinforce and not undermine state sovereignty . . . "By helping states to meet their core protection responsibilities, the responsibility to protect seeks to strengthen sovereignty, not weaken it. It seeks to help states to succeed, not just to react when they fail". (UN Sec. Gen. Report, 2009).

It was at the world summit of 2005 that "all UN member states including Russia and China who had earlier raised concern over state sovereignty, unanimously agreed for the establishment of the principles of responsibility to protect" (Wheeler, 2000). On the whole, the R2P is a global commitment principle concerned with protecting the civilian population from ethnic cleansing, war crimes, genocide and other crimes against humanity. The United Nations Security Council's approval of any action under this principle is the continuous maintenance of international peace and security.

These Six elements gave rise to the three pillars of R2P. These three pillars are the responsibility to prevent; the responsibility to react; and the responsibility to rebuild" (ICISS, 2001). Consequently, ICISS also set a standardised mechanism on the right military intervention, for the

UN Security Council and other member states of the General Assembly (GA) to abide by, namely:

1) The Just Cause
2) Right Authority
3) Right Intention
4) Proportional Means
5) Reasonable Prospect
6) Last Resort.

On the Just Cause, there should be “serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur.” (ICISS, 2001) Also, “The military action has to be approved by the Right Authority, with the Security Council outlined operational principles" (ICIS, 2001; Sigma, 2013). However, the purpose of the intervention must be done with a genuine motive and Right Intention to stop or prevent human suffering. The military means must not exceed what is proportionally necessary for scale, duration and intensity "to secure the defined human protection objectives. (ICISS, 2001)"Similarly, "the chances of success must be reasonably high and prospective" (ICISS, 2001; Sigma, 2013). The "military intervention can only be justified when every non-military operation for the prevention or peaceful resolution of the crises has been explored and taken into account with reasonable grounds to believe that only military action would work in that situation as a Last Resort" (ICISS, 2001; Sigma, 2013).

However, the three pillars of R2P carries equal capacity and strength without any layout planned modalities or sequence for enforcement or implementation as to which pillar should be applied first when responding to any crisis situation of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and other atrocity crimes against humanity. Meanwhile, the prevention of these atrocity crimes mentioned

above is the major trust of the three pillared approaches before the atrocity crimes occurs and spread out harmfully to other parts of the world. For instance, pillar one which is the protection responsibilities of the state emphasizes that "the states have the major and primary responsibility to protect her citizens or civilian population from genocide, war crimes ethnic cleansing and other atrocity crimes against humanity." Consequently, in January of the year 2007, Banki-Moon took over as the secretary – General of the United Nations. He being an advocate of the R2P principle published a report in January of 2009, entitled implementing the 'Responsibility to protect' where he conspicuously outlined his 'master plan' by way of recommendations to the UN for putting the responsibility to protect doctrine into practice as following:

- "To ensure that there are effective mechanisms put in place by states for handling domestic disputes.
- To protect the right of women, youths and minorities within their country.
- The proper domestication and implementation of relevant international law treaties on human rights, international humanitarian laws and refugees laws as well as the Rome statute of the international court of justice.
- To engage in a process of self–reflection, assessment and examination to understand how Responsibility to protect principles can be appropriately integrated into the state.
- Working to improve states conditions which helps to uphold their responsibility to protect, such as with the police, military, judiciary and legislators to improve the rule of law and the protections of human rights.
- To work with the civil society and international organizations to facilitate the development of the responsibility to protect" (APCR2P, 2009).

Again, for pillars Two- International Assistance and Capacity-Building to states, it emphasizes the major role and commitments of the international community to provide assistance to states with the abilities to develop their capacities to protect their civilian populations from war crimes, ethnic cleansing, genocide and other atrocity crimes against humanity. According to pillar two, the international community is to help state under stress before the outbreak of crisis or conflicts, and further insisting that 'prevention of crisis is the panacea to preventing criminal atrocities.'

Furthermore, BanKi-Moon then UN Sec-Gen made more recommendations to states viz:

- "Giving support to the UN and Sub regional organizations which have mechanisms for dialogue, education and training on human rights and humanitarian standards
- Promote region-to-region learning about the responsibilities to protect, including education about which strategies and practices works best to prevent genocide and other mass atrocities.
- Encourage countries to give money towards programs which will improve conditions for the responsibilities to protect, such as military reforms and the improvement of the rule of law.
- Create regional "rapid–response joint civilian and military teams' to help states in which there is growing conflicts" (ICR2P, 2009).

Pillar Three Concerns itself with a timely and Decisive Humanitarian Response action by the international community to prevent genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and other crimes against humanity when a particular member state is failing or unable to protect its civilian population.

However, BanKi-Moon proposed some number of steps for the UN regional or sub regional organizations to implementing pillar three as follows:-

- ❖ “The security council and the UN General Assembly can appoint a fact.- Finding missions to investigate and report on alleged violations of international law. The Human Rights council may also send a fact – finding mission as well as appoint a special representative or ‘rapporteur’ to advise on the situation.
- ❖ “These missions could provide an early warning of humanitarian crises and negotiate with leaders of states where a crises is about to occur or occurring.
- ❖ Regional and global cooperation to ensure increased and more effective collaboration between the UN, regional and sub-regional organizations, Including matters, to do with capacity-building, sharing and early – warning capabilities.
- ❖ “Consideration by the UN of developing a UN ‘rapid-response’, military capacity to confront imminent or actual atrocities” (GCRP, 2019).

The UN Secretary General report also emphasized that early warning of conflict capacities would also be crucial for the responsibility to protect principles in order to prevent mass atrocity crimes before they occur.

2.4 BETWEEN HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND R2P

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the UN General Assembly (UNGA) began to lose their reputation in the eyes of men who questioned their credibility under the old humanitarian intervention principle after it failed to respond to the Iraq, Srebrenica, Rwanda and Kosovo crises respectively. In a bid to restore its battered image, Kofi Annan who was the then UN Secretary-General mandated the United Nations General Assembly (GA) "to come up with a new approach for humanitarian intervention” (Wheeler, 2001). He delivered a powerful speech in the year 2000 in which he stated that “if humanitarian intervention is indeed an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica – to gross and

systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?" (Annan, 2000). In other words, the sovereignty of states according to Annan, bestowed by the 1648 Westphalia Treaty is not leverage for human rights violations. Kofi Annan emphasized that "Humanitarian intervention is a sensitive issue, fraught with political difficulty against humanity, where such crimes occur and peaceful attempts to halt them have been exhausted, then Security Council has a moral duty to act on behalf of the International Community. The fact that we cannot protect people everywhere, is no reason for doing nothing when we can" (Annan, 2000). Hence a deliberation on this subject matter "use of force in defence of human rights protected in the UN Charter and customary international law" began (Wheeler, 2001). From the foregoing, therefore, "the intervention rights must be viewed as 'Responsibility to Protect" (UN Sec. Gen Millennium Report, 2000).

Thus, "the sovereignty of human beings over the sovereignty of the state reached its peak when the Canadian government in September 2000 established the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)" (Evans, 2006). The ICISS in December 2001, "formulated and published its report titled 'Responsibility to Protect' as against the 'right to intervene' in cases of mass atrocities" (ICISS Report 2001). The published report downplayed the "old principles of non-intervention and national sovereignty, and thus a re-categorised international response to humanitarian crises" (Evans, 2008). It's based on this report by ICISS that state sovereignty entails "responsibility to their citizens from an avoidable catastrophe like mass murder, rape and starvation. However, when they are unable to do so, the responsibility to protect these citizens must be taken over by the broader community of states" (Evans, 2006). This means that the old maxim of "if sovereignty, then non-intervention" that application under

humanitarian intervention was now replaced by a new dictum of "if sovereignty then responsibility" under R2P (Vincent, 1986: 117).

The humanitarian intervention emphasized a fundamental faith in human rights but without protection, thus R2P has an ideal characteristic of the UN Charter (United Nations, 2014). This 'new emerging norm' of international law, 'Responsibility to Protect' according to the ICISS's report indicates that "sovereigns are under strict obligation to protect and not violate the rights of its subjects and the non-adherence to this principle means the absence of sovereignty". In this way, the R2P principle cannot be viewed as an illegal intervention into a “sovereign entity” because sovereignty is lost and profligate to the international community with the failure of sovereigns to protect their citizens and R2P shall be applied as a last resort after exhausting all diplomatic avenues of peace.

Indeed, ICISS proposed both internal and external responsibilities to states which include the safety, life, and welfare of their citizens at the domestic level, which she will also bear external responsibility to them with regards to the international community through the United Nations (Carsten Stahn, 2007). That is, “When a particular state is clearly either unwilling or unable to fulfil its responsibility to protect, when a particular state . . . is itself the actual perpetrators of crimes or atrocities” or “Where people leaving outside a particular state are directly threatened by actions taking place there" (ICISS Report, 2001). Moreover, "preventive measures" was the most important element of the R2P doctrine. In the commission's report of 2004, any form of military intervention on humanitarian protection grounds is "on exceptional and extraordinary circumstances" (ICISS Report, 2001), and as much to "justified, if serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur" (ICISS, 2001).

2.5 DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND R2P

Humanitarian intervention is different from the responsibility to protect (Chandler, 2011) in five different ways viz: Humanitarian intervention is particularly concerned with the deployment or use of military force with or without the authorization of the Security Council, while R2P primarily adopts a responsibility to preventive measures such as reaction, early warning, sanction, rebuilding, and diplomatic pressure on states to halt the occurrence of ethnic cleansing, genocide, war crimes and other crimes against humanity before they occur. The use of military force may only be carried out as a measure of last resort with the approval of UNSC, if a state manifestly neglects to protect its citizens and when other non-coercive diplomatic measures have failed (United Nations Advisory Council on International Affairs, 2010 and Jide, 2009).

The humanitarian intervention consists of legally binding treaties and conventions, whereas R2P is not. Responsibility to Protect is rooted unwaveringly in existing international laws, especially the ones relating to human rights, armed conflicts, sovereignty, peace and security, such as the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the crime of genocide and states are legally obliged to comply (Lee, 2012).

Humanitarian intervention has been justified in the past in varying situations, like East Timor, Bosnia and Kosovo after the wars broke out, but R2P is concerned primarily with preventing mass atrocity crimes like genocide, war crimes and other crimes against humanity; which are clearly defined in international law and codified in the Rome Statute that established the International Criminal Court (ICC). Ethnic cleansing has not been conspicuously spelt out as a crime under international law but was defined by the UN as “a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian

population of another ethnic or religious group from certain geographical areas" (Human Right Watch, 2004).

Humanitarian intervention confers the "'right to intervene' while the 'R2P' is based on the responsibility to protect civilians. However, both principles acceded to the fact that sovereignty is sacrosanct and not limited. The R2P doctrine shifts away from state-centric motivations to the interest of victims by focusing on the right of states to intervene but on "a responsibility to protect the population at risk" (Holzgrefe, 2003).

R2P ushered in a novel paradigm of sovereignty, moving away from issues of "absolute control" under humanitarian intervention and emphasizing "responsibility' to one's citizens and the wider international community" (Ryan, 2006).

2.6 THE UN CHARTER AND R2P

Grover (2015:1112) suggested the following:

> Here follows then a tentative, but perhaps in some ways an audacious attempt at just such semantic gamesmanship in support of R2P as not only a viable Principe; but one which goes to the heart of the international rule of law, the intent and meaning of the UN Charter and the very credibility of the UN as a mechanism for the promotion of human rights and the achievement of international peace and security

As revealed by Grover (2015), "the literature is in support of using Article 2 of the UN Charter for using R2P as a mitigating factor to use force to stop mass atrocities in Syria. Grover "suggested that implementing R2P by force, if necessary, is permissible under the means permissible per the UN Charter Article 2(4) as it served the purposes set out at Article (1) and (3) relating to safeguarding the rights and freedoms of the peoples of a state. These purposes underpinned the sovereignty of that state". Conversely, Stahn (2013) argued that "using force

under any condition, as per the UN Charter (1945), would require either the notion of self-defence or collective security (consensus within the UNSC)". Regarding Syria, Stahn (2013) 'stated that humanitarianism was invoked as entitlement to justify an action that is 'punitive' in nature, outside the realm of self-defence or collective security." Grover (2015) and Stahn (2013) had opposing views on Article 2(4) of the UN Charter (1945).

Article 2(4) 'stated that all members should refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN" (Grover, 2015). **Grover (2015)** argued that the purposes of the UN were written in Article 1 of the UN Charter (1945). In Article 1, the UN Charter (1945: 3) stated that "to maintain international peace and security, collective measures should be taken to prevent threats and other breaches of the peace, and these actions should be done in the conformity with the principles of justice and international law." Grover (2015) argued that despite what Article 2(4) expressed in the form of refraining from using force against another state, using force in Syria would be inconsistent with the purposes of the UN. Grover suggested that "the UN Charter preamble respecting the fundamental human rights of all human beings may lead to war in certain circumstances. Grover suggested that armed force should not be used, saved for the common interest. Grover concluded that this focus on the 'common interests' was justified in the semantics of Article 1 and Article 2". Grover (2015:1114) explained the following:

> The threat to the Syrian people by the Assad regime triggers the pre-existing 'common interest' to preserve and protect those human rights; and the fact that Article 2(4) requires, by implication, that any threat or use of force be consistent with the UN Charter purposes and principles which includes protection of 'jus cogens norms' including those related to fundamental human rights

In contrast to Grover, Stahn (2013) alleged that invoking the protection of fundamental human rights in Syria indicated the humanitarian intervention model is used to employ the use of force to protect civilians in Syria. Humanitarianism was invoked as entitlement to justify an action that is "punitive" in nature, outside the realm of self-defence or collective security (Grover, 2015: 1115–1117). Grover (2015) and Stahn (2013) differed in their interpretations of the UN Charter (1945) and using force. Stahn (2013) believed in the traditional manner of self-defence and authorization by the UNSC only in a collective manner to use force against another member. Conversely, Grover was willing to use keywords like 'common interests' and 'purposes' and 'principles') to broaden an interpretation of the R2P concept so that when using force, it could be justified as a last resort.

On the whole, authors and scholars has discussed three points of contestation that divided the International Community on using force to prevent atrocity crimes. Firstly, colonialism influences the thinking of BRICS nations, two of which holds 'veto power' within the UNSC i.e, (Russia and China).

Lee and Chan (2016:20) concluded the following:

> That the shared norm of opposing US hegemonic intervention with a hidden agenda of regime change is shaped by a "collective historical trauma" and "postimperial ideology" as a result of their painful colonization at the hands of Western imperialist powers between the eighteenth and twentieth century

At the end of the Cold War era, it was only the humanitarian intervention policy that emerged as the primary instrument to combat mass atrocity crimes regarding fundamental human rights issues. Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia were immediate challenges to international peace and security; thus, intervening through forceful means, therefore, was justified under the humanitarian intervention model. Russia and China, however, became fed up with the escalating

unilateral action by the West. Plakoudas (2015) articulated that “Putin is striving to transform the international system into a multipolar world where the United States will share power with Russia and other powers (e.g., China), rather than operate unilaterally”. In addition, researchers have revealed that the more powerful states in the West, led by the United States and its NATO allies, tend to see a ‘regime change’ as part of the intervention strategy, which only added to the scepticism of the BRICS. Lee and Chan (2016) explained that because of their 19th-century historical trauma and common postcolonial identities, powerful states’ use of force against inferior states has caused China and India much consternation. Secondly, the literature showed the interpretation of the UN Charter (1945) has caused much contestation within the international community. Grover (2015:2) “insisted that such semantic gamesmanship has life-or-death consequences”. Conversely, Stahn (2013) argued that Article 2 indicated, “All members must refrain from using force or the threat of using force against any state or in any manner inconsistent with purposes of the United Nations” (as cited in Grover, 2015:1115–1117). Thirdly, the remaining debate lies in the general notion of public opinion about the UN, which lies in their interpretation of the intent and purposes of the United Nation.

2.7 THE DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGNTY

Sovereignty and human right have generated a lot of controversial debate among states, scholars and opinion leaders in the international arena. The ICISS further reaffirmed this position when it stated that "external military intervention for humanitarian protection purposes has been controversial both when it happened as in Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo as well as when it failed to happen, as in Ruanda." (ICISS 2001). The proponents of sovereignty have articulated that domestic affairs have nothing to do with the international community because it's within the confines of the territorial jurisdiction of a sovereign state with the government.

consequently, this belief has constantly jeopardized the efforts of the international community to intervene in another sovereign state on humanitarian grounds, because it lacked international law requirements and morality to do so.

According to the Westphalia treaties of 1648, the idea of national sovereignty indicates that "states are not legally allowed to intervene in the domestic affairs of each other." (Abiew, 1999). In other words, Sovereignty connotes independence and equality among independent states, irrespective of their powers and sizes in the international system, without any external interference in their domestic affairs except on fundamental international human rights customary laws/treaties, protocols or conventions voluntarily entered into by the state representatives. The ICISS (2001) on the UN charter, views sovereignty as a customary international law which is an "essential component for the maintenance of international peace and security" . . . "Construed as a body of rules established by Princes for the management of their relations with each other" (Omu, et al; 2002).

The prohibition of the threat and the use of force is also enunciated in the principle of non-intervention according to Article 2 (4) of the UN charter when it stated that “All members in their international relations shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the UN” (UN Charter, 1945). The prohibition of the threat and the use of force forbids all forms of aggression or war in the territory of another state. Hence, sovereignty cannot be a shield to UN Security Council intervention when peace and security are threatened or violated.

Sovereignty exists in a state, occupying a geographical area in the international system. Therefore, what is a state**?** Northedge defines "a state as a territorial association of people

recognized for purposes of law and diplomacy as a legally equal member of the system of states. It is, in reality, a means of organizing people for their participation in the international system" (Northedge, 1976). Judging by Article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the rights and duties of states: That "the state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications, (a) a permanent population; (b) defined territory;(c) government and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other states" in the international system (Montevideo Convention, 1934). On this score, "sovereignty must be exercised according to the tenets and principles of international law protection against the violation of fundamental human rights and other crimes against humanity" (Annan, 1999).

A REVIEW OF THE ENFORCEMENT OF R2P'S THIRD PILLAR IN CURBING THE CRISES IN THE SOVEREIGN STATE OF LIBYA

The Libyan crisis which officially started on the 15th of February, 2011 sterns from a combination of factors like the 2011 Arab spring uprising to change bad government across the Maghreb and the Middle East, the collapse of Gadaffi's weak state institution to maintain adequate security in Libya, the proliferation of different armed groups and the involvement of regional and international actors in the conflict. These salient issues combined with existing social economic grievances, job creation, ethnic and regional conflicts and general political instability in the country fueled the civil war (BBC, 2011 and Sloan, 2014).

In fact, Libya was the first case that the security council authorised a military intervention citing the R2P (Pommier, 2011). Following widespread and systematic attacks against the civilian population by the Libyan regime and language used by Muammar Gaddaffi that reminded the international community of genocide in Rwanda, the security council unanimously adopted resolution 1770 on the 2nd of February, 2011, making explicit reference to the R2P.

Deploring what is called the “gross and systematic violation of human rights” in strife-torn Libya, the security council demanded an end to the violence, recalling the Libyan authorities responsibility to protect its population” and consequently imposed a series of international sanctions on the sovereign state of Libya. The council also decided to refer the situation to the international criminal court (UNSC, 2011).

In Resolution 1973, adopted on the 17th of March, 2011, the security council vehemently demanded an immediate ceasefire in Libya, including an end to ongoing attacks against civilians, which it said might constitute “crimes against humanity”. The council authorised UNGA member states to take “all necessary measures” to protect civilians under threat of attack in the country, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory (Lee, 2014).

A few days later, acting on the resolution 1973. NATO planes started bombarding and striking at Gaddafi’s forces. NATO subsequently came under severe scrutiny and criticisms for its behaviour during the air strikes; concerns were raised including the fact that the intervention quickly moved to ‘regime-change following the killing of Gadaffi and that there were allegations regarding aerial bombardments that may have caused more civilian casualties (Bellamy, 2011:40).

Consequently, the civil war in the sovereign state of Libya officially came to an end with the collapse of Gaddafi’s regime on the 23rd of October 2011 following the National Transitional Council (NTC) declaration of the “liberation of Libya”. Although there were still pockets of other factional violence in the country thereafter which is not the focus of this research study.

2.8 TO EVALUATE THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF R2P IN LIBYA

The R2P doctrine was rejuvenated in Libya following its application in the country (Ki-Moon 2012). The UNSC adopted Resolution 1970 after Gaddafi's attacks on civilians and further threatened to commit mass atrocity crimes (Williams, Ulbrick and Worboys 2012). This declaration reasserts Libya's R2P, and consequently alluded it to the International Criminal Court (ICC) which then imposed arms embargo, travel bans and assets freezing of the country and officials treasures, wealth and other belongings. Meanwhile, the violence and brutality to save the populace continued, hence Revolution 1973 was initiated and adopted allowing states to intervene and use brute force to protect the civilian populations in Libya.

However, the application of R2P by the UNSC in Libya was completely within the confines, scope, ethos and spirit of R2P. Besides, this implementation of resolution 1973 by NATO was irreconcilable with R2P doctrine, by advancing further beyond the 'civilian protection directives or instructions' and giving the impression of a 'regime change operation', which has led to lack of trust and confidence in R2P principles with a dare aftermath consequences for any further likelihood of a humanitarian action, steps or measures to resolve the crisis in Syria or anywhere else. Nevertheless, states implementing R2P can still be 'responsible enough' without ulterior motives while protecting and focusing on the aims and objectives of the spirit and letters of R2P principles on the responsibility to rebuild thereby creating the impression that its not mainly about forceful military intervention as a last resort to protect civilians. On the whole, resolution 1970 and 1973 were intelligibly outlined in R2P terms and conditions (Williams and Bellany 2012:276). The Libyan authorities were recalled by invoking resolution 1970 on their responsibilities to protect its population and Resolution 1973 was founded basically on Libya's obvious inability to obey and honour its responsibility to protect its civilian population and the

failure of a peaceful preventative procedures (Williams, Ulbrick and Worboys 2012: 13). Notably, Libya was the first state that force had been authorized by the UNSC for humanitarian protection purposes against the desire of an existing state government apparatus (Bellamy and Williams, 2011).

Formulating the R2P doctrine in the world summit in 2005, state governments in the international system pledged their unalloyed allegiance to take timely and decisive action when necessary to prevent atrocity crimes (Sarkin, 2012). Consequently, the UNSC took action with an extraordinary momentum and impetus in Libya (Zifcak 2012:3). Civil unrest protests and public demonstrations began in mid February 2011 and on the 22nd of the same month, Muarmma Gaddafi swore to 'purge Libya' of these protesters and demonstrators whom he called 'rats' and 'cockroaches' (Zifcak, 2012:63). From the foregoing, just four days later, precisely on 26th of February 2011, Resolution 1970 was unanimously adopted by the UNSC referring to the 'Responsibility to protect doctrine'. Gaddafi wasn't deterred by the threat to use force in Libya instead he threatened to 'show no mercy nor pity for the rebels' who happen to be his own people. Thereafter, Gaddafi prepared a brutal attack on Benghazi (Pommier 2011: 1070). This promoted the adoption of Resolution 1973 on the 17th of March 1973 declaring .Libya's failure and inability to comply with the terms of resolution 1970, thereby authorizing all 'forceful measures necessary' to protect the civilian population in Libya just five weeks after the crisis began, the UNSC adopted two major resolutions against the declining conditions in Libya. R2P doctrine was greatly propagated in order to ensure that the uninspired reaction to the Rwanda and Srebrenica atrocities, which 'embarrassed' the world's powers (Western and Goldstein 2011) weren't repeated mainly when Muaumar Gaddafi disregarded their threats and further labeled the civilian demonstrators as cockroaches and rats signalled a straight reminder and reverberation of

violent atrocities during the Rwanda genocide (Bellamy and Williams 2011: 383). Despite the criticisms to the UNSC for acting too slowly on the above mentioned crisis, some states like the USA on the contrary has been distinguished and criticized as been too anxious to embarked on military action without properly debilitating alternative peaceful measures especially considering her intervention in other states like Grenada, Panama etc (Grey 2008: 56-57). This apprehension was expressly conveyed and considered by Russia, China and their allies at the world summit, that military action must therefore only be approved should peaceful means be exhausted and inadequate" (Grey 2008:139).

According to the tenents of resolution 1970, peaceful means like mediation, travel ban on government agents assets, freezing arms embargo and directing the Libyan authorities to stop any form of violent hostilities to enable humanitarian assistance gets to the civilians population must be employed as peaceful means and a strategy to pressurize the government to end the violence. Besides, its worthy of note that the UNSC for the second time has assigned the ICC to the Libyan situation and the first time unanimity was achieved with the invocation of R2P especially the one that involves the International Criminal Court Tribunal (Stalin 2012: 325). All the strategies as mentioned above where aimed at deterring world leaders from committing atrocity crimes against their people to gain more power (Akhavan 2009: 652). In contrast, O'connel Contends that the international sanction on Libya didn't enjoy a sufficient time for compliance by the Libyan authorities to show beyond reasonable doubts whether these proposed peaceful means would be complied with or not because Resolutions 1970 and 1973 were passed between three weeks intervals when bombings by NATO and aero attacks had already began in Libya. Consequently, O'Connell has strongly ignored R2P essential demands for a 'decisive action' if a particular state is manifestly failing in its responsibility to protect its citizens as stated

in the world summit in 2005 (O'Connell 2011, para 139). However, it was very Obvious that the Libyan state has manifestly failed in its responsibility to protect its civilian population before Resolution 1973 was adopted to because several reports has it that despite the adoption of Resolution 1970 there were still widespread and systematic attacks against the civilian population of Libya (United Nations, 2011) and further revealing how Muarmar Gaddafi's military armed forces has marched to Eastern Benghazi with the blatant threats to commit more atrocity crimes against his own people therein (Williams and Bellamy 2012: 288). Therefore, waiting further for the peaceful means and sanctions on Libya to manifest on the state would have been late and very disastrous following the attacks and deterioration of the situation in the country. As a matter of fact, decisive military action was the only best possible option and proper policies to stop the massacre in Benghazi at the time (Williams and Bellamy 2012:288). Hence authorizing the use of force by resolution 1973 was adopted as a last resort to protect the civilian populations with an international armed incursion by the occupation forces and imposition of a 'no fly zone' on the Libyan airspace. This approval of sanction against Libya was in full connected with R2P principle as 'last resort' due to the manifest failure of the Libyan state to protect its people against atrocity crimes.

Nevertheless, the prerequisites of R2P as articulated at the World Summit are hamstringed by compelling the use of force mission with the authorization of the UNSC in agreement with the UN charter. The argument about NATO's not getting the authorization to use force in Kosovo and substantiated how a commissions authority relied upon the authorization of the UNSC (Grey 2008: 39-51). Moreover, it was generally agreed at the World Summit that adequate force should be used with the collaboration of regional organizations (Grey 2008, Para 139) in order for R2P not to seem like an 'imperialistic' instrument of the most powerful countries in the world

(Bellamy 2010:144). Regional organizations like the organizations of Islamic cooperation, the League of Arab states, Africa Union and the Gulf cooperation council all condemned the violent attacks against the Libyan civilian population and played a vital role at the UNSC's condemnation of Libya and backed the no fly zone imposition on Libya (Dunne and Gifkins 2011:519). Furthermore, they prevailed on the UNSC to take all wholly legitimate and required precautionary humanitarian measures to protect the civilians and the military personnel (Zifcak 2012:5). From the foregoing, its conspicuously visible that the R2P intervention mission on humanitarian ground in Libya alone was an ideal application of the global community's outstanding Responsibility to Protect mass civilian population at risk of atrocity crimes following the adoption of two resolutions on Libya in consonance with R2P principles. Moreover, on the particular prevention of mass atrocity crimes and the dethronement of an authoritarian, powerful and despotic leader like Muarmar Gaddafi. The R2P international interventionist mission in Libya was a huge success especially with Banki-Moon's (2012) estimation and appreciation that 'tens of thousands of lives were saved by the R2P intervention in Libya. Unequivocally, humanitarian protection objectives with R2P are our major area of concentration without ambiguities. This resolution 1973 implementation weakness is also an important factor for subsequent improvements in R2P as an obligation to humanitarian intervention mechanism, hence; it was strongly repudiated by the international community owing to the apprehension that it could be misused by the big super power states to the detriment of the small and weaker countries (Crush, 2014:3). Consequently, these frights were further substantiated with the guise of a humanitarian military operations in Iraq during the 1990's as a precursor for 2003 aggressive military occupation by the U.S and the contentious unlawful intervention in Kosovo by the same U.S (Grey 2008: 36-51).

Despite these shortcomings, R2P doctrine is mainly focused at using force for outstanding humanitarian purposes and not an obligation especially when specific circumstances exist according to the R2P principles; such as the manifest failure of a state and the UNSC authorisation of the use of force, which prompted major sceptical states to reluctantly assent to R2P proposition clauses/sessions at the world summit. These restrictions on R2P interventionist mission would have been perceive to be deeply divisive with unilateral action, self-interest and impromptu ad-hoc action by powerful states (Thakur 2011:13). Meanwhile the seriousness of the Libyan situation at the time made some of these states not to vote against the R2P resolutions in the UNSC even though they were not too comfortable with authorizing the use of force in Libya due to perceived abuses (UNSC, 2011). Resolution 1973 was well and plainly drafted and created to define the scope and limits of intervention to humanitarian protection goals only and hence these states confided in NATO and other western allies to intervene in the spirit and letters of R2P doctrine in spite of these fears allayed by Russia, China and their allies (Thakur 2011:13). NATO intervention in Libya in the guise of R2P was still more concerned about 'regime change' than protecting the civilian population there in Libya **(**Tarnogorski 2012:4). The BBC 2011 reports shows a great deal of arms supply to the Libyan rebels and the Guardian in 2011, also reported attacks by the rebel in the main family house of Gaddafi and killing him on Sunday the 20th of October 2011 at the Western Sirte town of Libya following Nato's attack on his convoy at about 11am in the morning by the rebel forces (Lehal, 2014). These were a sharp deviation from the mandate of R2P principles of intervention goals to protect the civilian population against atrocity crimes (Pommier 2011:1067). Meanwhile the expression means of 'using all necessary means/measures' to bring Muarmar Gaddafi's government down can be a justified action needed at all cost to protect the civilian population in Libya at that time because the ability

to checkmate a recalcitrant dictator's regime is a panacea to attaining the human protection objectives globally (Thakur 2003: 163).

R2P and humanitarian intervention run paripasu especially when comparing its failed application during the late 20th century's genocide and other atrocity crimes in Ruanda, Srebrenica and Kosovo which made several states in the international system to withdraw their support for the doctrine as generally agreed at the world summit of 2005 as a revolt to the abuse of the principle due to their earlier fright that it could possibly be hijacked and abused by the western powers (Bellamy 2009:112). Despite this rebellion by some states against the R2P principles, it was still applied in Libya by operation 'Odyssey Dawn'. Although the manner at which NATO managed their interference has resuscitated the above scepticism by Russia, China Brazil, South Africa, India and their other allies (Pommier 2011:11). The aims and objective of R2P would have taken precedence over other consideration during its application by states in other for it to have a lasting gains over the years to come thereafter, NATO should have been watchful with a standing army ready to attack if atrocity crimes are being committed by Gaddafi against his people without having to be giving support to the rebels in civil war in Libya. This approach delayed the R2P conflict resolution mechanism. Most unfortunately, NATO's adopted application of R2P and its attendant failures completely destroyed the confidence in the doctrine with its aftermath insinuations for R2P's possible utilization or implementation in Syria. Consequently, Russia and her allies vetoed against all resolution for intervention in the Syria crisis following the misapplication of Resolution 1973 (Zifcak 2012:20). According to the Tarnogorki (2012:1) "the negative disposition and withdrawal of support from some states due to the fears of abuse and the unknown by the Western powers could eventually be a death knell for the whole R2P concept". R2P doctrine is supposed to be a force to reckon with in resolution of international disputes and

adding momentum for an appropriate decisive measures for combatting atrocity crimes in the international system just like we saw in Libya, both this act of faithfulness from its members has been lacking in the UNSC just as perceived since the commencement of the Syrian crisis. Therefore the onus or dilemma at the moment now is to reinstate the trust in R2P which must learn to modify its glaring defects and weaknesses amidst its implementation in the Libya civil war. To a great extent, R2P doctrine offers little support to humanity. Apart from using military force according to the R2P principles of Resolution 1973 to 'protecting the civilian population at risk of atrocity crimes' after adopting resolution 1973, this fears was also raised by Russia and her allies in the UNSC. According to UNSC (2011:6-8) "that how will the assets to prosecute the wars of atrocity crimes be gotten, what manner should the military force be constituted, operationalized, applied scope and limit, elements, extent and legal rights of the humanitarian intervention and application of force according to R2P objectives?" (UNSC 2011).

Some of the two ways that, R2P can be reinstated are: firstly, if these proposals of fears raised in Libya are properly considered and addressed during the implementation of R2P , surely, the battered image of the doctrine will be re-established adequately especially when the recommendations is coming from the major protagonists of the concept of R2P. Secondly, that the implementation of R2P in Libya is highly independent on how successful the resolution of the Libyan crisis is (Bellamy and Williams 2011:845). Thus, R2P implementation in Libya is very deficient in the respect of the 'responsibility to rebuild after intervention and assist states from atrocity crimes to rebuild as stated in the World Summit Outcome Document and enshrined in the ICISS report of 2005. The international community and the UNSC has the blame of not rebuilding Libya after the forceful military intervention. Today, the country amongst other disputed states are further drifted into more chaos due to the lack of UNSC efforts to

permanently resolve the conflicts therein. (Pace and Deller 2005:30). Nevertheless, the prevention of atrocity crimes and rebuilding of states societies after a concerted intervention effort are the most feasible and credible features of R2P, other considerable elements of the concept like 'military intervention' are peripheral as a last resort (Sarkin 2012: 25). The misrepresented intervention in Libya and its aftermath consequences further generated a lot of adversaries and admirers among states which are also deficient to the doctrine judging by the distortion of the intervention mandate (Evans, 2007).

In order to rebuild Libya, her democratic processes must be reformed and seen to be practicing true democracy and the rule of law with utmost respect for human rights and its leaders accountable to the people. The authorities must ensure that a sustainable economic development is achieved in all stratas of the society as a new and emerging democratic regime (Lipset 1959). Merkel (2004) has opined that this electoral democracy alone is not enough for sustainable growth and development in Libya, but transparency from the government is also a major indices for societal progress. Hence on Saturday the 7th of July 2012, Libya which has never practiced democracy in recent years (Sakin 2012:2) had its first democratic election in the country since 1964 after 48 years of Muarmar Ghadaffi's autocratic rule in the country. The Economist (2012) reported that about 1.77 million people voted and that the election was generally peaceful, free, fair and credible with absolute transparency and no influence, election malpractices or rigging of any sort from the government. However, this is one area of rebuilding Libya and the international community is still trying through the UN support mission (UNSMIL) to accomplish the R2P's responsibility to rebuild states with the authorization of providing the Libyan government with critical assistance and guidance by using trade conferences to attracting investments, enhance the economy, give technical support and build infrastructures in its

transition into a democratic rule (Sarkin 2012:10-11). Little wonder that Banki-Moon in his report on Libya's UNSMIL in 2012 stated that "UN has made several frantic efforts through the ministry of justices to make sure that the Libya's Judicial system is properly reformed by giving practical scientific and psychological aids or reinforcement to dispense justice appropriately to all suspects held within the bounds of the legal and lawful structure in the country with fair trail" (Sarkin 2012:5-6).

Although, there are still some groups of radical Jihadist protagonist in existence which has seriously threatened states security judging from the September 11th 2012 assassination of the US Ambassador to Libya and attacks against foreigners in January 2013 in Algeria etc to Libya (Economist 2012) amongst other aftermath consequences in the north Africa sub-region. All these issues, the Libyan government is still struggling to curtail and control the loosed pockets of militia groups that rebelled and combatted Gaddafi hence the security issues still remained unabated in Libya. It is on this note that one will expect the European Union (EU) to honour its R2P 'responsibility to rebuild' principle by deploying its expatriates and professionals in all fields of human endeavors to support Libya and secure her borders against incursions to protect her territorial borders and further enhance stability in the whole region of North Africa and by extension the entire African continent.

However the forceful military intervention by the international community in Libya wasn't really implemented properly according to the letters and spirit of R2P principles as its goals and objectives goes beyond just protecting civilian population alone to enforcing a 'regime change agenda' which has generated a lot of criticisms against R2P by some states and their allies like Russia, China with utmost anxiety that the initiated idea of R2P will be misused for a more concealed intentions of the western powers. Comparatively, the international community's

Libyan forceful military intervention is more successful to that of Rwanda, Srebrenica and Kosovo's un-wilful responses by states considering the fact that the internationalist military action has saved many civilian lives and has led to the emergence of a modern democratic state of Libya. Meanwhile, success isn't yet fully guaranteed in Libya but insightful by the successful mobilization of UNSC member states to decisively with such speed respond to prevent humanitarian catastrophe and atrocity crimes from being committed, one would have expected such decisive and enthusiastic forceful military interventionist moves by world leaders in Syria to save her people.

2.9 AN OVERVIEW OF THE CRISIS OF THE SOVEREIGN STATE OF SYRIA

The "Arab Spring" protests to change bad government all over the Middle East started in Tunisia and eventually broke out in Syria on the 15th of March, 2011 in Damascus and later Aleppo respectively. The need for democratic political overhauling, socio-economic reforms and job creation that the nation of Syria faced orchestrated the crisis. Sharp and Blanchard (2012:12), listed "some of the challenges which include high unemployment, high inflation, limited upward mobility, rampant corruption, lack of political freedom and repressive security forces fuelled persistent opposition to the Syrian authoritarian government."

According to BBC NEWS (2012), sectarian conflict was another major cause of the "Syrian crisis, because Assad's family members, security forces and Shabiha Militia belong mainly to the Alawite Shia Islamic Minority Muslim Group while the majority of the Syrian population are Sunni Muslims" (Potter Lawrence, 2014). From the foregoing, the Assad regime came under severe criticism. The Syrian National Council (SNC) formed in Oct. 2011 in Turkey is one major opposition group that has wanted a regime change or military intervention in Syria over the misrule of Assad (New York Times, 2013). Another major opposition force, the Free Syrian

Army (FSA) formed on July 29, 2011, is comprised of "soldiers who defected from the Syrian Army" (Dunne, 2012).

The torture of students, who drew anti-government caricature figures with painted inscriptions "in the Southern Town of Daraa in March 2011, provided a decisive spark for the emergence of demonstrations in Syria" (Sharp and Blanchard, 2012:14). "Tens of thousands of Syrians demanded reforms and resignation of President Bashir al-Assad who assumed office on 17th of July, 2000" (BBC News, 2020). The Syrian government's use of brute force against protesters in Daraa and some other cities alongside the banning of journalists from Syria further escalated the crisis. In the circumstance, the bombardments of Daraa together with harsher strategies of the Syrian government forces to suppress or repress growing civil unrest inadvertently intensified the conflict which later spread across the length and breadth of Syria, it reached the capital city of 'Damascus and Aleppo in 2012'. The initial non-violent uprising gradually degenerated into a civil war between the Assad-led government armed forces and the opposition rebel forces led by the Free Syria Army, with many civilian casualties (Norooz, 2015).

The approval by the UN Security Council for the appointment of Kofi Annan as the UN–Arab League Special Envoy to Syria in March 2012 eminently reveals the determination and commitment of the international community as part of efforts to peacefully resolve the Syrian crisis without being partisan in favour of the combatants. The "aim of the peace deal brokered by Kofi Annan was to establish a long-term ceasefire that would support the opening of a national dialogue between the Syrian government and the opposition groups on Syria's political future" (Sharp and Blanchard, 2012).

The appointment of Kofi Annan came with a lot of expectations of ending the war. As a result, Annan came up with a six-point peace plan to ensure an end to the conflict. These plans provided

“(a). A Syrian-led political process to address the aspirations and concerns of the Syrian people; (b). UN-supervised cessation of armed hostilities, violence in all its forms by all parties to protect civilians; (c). All parties to ensure the provision of humanitarian assistance to all areas affected by the fighting, and to implement a daily two-hour humanitarian pause; (d). Authorities to intensify the pace and scale of release of arbitrarily detained persons; and (e). Authorities to respect freedom of association and the right to demonstrate peacefully” (Mood, 2012).

The protracted war in Syria led to dual axes created between the U.S. and Russia following President Assad's refusal to surrender power. The partisan activities of the U.S. and Russian governments to favour their allies despite sanctioning the Annan peace process led to the failure of the peace plan. Subsequently, the collapse of Annan's peace process in Syria by the end of August 2012 following his resignation in that capacity further escalated the violent conflict between the Syrian government and the opposition Free Syrian Army (FSA). Consequently, there exists a competition between the Anti-Assad axis which consists of the United States, Germany, France, Britain, Portugal e.t.c and the Pro-Assad axis which consist of Russia, China, Iran, North Korea and Venezuela. Moreover, the "involvement of Al-Qaida militants, religious and regional bodies in Syria made intervention difficult" (Norooz, 2015).

From the foregoing, realism theory became demonstrated and conspicuous when both the U.S. and Russian governments in their conducts were rationally pursuing their respective strategies to achieve their objectives. The United States government's strategies for ousting the Assad government include; financially supporting the rebels with arms and ammunition to fight the government forces; advocating for the imposition of multilateral sanctions and possible military intervention in Syria by invoking R2P to replace the Assad regime with a new government to be formed by her allies and attempted to weaken the economy of Syria, by imposing economic

sanctions. On the part of Russia, she has assisted the Assad government to print currency for paying soldiers and pieces of machinery fighting for the regime and ensure steady cash flow in the economy. This financial aid is to cushion the effect of U.S sanctions on Syria, she also gave more sophisticated ammunition to the Assad regime as assistance to the government forces of Syria and constantly used the instrument of the U.N Security Council to 'VETO' every effort of the U.S and her allies "to impose multilateral sanctions on the Syrian government that may result to 'direct military intervention'". The interest of the U.S is to change the Assad government with a new one in furtherance of bilateral interest with Syria in particular and the Middle East region in general, while Russia on the order hand wants to maintain the status quo, by maintaining a bilateral cordial relationship with Syria her biggest trading partner. At the moment, the war in Syria is stalemated or deadlocked due to the influence of the two major foreign opposing factions in Syria.

Again, the U.S. and Russia, are very willing and determined with a 'political will' to invest their nation's financial and human resources into the crisis in Syria, which shows a balance in the rules of the game. Again, that the U.S. and Russia are permanent members (P5) of the UN Security Council with 'VETO POWERS' to permit or refuse a multi-lateral sanction on Syria against their core interest is another example of a balance in the rules of the game. The United States has formed a labyrinth of alliances between regional blocs like the European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) alongside Saudi Arabia and Turkey in the Middle East; to supply financial, military and logistics supports to the opposition rebel forces in Syria as well as mounting "international pressure for a multilateral sanction that would orchestrate the deployment of a foreign military intervention to be imposed on the Assad regime. Russia has influenced the Iranian government to send about 50,000 militia fighters to assist government

forces in Syria to fight the Rebels, providing backyard routes to help deliver Russia's sent armoury to government forces in Syria to undermine Western sanctions of the arms embargo on the Syrian government and giving over the US $ 1 billion in financial and military aid to the Syrian government" (Yousaf, 2012). Similarly, "Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS) member states and Lebanon have always joined Russia to veto against any form of UN military sanction on the Assad regime, stating that the Syrian crises must be resolved through a Syrian led political process" (United Nations, 2011).

As a solution to the conflict, the United Nations earnestly seek to resolve the Syrian crisis by the appointment of Kofi Annan as the UN-Arab League Special Envoy to negotiate for a peaceful resolution of the crises, the activities of the United States and Russian government together with their allies thwarted these efforts. The core interest of the U.S and Russia in the Syria conflict made it very cumbersome to get a rallying frontier for the UN to champion a common formidable course for the imposition of R2P or any other form of military intervention in Syria to protect the citizens or oust the Assad regime.

With the fall of Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria on December 8, 2024, it is widely considered that the Syrian crises has officially came to an end. The Syrian National Army took control of Damascus on the above date effectively bringing an end to the Assad dictatorial rule and the crisis that ensued.

2.10 ASSESSING THE HUMANITARIAN IMPACTS OF THE CRISIS IN SOVEREIGN STATE OF SYRIA

Since the commencement of the Syrian civil war on the 15th of March, 2011, the conflict has created one of the worst largest humanitarian refugees crisis in the 21st century according to several human rights organization’s reports. Humanitarian needs in the country rose up and is

now higher than ever before. As a matter of fact, about 7 to 10 Syrians are in dire needs of humanitarian assistance as the people have been challenged with various humanitarian impacts of the crisis like social economic recession or dislocation, widespread poverty, destruction of social infrastructures, mass displacements, fast spread of preventable diseases and epidemics etc. These humanitarian needs has increased considerably since 2011 and reaching over 11.3 million people in 2021. Indeed, there has been a significant or geometric increase in the populace that requires humanitarian assistance and care since the conflict began in 2011. The humanitarian report summary of 2020 has it that "over 12 million people are malnourished due to food shortages, about 85 % of households cannot meet their basic needs for survival, more than 80% of the entire Syrian population lacks a stable source of water supply across the country, although about 60% of the health facilities in Syria are still functional, the people lacks adequate Medicare due to the risk of being hit to death by stray bullets when tying to access these facilities, educationally, over 12 million children has remained out of school since the conflict started in 2011.

Against this backdrop, the human casualties in Syria continue to increase, mostly women and children. Over hundred thousand people have died in the crisis. However, due to issues in recording, access and partiality, the correct figure of human casualties in Syria from 2011 to 2021 is not well known as organizations' reports differ. For instance, according to the reports sometimes published by the House of Commons Library, UK in June 2021, the number of casualties in Syrian since 2011 was put at more than 350,209 people. To Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR), between 2011 and September 2021, at least 229,112 people have died (cited in US Department of State, 2021).

Further, SNHR reported that apart from direct killings, at least about 155,368 people either have being arrested especially opposition forces who were tortured indiscriminately and remained detained or have disappeared in the hands of the parties to the Syrian conflict between 2011 and December 2021. Breaking the figure down, SNHR reported that Assad regime was responsible for 87 per cent (135,706) of detentions and disappearances including about 3,691 children and 8,484 women ((cited in US Department of State, 2021).

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) (2021) reported that between March 2011 and June 2021, about 606,000 people have died while 2.1 million civilians have been injured or permanently made disabled.

In addition, the number of refugees has also increased. As of December 2021, House of Commons Library, UK reported that 6.8 million people have been internally displaced and about I million more including women and children have fled the country to seek refuge abroad (UNHRC 2012). In March 2021, children refugees were numbered 2.5 million while United Nations International Emergency Fund (UNICEF) in 2021 reported that 2.3 million children were forced out of school and the number of children in need was 6.5 million in May 2021. The human rights watch (2012) reported the use of barrel bombs and chemical weapons on the citizens by the Assad government forces and these attacks reached the level of crimes against humanity in cities across Syria. These allegations the Assad regime has vehemently denied alleging that the rebels are behind the violent attacks.

In the comparative scenarios in Libya and Syria, the Security Council Authorization of "all necessary measures" and the reference to R2P doctrine as the condition for "military intervention by the UNSC unlike the case of Ruanda, Srebrenica and Kosovo were seen by many as the dawn of a new era" (Weiss 2011; Bellamy and Williams, 2011). To protect the civilians in Libya with

resolution 1973, the use of force in another sovereign state for the first time was approved in Libya within one month of the commencement of the crisis. Conversely, despite the increasing death toll of tens of thousands of people in Syria, the security council has not been able to unite with each other and form a formidable frontier in the case of Syria talkless of imposing international "sanctions on Assad's regime let alone military intervention to protect the citizens. Moreso, despite the report of the Commission of Inquiry authorized by the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) revealing gross human rights violations committed by the Assad regime in Syria in which civilians were attacked, health and aid worker were targeted, chemical weapons were used alongside with barrel bombs, rapes, torture, indiscriminate execution e.t.c were carried out" (UNHRC, 2014), R2P was not invoked by way of forceful military intervention as a last resort to save and protect the civilian population in Syria.

Meanwhile, the U.S. on her part was very sceptical about "whether a regime change in Syria would be more or less favourable to her other interests (like Israel) in the Middle East (Chivers, 2012). Save for Syria, the EU States like the UK, Italy and France were desirous of gaining access to the oil of Libya (Norooz, 2015). Russia has wanted continuous maintenance of a long-standing economic relationship with Syria. Thus, "Gorenburg (2012) noted that Russia has extensive economic interests in the Middle East and especially in Syria." Hence, she had prevented R2P intervention in that country, unlike Libya without any superpower shield. The success of government forces in maintaining the status quo will be in favour of the Russian government while a regime change would boost the U.S. government's influence, particularly in Syria and the entire Middle East region.

This narrative illustrates that Kofi Annan's peace process was hampered by the U.S. and Russia's governments after they agreed on the UN Security Council Resolution that established it. Hence,

'peacebuilding' in R2P intervention principles was elusive in the Syrian conflict because the duo of U.S and Russia and their allies provided both financial, military, logistics and other human assistance that further escalated the crises into a full-blown civil war to date with crimes against humanity committed in a large scale "unequivocally and objectively chemical weapons had been used" (BBC NEWS, 2013), with impunity by the Assad government thus, rendering the UN helpless as a toothless bulldog probably because of its failed intervention in the Libyan crisis and its aftermath.

All attempts to impose sanctions on the Syrian government and bring Assad to justice at the International Criminal Court (ICC) for committing war crimes and other crimes against humanity were repeatedly vetoed by Russia and China (Ziegler, 2016). Therefore, the condition for the use of military force to be implemented in full scale to protect civilians in Syria is conspicuous despite its abuse in Libya. Unfortunately, the International Community has only expressed soberness and condemnation against Syria's humanitarian atrocities, an act indicating that the five permanent members of the Security Council who are supposed to maintain international peace and security are selective with the use of R2P and their core national interest takes precedence over every other consideration. This has further exposed the constraints of R2P in practice (Thakur, 2015), with a failure to protect civilians in Syria and the weaknesses of the principle in international power politics as a major determinant factor for bargaining and conflict resolution.

2.11 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.11.1 Political Realism

In international relations, there are competing theories that explain global structure and politics. These theories, however, as resounding as they are in explain power, interest and alliances in

international system; they also have strands that account for a change in global realities. For instance, realism has strands as political or classical realism, neo-realism, defensive realism and offensive realism. Liberalism has neo-liberalism as a strand while Marxism has neo-marxism as a strand. Constructivism has also emerged as a competing theory of international relations. However, while each of these theories and their various strands is imbued with explanatory variables that account for global political and economic realities, realism appears more dominant given its explanatory power for accounting the place of interest and conflict.

Political or classical realism was a 20th century response to the dominance and perspectives of idealism and liberalism that were premised on building international peace and co-operation through creation of international law and backed by international organizations (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2017). These foremost theories, largely regarded as utopians, were influenced by the devastating inter-state wars that claimed lives and created vacuum for misery and chaos. Dominating in 1920s and 1930s, their perspectives influenced the establishment of League of Nations and United Nations after devastating First and Second World Wars (Bull, 1995). To the Idealists, the cause of the wars was not because of the egoistic nature of humans as claimed by political realists, but the imperfect socio-economic conditions and political arrangements (Bellamy, 2011). However, as dominant as these views were, political realists such as Reinhold Niebuhr and E.H Carr lent their vituperations.

To Carr (1939) in his *The Twenty Years' Crisis* described idealist thinking as 'utopianism.' He questioned the idealist claim of 'moral universalism' and harmony of interest. He rather contended that the privileged groups to justify and maintain their dominance mostly invoke what is regarded as harmony of interest. In addition, he argued that morality is relative and not universal. What constitutes moral principles therefore is dependent on a party' interest. Powerful

politicians often use language of justice to-justify their countries' interests and create a negative image of other people.

Hans Morgenthau (1904-1980), arguably regarded as the father of political realism developed realism into an international relations theory. Influenced by the likes of Thomas Hobbes, and Reinhold Niebuhr, he traced the cause of conflict to self-seeking human nature that gratifies himself in the lust for power in order to be able to dominate others. In his classics, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (1948:25)*, he likened international politics to all politics that is for "struggle for power."

Therefore, generally, the arguments of political realism are as follow:

First, the starting point of global conflict can be traced to human nature. Classical realists generally see human beings as egoistic and power-seeking that can trump moral principles if need be. During the Peloponnesian War, as Thucydides rightly noted, the Athenians affirmed the priority of self-interest over morality.

Second, classical realists as with neo-realists contend that the absence of an overarching power, a form of anarchy, is also responsible for the international conflict. Given lack of common rule and international government to control and regulate the actions of states, states resort to self-help system for survival. States therefore define their interests and pursue their realizations.

Third, following from the second above, political realists envisage security dilemma since power and interest determine interstate relations. Therefore, for security, states increase their power capabilities and engage in power-balancing so as to deter potential enemy. Powerful states engage in wars in order to prevent competing nations from becoming stronger.

Last, classical realists and realists in general do not see the relevance of morality in international politics. To them, it is either there is no morality in international politics or that states have their

own version of morality different from the customary morality or that morality, if employed at all, is used by states to justify their actions against other state.

Just as realists have criticized norms as states-created to serve the interest of the creators, so also they have criticized the R2P as a norm. They contend that R2P is another strategy by which powerful states extend their interests to less-powerful states under the guise of humanitarian intervention (Gallagher, 2012). Realists are skeptical about stopping mass atrocity crimes unless a world government is formed and that on its own is almost impossible.

The pillar 3 of the doctrine of R2P is a strategy by the powerful countries to advance their national interests. The hasty invocation of the principle in the case of Libya and the subsequent supervision of the killing of Muammar Gaddafi have further fueled the suspicion created by the norm (Bellamy, 2011). States such as China and Russia have vetoed the deployment of the principle in Syria based on strategic interest (Friedman, 2012). Furthermore, lack of clear-cut enforcement procedure has further undermined the potency of the principle, as each powerful state is reluctant to lead the intervention.

The availability of natural resources like oil has made the Middle East Central to the U.S. core interest, hence she and her western allies has been directly involved with its affairs since the continents oil transaction is put at 23% imports. More recently, “Syria has occupied the front burner of major US policies because it threatens US interest in the Middle East region, especially the Arab- Israeli conflicts which put both US and Syria at loggerheads” (Prados, 2006). The U.S. has vehemently sought a crucial strategy in the Middle East to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict in order to maintain regional stability, and Syria is very instrumental in the actualization of this US policy objective. The “U.S. department of State report on Syria in 2012 noted that the actions of President Bashir Al-Assad’s regime affect the achievement of U.S. goals in the region,

particularly the Syrian government's deliberate attempts to complicate efforts to resolve the Arab- Israeli conflict, fight international terrorism, reduce-weapon proliferation and inaugurate a peaceful democratic and prosperous Iraqi State" (U.S. Dept. of State 2021). The collapse of Assad Al-Bashir's government according to the U.S, European Union (EU) and other allies planned strategies would bring an era of improvement between U.S. and Syria's economic and diplomatic relations, cooperation with the U.S to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict together with the U.S achieving and installing a democratic government in Iraq and regional stability in the Middle East Region.

Russia and her allies also has extensive economic interests in the middle East, particularly in Syria, which includes the sales of military equipment and energy. In fact, "Syria happens to be the second largest Russian arms customer in 2011 after China. Russia and Syria's arms deal is estimated at 15% of total sales valued at 3.7 billon U.S Dollars" (Gorenburg, 2012). These sales include tank upgrades, air-defence systems anti-missiles helicopters etc. Moreover, Russia expected to continue sales to Syria because its military soft and hardware equipment are well "entrenched within the Syria armed forces. Western sanctions on Syria have also increased the opportunity for Russia's oil, gas and power firms to invest in Syria" (Nicoll, 2012). Connell and Zalasky, (2008) noted that "Russia' company has made a lot of investments in oil gas exploration, production manufacturing, aviation and agricultural sectors". (Gorenburg 2012). "Russia has always maintained for favourable policy toward the Assad regime to expand her influence in the Middle East region as part of its efforts to further boost her status internationally as the world superpower, particularly about the Western protagonist power" (Rabil, R. 2011). Russian government fears that any attempt for a regime change in Syria would affect her economic ties in favour of the United States. Russia wants a "regime stay in Syria and instability in the Middle

East region to continue to keep the world price of oil and gas very high and further reinvigorating efforts to frustrating the Arab-Israeli's peace process so that she can enhance her political leverage in the region. Consequently, U.S failure in the Middle East would create instability in the continent and put Russia in a position of relative strength" (Connell and Zalasky, 2008).

The ability of Syria to make r mar the Arab Israeli peace process in the Middle East makes Syria inevitable to both the U.S and Russian governments respectively. Since the Assad regime is a threat to the U.S core political and economic interest in the Middle East, the U.S. vehemently favoured a 'regime change' in Syria, while the Russian government continued to maintain cordial bilateral regions and 'regime' stay' policy with Assad.

Russia has been a longstanding partner of Assad's Syria as a major supplier of arms. China also supplies war equipment and purchase oil from Syria. On a larger scale, it seeks the peace of the Middle East including Syria for its continued prosperity and to checkmate the frequent incursion of USA in the region (Gallagher, 2012). Therefore, to the realists, the moral creation of the R2P is indeed lack of morality unless where it is employed by a powerful state to justify intervention as it was in the case of Libya. Against this backdrop, the political realism would be helpful in explaining intervention in Libya and non-intervention in Syria is which contrary to the dictate of pillar 3 of the doctrine of R2P.

2.11.2 Game Theory

The founder of game theory is John von Newmann in 1928. The use of "two persons 'zero-sum model' of 'game theory' in evaluating the United States and Russian governments' strategic and economic interest in Syria explains better why the Annan peace process failed and why R2P could not be imposed on Syria" (Ken Ifesinachi & Raymond Adibe, 2014). According to Shelling (1960), "game theory is the formal study of the rational consistent expectations that

participants can have about each other's choices." On the other hand, Plano and Riggs (1973) "defined game theory as a body of thoughts dealing with rational decision strategies in situations of conflicts and competition when each participant or player seeks to maximize gains and minimize losses." On his part, S.P. Varma (1975) "enumerated six major features of game theory as follows: (i) Rational Behaviour; (ii) Strategy; (iii) Pay-off or Outcome; (iv) Rules of the Game; (v) Alliances; and (vi) Solution." Therefore, the "Game theory is generally played according to what is called the 'Minimax Strategy', which means that players try to minimize their maximum possible losses" (Kjeldsen, 2001).

Basically, the two person's zero-sum model of game theory indicates that there are two key players, the advantages of one party amounts to the disadvantage of the other party. In other words, the benefit of one actor is detrimental to the other. For instance, the U.S and Russian government are two rational actors involved in conflicting and cooperation games in the Middle East, in their relationship with Syria. The zero-sum nature in the crises in Syria is that the U.S benefit in the region vis-a-vis Syria is tantamount to Russia's detriment. In this case, regional stability in the Middle East is paramount to the U.S government to ensure a reduction and stability of oil prices globally as an oil-importing country, while instability in the region will lead to increasing oil prices in the world market which is beneficial to Russia, an oil-exporting nation. The availability of natural resources like oil has made the Middle East Central to the U.S core interest, hence she has been directly involved with its affairs, since the continents' oil transaction is put at 23% imports. Most recently, "Syria has occupied the front burner of major US policies because it threatens US interest in the region, especially the Arab – Israeli conflicts which puts both US and Syria at loggerheads" (Prados, 2006). The U.S has vehemently seeked as a crucial strategy in the Middle East to resolving the Arab – Israeli conflict in order to maintain regional

stability, and Syria is very instrumental to the actualization of this US policy objective. Prados and Sharp (2005), noted that "a comprehensive settlement of Arab – Israeli issue requires Syria support or acquiescence".

The "U.S Department of State report on Syria in 2005 noted that the actions of president Bashir Al-Assad's regime affects the achievement of U.S goals in the region, particularly the Syrian government deliberate attempts to complicate efforts to resolve the Arab – Israeli conflict, fight international terrorism, reduce – weapons proliferation and inaugurate a peaceful democratic and prosperous Iraqi State" (U.S Dept. of State, 2021). The collapse of Assad Al Bashir's government according to the U.S planned strategies would bring an era of improvement between U.S and Syria's economic and diplomatic relations, cooperation with the U.S to resolving the Arab – Israeli conflict together with the U.S achieving and installing a democratic government in Iraq and regional stability in the Middle East region.

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2.11.3 The Chicken Game

A 'chicken game' is a game theory set-up that typically describes two players heading towards each other. If the players continue on the same path, they bump into each other, if one swerves out of the way and the other does not, the swerve 'loses' and is labeled the chicken, while the second implicitly braver player wins (Nash, 2015). The chicken game is basically a forceful, dictatorial and coercive negotiation pattern or strategy used for bargaining in international crises situations. Taken a critical assessment at the Cuban Missile Crisis of 16th October, 1962 for about thirteen days in that month of October, there was pandemonium and tension for a nuclear annihilation war across the globe between the west led by the US and Eastern bloc led by Russia

following the US pilot photographing of nuclear missile sites building in Cuba by Russia. People prayed and hoped for a peaceful resolution of that crisis (Kenedy, 1962:142-200). The U.S and Russia actually wants to prevent the total annihilation of everyone in the form of an Armageddon while also desiring to be regarded as not only being strong as a nation, but also formidable in the committee of nations, hence not capitulating nor giving-up her stance on the issue but wants the other protagonist to surrender or acquiesced to her demands. In this scenario, either states ready, willing and able to call the others bluff wins. The risk for deterrence of both actors depends on Armageddon – which is the Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). According to Robert Puttnam (1988:427-430), "game theory utilizes abstract simulation resulting in possible decisions by opposing actors and over time these becomes evolutionary enabling actors to anticipate behaviour and strive for a general equilibrium." A good example of the known game theoretical model for analyzing the Libyan and Syrian crises scenario in international political relations is the Chicken game. This chicken game could also be described as the 'prisoner's dilemma' developed from the 'Nash equilibrium'. As the study continues, different game political moderns notably 'Stag Hunt' shall be elucidated upon. The advent of diverse rational and irrational actors in some cases, particularly, using it to analyse the divergent shades of opinion of the UNSC members vis-à-vis the Libyan and Syrian conflicts to demonstrate how the western powers game theoretical thinkers failed to prove in reality their theoretical philosophical postulations in Syria. However, the conflicting interests of actors in the Syrian crises and its aftermath, together with the applied chicken game method of analysis will further split these major international actors into two groups; the ones for sanctions and forceful military intervention against the Assad led government in Syrian (with the regime change martra) and those for (regime stay) in favour of Assad using the chicken game theoretical model to analyse the Syrian conflict implies that each

opposing sides are struggling or attempting for a ‘zero sum game of the winner takes it all’, which will provide unprecedented and unpredictable political effects in the middle Eastern region and the likelihood of a brutal revenge or reprisal by the weak surrenders whose influence, power and position has been dispossessed forcefully. Chances are that game theories are unable to accurately foretell or predict political situations as its hinged on the belief that ‘rational international actors are always participants in a crises situation’.

On the whole, Game theory is all about predicting crises aftermaths and figuring out possible solutions. The momentum or impetus of game theory is that “rationality determines risk versus rewards and cost versus benefit scenarios**”** (Ganti, 2020:7). The challenges about this assertion are ‘not all political actors are rational’. Again ‘not all players in a crises situation are predictable’ (Milner, 1998:782-784). One of the popularly appreciated and accepted concept of game theoretical model is ‘Prisoner Dilemma’. The task is used in order to study different types of social interactions by giving participant the choice to defect or cooperate in a specific dilemma situation (Rapoport & Chammah, 1965). Here, the two parties are completely separated from each other and unable to really communicate with themselves, yet they have to take decisions with outcomes. Whether each of them will choose to cooperate with the other or not is left to the strategy of the parties who are expected to be rational decision makers. The benefit for each party is to cooperate. Decision theory is basically concerned with the decision making effects from a disorganized setting or situation and this is where rational choice analysis emanated from. It is used mostly in international relations for arms race, conflict resolutions, negotiations and to instigate the overthrow of government through coup de etat.

With this scenario, the researcher will view the five permanent members of UNSC who bears the highest responsibilities and extension of conflict in Syria. The UNSC is an embodiment of two

rational actors in the council, the UNSC and Russia also comprises of two rival axis (West and East) with many actors making up the whole entity of the organisation. U.S, UK, France, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States are (player 2 team) while Russia and China wield veto powers with the requirement of only one veto to spoil the entire game board and a new sequence has to begin all over again. In Libya for example, the UNSC unanimously voted for resolution 1970 and 1973, and the enforcement of a 'no fly zone' in the Libyan Airspace, on the 17th of March, 2011 (United Nations, 2011). In an apt reaction to offensive assault, strikes, brutality and violent atrocities that Muammar Gadaffi was committing against his own people who were protesting for their political freedom from dictatorial leadership and respect for their fundamental human rights. The United States and her western allies of United Kingdom and France intervened in Libya by a military action with the guise of NATO's cover and air bombardments. They also provided intelligence arms supplies to the opposition rebel militia groups to oppose the Assad government. All these actions by the Western powers facilitated to Muarmar Gadaffi's fall and consequently he was killed by the rebel forces after Nato's attack on his convoy at about 11am on Sunday 20th of October, 2011 in Western Sirte Town of Libya (Lehal, 2014:3).

The civil war in Syria began as a protest and has been on since on the 15th of March 2011 following the Arab spring to change bad government in North Africa and this spread across the entire Middle Eastern region before it got to Syria. Nevertheless, the administration of Bashar Al-Assad divided the Syrian population between those political supporters that benefited from the government economically and the Alwalites (branch of the Shia muslims minorities) religious supporters. These two groups shall be categorized as player 1. The majority of the Syrian population are the rebels and Sunni muslims who are supported, financed and sponsored by Qatar, Turkey and Saudi Arabia together with the Sunni Muslims in other Gulf States in the

region. As the conflict in Syria progressed, it inspired and enticed other phantom secret covert international actors such as al-Qaeda, Islamic state of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) (Reutes News Agency, 2012). These groups, their military and financial supporters shall be categorized as player 2. The 'Stag Hunt' game theoretical is very suitable for this analysis as many hunters will set a trap for a stag i.e.(Al-Assad and Syria), rather than the stag to show up, a hare does i.e. (without a UN resolution, and viable lopsided biased action by team 2 or its members). Peradventure, a huntsman kills the hare by (taking a single and independent action) the major aim of the stag (the UN Security Council Resolutions authorizing the intervention) will be extinct and all the huntsmen in team 2 will starve with hunger by (defeating all rounds) and negative win sets in because the crisis continues unabated (Lehal, 2014). Team 1 will insist on their quest and demand for sovereignty thereby putting an end to Saudi Arabia's financial support and other oil producing countries of Sunni theocratic muslims states. Again, they shall also copiously demand for the disarmament of transnational actors like ISIS and Al-Qaeda together with the present state of affairs to be maintained before talks and compromise. It will also be demanded that Turkey should stop terrorists from using her territory as a base for regrouping and transporting arms (Lehal, 2014:4-8).

UNSC Actions Compared in Libya and Syria

The similarities in the Syrian and Libyan conflicts are that the both conflicts occurred at about the same time and relatively the same reasons, of political inferences, as the civilians in both countries were agitating for political emancipation from the ruling political elites using the 'Arab Spring' as a precursor or motivating factor. Consequently, while the crises lasted, sovereignty was lost in both countries, the chicken game theoretical model was on with two level game

strategists of the U.S and Russia with veto powers at the UNSC. In both teams, their choice of game for national interest was very important at the council. U.S., U.K, France and other western powers demanded for respect for human rights, freedom and democracy while Russia and China agitated for regime stay, supported Al-Assad, the respect of national sovereignty and the UN principle of non-intervention into another state by foreign or external actors. The voting patterns of both Russia and China were different also in both states which demonstrated their game theoretical choices in Libya and Syria (Bellamy, 2009:35-36).

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHOD

RESEARCH DESIGN

A research design provides a framework for gathering and analysing data. This study adopts the mixed methods research design by utilizing both qualitative and quantitative research design to elicit responses from respondents. Qualitative research design provides a framework for assessing the situation, beliefs and world views of respondents through unstructured and semi structured interviews. In this study, semi-structured interviews were used to gather qualitative data from respondents.

Qualitative research involves philosophical assumptions that guide the research data collection and enable the researcher to gain a deeper understanding of the participants' stories in order to explore the meaning of their experiences (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007). Olsen and Morgan (2004) contend that the choice of data collection methods is dictated by the nature of the research itself and how the methods are used.

The study using the qualitative approach collects data on the perceptions of a group of individuals and their interpretations of the social phenomena under study through interviews. The approach to this study is informed by the interpretivist ontology. An interpretivist ontology is acknowledged as being a potentially effective model of research that occurs in a natural setting that enables the researcher to develop a level of detail from being highly involved in the actual experiences of the participants (Creswell 2003). It is argued that when social scientists understand, explain and interpret social reality through the eyes of different participants, reliable and rich data may be achieved (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2007). In view of the foregoing

assumption, the methods in which this research process is pursued relies on the intention of the researcher to gather and present detailed viewpoints R2P instrumentality.

The advantage of qualitative methods, from an interpretivist perspective, is that they are open-ended, which allows themes to emerge and in exploring the research, the study utilised the semi-structured interview in order to elicit information from the respondents on the instrumentality of R2P. Thus, the aim of the research is to establish and identify the 'How', the 'What', and the 'Why' of R2P implemntation in one country and non-implementation in another under the same circumstance. Adopting this creative and innovative methodological process contributed new knowledge to this area, hence the originality of this research is also derived from this research approach. Complex issues associated with UNSC R2P pillar (3) was considered in the emergence of this study.

On the other hand, the quantitative approach relies on the gathering and examination of quantitative data and adheres to the paradigm of quantitative research (Johnson & Christensen, 2012). The assumption of quantitative paradigm is that there is only one objective reality distinct from the researcher's perceptions. The phenomenon under study is not influenced or altered by the researcher. According to Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004), the primary objective of quantitative research is to quantify causal relationships using a framework devoid of values.

However, the use of both qualitative and quantitative methods allows for a more comprehensive and critical understanding of the dynamics between responsibility to protect (R2P) and national sovereignty in the Syrian crisis.

SOURCES OF DATA COLLECTION

The data for this study was sourced from both primary and secondary sources. The primary data was sourced with semi-structured interviews while the secondary data was sourced from

secondary sources such as textbooks, the internet, articles, documentary evidence, reports and prints. The interviews explored the views, experiences, beliefs, and knowledge of the research participants on specific matters relating to the use of the instrumentalities of the R2P pillar 3 principle.

SAMPLING METHOD/SAMPLE SIZE

This study employs a purposive sampling method for the selection of research participants. Purposive sampling is a research sampling technique commonly used in qualitative research for the selection of research participants (Patton 2002). Furthermore, the purposive sample is described as sampling procedures in which specific participants with certain characteristics are selected (Johnson & Christensen, 2014). This technique entails identifying and selecting informants or groups of people that are essentially knowledgeable about or experienced with a phenomenon or topic of interest (Denscombe 2017). Purposive sampling is characterized by the incorporation of specific criteria met by the participants during the selection process (Bernard 2002). In supporting the choice of this sampling technique, Palinkas et al. (2015) argue that purposive sampling is widely used within the research community in qualitative research for the identification and selection of information-rich cases related to the phenomenon or topic under investigation. It is worth noting that in this study, the participants were selected on the basis of their knowledge and experiences, and also on the basis of their availability and willingness to participate.

Nonetheless, Palinkas et al. (2015) argue that the chosen sampling approach selected by the researcher ought to be consistent with the aims and assumptions that conform to the use of either research approach. However, Miles & Huberman (1994) argue that qualitative methods tend to

place a primary emphasis on capacity. This implies that the researcher obtains a comprehensive understanding by continuing to sample until no new substantive information is acquired.

However, purposive sampling operates on the principle that the researcher can get the necessary information through focusing on a relatively small number of instances deliberately selected on the basis of their known attributes, and not through random selection. For purposive sampling, the research sample is often selected on the basis of 'relevance' to the issue being investigated. It could also be based on 'knowledge' where participants are selected with regards to privileged knowledge or experience about the topic of study (Merriam, 2016). Purposive sampling is most suited where the researcher already has an insight about the specific people or events and consciously selects participants who are likely to generate the most valuable data. This suggests that the participants are selected with a specific purpose in mind and that the purpose reflects a given quality or event and their relevance to the topic of investigation. In light of this, the study participants for this research are lecturers in the Department of Political Science, NIIA staff, Syrian embassy staff and staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Instructively, purposive sampling is also used in order to ensure that a wide cross-section of items or people are included in the sample. Therefore, when used in this way, purposive sampling is enabling a suitable sample. Ensuring that a wide cross-section of items or people were included in the sample is the aim of adopting purposive sampling for the study.

The study administered 145 copies of questionnaire to the respondents which represents 20% of the population of study. The study interviewed a total of forty (40) respondents who have expertize and are knowledgeable about the topic under investigation while only 28 obliged. This sample size comprises of lecturers from the Department of Political Science who have expertise

on international relations, and particularly the conflicts in Syria, employees in the Nigerian Institute for International Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Syrian Embassy in Abuja.

The table below shows the population of the respondents and the sample size

Target Group	Population	Sample Size	
		Questionnaire	Interview
Lecturers in the Department of Political Science	40	20% of the population	5
Workers in the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs	152		10
Workers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs	504		10
Syrian Embassy in Abuja	17		10
Libyan Embassy in Abuja	14		5
Total	727	145	40

Source: Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2021); Nigerian Institute for International Affairs (2021); Syrian Embassy in Nigeria (2021).

VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY OF RESEARCH INSTRUMENT

Validity connotes the capacity of the research instrument to measure the construct it sets out to measure. The research instrument in this study is the interview guide. To ensure the validity of the instrument, the guide was face validated by the researcher's supervisors and experts in the Department of Measurement and Evaluation, Faculty of Education, University of Benin. The reliability of the instrument connotes the dependability and conformability of the results. To confirm the reliability of the instrument, the instrument was pre-tested by some lecturers in the Department of Political Science who are knowledgeable on the Syrian conflict. Their responses as well as queries raised in the course of the pre-testing were used to fine-tune the instrument.

METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS

The researcher utilizes a tape recorder and note-taking to record and take notes of respondents' responses. Upon the completion of the data collection process, the recorded audio data obtained from the interviews was transcribed verbatim. The transcription was completed by leaving a wide margin on the right-hand side of the pages for making notes, and for the writing of codes, using an ‘open coding’ technique. The researcher used NVivo software to code the responses and create themes according to the research questions. Generally, the researcher purchases two external hard drives which were used to store all the research data which serves as the primary backups. The researcher stored the research findings through multiple computer devices, desktops, laptops, and tablets; multiple storage devices include, internal drives, external drives, and USB drives; cloud storage and email. These strategies enabled the researcher to complete the data collection and analysis process effectively and efficiently.

ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Ethical consideration is at the heart of the research. The research will be meaningless when it is in contravention of ethical principles such as anonymity, confidentiality, informed consent, freedom from harm and objectivity. The researcher issued the respondents with stamped Ethics Form from the Department which stipulates various ethical principles as listed above and requires the consent of the respondents before the actual interview process starts. Each respondent was represented with a pseudonym or a nickname so as not to subject the respondents to undue physical and non-physical harm. As stated earlier, some responses was tape-recorded and stored in the various drives highlighted above and destroyed after use while other were given interview guide paper to write. The information made available in the study is only one agreed

by the respondents to be made public. The goal and objective of the study was objectively made known to the respondents. As well, any foreseeable benefit and possible harm to the respondents was objectively communicated to the respondents.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

Introduction

This chapter of the thesis is organised into three sections, with the first section presenting demographic data about the participants and their knowledge on R2P and the Syrian crisis. The second section of the chapter presents the findings that have been obtained from the 28 Key informants interviewed (KII) who were selected purposively from lecturers, Syrian Embassy, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Nigeria that make up the research set. The third section discusses the findings of the study. This chapter presents the key research themes that have evolved through constant reflection on the themes that have emerged from the research data.

The major motivation for this research work is to scrutinize the non-implementation of R2P pillar three doctrine to intervene and save civilian lives in Syria by the UN/UNSC members states, after all diplomatic means has been depleted in the country (Grover, 2015). The gap created by the non-application of pillar 3 in Syria is worth examining due to the mass atrocity crimes committed there that has disrupted the sensibilities and perceptions of men in the international system. According to the UN Charter of 1945 and in consonance with the R2P concept, the third pillar of the R2P doctrine is supposed to be applied as a last measures after all peaceful attempt to resolve the dispute may have been exhausted by the international community of states for the maintenance of global peace and security.

The following research questions were utilised to tackle the research problems viz:

- What are the instrumentalities of R2P principles in enforcing peaceful resolution of crisis?
- What are the successes and failures of R2P in Libya?

- What are the humanitarian impacts of R2P in Syria?

In this chapter, the study presents a comprehensive presentation of the research work, method of data collections and analysis processes. This data collection espouses the collection of relevant data and analytical plan employed to examine the diverse reactions of the UNSC P5 members states, the UNGA itself, from professionals, scholars and experts on the doctrine of R2P were thoroughly examined and prominent personalities interview responses to the application of R2P third pillar in Syria. Furthermore, the researcher evaluated available data on Syria, R2P principles, UNGA and UNSC intentions in Syria from 2011 to 2021. Ultimately, this chapter consists of a complete analysis of the outcome of the research work and how it assisted the investigator to proffer solutions to the research problems of this study.

The researcher utilizes a purposeful sampling strategy to collect relevant data from KII on UNSC (P5) permanent five members states who has veto power, which permits every member with the veto authority to either accept, annual or declare null and void any proposal for resolution or actions for forcefully military intervention by the UNSC. Primary and secondary data was used to provide answers to the research questions above.

Data Analysis

Bio-Data of Respondents

Table 4.1: Respondent's Position

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Secretary	14	10.7	10.7	10.7
	Clerk	10	7.1	7.1	17.9
	Desk Officer	19	14.3	14.3	32.1
	Translator	5	3.6	3.6	35.7
	Consular Officer	5	3.6	3.6	39.3
	Executive Officer	14	10.7	10.7	50.0
	Admin	5	3.6	3.6	53.6
	Lecturer/Research Fellow	36	25.0	25.0	78.6
	Intern	30	21.4	21.4	100.0
	Total	138	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, 2024

Figure 1:



The table and graph of respondent's position show that 10.7% of the respondents were secretaries, 7.1% of the respondents were clerks, 14.3% were desk officers, 3.6% of the respondents were translators, consular officers made up of 3.6% of the sampled respondents,

10.7% of the respondents were executive officers, the administrative officers involved in the study were 3.6%, 25.0% of the respondents were research fellows while 21.4% were interns. This analysis shows that research fellows participated in the study more than other positions.

Table 4.2: Respondent's Years of Service

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1-3	74	53.6	53.6	53.6
	4-6	30	21.4	21.4	75.0
	7-9	30	21.4	21.4	96.4
	10 years and above	4	3.6	3.6	100.0
	Total	138	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, 2024

Figure 2:



Table 2 shows the years of service of the respondents. The data show that 53.6% of the respondents have 1 to 3 years of service on the job, the respondents with 4 to 6 years of service and 7 to 9 years of service were 21.4% of the respondents respectively while 3.6% of the respondents have 10 years of service and above.

Table 4.3: Respondent's Education

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Under graduate	10	7.1	7.1	7.1
	First Degree	39	28.6	28.6	35.7
	Masters	54	39.3	39.3	75.0
	Ph.D	35	25.0	25.0	100.0
	Total	138	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, 2024

Figure 3:



The data in the table shows that 21.4% of the respondents are undergraduates, 64.4% of them are first degree holders, 7.1% were Master's degree holders while 7.1% were Ph.D holders. This analysis shows that majority of the respondents have tertiary education.

Table 4.4: Respondent's Gender

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Male	99	71.4	71.4	71.4
	Female	39	28.6	28.6	100.0
	Total	138	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, 2024

Figure 4:



The table and graph of gender respondents show that 71.4% of the respondents were male while 28.6% are females. This analysis shows that males participated in the study more than their female counterparts.

Table 4.5: Respondent's Religion

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Christianity	79	57.1	57.1	57.1
	Islam	59	42.9	42.9	100.0
	Total	138	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, 2024

Figure 5:



The data shows that 57.1% of the respondents are Christians while 42.9% of the respondents practice Islam. This analysis shows that majority of the respondents are Christian.

Respondent's Knowledge of R2P and the Syrian Crisis

Table 4.6: Respondents' understanding of the principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Understand	118	85.7	85.7	85.7
	Parially understand	20	14.3	14.3	100.0
	Total	138	100.0	100.0	

Field Survey, (2024)

Figure 6:



The data showed that 85.7% of the respondents surveyed have adequate knowledge and understanding of the principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) while the remaining 14.3% have partial knowledge of the principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P).

Table 4.7: Respondents view of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as a humanitarian intervention or norm complementing humanitarian intervention

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	It is humanitarian intervention	54	39.3	39.3	39.3
	Norm complementing humanitarian intervention	84	60.7	60.7	100.0
	Total	138	100.0	100.0	

Field Survey, (2024)

Figure 7:



Again, the data in the chart shows that 39.3.7% of the respondents interviewed viewed Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as a humanitarian intervention while the remaining 60.7% believed that it is a norm complementing humanitarian intervention.

Table 4.8: Respondents view on the causes of the Syrian Crisis

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Unemployment	35	25.0	25.0	25.0
	Increased State repression	25	17.9	17.9	42.9
	Corruption	48	35.7	35.7	78.6
	Lack of Democracy	20	14.3	14.3	92.9
	Collapse of Currency(Lira)	10	7.1	7.1	100.0
	Total	138	100.0	100.0	

Field Survey, (2024)

Figure 8:



From the data gathered, it show that corruption is seen as the highest cause of the Syrian crisis, followed by unemployment, then increased state repression, lack of democracy was adduced also as one of the causes of Syrian crisis and finally the collapse of Syrian currency known as the Lira. In other words, the respondents posited that authoritarian rule is pivotal to causes of Syrian crisis as the Assad family, ruling Syria since 1970, maintained power through repression, limiting political freedoms, and suppressing opposition. Again, Arab spring uprisings inspired by protests in Tunisia and Egypt, Syrians began demonstrating against the government in March 2011, demanding reforms and democracy. The government responded with violent crackdowns, escalating tensions. The sectarian divisions play a great role in the crisis as Syria's diverse population includes Sunnis, Alawites, Christians, and Kurds. The ruling Assad regime, dominated by the Alawite minority, faced opposition from the Sunni majority, fueling sectarian tensions. Economic hardship leading to high unemployment, corruption, and declining living standards created frustration among citizens, especially in rural areas. A severe drought from 2006 to 2010 worsened conditions, leading to mass migrations to cities. Also, foreign interventions of the regional and global powers, including the U.S., Russia, Iran, and Turkey, supported different factions, turning Syria into a battleground for geopolitical interests.

Table 4.9: Respondents' opinion on the measures to apply to resolve the Syrian crisis

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	R2P	69	50.0	50.0	50.0
	Dialogue/Negotiation	39	28.6	28.6	78.6
	Adopt democracy	30	21.4	21.4	100.0
	Total	138	100.0	100.0	

Field Survey, (2024)

Figure 9:



The data in the chart showed that 50.0% of the respondents assert that R2P is a good measure to apply in resolving the Syrian crisis, 28.6% advocates for dialogue and negotiation in resolving the Syrian crisis while the remaining 21.4% believed that the adoption of representative democracy will resolve the Syrian crisis.

Table 4.10: R2P pillars helps to prevent and respond to mass atrocity crimes such as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	SA	16	11.9	11.9	11.9
	A	82	59.1	59.1	71.0
	D	40	29.0	29.0	100.0
	Total	138	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, (2024).

Figure 10:



The data in table 4.10 shows that 16 respondents representing 11.9% strongly agreed that R2P pillars helps to prevent and respond to mass atrocity crimes such as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, 82 respondents representing 59.1% agreed to this claim while 40 respondents representing 29.0% of the total sampled population disagreed with the assertion that R2P pillars helps to prevent and respond to mass atrocity crimes such as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. The analysis of the study reveals that the majority of the respondents agreed that R2P pillars helps to prevent and respond to mass atrocity crimes such as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.

Table 4.11: The effective implementation of R2P is a good mechanism to resolve violent conflicts and humanitarian crises

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	SA	125	90.3	90.3	90.3
	A	13	9.7	9.7	100.0
	Total	138	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, (2024).

Figure 11:



From table 4.11 and chart 11 above, the data showed that 125 respondents representing 90.3% of the total sampled population strongly agreed that the effective implementation of R2P is a good mechanism to resolve violent conflicts and humanitarian crises while the remaining 13 respondents representing 9.7% agreed that the effective implementation of R2P is a good mechanism to resolve violent conflicts and humanitarian crises. The study revealed from the analysis that the majority of the respondents strongly agreed that the effective implementation of R2P is a good mechanism to resolve violent conflicts and humanitarian crises.

Table 4.12: R2P provides a legitimate framework for external actors to intervene in national crises

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	SA	111	80.6	80.6	80.6
	A	27	19.4	19.4	100.0
	Total	138	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, (2024).

Figure 12:



The study in table 4.12 revealed that 111 respondents representing 80.6% strongly agreed that R2P provides a legitimate framework for external actors to intervene in national crises while 27 respondents representing 19.4% agreed with the assertion that R2P provides a legitimate framework for external actors to intervene in national crises. The analysis of the study posited that the majority of the respondents agreed that R2P provides a legitimate framework for external actors to intervene in national crises.

Table 4.13: R2P pillars 3 is most instrumental in achieving peaceful crisis resolution in conflict affected sovereign states

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	SA	15	10.8	10.8	10.8
	A	43	31.2	31.2	41.9
	SD	80	58.1	58.1	100.0
	Total	138	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, (2024).

Figure 13:



Table 4.13 of the study posited that 15 respondents representing 10.8% strongly agreed that R2P pillars 3 is most instrumental in achieving peaceful crisis resolution in conflict affected sovereign states, 43 respondents representing 31.2% agreed to this assertion while 80 respondents representing 58.1% strongly disagreed with the assertion that the anticorruption instruments in Nigeria has led to increased transparency and accountability in both public and private sectors of the co R2P pillars 3 is most instrumental in achieving peaceful crisis resolution in conflict affected sovereign states. The analysis of the study indicates that the majority of the respondents strongly disagreed that R2P pillars 3 is most instrumental in achieving peaceful crisis resolution in conflict affected sovereign states.

Table 4.14: Geopolitics is a barrier to implementing R2P in conflict-affected regions

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	SA	70	50.5	50.5	50.5
	A	55	39.8	39.8	90.3
	D	13	9.7	9.7	100.0
	Total	138	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, (2024).

Figure 14:



From the data in table 4.14 of the study, it was revealed that 70 respondents representing 50.5% strongly agreed that geopolitics is a barrier to implementing R2P in conflict-affected regions, 55 respondents representing 39.8% agreed to the view while the remaining 13 respondents representing 9.7% of the respondents sampled disagreed with the assertion that geopolitics is a barrier to implementing R2P in conflict-affected regions. The analysis of the study indicates that the majority of the respondents agreed that geopolitics is a barrier to implementing R2P in conflict-affected regions.

Table 4.15: The use of R2P in Libya demonstrated the global commitment to upholding human rights and civilian protection

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	SA	82	59.1	59.1	59.1
	A	44	32.3	32.3	91.4
	D	12	8.6	8.6	100.0
	Total	138	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, (2024).

Figure 15:



In table 4.15 of the study, the data shows that 82 respondents representing 59.1% strongly agreed that the use of R2P in Libya demonstrated the global commitment to upholding human rights and civilian protection, 44 respondents representing 32.3% agreed to the claim while the remaining 12 respondents representing 8.6% disagreed with the assertion that the use of R2P in Libya demonstrated the global commitment to upholding human rights and civilian protection. The analysis of the study indicates that the majority of the respondents strongly agreed that the use of R2P in Libya demonstrated the global commitment to upholding human rights and civilian protection.

Table 4.16: The R2P timely and decisive intervention in Libya successfully prevented large-scale civilian massacres in Benghazi and other cities

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	SA	96	69.9	69.9	69.9
	A	30	21.5	21.5	91.4
	D	12	8.6	8.6	100.0
	Total	138	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, (2024).

Figure 16:



In table 4.16 of the study, the data shows that 96 respondents representing 69.9% strongly agreed that the R2P timely and decisive intervention in Libya successfully prevented large-scale civilian massacres in Benghazi and other cities, 30 respondents representing 21.5% agreed to the assertion while the remaining 12 respondents representing 8.6% disagreed with the view that the R2P timely and decisive intervention in Libya successfully prevented large-scale civilian massacres in Benghazi and other cities. Thus, the analysis from the study indicates that the majority of the respondents strongly agreed that the R2P timely and decisive intervention in Libya successfully prevented large-scale civilian massacres in Benghazi and other cities.

Table 4.17: The R2P operation in Libya ought to set a precedent for future humanitarian interventions in other conflict-affected countries

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	SA	83	60.2	60.2	60.2
	A	43	31.2	31.2	91.4
	D	12	8.6	8.6	100.0
	Total	138	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, (2024).

Figure 17:



The data from the study in table 4.17 revealed that 83 respondents representing 60.2% strongly agreed that the R2P operation in Libya ought to set a precedent for future humanitarian interventions in other conflict-affected countries, 43 respondents representing 31.2% agreed to the claim while 12 respondents representing 8.6% disagreed with the assertion that the R2P operation in Libya ought to set a precedent for future humanitarian interventions in other conflict-affected countries. Thus, the analysis of the study clearly posited that the majority of the respondents strongly agreed that the R2P operation in Libya ought to set a precedent for future humanitarian interventions in other conflict-affected countries.

Table 4.18: The R2P intervention in Libya exceeded its civilian protection mandate and led to regime change rather than just humanitarian protection

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	SA	16	11.8	11.8	11.8
	A	122	88.2	88.2	100.0
	Total	138	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, (2024).

Figure 18:



The data from the study in table 4.18 revealed that 16 respondents representing 11.8% strongly agreed that the R2P intervention in Libya exceeded its civilian protection mandate and led to regime change rather than just humanitarian protection while 122 respondents representing 88.2% agreed with the assertion that the R2P intervention in Libya exceeded its civilian protection mandate and led to regime change rather than just humanitarian protection. Thus, the analysis of the study clearly posited that the majority of the respondents agreed that the R2P intervention in Libya exceeded its civilian protection mandate and led to regime change rather than just humanitarian protection.

Table 4.19: The implementation of R2P in Libya led to a loss of international consensus and undermined trust in future humanitarian interventions

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	SA	126	91.4	91.4	91.4
	A	12	8.6	8.6	100.0
	Total	138	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, (2024).

Figure 19:



The data from the study in table 4.19 revealed that 126 respondents representing 91.4% strongly agreed that the implementation of R2P in Libya led to a loss of international consensus and undermined trust in future humanitarian interventions while 12 respondents representing 8.6% agreed with the assertion that the implementation of R2P in Libya led to a loss of international consensus and undermined trust in future humanitarian interventions. Thus, the analysis of the study clearly posited that the majority of the respondents strongly agreed that the implementation of R2P in Libya led to a loss of international consensus and undermined trust in future humanitarian interventions.

Table 4.20: The Syrian crisis has led to one of the worst humanitarian disasters of the 21st century

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	SA	98	71.0	71.0	71.0
	A	28	20.4	20.4	91.4
	D	12	8.6	8.6	100.0
	Total	138	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, (2024).

Figure 20:



In table 4.20 of the study, the data revealed that 98 respondents representing 71.0% strongly agreed that the Syrian crisis has led to one of the worst humanitarian disasters of the 21st century, 28 respondents representing 20.4% agreed to the view while the remaining 12 respondents

representing 8.6% disagreed that the Syrian crisis has led to one of the worst humanitarian disasters of the 21st century. From the analysis of the study, it was discovered that the majority of the respondents strongly agreed that the Syrian crisis has led to one of the worst humanitarian disasters of the 21st century.

Table 4.21: The crisis has resulted in widespread displacement of civilians both within Syria and to neighboring countries

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	SA	67	48.4	48.4	48.4
	A	71	51.6	51.6	100.0
	Total	138	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, (2024).

Figure 21:



The data from the study in table 4.21 revealed that 67 respondents representing 48.4% strongly agreed that the crisis has resulted in widespread displacement of civilians both within Syria and to neighboring countries while 71 respondents representing 51.6% agreed with the assertion that the crisis has resulted in widespread displacement of civilians both within Syria and to neighboring countries. Thus, the analysis of the study clearly posited that the majority of the respondents agreed that the crisis has resulted in widespread displacement of civilians both within Syria and to neighboring countries.

Table 4.22: The destruction of critical infrastructure (hospitals, schools, markets) has worsened the humanitarian conditions in Syria

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	SA	99	72.0	72.0	72.0
	A	39	28.0	28.0	100.0
	Total	138	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, (2024).

Figure 22:



The data from the study in table 4.22 revealed that 99 respondents representing 72.0% strongly agreed that the destruction of critical infrastructure (hospitals, schools, markets) has worsened

the humanitarian conditions in Syria while 39 respondents representing 28.0% agreed with the assertion that the destruction of critical infrastructure (hospitals, schools, markets) has worsened the humanitarian conditions in Syria. Thus, the analysis of the study clearly posited that the majority of the respondents strongly agreed that the destruction of critical infrastructure (hospitals, schools, markets) has worsened the humanitarian conditions in Syria.

Table 4.23: Children and women have been disproportionately affected by the humanitarian fallout of the Syrian conflict

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	SA	96	69.9	69.9	69.9
	A	42	30.1	30.1	100.0
	Total	138	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, (2024).

Figure 23:



The data from the study in table 4.22 revealed that 96 respondents representing 69.9% strongly agreed that the children and women have been disproportionately affected by the humanitarian fallout of the Syrian conflict while 42 respondents representing 30.1% agreed with the assertion that the children and women have been disproportionately affected by the humanitarian fallout of the Syrian conflict. Thus, the analysis of the study clearly posited that the majority of the respondents strongly agreed that the children and women have been disproportionately affected by the humanitarian fallout of the Syrian conflict.

Table 4.24: The conflict in Syria has severely disrupted access to food, healthcare, and clean water for civilians.

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	SA	126	71.0	71.0	71.0
	A	12	29.0	29.0	100.0
	Total	138	100.0	100.0	

Source: Field Survey, (2024).

Figure 24:



The data from the study in table 4.22 revealed that 98 respondents representing 71.0% strongly agreed that the conflict in Syria has severely disrupted access to food, healthcare, and clean

water for civilians while 40 respondents representing 29.0% agreed with the assertion that the conflict in Syria has severely disrupted access to food, healthcare, and clean water for civilians. Thus, the analysis of the study clearly posited that the majority of the respondents strongly agreed that the conflict in Syria has severely disrupted access to food, healthcare, and clean water for civilians.

4. Analyses of Research Questions and In-Depth Interview

Research Question One: What are the instrumentalities of R2P principles in enforcing peaceful resolution of crisis?

TABLE 4.: To examine the instrumentalities of R2P principles in enforcing peaceful resolution of crisis (**n-138**)

S/N	Item	Responses				Mean	Decision
		SA	A	D	SD		
1	R2P pillars helps to prevent and respond to mass atrocity crimes such as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity	16 (11.9%)	82 (59.1%)	40 (27.0%)	- -	2.83	Accepted
2	The effective implementation of R2P is a good mechanism to resolve violent conflicts and humanitarian crises	125 (90.3%)	13 (9.3%)	- -	- -	3.90	Accepted
3	R2P provides a legitimate framework for external actors to intervene in national crises	111 (80.6%)	27 19.4%)	- -	- -	3.81	Accepted
4	R2P pillars 3 is most instrumental in achieving peaceful crisis resolution in conflict affected sovereign states	15 (10.8%)	43 (31.2%)	- -	80 (58%)	1.95	Rejected
5	Geopolitics is a barrier to implementing R2P in conflict-affected regions	70 (50.5%)	55 (39.8%)	13 (9.7)	- -	3.41	Accepted

Source: Field Survey, (2024)

Key: S-A- Strongly Agree; A- Agree; D-Disagree; S-D- Strongly Disagree

Interpretation

The mean results of the data in items 1, 2, 3 and 5 of research question one of the study is **2.83, 3.90, 3.81 and 3.41** respectively while the mean result in item 4 is 1.95. Thus, the data analyzed indicates that the respondents accepted the questions raised in item 1, 2, 3 and 5 while rejecting the questions raised in item 4 of the research question one of the study. In order to examine the instrumentalities of R2P principles in enforcing peaceful resolution of crisis, the analysis of the data revealed that the respondents accepted that R2P pillars helps to prevent and respond to mass atrocity crimes such as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. Also, accepted that the effective implementation of R2P is a good mechanism to resolve violent conflicts and humanitarian crises. Again, they accepted that R2P provides a legitimate framework for external actors to intervene in national crises. And finally, the respondents accepted that geopolitics is a barrier to implementing R2P in conflict-affected regions. On the other hand, the respondents rejected the notion that R2P pillars 3 is most instrumental in achieving peaceful crisis resolution in conflict affected sovereign states.

To complement the above analysis on the instrumentalities of R2P principles in enforcing peaceful resolution of crisis and examining if the R2P has fulfilled its core objective, particularly in light of the Syrian crisis, the interviewed respondents posited as follows:

One of the lecturers interviewed stated that:

> R2P is an intentional international instrument used to check leaders of nations on the need for proper protection and responsibility towards individuals in a nation. It urged them to be aware that the world has the power to protect individuals when they fail to do so regardless of sovereignty. It is a diplomatic measure for prevention of atrocity. This principle thou has been politicized by the UNSC being the political and security power of the state (IDI 1, 2024).

Another lecturer posited that:

> The primary objective of R2P is to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. It can also be implemented through economic sanction to states. This instrumentality of this principle has been limited as a result of world leaders' interest which usually manifest in veto powers. For instance, in Syria, despite early warnings of escalating violence, the international community failed to act decisively to prevent mass atrocities (IDI 2, 2024).

Again, one of the lecturers asserts that:

> The instrumentality of R2P principle is germane in crisis ridden as an instrument to enable peacekeeping in the world but he inability of the UN Security Council to reach a consensus, primarily due to vetoes by Russia and China, has undermined R2P's implementation in Syria. This highlights the limitations of R2P when geopolitical interests clash (IDI 3, 2024).

Another interviewee posited that:

> The instrumentality of R2P emphasizes preventive measures, but in Syria, efforts to address root causes, such as political oppression and socio-economic grievances, were inadequate before the conflict escalated. The adoption of the instrumentality of R2P was hindered by the division and the UNSC. Although there is need for improvement on what happened in Libya. The post Libya escalation of tension is devastating (IDI 4, 2024).

One of the interviewed respondents stated that:

> The instrument of R2P seeks to protect populations through military intervention of the principle in pillar three, but international efforts in Syria have largely been limited to humanitarian intervention, which addresses symptoms but not the root causes of the crisis (IDI 5, 2024). There is need for R2P 3 principle to be adopted to help curb the humanitarian crisis in Syria (IDI 5, 2024).

A respondent in the study argued that:

> With by knowledge of the global crisis, the Syrian crisis like the Libya crisis where the R2P was used has raised questions about the efficacy of international community's commitment to R2P principle. The lack of decisive action has led to skepticism about its effectiveness and willingness to act (IDI 6, 2024).

Furthermore, an interviewee reiterated that:

> I can tell you authoritatively that one very loud idea in international politics that seeks to shield people from mass atrocities is the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). If this principle is implemented to the letter, the world may know relative peace because it will help to curb the excess of leader of nations (IDI 7, 2024).

Again, another respondent asserts that:

> The debate about sovereignty and R2P is crucial but the R2P principle asserts that states as a sovereign nation have an obligation to defend their own citizens against atrocities such as ethnic cleansing and genocide. However, in order to stop such atrocities, the international community must step in through economic measures, diplomacy, and, in the worst situations, military action when states fail to fulfil this obligation (IDI 8, 2024).

An interviewee posited that:

> R2P was applied inconsistently particularly in Libya. It was used as a regime change mechanism and to promote western democracy principles and as such it has experienced minimal implementation in Syria, suggesting it was influenced by political considerations (IDI 9, 2024).

A research participant in the study observed that:

> The Assad regime has used the principle of state sovereignty to resist external intervention, creating a tension between R2P's objectives and respect for sovereignty (IDI 10, 2024).

Moreso, another participant stated that:

> The division among the UNSC in non-implementation of R2P in Syria has created the presence of multiple non-state actors and terrorist groups, such as ISIS, making it difficult to identify clear solutions or accountability measures (IDI 11, 2024).

In addition, a researcher with the NIIA reports that:

> One of R2P's goals is to ensure accountability for atrocities. However, key perpetrators in the Syrian conflict, including government and rebel forces, have largely avoided justice, undermining R2P's credibility. The instrumentality of this principle has been made watery without effect as a result of bickering among the world powers (IDI 12, 2024).

Again, an interviewee interviewed declared that:

> The R2P principle has been undermined by world leaders. Even with the non-implementation of the principle as result of orchestrated political mechanism by UNSC to thwart the use of the principle in some conflict ridden countries, R2P still remains one of the most laudable principle to checkmate war monger leaders in the world (IDI 13, 2024).

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has faced numerous challenges in fulfilling its core objectives, particularly in the context of the Syrian crisis. The Syrian crisis underscores significant gaps in R2P's implementation, particularly in the face of geopolitical rivalries, lack of enforcement mechanisms, and challenges in addressing complex conflicts.

Again, in examining if the doctrine of R2P has been fairly applied in crisis states such as in Libya, the respondents' opinion on the application of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in Libya had mixed outcomes. The following are the extracts from the interviewees who believed that the R2P principle was fairly applied in the Libya crisis are as follow:

An interviewee stated that:

> The NATO-led intervention in 2011 helped prevent imminent mass atrocities in Benghazi, where Gaddafi's forces threatened to commit large-scale violence. This

> aligned with the core goal of R2P: protecting vulnerable populations. R2P instrument was established to help humanity solve basic conflict problem (IDI 14, 2024).

Also, another interview participant asserts that:

> The R2P instrumentality intervention in Libya signaled that the international community could mobilize swiftly to address potential genocide or crimes against humanity, reaffirming the relevance of R2P in global governance (IDI 15, 2024).

Another participant in the interview session alerts that:

> The removal of Muammar Gaddafi ended a regime known for widespread human rights abuses and repression, creating an opportunity for Libyans to pursue democracy and freedom. R2P cannot do everything for a nation (IDI 16, 2024).

One of the interviewees unequivocally stated that:

> After Gaddafi explicitly threatened to show "no mercy" to rebels in Benghazi, the R2P intervention was used to prevent mass killings, which could have been catastrophic in Libya at that time (IDI 17, 2024).

One of the researchers interviewed indicate that:

> The instrumentality of R2P operation in Libya had broad international support, including the UN Security Council, NATO, and the Arab League, showing that global powers could unite against humanitarian crises (IDI 18, 2024).

An interviewee stated that:

> Without intervention, Gaddafi's forces might have crushed opposition in some areas but faced prolonged insurgencies elsewhere, leading to an even bloodier conflict similar to Syria's civil war (IDI 19, 2024).

Another respondent reiterated that:

> As an advocate of democracy, the use of the instrumentality of R2P in Libya is well acknowledged. Gaddafi ruled Libya for 42 years with widespread human rights abuses. To me his removal ended an era of repression, arbitrary arrests, and state-sponsored violence (IDI 20, 2024).

One of the respondents ignited that:

> The R2P intervention in Libya demonstrated that the international community could take collective action against mass atrocities, reinforcing the legitimacy of R2P as a global norm. This is really a welcome development if not the politicization of the principle in achieving the desire aim (IDI 21, 2024).

The views of the respondents who believed that the R2P principle was not fairly applied in the Libya crisis are as follow:

> The R2P instrument was not used with good faith as Libya descended into a prolonged civil war following the intervention, leading to widespread instability, political fragmentation, and the rise of armed militias and extremist groups such as ISIS which is threatening the region and the world at large (IDI 22, 2024).

Again, another respondent stated that:

> R2P's post conflict resolution was neglected by the world powers, leaving Libya without the necessary support to establish stable governance, rule of law, or security (IDI 23, 2024).

An interviewee argued that:

> NATO airstrikes, while aimed at protecting civilians, caused collateral damage and civilian deaths, which contradicted the humanitarian principles of R2P The Libya intervention is seen by many as a case where R2P was used as a pretext for regime change. This undermined the principle's credibility and made other nations (e.g., Syria) skeptical of its true intentions (IDI 24, 2024).

A respondent argued that:

> The power vacuum in Libya destabilized the broader Sahel and North African regions, leading to increased arms trafficking, terrorism, and displacement across borders The swift intervention in Libya contrasts with inaction in other crises (e.g., Syria, Yemen, Myanmar), reinforcing the perception of R2P as inconsistently applied based on geopolitical interests (IDI 25, 2024).

An interviewee declared that;

> The R2P principle is meant to ensure lasting peace, not just immediate intervention. The lack of post-Gaddafi planning and the subsequent descent into chaos undermined the principle's effectiveness to curb crisis in a given State. The international community applied R2P in Libya but largely ignored similar atrocities in other countries, like Syria and Yemen. The international response was inconsistent, and was not based on humanitarian needs but on political motives (IDI 26, 2024).

A participant in the study stated that:

> To me, the intervention was more about Western powers advancing their interests in the region rather than genuinely protecting Libyan civilians (IDI 27, 2024).

Another respondent interviewed stated that:

> The international community, led by NATO, imposed its will without sufficiently involving regional actors in Libya's future. The aftermath of the intervention raised questions about the legitimacy of R2P itself. If R2P leads to destabilization rather than protection like in Libya, it cannot maintain a moral authority and effectiveness in future crises (IDI 28, 2024).

While R2P in Libya achieved its short-term goal of preventing mass atrocities, its long-term consequences have been overwhelmingly negative. Again, the failure to plan for post-intervention stability and the perception of R2P's misuse as a regime-change tool has damaged

the principle's credibility and effectiveness. This view is instrumental in hindering the collective resolve of the UNSC (P5) members on a unified action.

Research Question Two: What are the successes and failures of R2P's implementation in Libya?

TABLE 4.: To evaluate the successes and failures of R2P's implementation in Libya (**n-138**)

S/N	Item	Responses				Mean	Decision
		SA	A	D	SD		
6	The use of R2P in Libya demonstrated the global commitment to upholding human rights and civilian protection	**82 (59.1%)**	**44 (32.3)**	**12 (8.6%)**	**- -**	**3.51**	**Accepted**
7	The R2P timely and decisive intervention in Libya successfully prevented large-scale civilian massacres in Benghazi and other cities.	**96 (69.9%)**	**30 (21.5%)**	**12 (8.6%)**	**- -**	**3.61**	**Accepted**
8	The R2P operation in Libya ought to set a precedent for future humanitarian interventions in other conflict-affected countries	**83 (62.2%)**	**43 (31.2%)**	**12 (8.6%)**	**- -**	**3.52**	**Accepted**
9	The R2P intervention in Libya exceeded its civilian protection mandate and led to regime change rather than just humanitarian protection	**16 (11.8%)**	**122 (88.2%)**	**- -**	**- -**	**3.12**	**Accepted**
10	The implementation of R2P in Libya led to a loss of international consensus and undermined trust in future humanitarian interventions	**126 (91.4%)**	**12 (8.6%)**	**- -**	**- -**	**3.91**	**Accepted**

Source: Field Survey, (2024)

Key: S-A- Strongly Agree; A- Agree; D-Disagree; S-D- Strongly Disagree

Interpretation

The mean results of the data in items 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of research question one of the study is **3.51, 3.61, 3.52, 3.12 and 3.91** respectively. Thus, the data analyzed indicates that the respondents accepted the questions raised in item 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the research question two of the study. In order to evaluate the successes and failures of R2P's implementation in Libya, the analysis of the data revealed that the respondents accepted that the use of R2P in Libya demonstrated the global commitment to upholding human rights and civilian protection. The R2P timely and decisive intervention in Libya successfully prevented large-scale civilian massacres in Benghazi and other cities. The R2P operation in Libya ought to set a precedent for future humanitarian interventions in other conflict-affected countries. The R2P intervention in Libya exceeded its civilian protection mandate and led to regime change rather than just humanitarian protection and finally they accepted that the implementation of R2P in Libya led to a loss of international consensus and undermined trust in future humanitarian interventions.

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was invoked in Libya in 2011 as part of a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) response to the escalating violence against civilians by the Gaddafi regime. While the intervention succeeded in certain areas, it also revealed significant shortcomings that have shaped subsequent debates on the application of R2P. The following are the interview responses of the interviewees on a detailed breakdown of the successes and failures of R2P's implementation in Libya:

On the success recorded by the R2P in Libya, a respondent interviewed asserts that:

> The use of R2P helped to prevent a massacre in Benghazi. Gaddafi had threatened to crush opposition forces in Benghazi, and without intervention, there was a high risk of mass atrocities. The R2P application helped to save thousands of civilians from the threat which is also appropriate to be used in Syrian crisis. The division of

> global power interest hindered the use of this principle (IDI 21, 2024).

Another respondent posited on the issue that:

> The invocation of R2P was timely, as it responded to Muammar Gaddafi's threats to cleanse Libya house by house in Benghazi, where civilians were at imminent risk. UNSC Resolution 1973 authorized all necessary measures to protect civilians, effectively preventing a massacre in the city (IDI 25, 2024).

An interviewee stated that:

> The UNSC's decision to authorize intervention under R2P marked a milestone in the doctrine's history. It showed that the international community was willing to act collectively to protect populations at risk, even at the cost of violating state sovereignty (IDI 15, 2024).

Another interviewee reiterates that:

> The intervention received significant support from regional organizations like the Arab League, the African Union (AU), and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). This regional endorsement lent legitimacy to the operation and reinforced the idea that R2P requires collaboration with local actors (IDI 10, 2024).

Another interviewed respondent supported the R2P (3) intervention in Libya by saying that:

> The intervention contributed to the fall of Gaddafi regime, ending decades of authoritarian rule marked by human rights abuses and political repression. This outcome was viewed by many as a success in terms of dismantling a regime that posed a clear threat to its citizens (IDI 9, 2024).

A lecturer interviewed affirmed that:

> The Libyan intervention reaffirmed the international community's commitment to protecting civilians from mass

> atrocities, reinforcing R2P as a mechanism to address grave human rights violations (IDI 2, 2024).

Moreso, in examining the failure of the R2P pillar 3 intervention in Libya, the following views were extracted from the respondents.

One of the lecturers from the department of political science unequivocally asserts that:

> To be frank with you, while the initial mandate was to protect civilians, the intervention shifted toward regime change, with NATO forces directly targeting Gaddafi and his forces. This shift undermined the legitimacy of R2P, as the doctrine was being used as a pretext for political objectives. This rendered the principle ineffective to be used in other nations (IDI 1, 2024).

Another lecturer succinctly stated that:

> The absence of a comprehensive strategy for post-conflict stabilization left Libya in chaos after Gaddafi's ouster. The resulting power vacuum allowed armed groups, extremist factions, and rival militias to proliferate, leading to civil war and widespread instability in Libya till date (IDI 3, 2024).

On the failure of R2P in Libya, an interviewee posited that

> Despite its initial intent to protect civilians, the intervention led to significant collateral damage. Airstrikes and the subsequent collapse of state structures worsened the humanitarian situation, with thousands of civilians killed or displaced (IDI 4, 2024).

Another interviewee interviewed reiterated that:

> The perceived misuse of R2P for regime change in Libya damaged its credibility, particularly among nations like Russia and China, which have since resisted R2P-related resolutions in the UNSC. This division has hindered the international community's ability to address other crises, such as in Syria using the R2P machinery (IDI 5, 2024).

Also, a respondent that participated in the study asserts that:

> Libya has been in near-continuous civil war since 2011, with rival governments, militias, and extremist groups fighting for control. R2P failed to establish a lasting peace.
>
> The power vacuum allowed ISIS, al-Qaeda, and other militias to gain a foothold in Libya, worsening regional security. The efficacy of R2P post conflict peace building failed (IDI 6, 2024).

Another respondent insists that the intervention recorded more failure than success as he argued that:

> Libya's descent into chaos had ripple effects across the region. The proliferation of weapons and the spread of extremist groups destabilized neighboring countries, including Mali and Chad, and fueled broader regional conflicts (IDI 7, 2024).

Again, a respondent stated that:

> The intervention did not prioritize or facilitate a political solution among Libyan factions. Without mechanisms to foster reconciliation, Libya became deeply divided along tribal, regional, and ideological lines, perpetuating conflict. This is making the R2P intervention loss its essence (IDI 8, 2024).

Similarly, another respondent asserts that:

> While the intervention initially appeared to protect civilians, many Libyans viewed the international community's actions as self-serving and imperialistic. The failure to address Libya's post-intervention needs further alienated the population which has hindered the Syrian debacle (IDI 9, 2024).

This respondent highlights the danger emanated from the aftermath of the R2P intervention in Libya by saying that:

> Libya became a hub for human trafficking, modern-day slavery, and migrant abuse, as smugglers and militias took advantage of the instability. Gaddafi's massive weapons stockpiles fell into the hands of insurgents and terrorists**,** fueling conflicts in Mali, Chad, and beyond (IDI 18, 2024).

Another interviewed session participant stated that:

> NATO's bombing campaign caused civilian casualties and infrastructure destruction, contradicting R2P's goal of protecting people (IDI 13, 2024).

Another respondent recapped that:

> Libya's collapse spread instability across North Africa**,** leading to insurgencies, coups, and terrorism in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso (IDI 19, 2024).

Research Question Three: What are the humanitarian impacts of the crisis in Syria?

TABLE 4.: To assess the humanitarian impacts of the crisis in Syria (**n-138**)

S/N	Item	Responses				Mean	Decision
		SA	A	D	SD		
11	The Syrian crisis has led to one of the worst humanitarian disasters of the 21st century	**98 (71.0%)**	**28 (20.4%)**	**12 (8.6%)**	**- -**	**3.62**	**Accepted**
12	The crisis has resulted in widespread displacement of civilians both within Syria and to neighboring countries	**67 (48.4%)**	**71 (51.6%)**	**- -**	**- -**	**3.48**	**Accepted**
13	The destruction of critical infrastructure (hospitals, schools, markets) has worsened the humanitarian conditions in Syria	**99 (72.0%)**	**39 (28.0)**	**- -**	**- -**	**3.71**	**Accepted**
14	Children and women have been disproportionately affected by the humanitarian fallout of the Syrian conflict	**96 (69.9%)**	**42 (30.1%)**	**- -**	**- -**	**3.72**	**Accepted**
15	The conflict in Syria has severely disrupted access to food, healthcare, and clean water for civilians.	**98 (71.0%)**	**40 (29.0%)**	**- -**	**- -**	**3.70**	**Accepted**

Source: Field Survey, (2024)

Key: S-A- Strongly Agree; A- Agree; D-Disagree; S-D- Strongly Disagree

Interpretation

The mean results of the data in items 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 of research question one of the study is **3.62, 3.48, 3.71, 3.72 and 3.70** respectively. Thus, the data analyzed indicates that the respondents accepted the questions raised in item 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 of the research question two of the study. In order to assess the humanitarian impacts of the crisis in Syria, the analysis of the data revealed that the respondents accepted that the Syrian crisis has led to one of the worst humanitarian disasters of the 21st century. The crisis has resulted in widespread displacement of civilians both within Syria and to neighboring countries. The destruction of critical infrastructure (hospitals, schools, markets) has worsened the humanitarian conditions in Syria. Children and women have been disproportionately affected by the humanitarian fallout of the Syrian conflict and finally the respondents accepted that the conflict in Syria has severely disrupted access to food, healthcare, and clean water for civilians.

To complement the above analysis on the humanitarian impacts of the crisis in Syria which began in 2011, has had devastating humanitarian impacts, making it one of the worst conflicts of the 21st century. The following are the interview responses of the respondents on the key humanitarian consequences of the Syrian crisis.

One of the lecturers asserts that:

> The crisis has created massive civilian death toll in the country. Over 500,000 people have been killed, many of them civilians, due to airstrikes, shelling, chemical attacks, and extrajudicial killings. The crisis has resulted to humanitarian calamity in the country and region (IDI 1, 2024).

The second lecturer posited that:

> The Syrian war has produced the largest refugee crisis in modern history. Report has it that over 6.8 million Syrians have fled the country, creating an unprecedented refugee crisis in neighboring countries (Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan) and Europe (IDI 2, 2024)..

The third lecturer interviewed said:

> The impact of the crisis is enormously negative on the people. Over 7 million people remain displaced within Syria, facing extreme poverty, food shortages, and limited access to healthcare and education. It is still surprising that R2P was not invoked in Syria considering the level of devastation (IDI 3, 2024).

A research fellow interviewed reiterated that:

> Many part of the country have witnessed infrastructural destruction. Cities like Aleppo, Homs, and Raqqa have been seriously devastated, with hospitals, schools, and roads destroyed, making long-term recovery difficult yet there was R2P intervention to save people's lives (IDI 4, 2024).

Reiterating further, another respondent stated that:

> The humanitarian impact of Syrian crisis is enormous. Medical facilities have been destroyed leading to health crisis in the country. Report has it that over 600 medical facilities have been bombed, and thousands of doctors have fled, leaving millions without healthcare access (IDI 5, 2024).

Again, another respondent claimed that:

> The crisis has created serious famine in the country as children and the aged die continuously. The siege warfare has led to famine-like conditions, with children dying from starvation and malnutrition (IDI 6, 2024).

An interviewee accused the Syrian president that:

> The Assad regime has been accused of using sarin and chlorine gas multiple times against civilians, causing horrific injuries and deaths. Even with this accusation, R2P

> was never invoked in the crisis as it continues in that country (IDI 7, 2024).

Another interviewee observed that:

> The crisis opened way for terrorist operations to thrive. The conflict allowed ISIS to operate without check, leading to massacres, sexual slavery, and the destruction of cultural heritage (IDI 8, 2024).

A respondent posited that:

> The country is experiencing worsening of child sufferings. Millions of children have been orphaned, recruited as child soldiers, or forced into labor and early marriages. Over 2.4 million Syrian children are out of school (IDI 9, 2024).

Similarly, another respondent asserts that:

> Gender-based violence and exploitation is on the increase. Women and girls have faced sexual violence, human trafficking, and forced marriages, especially in refugee camps (IDI 10, 2024).

On the impact of the conflict, this respondent asserts that:

> The Syrian conflict is so devastating on the vulnerable citizens. As the hospitals are continually destroyed, the mental health crisis increases. Millions of Syrians, especially children, suffer severe mental trauma, with little access to psychological care in the country (IDI 11, 2024).

This respondent concurred to the above respondent when he reiterates that:

> The war is telling on the country and the region. The country is experiencing increased spread of diseases as healthcare facilities collapses. The destruction of water and sanitation systems has led to outbreaks of cholera, typhoid, and other preventable diseases. Again, there is worsening food shortages and medical emergencies (IDI 12, 2024).

Another respondent claimed that:

> The internally displaced people and refuges from the Syrian crisis is quite alarming and requires world leaders to look

> into it dispassionately to curb the humanitarian crisis (IDI 13, 2024).

An interviewee stated that:

> The crisis has greatly resulted in economic collapse and extreme poverty. Report has it that the Syria's economy has lost over $1.2 trillion, and 90% of the population now lives in poverty, relying on humanitarian aid (IDI 14, 2024).

Another interviewee posited that:

> Children are been recruited in the crisis as foot soldiers by the armed groups involved in the war. Armed groups are forcefully recruiting thousands of children as soldiers to fight in the war (IDI 15, 2024).

On the effect of the crisis on the environment, an interviewee posited that:

> The effect of the Syrian crisis on the environment is devastating. Years of bombing and industrial damage have led to severe air and water pollution, affecting agriculture and public health in Syria (IDI 16, 2024).

Concurring, another respondent stated that:

> The conflict has become a theatre of proxy war between world and emerging world powers leading to global political tensions. The crisis escalated into a proxy war, with the world powers prioritizing their interests over humanitarian concerns (IDI 17, 2024).

Another respondent captured it this way:

> The humanitarian impacts of the Syrian crisis are long-lasting and devastating, affecting millions of people. Even if the conflict ends, generations will suffer from its consequences (IDI 18, 2024).

A respondent stated that:

> Report has it now that more than 6.8 million Syrians have fled the country, overwhelming neighboring nations and Europe. Yet, the UNSC is playing politics of interest on a dying generation in Syria (IDI 19, 2024).

On the increase rate of IDPs living in harsh conditions resulting from the crisis, a respondent posited that:

> There is increase in internally displaced persons (IDPs), living in harsh conditions with limited access to food, shelter, and medical care. The failure of R2P has increased the burden of the civilian population in Syria (IDI 20, 2024).

This respondent agreed that the people are living in harsh situation as he stated that:

> Crucial facilities are been destroyed in the conflict. Over 600 medical facilities were bombed, and healthcare workers were killed or forced to flee. The lack of R2P action allowed intentional attacks on humanitarian infrastructure to continue unchecked creating havoc to the vulnerable population (IDI 21, 2024).

Again, speaking vulnerable population, a respondent asserts that:

> The effect is huge on women and children. Women and children fleeing Syria became vulnerable to forced labor, child marriage, and sex trafficking in refugee camps (IDI 22, 2024).

On the increasing collapse of infrastructure, an interviewee responded thus:

> The Syrian cities are continually reduced to rubble as a result of the conflict, with report having it that the economy is collapsing by over $1.2 trillion. R2P's failure to protect civilians also meant no post-conflict recovery efforts were in place (IDI 23, 2024).

Another interviewee stated that:

> While there was no intervention from world leaders to protect the vulnerable population, sanctions were imposed, worsening the conditions for ordinary Syrians. What is then the essence of economic sanctions (IDI 24, 2024).

A respondent passionately posited that:

> Wars generally create more harm than good. The world leaders need to unite to find a lasting solution to the crisis

> in Syria and not to champion a regime change as it was done in Libya by the western powers (IDI 25, 2024).

Reiterating on the long time effect of the crisis, an interviewee asserts that:

> For a long time in the history of Syria, the effect of his armed conflict will be present. Live has lost, properties destroyed, increased health crisis. The Libya crisis was not up to this extent before the R2P intervention in the area (IDI 26, 2024).

An interviewee who participated in the study posited that:

> Although, there is humanitarian crisis in Syria but not as it's been reported in the western media outfits. The west wants Assad out, so they can introduce their so called democracy (IDI 27, 2024).

One respondent interviewed asserts that:

> The fallout of the Syrian crisis is huge and damning to rest of the world. The Syrian people are battling serious humanitarian crisis presently. There is need for the world to visit Syria with the instrumentality of R2P to help curb the menace of humanitarian crisis on the people (IDI 28, 2024).

Test of Hypotheses

Hypothesis One

Ho^1 There is no relationship between R2P principles and peaceful resolution of crisis

Hr^1 There is a relationship between R2P principles and peaceful resolution of crisis

Table 4.	**Correlations**		
		R2P principles	Peaceful resolution of crisis
R2P principles	Pearson Correlation	1	.519**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	N	138	138
Peaceful resolution of crisis	Pearson Correlation	.519**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	
	N	138	138
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).			

There is a statistically significant relationship between the two variables ($p < .005$). The direction of the relationship is positive. There exists a positive relationship between R2P principles and peaceful resolution of crisis, meaning that these variables tend to increase together. Hence, the increase in the R2P principles implementation will lead to a corresponding increase in peaceful resolution of crisis. Thus, from the analysis, the study accepts the Hr and rejects the Ho which means that there is a relationship between R2P principles implementation and peaceful resolution of crisis.

Hypothesis Two

Ho^2 There is no relationship between R2P successes and solving humanitarian crisis

Hr^2 There is a relationship between R2P successes and solving humanitarian crisis

Table 4.57	**Correlations**		
		R2P successes	Solving humanitarian crisis
R2P successes	Pearson Correlation	1	.507**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	N	138	138
Solving humanitarian crisis	Pearson Correlation	.507**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	
	N	138	138
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).			

There is a statistically significant relationship between the two variables ($p < .005$). The direction of the relationship is positive. There exists a positive relationship between R2P successes and solving humanitarian crisis, meaning that these variables tend to increase together. Hence, the increase in the R2P successes implementation will lead to a corresponding increase in solving humanitarian crisis. Thus, from the analysis, the study accepts the Hr and rejects the Ho which means that there is a relationship between R2P successes and solving of humanitarian crisis.

Hypothesis Three

Ho^3 There is no relationship between R2P humanitarian intervention and solving the crisis in Syria

Hr^3 There is a relationship between R2P humanitarian intervention and solving the crisis in Syria

Table 4.:		Correlations	
		R2P humanitarian intervention	Solving Syria crisis
R2P humanitarian intervention	Pearson Correlation	1	.513**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000
	N	138	138
Solving Syria crisis	Pearson Correlation	.513**	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	
	N	138	138
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).			

There is a statistically significant relationship between the two variables ($p < .005$). The direction of the relationship is positive. There exists a positive relationship between R2P humanitarian intervention and solving Syrian crisis, meaning that these variables tend to increase together. Hence, the increase in the R2P humanitarian intervention will lead to a corresponding increase in solving Syrian crisis. Thus, from the analysis, the study accepts the Hr and rejects the Ho which means that there is a relationship between R2P humanitarian intervention and solving Syrian crisis.

Discussion of Findings

Theme one: R2P instrumentality principle in enforcing peaceful resolution of crisis

The study indicates that the R2P is an international instrument used to check leaders of nations on the need for proper protection of citizens during conflict but the instrumentality of the R2P principle has been hindered by deep-seated divisions among UNSC (P5) members using veto powers to stop interventions as a result of geopolitical interest. On the issue of R2P as an international instrument used to check leaders of nations on the need for proper protection of

citizens during conflict, the hypothesis from the analysis of the study indicates that there is a positive relationship between R2P principles and peaceful resolution of crisis. Marrone (2015) concurred that the impact of R2P regarding human security and human rights asserts that the instrumentality of R2P empowers the global community the responsibility to protect civilians during conflict and post-conflict period. The doctrine of R2P was advanced from other theories that have embraced the protection of vulnerable populations and their fundamental human rights viz: human security, humanitarian intervention and global governance. Corroborating on the instrumentality of R2P, the Former Secretary-General of the United Nations Kofi Annan, posited that building on our evolved understanding of sovereignty, R2P asserts that when states cannot or will not protect their populations from the worst crimes, other states, acting through the UN, should do so. The endorsement of this principle by UN Member States in 2005 was a momentous step.

The emerging debate therefore is the discussion over the importance of national sovereignty versus the duty of the international community to respect universal principles and standards for the defence of human rights is one factor that motivates humanitarian intervention initiatives. In this context, a state's justification for intervention is related to the norms of human rights that should be advocated by all parties against anything that could threaten those rights (Axworthy, 2012). This perspective, in the context of international relations, aligns with the idea that views intervention as a form of enforcement of international norms that have been violated. In its development, the debate on humanitarian intervention is closely linked to the aspects of legality and legitimacy. Humanitarian intervention often contradicts the concept of non-intervention as an embodiment of a nation's sovereignty (Carvalho and Lima, 2020).

In response to this debate, Evans et al. (2013) assert that the concept of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) began to be developed by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001 through a report. The document comprehensively regulates the basic rules, procedures, and criteria for humanitarian intervention, particularly to ensure that intervention are not only assessed from a legitimacy perspective but also from the effectiveness of humanitarian intervention itself (Estriani, 2023).

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a global norm that emerged in response to the international community's failure to prevent mass atrocities such as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. Adopted by the United Nations (UN) at the 2005 World Summit, R2P redefined sovereignty by asserting that states have a primary duty to protect their populations from such atrocities. If a state is unwilling or unable to fulfill this obligation, the international community has a responsibility to step in through peaceful means or, in extreme cases, military intervention. The principle is instrumental in shaping global responses to humanitarian crises, reinforcing legal and moral responsibilities, and addressing state sovereignty in the context of human security (Lau, 2023).

R2P is instrumental in bridging the gap between state sovereignty and human rights by establishing that sovereignty is not absolute. Traditionally, international law has respected the non-interference principle, but R2P asserts that sovereignty entails responsibility. This shift aligns with existing legal obligations under the Genocide Convention (1948), the Geneva Conventions (1949), and customary international law, reinforcing the duty of states and the international community to prevent and respond to mass atrocities. The moral argument for R2P is strong, it emphasizes the global conscience and ethical obligation to prevent large-scale human suffering, as witnessed in Rwanda (1994) and Srebrenica (1995). R2P is instrumental in

enforcing peaceful resolution through various mechanisms, ensuring that states uphold their responsibility to protect their populations. Five key areas of strength where R2P should play crucial role are prevention through diplomacy, sanctions and economic measures, peacekeeping missions, military intervention, and post-conflict stabilization. Each of these areas contributes uniquely to conflict prevention and resolution, reflecting the principle's flexibility and effectiveness as represented in the chart below.



One of the most critical aspects of R2P is its emphasis on prevention. It encourages states and international organizations to take early action through diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, and mediation to address underlying factors of conflict, such as political instability, human rights abuses, and social grievances. The African Union (AU), for example, has embedded R2P in its principles, allowing for proactive peacekeeping interventions, as seen in cases like South Sudan and Darfur. When prevention fails, R2P enables timely international responses through sanctions,

peacekeeping missions, or, in extreme cases, military intervention authorized by the UN Security Council (UNSC). The 2011 NATO-led intervention in Libya, authorized under R2P, demonstrated its ability to mobilize action to prevent mass atrocities.

According to Cohen (2024), one of the most effective aspects of R2P is its emphasis on diplomatic efforts to prevent conflicts before they escalate into mass atrocities. Diplomacy involves early warning mechanisms, mediation, and negotiation to address tensions between conflicting parties. International organizations such as the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU), and European Union (EU) often engage in preventive diplomacy through dialogue, peace talks, and confidence-building measures. The successful prevention of violence in Kenya (2008) following post-election tensions, mediated by Kofi Annan, exemplifies how diplomatic interventions aligned with R2P can prevent large-scale atrocities.

Again, when diplomacy alone is insufficient, sanctions and economic measures serve as tools to deter aggressors and pressure regimes into compliance with international norms (Drezner, 2024). R2P-related sanctions include asset freezing, trade restrictions, and arms embargoes, targeting individuals or states responsible for human rights violations. The sanctions imposed on Sudan during the Darfur crisis, for instance, sought to limit the government's ability to fund military operations against civilians (UN Resolution 2750, 2024). While economic measures can be effective, they require strong enforcement and international cooperation to prevent sanctions evasion and unintended humanitarian consequences.

Holt and Taylor (2009) argued that R2P aids the deployment peacekeeping forces to conflict zones to protect civilians and maintain stability. UN peacekeeping missions, often authorized by the UN Security Council (UNSC), are tasked with preventing human rights abuses, monitoring ceasefires, and supporting local governance structures. The UN Mission in South Sudan

(UNMISS) is a key example of R2P in action, where peacekeepers provided protection to civilians in internally displaced persons (IDP) camps. However, peacekeeping missions often face challenges, including limited mandates, funding constraints, and political resistance from host states.

Moreso, Pattison (2015) posited that when diplomatic efforts, sanctions, and peacekeeping measures fail, R2P allows for military intervention as a last resort. Such interventions must be authorized by the UNSC and are intended to prevent large-scale atrocities. The 2011 NATO-led intervention in Libya, justified under R2P, was aimed at stopping mass killings by Muammar Gaddafi's forces. While the intervention succeeded in preventing immediate atrocities, the lack of a long-term stabilization plan led to post-conflict instability. This highlights the complexity and risks of military interventions under R2P principle.

To buttress the issue, Genser (2022) stated that the final stage of R2P's application involves post-conflict stabilization, which is crucial to ensuring long-term peace and preventing the recurrence of violence. This includes efforts such as state-building, disarmament, reintegration of combatants, and judicial accountability. The International Criminal Court (ICC) plays a role in holding perpetrators accountable, ensuring justice for victims, and deterring future crimes. However, challenges such as political instability, weak institutions, and external interference often hinder post-conflict recovery, as seen in Libya and Iraq.

Under the concept of R2P, States bear a full obligation and responsibility for the protection of the human rights of their citizens. However, when a state is no longer capable of safeguarding human rights, marked by actions such as genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, the international community has a responsibility to intervene, disregarding the sovereignty of that state. Therefore, in R2P, humanitarian intervention using military instruments

is not only seen as a moral 'right' but has transformed into a “duty”, namely the obligation of the international community to be actively involved in such situations (Pattison, 2008, p. 263).

The R2P doctrine represents a significant evolution in international humanitarian intervention, providing specific instrumentalities for the international community to prevent and respond to mass atrocities globally. The first instrumental aspect of R2P lies in its three-pillar framework. Pillar one establishes the primary responsibility of states to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. This creates a clear foundation for accountability and sets baseline expectations for state behaviour during crises. Pillar two provides the mechanisms for international assistance and capacity building. This includes preventive diplomacy, economic aid, and technical support to strengthen state institutions. The international community can deploy various diplomatic tools such as mediation, confidence-building measures, and early warning systems. These preventive instrumentalities are particularly crucial as they help address potential crises before they escalate into violent conflicts. Pillar three outlines the international community's responsibility to take collective action when a state fails to protect its population. This can involve peaceful measures under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, such as negotiation and arbitration, or more coercive measures under Chapter VII, including sanctions or military intervention as a last resort.

The UN Security Council serves as the primary institutional mechanism for implementing R2P principles. Through its resolutions, the Council authorizes various forms of intervention, from fact-finding missions to peacekeeping operations. The Secretary-General's Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide and R2P play crucial roles in monitoring situations and providing early warning of potential crises. Furthermore, the International Criminal Court (ICC) serves as a crucial judicial instrument for R2P implementation. The threat of prosecution can deter potential

perpetrators of mass atrocities, while actual prosecutions demonstrate accountability and help prevent future crimes. Moreso, regional organizations have emerged as essential instruments for implementing R2P. The African Union, for instance, has incorporated R2P principles into its Constitutive Act, allowing for intervention in member states under grave circumstances. This regional approach often provides greater legitimacy and understanding of local contexts.

Economic instrumentalities include targeted sanctions, asset freezes, and conditional aid programmes. These tools create pressure for compliance without resorting to military force. International financial institutions also play a role by linking assistance to human rights performance and good governance. Also, civil society organizations contribute significantly to R2P implementation through monitoring, advocacy, and capacity building. They help raise awareness, document violations, and pressure governments to act in accordance with their R2P obligations.

However, the effectiveness of these instrumentalities faces several challenges. The requirement for Security Council authorization leads to paralysis when permanent members exercise their veto power. Questions of sovereignty and competing national interests often complicate intervention decisions. In addition, the international community's capacity and willingness to commit resources to prevention and response varies significantly. Despite these challenges, R2P's instrumentalities have evolved to provide a more structured approach to crisis prevention and resolution. The doctrine's emphasis on prevention and capacity building, rather than just reaction, has helped shift focus toward earlier, less costly interventions. The combination of diplomatic, economic, legal, and military tools provides a flexible framework for responding to diverse crisis situations, though their successful application requires sustained political will and international cooperation.

Despite its instrumental role, R2P faces some limitations. The principle is often politicized, with powerful States using it selectively to justify intervention while ignoring crises that do not align with their geopolitical interests. The UNSC's veto power further hampers R2P's effectiveness, as seen in Syria, where international divisions have prevented decisive action despite ongoing atrocities. Additionally, concerns about R2P being used as a pretext for regime change, as critics argue happened in Libya, undermine its legitimacy.

The continuous use of the veto power by the UNSC (P5) members (USA, UK, France, Russia and China) to pursue and preserve their core national interests thereby frustrating all efforts and proposals at implementing the pillar 3 of R2P according to the standard mechanism, framework and guidelines of the R2P doctrine has limited the effectiveness of the instrumentality of the principle in achieving its goal. This limitation in the efficacy of R2P principle is manifested as a result of deep-seated divisions among the UNSC member States. The chart below shows the level of deep-seated divisions among the UNSC member States.



The only ground for the application of R2P's pillar 3 is when the UNSC permanent 5 members States all agrees for a concerted action and this was impossible to achieve since the Syrian crisis began in 2011 due to the deep-seated divisions rooted between the UNSC member states. The inability of the UNSC (P5) members states to unanimously adopt a resolution by a consensus denouncing, condemning and criticising the brutal attacks and violent application of force by the Assad military forces to suppress public insurrections and anti-government demonstrators due to divisions within the council till date has hampered the application of R2P pillar 3 in Syria which were conspicuously revealed by the chart, and the masses has been suffering from trauma of the war, agony, pains, and the people who are at the risk of mass atrocity crimes in Syria are helpless in their mother-fatherland.

The data shows the deep-seated division and the dynamism in the use of veto power by the UNSC (P5) members States to pursue their national interests has frustrated all efforts in applying the structural framework, strategic standard mechanism of pillar 3 measures and guidelines of R2P.

The chart presents the deep-seated issues hindering the effectiveness of the instrumentality of R2P principle in the world. First, the highest hindrance to actualizing the (R2P) principle is the use of veto powers by UNSC (P5) members. The second highest is the global power struggle and influence among world leaders especially the (UNSC (P5) members. The third highest hindrance is the diverging national interest among world leaders especially the (UNSC (P5) members. The fourth is the humanitarian and sovereignty debate. The fifth is the proxy conflicts in the Middle East. The sixth is the cold war legacies and finally, the representation issues especially in the UNSC.

The veto power is a major source of division within the UNSC, as it allows any P5 member to block resolutions, regardless of their support among the wider UN membership. This has led to repeated policy deadlocks, preventing action on conflicts like Syria, Ukraine, and Israel-Palestine. Russia and China frequently use their vetoes to protect allies from Western-backed interventions, particularly in cases involving Syria and Myanmar. The U.S. has used its veto power extensively to shield Israel from resolutions condemning its actions in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This selective use of the veto has led to accusations of bias and inaction, eroding trust in the UNSC to effectively carry out R2P principle.

The UNSC serves as a stage for global power competition, with the P5 states using their influence to advance strategic interests rather than collective security. The U.S. and its allies push for resolutions that support democracy, human rights, and free-market policies, often using the UNSC to pressure adversaries like Iran, North Korea, and Russia. Russia and China counteract this by promoting multipolarity, advocating for non-intervention, and using the UNSC to resist what they see as Western hegemony. Disputes over NATO expansion, military interventions, and sanctions further fuel tensions, making cooperation difficult. This struggle has made the UNSC less of a peacekeeping body and more of a battleground for geopolitical rivalries.

UNSC members prioritize their national interests, often at the expense of collective action. The U.S. seeks to maintain its global dominance and support key allies like Israel and Ukraine. Russia aims to reassert itself as a global power, opposing Western influence in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. China focuses on securing economic and military dominance while resisting any UN resolutions that could challenge its sovereignty over Taiwan, Hong Kong, or the South China Sea. France and the U.K. attempt to balance between Western alliances and their

former colonial interests in Africa and the Middle East. These conflicting priorities make consensus difficult, particularly on sanctions, military interventions, and peacekeeping operations.

One of the most contentious debates within the UNSC is the balance between humanitarian intervention and state sovereignty. The U.S., U.K., and France advocate for humanitarian interventions under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, as seen in Libya 2011. China and Russia, on the other hand, emphasize non-interference, fearing that interventions could be used to justify regime change (e.g., Syria, Venezuela). This divide has led to inconsistent responses to crises: the UNSC authorized intervention in Libya, but failed to act in Syria due to Russian and Chinese opposition.

The Middle East has become a battleground for proxy conflicts, with UNSC members backing opposing sides. In Syria, the U.S. supports opposition groups, while Russia and Iran back the Assad regime. In Yemen, the U.S. and its allies support Saudi Arabia, while Iran backs the Houthis. In Israel-Palestine, the U.S. defends Israeli actions, while Russia and China support Palestinian causes. These conflicts exacerbate divisions within the UNSC, as members block resolutions that go against their geopolitical interests.

The composition of the UNSC is increasingly seen as outdated, leading to demands for reform. Critics argue that the P5 structure reflects the post-World War II power balance, not today's global realities. Emerging powers like India, Brazil, Germany, and Japan seek permanent membership to better represent regional interests. African nations argue that no African country holds a permanent seat, despite the continent being a frequent subject of UNSC decisions. Calls to limit or remove the veto have gained traction, but face opposition from P5 members unwilling

to cede power. Without meaningful reform, the UNSC risks becoming less relevant in addressing modern global conflicts.

The deep-seated divisions within the UNSC, fueled by veto power abuse, global power struggles, diverging national interests, the sovereignty debate, proxy wars, and representation issues, significantly weaken its ability to maintain international peace and security. These conflicts have turned the Council into a battleground for geopolitical rivalries rather than a functional decision-making body. Without structural reforms, increased representation, and restrictions on the use of veto, the UNSC's credibility will continue to erode, limiting its effectiveness in resolving global crises.

In summary, R2P's instrumentality in enforcing peaceful resolution is evident across these five areas. While diplomatic prevention and sanctions offer early intervention strategies, peacekeeping missions and military intervention serve as immediate responses to crises. Meanwhile, post-conflict stabilization ensures long-term peacebuilding. The effectiveness of R2P depends on strong political will, international cooperation, and strategic implementation to address both the immediate threats and the underlying causes of mass atrocities. However, controversies surrounding post-intervention instability in Libya highlight the challenges of implementing R2P effectively. The Responsibility to Protect remains a crucial international norm for preventing and responding to mass atrocities. While challenges exist in its consistent application, R2P has significantly influenced humanitarian intervention and global governance. Strengthening multilateral cooperation, ensuring accountability, and refining the principle's implementation are necessary steps toward making R2P a more effective tool for safeguarding human security.

The study established that there are extreme fragmentations that exist in the UNSC especially at the onset of the Syrian crisis in 2011. It elucidates the profound disagreement by espousing the gross use of "veto power" by Russia and China on matter relating to R2P intervention after Resolution 1973 were authorized for nations to use military force in Libya. Again, there is a disharmony in the UNSC (P3) members states of U.S, UK and France against the (P2) members states of Russia and China seen using the "veto power" to protect their strategic economic and political core interests in the Middle East region which has made it impossible for the UNSC to apply the R2P pillar 3 principles in several crises that has occurred after Libya. Hence, "nation states, NGO's and prominent individuals has questioned the rationale and effectiveness behind the R2P's intervention moves in Libya being the first place to achieve a consensus in UNSC to invoke pillar 3 measures (Lopez, 2015).

The GC R2P (2016) stated that "when the UNSC fails the entire UNGA fails. Thus, the argued that members of the UNSC (P5) are obligated with the authority to veto any resolution but with the provision of an alternative solutions. Experts such as Robinson who was an Elder stateswoman and the former Ireland President and a former United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights suggested that "UNSC was created on the core mandate of UN charter for the maintenance of international peace and security, with grave effects when it comes to grief of inaction to perform such duties". Again, the Secretary General of Amnesty International in the person of Salil Shetty opined that "the UNSC was created and endorsed to put a stop to mass atrocity crimes in which they have constantly flopped and declined to act from 7th of April, 1994 in Rwanda genocide to Syria Massacre on 15th of March in 2011. Moreso, the former UN Secretary General and Chairman of the Elders, Kofi Annan also professed:

> "that it should be incumbent upon a member state, if it uses a veto to present an alternative. you cannot put down a veto, paralysed operations creating a stalemate and not propose a way forward when they are divided and cannot agree on a resolution, the crisis tends to fester" (GC R2P, 2016:52).

There was a radical change in the attitude of Russia and China after the Libyan crisis that the Russians and Chinese were no longer comfortable with the R2P doctrine especially the third pillar measures following the outcomes in Libya. Thus, the development in Libya at the time permitted the achievement of consensus by the UN members while some others abstained from voting e.g. Russia and China along with some other BRICS members states and consequently a forceful military intervention was authorised in Libya. Notwithstanding, the reverse is the case for Syria, because no agreement between the UNSC members was achieved. Meanwhile, the regime change agenda in Libya made Russia and China together with their BRICS allies to review the R2P third pillar measures as another instrument for their western neocolonialism. Therefore, China and India's reaction to the Syrian crisis dependent on the historical antecedents of how the western powers has abused the processes during the era of colonialism and now imperialism (Lee and Chan, 2016: 180-181).

To further buttress China's inconsistencies and skepticism towards the third pillar of R2P doctrine, China agreed for the application of R2P pillar 3 in several African and Middle Eastern countries like Cote d'Ivoire, Libya, Mali and Syria between 2011 to 2012 in the heated deliberation at the UNSC for the invocation of the 7th Chapter of the UN Charter to use and adopt military force action as an intervention tool (Lee and Chan, 2016:179-214). Russia on the other hand has made frantic efforts at blocking every UNSC resolution on Syria presented by the US, NATO and her Western allies after she abstained from voting against the intervention in

Libya judging by the way and manner NATO and the western ideologies concealed their intentions from protecting civilian populations into a regime change with the fall of Gadaffi. Odeyemi (2016:122-149) stated that:

> "In October of 2011, Russia and China vetoed a resolution that condemned Syria's crackdown on anti-government forces. In February of 2012, they vetoed a resolution proposed by the league of Arab states, supporting a peace plan calling for a cease in violence. In July of 2012, Russia/China vetoed a resolution calling for Chapter 7 VII measures demanding the Syrian government to stop hostilities or face sanctions. Finally, in May of 2014, they vetoed a resolution referring the case in Syria to the International Criminal Court (ICC)".

This analysis from Odeyemi (2016:136) revealed a drift by the BRICS members states of their intentions to oppose the other UNSC members in Syria, as he posited that "Brazil, Russia, India, China and South African countries were very pervasive in recent deliberation in UNSC in their characteristic equalization to resist the western superior ascendance or hegemony of the new global order especially with the guise of R2P doctrine. Meanwhile, the error that was obviously committed by the western countries of the U.S and her allies while implementing the R2P pillar 3 in Libya was the regime change agenda which was totally against the R2P doctrine and resolution 1973 permitting forceful military intervention in Libya (Lopez, 2015:228-229).

It has been observed that since the beginning of the Syrian civil war, Russia, China and other BRICS allies put together have veto over 14 resolutions of the UNSC on Syria. Hence, some scholars like Averre and Danies (2015) has opined that "for the Russians and Chinese, the first and second pillar of R2P principles which is the protection of responsibility of weak civilian populations should be the major areas of concentration. While implementing the R2P doctrine; hence the third pillar was considered as a tool for the western powers to propagated or facilitates democracy and regime change agenda in the international system. The scholars, therefore

resolved that while using military force as an instrument of intervention in another country was used by Russia in Ukraine because it was favourable to her national interest which is an act of duplicity with double standards. A total of 14 UNSC resolutions have been blocked by Russia on humanitarian grounds as attempts to mitigate the excruciating agony of the Syrian people (Russo, 2017).

Accordingly, Russo (2017) carefully itemized the various resolutions passed in Syria in which most of it corresponded with the core Russia and China's national interest which is the strict adherence to UN Charter for the maintenance of non-interference into Syrian sovereignty which favours the Assad regime in Syria. This information shows how the veto power of Russia and China has blocked the proper application of the instrumentalities of R2P principles and the conflicting application of pillar 3 in Libya and the non-implementation in Syria. Conversely, the UNSC inaction for the maintenance of international peace and security has been hamstrung with abuse of the veto power, members inconsistencies, political ideological differences and national interests, polarisation and power balancing for national security concerns by states has further divided the council's ability to take a concerted forceful military action for intervention in states like Cote d' Ivoire, Mali, Ukraine, Syria except in Libya that got a unanimous vote for intervention based on R2P.

Unfortunately, the civilian population is the major casualties of this UNSC inaction and consequently, mass atrocity crimes are permitted unabated with impunity by the sovereign leaders to the detriment of their people particularly in Syria today. Thus, the Global Centre for the Responsibility to protect has stated in the year 2020 that "throughout the past nine years, the UNSC has consistently failed to uphold its responsibility to protect the Syrian people. Fourteen

vetoes by Syria (including eight with China) have underpinned international efforts to hold perpetrators on all sides accountable for war crimes against humanity" (GCR2P, 2020).

Moreso, the Secretary General of Amnesty International, Shetty (2016) has requested "the UNSC members states specifically the U.S., Russia and China to desist from using the veto powers to protect their national interests rather than concentrating on protecting the civilian populations at risk of mass atrocity crimes. Emphasizing that it was the last gasp moment that this government put the protection of their people first over their own political ambitions and interests" (GCR2P, 2016:2-53). This position was also supported by Lopez (2015:119-138), when he stated that "decisions about forceful military intervention will definitely be made swiftly by national political leaders to balance the interest of the states considering their legal stance, perceived costs, opinion and humanitarian impulse for as much as they were prior to the inception of R2P principles.

The United States, Russia and China has due to the non-application of R2P principle in Syria, other parts of the Middle East and Africa in recent times due to the arbitrary use of the veto power at the UNSC which hampered the perspective use of military force for humanitarian protection objectives. This made the implementation of R2P principles by the UNSC (P5) members to be inconsistent because of their diverse political ideological dividends in socio-economic and security concerns and interests at variance with the R2P intent and purposes for humanity by preventing atrocity crimes.

Theme Two: The Successes and Failures of R2P in Libya Crisis

The R2P doctrine, which was unanimously endorsed by United Nations (UN) member states in 2005, played a significant role in the 2011 intervention in Libya. The Libyan case is often cited as both a success and a failure in terms of its implementation. The hypothesis from the analysis

of the study shows that there is a positive relationship between a positive relationship between R2P successes and solving humanitarian crisis. The study indicates that the intervention successfully prevented immediate mass atrocities and demonstrated global commitment to R2P, backed by regional organizations, removal of authoritarian regime, emphasized civilian protection while it also resulted in unintended consequences, including prolonged instability and a power vacuum that fueled ongoing conflict in Libya. The success and failures of the use of R2P pillar 3 in Libya is encapsulated in the chart below.



The study noted that the R2P was successful in the protection and prevention of mass atrocity on civilians in Libya**.** One of the most significant achievements of the R2P intervention in Libya was the prevention of a potential massacre in Benghazi. Gaddafi's forces advanced towards the rebel stronghold of Benghazi, and he openly threatened to cleanse the city of "cockroaches," a term that raised alarms about potential mass killings. The UN Security Council responded swiftly by passing Resolution 1973, which authorized "all necessary measures" to protect civilians. This led to a NATO-led intervention, which effectively halted Gaddafi's advance and prevented the immediate slaughter of thousands of civilians in Benghazi and other opposition-held areas.

NATO's enforcement of the no-fly zone and targeted airstrikes halted Gaddafi's offensive, fulfilling R2P's primary objective of protecting civilians from mass atrocities.

The intervention in Libya marked the first time that R2P was fully operationalized through military means under the UN framework. The swift and decisive action taken by the international community underscored the growing recognition of the global responsibility to prevent mass atrocities. The Security Council's endorsement of military intervention reflected a consensus that sovereignty is not a shield for governments committing crimes against their populations. The commitment to R2P in Libya signaled that the international community was willing to act when faced with clear threats of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, or crimes against humanity. Thus, there was international consensus and legitimacy. The intervention in Libya initially garnered broad international support, both within and outside the UNSC. Resolution 1973 was passed with 10 votes in favor and five abstentions, with no vetoes from permanent members.

The Libyan case marked the first time the UNSC explicitly authorized the use of force under R2P principles. This set an important precedent for the international community's willingness to act decisively in the face of mass atrocities. It demonstrated that the global commitment to protect vulnerable populations could be translated into concrete action, reinforcing the normative strength of R2P.

The Libyan intervention was unique in that it had strong backing from regional organizations, particularly the Arab League and the African Union. The Arab League, which had historically been reluctant to endorse foreign interventions in member states, played a crucial role in legitimizing the call for action against Gaddafi. The League's resolution calling for a no-fly zone added significant political weight to the international response. Similarly, the African Union, though more hesitant about military intervention, engaged in diplomatic efforts to mediate the

conflict. This regional support was instrumental in countering accusations of Western unilateralism and reinforced the legitimacy of the intervention.

Furthermore**,** regime change was not explicitly mandated by Resolution 1973, the intervention indirectly contributed to the fall of Gaddafi's regime. By targeting government forces and infrastructure, NATO weakened Gaddafi's hold on power, enabling rebel groups to advance and ultimately seize control. Gaddafi's death in October 2011 symbolized the end of decades of autocratic rule, offering a chance for political transformation in Libya. Also, the intervention ultimately led to the removal of Gaddafi, who had ruled Libya for over four decades with an iron grip. The NATO-led air campaign weakened his military capabilities, and rebel forces captured and killed him in October 2011. His removal ended a regime characterized by human rights abuses, repression, and state-sponsored terrorism. While Libya's post-Gaddafi transition has been tumultuous, the intervention succeeded in dismantling a dictatorship that had systematically oppressed its people.

Again, the civilian protection was the core justification and operational priority of the R2P principle. The military campaign focused on neutralizing forces threatening civilian populations while minimizing collateral damage. The UN-mandated no-fly zone prevented Gaddafi from using air power against civilians, and NATO airstrikes targeted military assets rather than civilian infrastructure. Although challenges arose in post-intervention, the immediate goal of protecting Libyan civilians from imminent massacres was largely achieved.

Despite its immediate success record, the intervention has led to long-term instability. The removal of Gaddafi without a structured plan for post-conflict governance resulted in political fragmentation, militia rule, and ongoing violence. Libya descended into civil war, with rival factions vying for control, exacerbating human suffering. Critics argue that the lack of a post-

intervention strategy undermined the R2P mission, raising questions about the effectiveness of military interventions without comprehensive rebuilding efforts.

The R2P intervention resulted in mission creep and regime change which was not part of the plan. What began as a humanitarian intervention quickly transformed into a regime change operation, leading to accusations of mission creep. While Resolution 1973 authorized the use of force to protect civilians, NATO's actions extended beyond that mandate, actively supporting rebel forces and ensuring Gaddafi's overthrow. This shift set a precedent that weakened trust in R2P as a strictly humanitarian mechanism, making future interventions more politically contentious.

Again, lack of post-conflict planning is detrimental to the actualization of R2P principle. The absence of a coherent post-conflict strategy left Libya vulnerable to chaos. Unlike previous interventions that included long-term stabilization efforts, Libya was largely left to its own devices following Gaddafi's fall. The resulting power vacuum allowed armed militias to proliferate, preventing the establishment of a stable government and prolonging civil unrest.

Another failure of R2P intervention in Libya is the humanitarian and civilian costs. While the intervention aimed to protect civilians, it also contributed to unintended civilian casualties and suffering. NATO airstrikes resulted in collateral damage, and the ensuing lawlessness led to widespread human rights abuses. The country became a hub for human trafficking, and thousands of Libyans faced displacement and violence.

The Libyan experience damaged the credibility of R2P by reinforcing fears that the doctrine could be used to justify regime change. Countries like Russia and China cited Libya as a reason to block future R2P-based interventions, as seen in Syria. This reluctance has made it harder for the international community to act decisively in subsequent crises.

The wrong execution of the principle of R2P exacerbated regional instability in the Sahel region. Libya's destabilization had spillover effects across North Africa and the Sahel. The spread of weapons and fighters from Libya contributed to conflicts in Mali and the rise of extremist groups. The intervention inadvertently fueled broader regional insecurity, affecting stability in neighboring countries.

The post R2P intervention resulted in limited political reconciliation and local disillusionment in governance. Libyans who initially supported intervention became disillusioned as post-Gaddafi governance failures persisted. The lack of political reconciliation and continued factionalism prevented meaningful progress, leading to widespread frustration among the population. The unfulfilled promises of stability and democracy have fostered skepticism towards foreign interventions.

While R2P Libyan intervention achieved its immediate goal of preventing mass atrocities, it also exposed significant flaws in the implementation of R2P. Mission creep, lack of post-conflict

planning, humanitarian costs, and long-term instability has overshadowed its initial successes, providing a cautionary tale for future humanitarian interventions especially in Syria conflict.

The 2011 NATO intervention in Libya, authorized under UN Security Council Resolution 1973, represented the first major military implementation of R2P principles. While initially celebrated as a successful application of R2P to protect civilians from mass atrocities, the aftermath significantly impacted international responses to subsequent crisis, particularly in Syria. The Libya intervention's controversial outcome created several key challenges for applying R2P in Syria. First, Russia and China perceived that NATO had exceeded the UN mandate by pursuing regime change rather than strictly protecting civilians. This led to increased skepticism about R2P as a framework, with these powers viewing it as potential cover for Western-led intervention and regime change. Russia and China subsequently vetoed multiple UN Security Council resolutions on Syria, citing concerns about repeat of the Libyan scenario.

The Libya experience also influenced Western powers' appetite for intervention in Syria. The post-intervention chaos in Libya, including state collapse and ongoing civil conflict, made Western leaders more hesitant to pursue similar military action in Syria, despite comparable humanitarian concerns. This created a paradox where the first major implementation of R2P may have actually constrained its future application in situations where it might have been warranted. Also, the Libya intervention's focus on military aspects of R2P overshadowed the framework's emphasis on prevention and peaceful conflict resolution. The Syrian crisis might have benefited from earlier application of R2P's preventive and diplomatic tools, rather than waiting until violence escalated to consider military intervention. The international community's experience in Libya potentially led to an overcorrection - from too much military action to too little engagement of any kind in Syria's early stages.

The contrasting approaches to Libya and Syria also revealed inconsistencies in how the international community applies R2P principles. While rapid action was taken in Libya, the response to Syria was characterized by diplomatic paralysis and competing geopolitical interests. This inconsistency undermined R2P's legitimacy as a universal principle for protecting civilians from mass atrocities.

However, the Libya experience did yield some positive lessons for Syria. It highlighted the importance of regional organizations' support for intervention, comprehensive post-conflict planning, and maintaining strict focus on civilian protection rather than regime change. These insights could have informed a more effective diplomatic approach to Syria, though they were not ultimately implemented. The Libya intervention's impact on Syria also demonstrates the need to strengthen R2P's non-military components, including early warning systems, preventive diplomacy, and support for local peace initiatives. A more balanced application of R2P principles, emphasizing prevention and peaceful resolution alongside the possibility of intervention, might have created more opportunities for de-escalating the Syrian conflict.

In conclusion, the international community must carefully balance the need to protect civilians with concerns about sovereignty and intervention. The Libya-Syria dynamic suggests that successful implementation of R2P requires clearer guidelines for military action, stronger emphasis on prevention and diplomacy, and consistent application across different crises. These lessons remain relevant for future applications of R2P in complex humanitarian emergencies.

The implementation of R2P in Libya represents a mixed legacy. While it succeeded in preventing an imminent massacre and demonstrated the international community’s commitment to protecting civilians, it also exposed significant flaws in the application of R2P principles. The lack of a clear post-intervention strategy, perceived mission overreach, and resulting instability

have overshadowed the initial successes, raising questions about the feasibility of R2P as a long-term solution to mass atrocities. Libya underscores the need for a more holistic approach to R2P, one that integrates prevention, protection, and post-conflict recovery. By learning from these experiences, the international community can strengthen the implementation of R2P, ensuring that it remains a viable tool for safeguarding human rights and promoting global peace.

Theme Three: The Effects of the humanitarian Crisis in Syria

The humanitarian crisis in Syria, which began in 2011, represents one of the most severe humanitarian emergencies of the 21st century. The conflict has created devastating ripple effects that continue to impact millions of lives as represented in the graph below.



In answering this research question, the study posits that there exists a positive relationship between R2P humanitarian intervention and solving Syrian crisis. One would observe that the theme as provided by the available data is that of people in dire need, destruction of lives and properties, increase in internally displaced people in the region, food, economy, health, education crisis, refugee problems and children devastation occasioned by the inability of the UNSC to act promptly and decisively in Syria since 2012 to date. The abuse of the 'veto' power has provided enough evidence that the UNSC has not been able to consistently, collectively and fully implement R2P elsewhere after except in Libya, hence, the masses has continuously endured hunger, pain, agony, trauma and deaths from the Syrian people due to the use of regional powerful states to influence the BRICS nations with the veto power of Russia and China to prevent the application of pillar 3 in Syria. This was further buttressed by Lee and Chan (2016) when they stated that "both the Russia and China states tends to reject U.S. liberalism proposals and the advancement of western ideologies of regime change under the auspices of democracy in the form of R2P and thus making the war in Syria to continue with grave impacts on the people of Syria. Again Averre and Davies (2015) stated that Russia prefers the status-quo of the present international order to remain, where human rights are secondary to the international norm of state rights, lending to the concept that the actions of Russia appears to undermine the basic principles of R2P". These ideological differences in relation to sovereignty, has made the application of R2P (pillar 3) in Syria difficult and complex. Moreso, the scenarios demonstrated by the UNSC members has further espoused these deep ideological and political differences between the UNSC member states with references to the application of R2P pillar 3 thereby making people to wonder what the future holds for the doctrine.

According to Adams (2017) and Lopez (2015) respectively have stated that the negative impacts of R2P in Libya seems to have distorted how the UNSC has approached the Syrian crisis even though Libya and Syrian crisis situations has many things in common. Meanwhile after the conflict in Libya, and the fears of most of the UNSC members' states especially Russia and China to put military resources into place has made the efficacies of R2P stagnant and redundant. Feikes (2017) affirmed that "by not deciding to act in Syria, the U.S. and its NATO allies has widely opened the door to Russia intervention on behalf of the Assad regime". Also, the GCR2P has opined that UNSC members has failed to perform its obligations for the maintenance of international peace and security by not ending indiscriminate air strikes in Syria, end the use of illegal weapons, barrel bombs and atomic bombs, and ensuring humanitarian access (Odeyemi, 2016).

Furthermore, the study also established from available data that the UNSC's inability to apply pillar 3 in Syria by intervening forcefully was due to a lack of prospects to succeed according to R2P doctrine. The study contains the major criteria for a successful military operation based on forceful intervention in Libya. Kildron (2012:36) outlined the criteria and stated that "military intervention is not a 'panacea' for all humanitarian intervention and should only be explored in cases with high probability of success". He concluded that "the criteria in the Libya model needed to be in place, to achieve the goals of a successful military intervention by using force". The Libyan model has copiously stated that "Syria was not a good case for pillar 3 measures under the R2P mandate, because it does not satisfy any of the criteria needed for a successful intervention" (Kildron, 2012). No international permission was achieved by the international community (UNSC) in allowing the implementation of R2P pillar 3 going by the Chapter 7 of the UN charter because Russia and China have used their veto powers to frustrate and block all

resolutions proposals for the use of forceful intervention in Syria by the UNSC, hence getting unanimity collectively has been very difficult. To this end, Barber (2019) observed that "the UNSC has not been able to do much in Syria because of the deep-division among them. He stated that "with the limited exceptions, the UNSC has failed to impose any of the tangible measures that the UN Charter says it may employ to give effects to its decisions". Thus this ideological and political imbroglio has divided the UNSC and has created more difficulties in achieving consensus for the use of R2P pillar 3 to protect the people of Syria.

From the foregoing, achieving meaningful consensus action by the UNSC in international conflicts would be very difficult as a result of the interests and alignment with any one of the permanent 5 members states of the UNSC (Barber, 2019). Therefore, the chasing of core national interests by the P5 members states has made it so difficult to implement R2P pillar 3 mandate in the case of Syria (Bellany, 2014).

On the whole, public opinion was in favour of the protection of civilian populations that are in dire needs of humanitarian assistance in Syria due to their sufferings from mass atrocity crimes but this was hamstrung by the division within the council members, lack of political will skepticism and other aforementioned reasons and interests presented above, hence galvanizing a wide international support for the protection of civilian population in Syria has been unable to be manifested or achieved after the Libyan debacle thereby leading to inability to apply force and implement pillar 3 of the doctrine and therefore allowing the crisis in Syria to continue.

This UNSC division has made the Syrian people volatile and exposed to the risk of mass atrocity crimes (Odeyemi, 2016:122). Again, Topal (2013:2) maintained that "the UNSC cannot take action in Syria because of the opposition of Russia and China citing the lack of political will, unsustainable structure incompatible with the conditions of our times among its members".

Consequently, the formation of a wide coalition formidable force under the prerequisites of the Libyan model, and regional power influence is impossible due to the opposition force by Russia and China (Feikes, 2017).

The deep-seated division of the UNSC (P5) members thwarted that regional support which was success criteria in the Libyan model, thus igniting absolute no regional support to the application of R2P third pillar in Syria. Russia, China and the BRICS influenced Iran, a regional power to ensure that Bashar al-Assad remains in power, while the United States, U.K, France and her western allies are committed to see Assad is driven from power. Powerful regional powers in the region like Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia has the capacity to influence their vested national interest in the postwar settlement of the crisis in Syria to their own advantages" (Dragovic and Iron, 2017:67). On the other hand, the Arab league is not able to openly assist any party in Syria, hence showing more evidence of the lack of regional support in Syria. Consequently, the study shows that there were no regional supports involved in the Syrian crisis because of the numerous actions with diverse national interests in favour of Bashar al-Assad regime or against. This observation was also professed by Vanhullebusch (2015:1501-1680) when he stated that "in the present Syrian crisis, member states of the Arab league are equally trying to carefully profile themselves when supporting one or the other rebel factions fighting the Syrian government and paramilitary forces".

Consequent upon these varying interests, the Syria crisis, civil unrest gradually degenerated into a civil war with the highest humanitarian impact and refugees crisis in the 21st century. Humanitarian assistance rose geometrically reaching about 11.3 million people in 2021. There is high rate of malnourishment, food shortages, lack of water supply and medicare (HCL, 2021).

Over 221,112 people have died (U.S Department of States 2021). Indiscriminate arrest, torture and disappearance of women and children were prevalent in Syria (SNHR, 2021).

The UNSC has never been so divided without any decisive military action like in Syria (Coen, 2015). The Human Rights Watch (2012) reported the use of barrel bombs and chemical weapons on the citizens by the Assad government forces which reached the level of atrocity crimes against humanity in cities all over Syria. Although the Assad regime has vehemently denied these allegations alleging the rebels were behind it. This has further exposed the constraints of R2P in practice (Thakur, 2015).

The non-application of R2P principles in Syria that have led to humanitarian crisis in the region and beyond is attributed to the arbitrary use of the veto power by the UNSC (P5) members because of ideological divide. The geo-political interests of the UNSC members have hampered the use of military force for humanitarian protection purposes in Syria thereby causing a great humanitarian crisis in the globe. Although, the prompt and decisive mobilization of UNSC members has saved many civilian lives in Libya, but the regime change agenda has revealed more concealed intentions and skepticisms of the mission in the minds of the Russia and China and their allies member states. NATO's exit left the country in shambles due to their inability to rebuild the country after the war, hence leaving the country to begin from the scratch without any direction which is frustrating the R2P intervention in the world, hence, increasing the speed of humanitarian suffering and crisis of the people in Syria. The humanitarian impacts of R2P in Syria is that the mass population of the country has been traumatised with hunger, pains, deaths due to the use of weapon, economic woes, infrastructural decay due to the inaction of UNSC member states occasioned by internal division into two axis of P3 (U.S, France and UK) and P2 (Russia and China) for core national interests.

The study revealed that the scale of human displacement is staggering. Over 6.8 million Syrians have fled the country as refugees, primarily to neighboring countries like Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan. Another 6.7 million people are internally displaced within Syria, having fled their homes but remained within the country's borders. This massive displacement has torn apart families and communities, creating long-term psychological trauma and disrupting social support networks.

The healthcare system has been severely damaged by the conflict. Hundreds of medical facilities have been damaged and destroyed, and many healthcare workers have fled and some killed. This has left the remaining population with severely limited access to essential medical care. The situation is particularly dire for those with chronic conditions, pregnant women, and children requiring vaccinations. Pandemics further strained these already limited healthcare resources.

Children have been disproportionately affected by the crisis. Many have lost years of education due to destroyed schools, displacement, and the need to work to support their families. A generation of Syrian children has grown up knowing only conflict, leading to widespread trauma and mental health challenges. UNICEF (2019) reports that millions of children in Syria require humanitarian assistance, including access to education, proper nutrition, and psychological support.

Furthermore, food insecurity remains a critical concern. The conflict has disrupted agricultural production, supply chains, and markets, leading to widespread food shortages and soaring prices. Many families struggle to afford basic necessities, with a significant portion of the population relying on humanitarian aid for survival. The economic crisis has been exacerbated by international sanctions, inflation, and the collapse of the Syrian currency. Again, basic infrastructure has been decimated in many areas in Syria. Access to clean water, electricity, and sanitation facilities is limited or non-existent in many regions of the country. This has increased

the risk of waterborne diseases and created additional hardships for vulnerable populations, particularly during extreme weather conditions.

Also, women and girls face particular challenges, including increased risk of gender-based violence, early marriage, and limited access to education and employment opportunities. Many women have become heads of households due to the loss or absence of male family members, forcing them to take on new responsibilities while facing significant social and economic barriers in the country.

The humanitarian response has been complicated by ongoing security concerns, limited access to affected populations, and funding shortfalls. International aid organizations struggle to reach those in need, particularly in areas where fighting continues or where access is restricted by various parties to the conflict. The crisis has also placed enormous strain on host communities in neighboring countries. Countries like Lebanon and Jordan have experienced significant pressure on their infrastructure, public services, and social fabric while trying to accommodate large refugee populations.

The long-term impacts of the Syria crisis will likely persist for generations. Beyond the immediate humanitarian needs, the country faces enormous challenges in rebuilding infrastructure, restoring basic services, and healing the deep social and psychological wounds inflicted by years of conflict. The international community's continued support and attention remain crucial for addressing both immediate humanitarian needs and long-term recovery efforts.

In a nutshell, the UNSC inaction in Syria is thematised to answer this research question while using the Libyan model to discover the likelihood of favourable outcomes in the Syrian crisis. The standard of the Libyan model was also tested in other crises situations to know if the UNSC R2P pillar 3 forceful intervention in Syria would be successful or not. The data from the study

shows clearly that lack of an international consensus authorizing the use of force in Syria led to human suffering, pains, agony, atrocity and crimes against humanity. Again, the Arab league and African Union member states did not give any form of regional support to a coalition force in Syria despite mass killings and destruction of properties. Moreso, the absence of genuine or an authentic opposition forces on the ground in Syria also affected the UNSC cohesion because each party were securing their own strategic, national, economic, and core political interests in Syria thereby vetoing every resolution by the West. Consequently, fanning the ambers of disunity among the UNSC members states and thus their inability of implementing R2P pillar 3 depending on the conditions put in place and available in the Libyan model and the war has continued till date with so many human casualties.

The similarities in the Syrian and Libyan conflicts are that the both conflicts occurred at about the same time and relatively the same reasons, of political inferences, as the civilians in both countries were agitating for political emancipation from the ruling political elites using the 'Arab Spring' as a precursor or motivating factor. Consequently, while the crises lasted, sovereignty was lost in both countries, the chicken game theoretical model was on with two level game strategists of the U.S and Russia with veto powers at the UNSC. In both teams, their choice of game for national interest was very important at the council. U.S., U.K, France and other western powers demanded for respect for human rights, freedom and democracy while Russia and China agitated for regime stay, supported Al-Assad, the respect of national sovereignty and the UN principle of non-intervention into another state by foreign or external actors. The voting patterns of both Russia and China were different also in both states which demonstrated their game theoretical choices in Libya and Syria (Bellamy, 2009:35-36).

Interpretation of the Findings

The aforementioned research questions of this study formed the structural framework for the research processes, starting from the sourcing, collection, analysis of data and careful interpretation techniques or procedures employed by the social researcher for answering the research questions. Taking a careful perusal at the three research questions and findings of this study, one will discover that it vehemently aided this contemporary research project work on R2P, especially on the enforcement of the 3 pillar of the R2P doctrine. According to Patton (2015:570) that "qualitative interpretation of data starts with the explanation of meaningful contexts whereas the major interpretation of the information transcends the illustrative and descriptive processes by adding meaningful importance to whatever that was discovered, established or created".

Research Question One: What are the instrumentalities of R2P in resolving crisis? The contents of 2005 WSOD provisions, the 3 pillars of R2P, the standardized mechanism, guidelines or framework of R2P operational procedures in intervening in another state with war as a last resort are the instrumentalities. The emerged theme used for answering it is that the arbitrary use of the veto power by the P5 members states especially the U.S., Russia and China in the UNSC to preserve and pursue their core national interest has hampered the implementation of these instrumentalities. The outcome/findings associated to this theme has established what the present literature has proposed. The proper enforcement of pillar 3 of R2P doctrine would be a complicated and unsuccessful mission without any reasonable prospect of the forceful in military intervention because of the pursuit of their core national strategic interests by the UNSC permanent five members thereby revealing the political, economic and ideological divisions in the UNSC which has been determined and permitted to frustrate the application of the 3 pillar

principles with the use of veto power. This however shows the conflicting implementation of R2P which has the interpretation of both life or death significance, stating further that "social activists who advocates on peoples inalienable rights are required to demonstrate and recreate more expertise while exhibiting their specialties or tactfulness to preserve valuable civilian population lives (Grover, 2015:1112-1128). Meaning that these NGO's organisations and prominent individuals cited all over this research work has persistently evaluated and advanced policies and programmes that seek to resolve mass atrocity crimes with diverse methods of enforcing R2P rather than through the UNSC only. Professional experts like Adams (2015:3) has been quoted in an interview with STAIR news agency as saying that the "institutionalization of the norm of R2P" and further elucidated how the GCR2P was presently training heads of an African joint police and military force to protect the lives of civilian population and their fundamental human rights, stating lessons learned from African countries like South Sudan, central Africa Republic and Syria and advance on the proper application of R2P.

The western propagation facts of colonialism and imperialism to advance their core national interests were checkmated by Russia and China with the use of veto power to block forceful military intervention as resolutions in Syria after the more concealed interventions of the western powers from increasing their powers on smaller and weaker nations while enforcing the 3 pillar of R2P in Libya by the fall of Gaddafi and the regime change agenda. Consequently, the states of Russia and China had persistently used its veto powers to preserve or safeguard the Assad regime from UNSC members states Resolutions that reprimands President Assad al Bashir's massacre of his civilian population and use of barrel bombs and chemical weapons to commit atrocity crimes against his own people since the beginning of attacks in the city of Idlib military crusade in Syria, there were evidence of atrocity crimes committed by the Syrian ground military

forces crimes committed by the Syrian ground military forces with the Russian air assaults on civilian facilities like hospitals, schools, market squares and the internally displaced peoples camp as major targets to create fear, trauma, and tension in the minds of the people. The use of Russian military force in Syria is done to promote and protect their core political, economic and ideological faith of a state-centric independent sovereignty rather than using their veto powers to prevent proposals for Resolutions on individual sovereignty enshrined on the basis of protecting fundamental human rights. Similarly (Lee and Chan, 2016 stated that China in consonance with Russia has vetoed 8 Resolutions on Syria, although the issue of core national interests does not instigate the Chinese in Syria much as the Russians but poverty, under development and social disorganisations caused by the western colonizers has brought about skepticism together with their present ideological stance which can be ascribed to the effects of expansionist colonial abuses and invasions. Again, the UNSC could not act in the Syria crisis due to the arbitrary use of veto power by Russia and China because of the challenges of inordinate delegation, the giving of veto authority to only 5 permanent member states out of the whole nations in UN and the common political resolution/determination between UN member nations has resulted in the United Nations acquiring an unverifiable framework, conflicting with the realities of our present times (Topal, 2013:2). Therefore one could say that the arbitrary use of the veto power by UNSC members states has hampered the proper implementation of R2P's principle in Syria.

Research Question Two: What are the successes or failures of R2P in Libya? The theme created concentrated on the successes and failures of R2P after Libya being the only case study scenario where the R2P doctrine has been authorised and implemented by the UNSC after all the necessary conditions for the use of military force as an instrument of intervention to save the civilian lives. During the crisis in Libya, the country was regarded by the UN/UNSC as a failed

state with complete breakdown of law and order. Therefore, the UNSC resolution on Libya was approved with a unanimous vote for Chapter 7 measures to be applied in Libya by enforcing the 3 pillar of R2P principles. All necessary measures were taken to safeguard the Libyan civilian population by the western allies and NATO to enforce sanctions on Libya which includes assets freezing, arms embargo and ultimately a 'no fly zone' war imposed on the Libyan airspace. The social researcher carefully evaluated the available data and analysed the outcome. He came to the inevitable discoveries that its an established fact that a contribution to knowledge was expanded also, thereby confirming the findings of former professional researchers on R2P 3 pillar.

Available data and other professional experts findings has agreed in the facts that the U.S. led western powers and NATO committed a little successes but with more blunders in Libya while implementing the 3rd pillars of R2P doctrine. Adams (2015) has stated that the West has continuously lamented their external policy determination/decision in Libya and this has further shaped their international relations objectives due to the Libyan debacle that has led to the distabilization in the country at their departure after the fall of Gadaffi as tagged 'Regime Change Agenda'. Although the major aim of the intervention to save civilian population from atrocity crimes was condemned by the regime change because of the fall of Gadaffi as Dr. Simon Adams (2017) has criticised the implementation of the 3 pillar of R2P in Libya when he stated that "thee mandate has been over stressed out of its proportion". Again, NATO, U.S. and other western allies together with the international community has failed to rebuild Libya after the demise and fall of Gadaffi. This obligation was ignored and Libya was left in chaos, social distabilisation in its legal, economic, social and political instability in the country till date as a result of the effects of the intervention. In fact, Libya was left with nothing to start up with. Consequently, the responsibility to rebuild Libya and other war then places has been advocated

by experts like Adams (2015), Friedman (2015) and Lopez (2015) respectively as a fourth pillar of R2P principle. At the death of Gadaffi, the intervention led by the U.S. left the country in shambles with a much restricted and limited transition process beginning with the international recognition of the National Transitional Council (ITNC) of Libya. The council took over the administration and management of Libya to ameliorate and assist to cushion the effects of the war in the country (Genser, 2012). Conversely, according to the R2P principles, "the international community is obliged to help rebuild Libya after the interventionist mission because the onus for maintenance of international peace and security rests on it (ICISS, 2000). Scholars like Obama of the Multinational Force, enforcing R2P has opined that R2P fell short of expectations in Libya, hence people began to ask what the future holds for the R2P doctrine, since it could not help to stay and rebuild Libya in its socio-economic and political institutions reestablishments to encourage, promote and rebuild peaceful processes between the factional warring parties.

Ten years after the authorisation of Resolution of 1973 for a forceful military intervention in Libya, the Libyan population is worse off during the implementation of R2P doctrine than before the mission for interference. This shortcomings of R2P in Libya has resulted to further chaos, destructions, wars and destabilisation of the country in particular and the region in general. Presently, the UNSC members states of France, Russia and other regional powers are struggling to exert their authority or influence in Libya which has created more crisis, pains, agony, sorrow and adversity on the Libyan civilian. Meanwhile, the Libyan state has metamorphosed into an international arena for power tussle, interests and influence in a multifaceted chess match and thee Syrianization of Libya" (Tharoor, 2020, Para 12).

The Third Research Question: What are the humanitarian impacts of R2P in Syria? The created theme is the destruction of economic, social and political institutions. Other areas are health, education, refugees crisis and properties as caused by the inabilities of the UN/UNSC member states to act and enforce pillar 3 in Syria since 2011 till date due to the UNSC P2 members like Russia and China supported by their allies has hampered the application of R2P 3 pillar doctrine in Syria according to the vital data or research findings of this study. Their strong stance and belief on the state-centred sovereignty of the Syrian nation and the use of force for self-defence, fear of R2P western interventions contravenes the ideological faith of their western protagonists at the UNSC (Odeyemi, 2016). The aftermath consequences of colonial experience, western imperialism, progressive liberal democracies of the western regime change agenda in Libya by the fall of Gaddaffi and the perception that the western powers are using these aforementioned ideologists to propagate their core national economic and political interests across the globe has affected the BRICS nations in their psychological and general perception of the R2P principles (Averre & Davies, 2015). Therefore, achieving unanimity for forceful military intervention is very difficult in Syria which has made the war to continue infinitely (Coen, 2015).

The available research data has shown that the weaknesses of implementing R2P 3 pillar in Libya has been advanced by Russia as the major reason for blocking ever resolution for a collective action of forceful military intervention in Syria and also to prevent the imposition of state sanction against Assad al Bashir especially for using barrel bombs and chemical weapons on his own people thereby committing atrocity crimes against his own people. This act of inaction by the UNSC has inadvertently permitted the Russia federation to use military force action for intervention by proxy of Assad since it was a free for all to the extent that the situation allowed ammunitions, airstrikes target attacks on civilian facilities like hospitals, schools,

markets and the displaced peoples camps without any free access to get the necessary available aid provided on humanitarian grounds (Feikes, 2017). Consequently, R2P's getting the desired successful prospect at any level was hindered by the UNSC P2, i.e. Russia and China's impact or interest and powerful influence in Syria and the Middle Eastern subregion as permitted by the UNSC P3 members so to say. Making a comparison between Syria and Libya, according to the Libyan model by taking a clue from table 4 and the (4) four prerequisites for the R2P doctrine for a successful intervention by "ascertaining that the Syrian case scenario was not good for the R2P's successful application of force according to the R2P 3 pillar tenents, the solitary action by Russia as stated earlier above, the lack of acceptable and dependable ground forceful resistance in opposition to Assad military regiments and the involvements of different phantom and visible militia groups like ISIS, Al Quaida and the Free Syria Army (FSA) who committed different degrees of mass atrocity crimes at different multifarious proportions of crimes against humanity has provided the momentum impetus for UNSC non-intervention in Syria (Odeyemi, 2016). Similarly, the Chinese Republic has been very sceptical about the U.S and Western continuous perpetuation of their imperialism and colonial tendencies which will not only inadvertently contravene the sovereignty of Syria, but will also expose powerless states in the international system from embarking on 'regime change agenda' by the most powerful once especially considering the fact that the UNSC is mostly comprised of the powerful nations of the West (Lee and Chan, 2016).

Meanwhile, this UNSC (P2), Russia and China's ironical stance on Syria is contradictory to their former forceful military intervention in Ukraine and the Crimea when it served their overall national social, economic, political and other strategic interests. Whereas, Russia has earlier unilaterally used military force to intervene in Ukraine and Crimea but has now turned around to

proclaim that R2P should just concentrate wholly on the first two pillars for protecting the vulnerable civilian population whilst viewing the enforcement of pillar 3 as an instrument for their western protagonists to propagate liberal democracies and unfriendly regime change agendas across the globe (Averre and Davies, 2015). Scornfully, China has supported the application of R2P in some African States like Cote d'Ivoire, Sudan etc but has vehemently refused to do same in Syria due to her national interest. It is these many scenarios and complications that have made the reasonable prospect of success mechanism of R2P experts to suggest that forceful military intervention will not be successful in Syria. Again, the state of Syria does not meet the four prerequisites or criteria that were available at the Libyan model and these BRICS resurgence power and their faith in R2P principles of 'reasonable prospects' will be relied upon to develop R2P in Syria (Odeyemi, 2016).

Pathways for Applying R2P Lessons in Syria

Strengthening Multilateralism: A key lesson from Libya is the importance of broad-based support. In Syria, achieving consensus within the UNSC remains a challenge. However, leveraging regional organizations and engaging with both Western and non-Western powers could pave the way for more balanced solutions.

Comprehensive Post-Conflict Planning: Any intervention must prioritize rebuilding Syria's shattered infrastructure and institutions. Lessons from Libya highlight the dangers of neglecting the post-intervention phase, emphasizing the need for international cooperation in reconstruction efforts.

Enhanced Humanitarian Focus: In Syria, the humanitarian crisis demands immediate attention, regardless of political solutions. R2P's principles could be applied to secure humanitarian

corridors, enforce ceasefires, and protect aid workers, even in the absence of broader military intervention.

Avoiding Escalation: The involvement of multiple actors with conflicting interests in Syria's civil war heightens the risk of escalation. Unlike in Libya, where the intervention was relatively straightforward, Syria requires a more nuanced approach that prioritizes de-escalation and dialogue.

The successes and failures of R2P's implementation in Libya offer critical insights for addressing the Syrian crisis. While Libya demonstrated R2P's potential to save lives and act decisively, it also underscored the importance of comprehensive planning, maintaining legitimacy, and minimizing unintended consequences. Applying these lessons to Syria could enhance the international community's ability to protect civilians, address humanitarian needs, and work toward a sustainable resolution of the conflict. Ultimately, the future of R2P as a viable framework for preventing mass atrocities depends on its ability to adapt and deliver meaningful outcomes in complex crises like Syria.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary

The study evaluated the instrumentality of R2P principle, the success and failure of UN/UNSC consensus enforcement of the pillar 3 of the R2P in Libya and its non-implementation in Syria leading to humanitarian crisis. Consequently, the inaction by UN/UNSC has made the crisis in Syria to continue unabated with the commitment of mass atrocity crimes which has negative implications or impediments for the maintenance of international peace and security. Therefore, different experts, specialists and professional opinions, documents, etc and other secondary resources were sorted by the researcher on the 3 pillar of R2P principles. Purposive sampling method was used to collect data to provide solution and answers to the aforementioned research questions. The nature of voting conducts of the UNSC (P5) members states with veto powers were used to evaluate and analyse the data collected by the researcher who vigorously and meticulously analysed the UNSC Resolutions in Syria starting from 2011 to 2021. This study aimed at resolving the research question and fills the research gap in the literature in order to amplify and formulate policies that steer the UNSC peaceful resolution of dispute procedures or the application of force in the pillar 3 of R2P to avert the atrocity crimes by sovereign state leaders.

The proper evaluation of all the data in this study confirms the outcome of the finding concerning R2P and the intricacies of enforcing the pillar 3 of R2P doctrine in the Syrian civil war. In the meantime, Russia and China's arbitrary use of the veto powers to obstruct any resolution on the use of force in Syria has relegated the UNSC to a toothless bulldog posture in the eyes of people in the international system to the extent that they question what the future

holds for the doctrine of R2P. This inability to act effectively in Syria as well as a lack of steadfastness in the implementation of R2P has made the civil war in Syria to endure and continue indefinitely with atrocity crimes committed on the vulnerable population.

On the whole, for close to a decade and half now, the UN/UNSC members states has often refused, neglected or failed to invoke its pillar 3 of responsibility to protect the civilian population of Syrian due to geopolitical and ideological divide into P3 v P2, political and core national interest plus other considerations for their benefits as a nation (GCR2P, 2020); especially Russia and China whose fears of the western states rose significantly within the period considering the failure of the principle in Libya. Interestingly, between 2011 to 2021, the state of Russia has blatantly vetoed 19 Resolutions or proposals of which 14 of them are on Syria interventions, two resolutions were done against the crisis in Ukraine, Srebrenica's 20th anniversary ceremony in commemoration of 11th July, 1995 Ratkomladic genocide, one resolution on Yemen and the other on Venezuela respectively. China on the other hand has vetoed 8 Resolutions on Syria and 1 in Venezuela. The Israelite and Palestine conflict has equally made the U.S. to cast 3 vetoes against Syria since 2011. It is worthy to note that the United Kingdom and France has not vetoed any particular Resolutions on Syria between 2011 to 2021. Similarly, the United States and NATO's "regime change" agenda has more concealed intentions in implementing pillar 3 in Libya and this has also made the BRICS nations skeptical about their ulterior motives and consequently blocked any UN/UNSC military intervention in Syria, this is another revelation of this study findings on R2P and its aftermath consequences on developing countries in the international system. According to Lee and Chan (2016) advancing a western colonialism and imperialism by the western powers has prompted the BRICS nations-states to block any UNSC resolutions on Syria. Again, Libyan experiences has made the BRICS

nations support for inviolable state sovereignty and regime stay in favour of Bashar al-Assad of Syria. Maintaining the implementation of the first and second pillars of R2P should be the major concern of states and therefore stating that the enforcement of the third pillar of R2P in Syria should be carried out and accomplished as a substance of self-preservation or defence from other states. The irony of this stance by Russia and China is that Russia has acquiesced to the use of military force in Libya and has intentionally used her military force to forcefully intervene in the sovereign state of Crimea and Ukraine. While China on the other hand has concurred to the use of military force in African territories in states like Cote d' Ivoire, Libya and Mali respectively. Meanwhile, the research findings has shown negative consequences of R2P pillar 3 implementation in Libya which has well been exposed by the study, after haven't been able to score a major achievement of protecting the civilian population from Muarmar Goddaffi's threats of committing atrocity crimes, it later metamorphosed into a "regime change agenda" with the fall of Gaddafi by the rebel forces with Western (NATO) support thereby leaving the country and the people of Libya in shambles with a worse condition than before NATO intervention mission and mandate. The findings of the study reveals that the motives of inaction by the UN/UNSC member states in Syria is due to the core national, political, tactical, ideology differences of P5 members, strategic interests and the doubt of the principle of R2P's success in using forceful military intervention in Syria.

Conclusion

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, heralded as a framework to prevent mass atrocities, was prominently applied in Libya in 2011. While it achieved some of its immediate objectives, such as protecting civilians from imminent harm, it also revealed critical flaws in execution. The successes and failures of R2P's implementation in Libya provide valuable lessons for addressing

the ongoing humanitarian and political crisis in Syria, which has resulted in far greater casualties and displacement.

The study concluded that implementation of R2P in Libya was a double-edged sword. While it demonstrated the potential for timely and decisive action to prevent mass atrocities, it also exposed significant shortcomings in execution and long-term planning. The failures in Libya have since shaped international hesitations around R2P, particularly in crises like Syria, where consensus and trust in the doctrine are lacking. To restore R2P pillar 3 credibility and effectiveness, the international community must address the lessons learned from Libya and strive for a more balanced and sustainable approach in future interventions because the inability to use the principle in Syrian crisis has resulted in catastrophic humanitarian consequences, affecting millions of people inside and outside the country. Even if the war ends, the impact will last for generations.

The study evaluated and analysed the R2P principles especially the non-enforcement of the third pillar of the R2P doctrine in Syria to protect the people even though in the classification of the conflict, Syria falls under the categories of a failed state with total breakdown of law and order. Libya was compared in contrast with Syria on the assessment and use of military force being the only known instance in contemporary times where the UNSC was able to unanimously mobilise, galvanise and implement military force for intervention into another sovereign state as an instrument for protecting the civilian masses against the commitment of atrocity crimes by their leaders.

The implementation of R2P in Libya represents a mixed legacy. While it succeeded in preventing an imminent massacre and demonstrated the international community's commitment to protecting civilians, it also exposed significant flaws in the application of R2P principles. The

lack of a clear post-intervention strategy, perceived mission overreach, and resulting instability have overshadowed the initial successes, raising questions about the feasibility of R2P as a long-term solution to mass atrocities. Libya underscores the need for a more holistic approach to R2P, one that integrates prevention, protection, and post-conflict recovery. By learning from these experiences, the international community can strengthen the implementation of R2P, ensuring that it remains a viable tool for safeguarding human rights and promoting global peace.

Primary and secondary sources of data collection were used while the researcher also engaged different methods to assess the documents, interviews, voting patterns, records, conferences, meetings, seminars, charts, tables and online materials etc to properly comprehend the intricacies involved in the application of R2P third pillar in Syria and thereafter the research outcome revealed that the tenets of the instrumentalities of R2P could have greatly influenced the peaceful resolution of crises in Syria and beyond if the principles of the doctrine is properly implemented by the UNSC member states in Libya and if Russia and China had not used their veto powers to obstruct proposed resolutions for the enforcement of pillar 3 measures in Syria, albeit specifically permitting the use of R2P in other places. Besides, the failures of R2P in Libya has had great implications for the inability of the UNSC member states to solve the conflict in Syria which is to the detriment of the Libyan's people before the application of pillar 3 of R2P principles till today and this has allowed the war to continue unabated.

Finally, from the foregoing, it is clear from experts postulations and the study's findings that if the R2P doctrine had been applied accordingly, the humanitarian impacts of destruction of lives and properties and ultimately use of barrel bombs and weapons on civilian population in Syria could have been averted just as in Libya with the prompt response and swift mobilization of UNSC member states which saved many civilians lives and properties. However, the Syrian case

scenario is very complicated with the presence of several social, economic, political and other strategic interests, hence Syria did not fulfill the four prerequisites readily available in the Libyan case model stating the 'reasonable prospects' which must be seen before embarking on a successful intervention mission according to the 3 pillar of R2P principles.

The R2P doctrine serves as a standardized emerging normative principles and tools for the prevention of mass atrocity crime in the international system by states as espoused and embraced at the world Summit meeting held at the UN headquarters, New York City, U.S.A in 2005. The doctrine has three major pillars, standardize mechanisms and guidelines for the use of military force to protect mass population against atrocity crimes with the authorization of the UNSC only if states manifestly fail to safeguard and secure their people against atrocity crime like genocide, ethnic cleansing and war crimes. Relevant literature on R2P doctrine was discussed by the researcher in Chapter two of this work espousing the principles of R2P and how states centred sovereignty is compared with the individual sovereignty as derived from the intrigues of enforcing the third pillar of R2P to prevent atrocity crimes in Syria. A careful description of the research methodology and design applied to provide answers to the aforementioned research questions by the researcher is done in chapter three, while the careful analysis of the relevant data and findings of the information was done in chapter four. In chapter five, interpretation of data, inferences and recommendations for subsequent research study to evaluate important policies and procedural techniques relevant to stop the arbitrary use of veto power by UNSC P5 member states to promote international peace and security.

Recommendation

Based on the findings of the study, a few recommendations are inevitably imperative for this study bearing in mind the findings of the study: First, strengthening international consensus and

political will is crucial. The United Nations, regional organizations, and major powers must work collaboratively to depoliticize R2P and ensure consistent application, preventing selective interventions. Strengthening international consensus and political will on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle requires depoliticization, collaboration, and accountability. States must reaffirm their commitment to R2P through diplomatic engagement, ensuring it is applied consistently rather than selectively. The UN General Assembly and Security Council should work toward limiting veto power in cases of mass atrocities. Regional organizations must actively participate in conflict prevention and response. Additionally, public awareness campaigns and civil society advocacy can pressure governments to uphold R2P. By fostering trust, enhancing cooperation, and ensuring impartiality, the international community can reinforce R2P's legitimacy and effectiveness in preventing atrocities.

Moreso, early warning systems and preventive diplomacy should be reinforced. The international community must invest in intelligence gathering, mediation efforts, and capacity-building in fragile states to address root causes before crises escalate. Furthermore, legal and institutional reforms are necessary. The UN Security Council must adopt more flexible mechanisms to bypass political deadlocks, such as restricting veto power in cases of mass atrocities. Strengthening regional organizations' roles in enforcement will also enhance swift responses. Again, non-military interventions, including economic sanctions, diplomatic pressure, and peacekeeping missions, should be prioritized. Military action should remain a last resort.

The study traversed the UNSC enforcement of R2P pillar 3 in Libya and its non-implementation in Syria. The UNSC (P5) is the only body that is authorised to apply the use of military force as an instrument to intervene in another sovereign state to save vulnerable civilian population from atrocity crimes. The discovered that the inability of the UNSC P5 members states to forcefully

intervene in Syria is due to many complications in economy and socio-political intrigues which has made the UN/UNSC members to relinquish their core objective principles of the UN Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. Thus, the study recommends that the instrumentality of R2P principle must prioritize post-conflict stabilization as the Libyan experience highlights the necessity of comprehensive post-conflict planning to prevent power vacuums and ensure sustainable peace. Again, while regional support was a strength in Libya, it must extend beyond the intervention phase to include contributions to reconstruction and reconciliation.

Secondly, the future R2P pillar 3 interventions must adhere strictly to its mandates. Thus, in carrying out R2P pillar 3 intervention, it must avoid mission creep. The perception of regime change as an ulterior motive undermines trust in R2P and deters its application in other crises. In Libya, NATO's 2011 intervention helped prevent mass atrocities but failed to establish a long-term plan for governance, security, and reconstruction, leading to prolonged instability. Establishing frameworks for political transition and economic recovery should be a core aspect of R2P's implementation.

The regional organizations such as the African Union (AU) and the Arab League should play a more proactive role in decision-making and enforcement. Their involvement can ensure legitimacy, cultural sensitivity, and sustained support for peace processes. The study critically engaged the pillar 3 of R2P doctrine with the belief in the emerging philosophy of R2P that unless a particular state fails to meet the other two pillars, the third pillar cannot be applied hence the onus now rests on the international organisation to intervention in Syria and save the people from massacre or atrocity crimes. Consequently, the advocacy by R2P experts that the responsibility to rebuild states after a crisis situation should be included in the R2P doctrine as a

fourth pillar because rebuilding states would concentrate on the relevance economic, social and political system of a society required for recuperation and prevention of mass atrocity crimes against the citizens. Thus, R2P interventions should be multilateral and not driven by the geopolitical interests of powerful states. Strengthening UN mechanisms to ensure impartiality, transparency, and accountability in decision-making can prevent the misuse of Pillar 3 for regime change or political gains. Emphasis should be placed on non-military solutions, including diplomatic mediation, sanctions, and peacekeeping forces, ensuring military intervention remains a last resort within a broader peace strategy.

Thirdly, reforming the UN Security Council's decision-making process is crucial. The frequent use of veto power by permanent members has hindered timely responses to mass atrocities. A proposal to limit the veto in cases of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity could enhance R2P's effectiveness. Also, strengthening regional engagement is essential. Organizations like the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) should take a more active role in mediation and crisis response. Greater cooperation with neighboring countries can improve humanitarian access and de-escalation efforts. Principally, the imminent expansion of the R2P Code of Conduct scope should be inevitable to nations as about 121 sovereign nation-states are already signatories to this R2P states initiated framework/resolution declaration as at 2021 advocating for the UNSC (P5) member states to desist from the arbitrary use of the veto power to block honest and trustworthy proposals for timely and decisive action of resolution to halt genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and other atrocity crimes against the masses (GCR2P, 2017). Meanwhile only France and the UK has appended their signatories to the R2P Code of Conduct terms and conditions, but US, Russia and China are very reluctant to concur or conform whereas they have mostly used their veto powers in the middle East and other

part of the world regarding pressing international issues of mutual concern. According to the Code of Conduct Act (GCR2P, 2015) “voting to block collective action to prevent mass atrocity crimes is viewed as an insult to our common humanity” by the nation states who are signatories to this beautiful R2P Code of Conduct specifications; hence, it is recommended as expedient that the remaining UNSC P3 member states alongside with the other 83 UNGA members to sign the Code of Conduct Act, while the sovereign nations of France and Mexico in their own wisdom are advocating for the deferment of veto powers by P5 members states when issues of atrocity crimes are being committed by leaders of nations.

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APPENDIX A

INTERVIEW GUIDE
INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT AND NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY IN THE SYRIAN CRISIS (2011-2021)

Department of Political Science
University of Benin
Benin City
9th of March, 2024.

Dear respondents,

REQUEST FOR YOUR COOPERATION IN ANSWERING THESE QUESTIONS

I am a Doctoral student of the above-mentioned Department and University carrying out a research on 'RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (R2P) AND NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY IN THE SYRIAN CRISIS' (2011-2021).

In order to gather relevant data for the study, it will be highly appreciated if you could respond to these questions as frankly and objectively as possible. All information you supply is strictly for the purpose of the study, and will be treated confidentially.

Please give your opinion or response that you consider most suitable against the statements/questions provided below.

Interview guides for Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Nigerian Ministry of foreign Affairs and the Syrian Embassy.

Thanks.

Yours Sincerely,

Edosomwan Samuel Iroghama

- **BIO-DATA OF RESPONDENTS**
  1. Please, may we know your nickname?
  2. What position do you occupy in your place of work?
  3. May we know your year of service?
  4. May we know your educational background?

5. May we know your sex?
6. May we know your religion?

- **RESPONDENT'S KNOWLEDGE OF R2P AND THE SYRIAN CRISIS**
  7. What can you say about the principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P)?
  8. Is it different from humanitarian intervention or R2P is a norm complementing humanitarian intervention?
  9. What do you know about the causes of the Syrian Crisis?
  10. What can you say about the Syrian Crisis?
  11. In your opinion, what measures have been applied in the Syrian issue to resolve it?

- **THE INSTRUMENTALITIES OF R2P IN ENFORCING PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF CRISES**
  12. In your opinion, can you say that R2P has fulfilled its core objective, particularly in light of the ongoing Syrian crisis?
  13. Do you think the doctrine of R2P has been fairly applied in crisis states such as Libya?
  14. If No, what do you think is the cause? And if yes, can you expantiate further?
  15. Some scholars have argued that R2P is a ploy to further the interest of the powerful states, what is your take on this?
  16. would you say R2P has been consistently applied across all modern crisis-related states

- **WHAT ARE THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF R2P's IMPLEMENTATION IN LIBYA?**
  17. Do you think the application of R2P in countries like Libya resulted in positive or negative outcomes?
  18. If yes, can you explain further the successes or failures of R2P in Libya?
  19. Do you think it would have made more sense if R2P was not applied at all in Libya?

- **WHAT ARE THE HUMANITARIAN IMPACTS OF THE CRISIS IN SYRIA?**
  20. In your own view, what are the social, economic and political impacts of the crisis in Syria?

21. In what ways do you think that R2P's intervention is Syria would have helped solve the Syria crisis?
22. Can you explain another measure (s) that can be adopted to solve the crisis in Syria aside from R2P's intervention?
23. Some critics of R2P have suggested a political solution to the crisis, do you agree with them?
24. Do you think any solution to the crisis without the interests of the United States, Russia, China, Iran and other interested parties would be possible?

APPENDIX B

Table 1: Timeline of Syrian Civil War

March 2011	Day of dignity protests in Damascus and Daraa' security forces fire on and kill protesters, triggering violent unrest
July 2011	Mass demonstrations in Hama, governor dismissed and army sent in; opposition forms united front it Istanbul
August 2011	Obama calls for Assad to step down, freezes Syrian government assets
October 2011	Russia and China veto UNSC resolution condemning Syria
November 2011	Arab League suspends Syrian membership; Free Syrian Army attacks military base in Damascus
December 2011	Arab league observers land in Syria, leave in January in wake of worsening violence in Damascus
February 2012	US shuts embassy, Russia and China block UNSC draft resolution on Syria; new constitution approved in referendum
March 2012	Free Syrian Army withdraws from Homs in wake of heavy government bombardment
April 2012	UN-backed ceasefire appears to take hold, mission is deployed; opposition denounces it, saying Assad continues to fight
May, 2012	UNSC strongly condemns killing of a hundred civilians by government militias near Homs; parliamentary elections held
June 2012	UN suspends mission in light of escalating violence; Assad says conflict is now 'real war', Turkey announces that it will consider military forces near the border to be a threat and take appropriate action
July 2012	Free Syria Army kills three security chiefs of Assad in a bomb attack in Damascus
August 2012	Prime Minister Riad Hijab defects, UNGA resolution demands that Assad resign, UNHRC accuses Syria of war crimes, Obama warns against use of chemical weapons
October 2012	Skirmish with Turkey results in mutual ban on using each others' airspace; historic district of Aleppo destroyed in fire

November 2012	Opposition forces unify into National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition forces; Islamists refuse to join; Arab League stops short of full recognition; Israelis fire on Syrian artillery in Golan Heights
December 2012	USA recognizes National Coalition as legitimate government of Syria; Rebels advance on Damascus airport
January 2013	Israeli jets accused of bombing military base near Damascus
February 2013	Car bombing near Ba'ath party headquarters kills dozens
March 2013	US and Britain pledge non-military aid to rebels; Ghassan Hitto elected as head coalition; al-Nusra front tries implementing Shari'a in rebel-held areas
April 2013	Britain and France inform the UN that Syria has used chemical weapons against rebels; George Sabra becomes chairman of National Coalition; ISIS formed by Abu bakr alBaghdadi
May 2013	EU does not renew arms embargo on Syria in move to aid rebels; Israel targets military depot and exchanges fire in Golan Heights
June 2013	Government and Hezbollah recapture Qusair between Homs and Lebanese border; International arms supply tapers off because of involvement of Islamists; 93,000 dead so far in conflict; USA concludes that Assad used chemical weapons and authorizes direct military support to rebels.
July 2013	Ahmad al-Jarba elected opposition leader; Rebels capture Khan al-Assal, last major government-held town in Aleppo province
August 2013	UN chemical weapons inspectors arrive in Damascus
September 2013	Russia proposes that Syria give up chemical weapons to international control; UN finds convincing evidence of chemical attack; Rebel groups form alliance to create an Islamic state separate from the western-backed coalition
October 2013	Assad allows international inspectors to destroy chemical weapons stockpile on basis of a US-Russia agreement
December 2013	US and Britain suspend "non-lethal" support for rebels in northern Syria after reports that Islamist rebels seize some bases of Western-backed Free Syrian Army
January 2014	UN peace talks in Geneva fail because of refusal to discuss a transitional

	government
February-March 2014	Syrian army and Hezbollah recapture Yabroud, last rebel stronghold by Lebanese borders; Al Qaeda rejects ISIS
June-July 2014	ISIS establishes control in eastern Syria and north-west Iraq; Assad wins presidential election; government captures Kessab in Latakia province, rebels reenter Qalamoun area and Daraa governorate.

Source: Mariwala (2014:7)

Table 2: UNSC Vetoed Resolutions on Syria

Date	Concerns	Vote against	Abstention
17th of November 2017	Joint Investigation Mechanism (JIM) in Syria was mandated to resume their mission for another thirty (30) days.	States of Russia and Bolivia voted against it	China
16th of November, 2017	JIM mission was renewed for another twelve months with the criticism of Syrian army's use of chemical weapons on the innocent civilians.	Again Russia and Bolivia voted against the resolution	China, Egypt
24th of October 2017	JIM mission to resume for another one year	Russia, Bolivia	Kazakhstan
12th of April, 2017	Criticism for Syrian army's use of chemical weapons on the people. Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Independent International Fact-finding Mission (FFM) and JIM are to be allowed access to all necessary data for inquiries into the attacks	Russia, Bolivia	Ethiopia, China and Kazakhstan
28th of February, 2017	Admits the allegations of JIM's detailed account of how Syrian armed forces and ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant) used chemical weapons on civilians thereby calling for the UN International Court of Justice to trial and prosecute culpable individuals with adequate punishments.	States of Russia, Bolivia and China	Kazakhstan, Ethiopia and Egypt
5th of December, 2016	Free access for humanitarian aids agents and ceasefire by combatants excepting ISIL terrorists	Russia, China and Venezuela	Angola
8th of October, 2016	Unrestricted access to humanitarian assistance		

	together with the monitoring of the application of Resolution 2260 (2016) which is "the cessation of hostilities in Syria including ending aerial bombardments of Aleppo by the military"		
22nd of May,	The massacre and bad situation in Syria was mentioned at the Intervention Criminal Court (ICC) in Hague.	Russia, China	
19th of July, 2012	The resumption of United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) with the provisions of Chapter VII. Criticisms of the Syrian authorities for violating human rights and for the belligerents to cessation of hostilities and the enforcement of Kofi Annan's six-point plan in Syria.	Russia, China	South Africa, Pakistan
4th of February, 2012	Continued condemnation of the Syrian government for the violent attacks against civilians. Encouraging the league of Arab States to accelerate the conduct of Syrian political transition to democracy and the demand for a grant of a safe and free access for humanitarian aids by the Syrian government	Russia, China	
4th of October, 2011	Criticisms against the Syrian government for using brute force against its own people. To allow free access for humanitarian assistance, also for a call for a Syrian led political transition,		

	processes and further caution states to abide by the provisions of Art. 41 the UN Chapter refraining them from selling arms and ammunitions to Syria else sanctions shall be imposed on them.		

Table 3: United Nations Security Council Resolution Authorised on Syria

Date	Resolution	Concerns	Abstention
19th of December, 2017	S/RES/2393	A cross border humanitarian aid routes for a year and calls for the enforcement of a Syrian supervised political transitional movement for one year	Russia, China and Bolivia
31st of December, 2016	S/RES/2336	The facilitation and aiding suspension of hostilities by the States of Russia and Turkey	
21st of December, 2016	S/RES/2332	Resumption of 1 year aids delivery across battle lines to UN International agencies for humane purposes. Again, emphasized a Syrian political processes and transition to democratic rule and further insist on Syrian owned political future with a UN monitoring mechanisms in place to monitor the process	
19th of December, 2016	S/RES/2328	Easy entrance of the monitoring team for the evacuation of civilians from the Eastern districts of Syria and the supply of humanitarian aid. Ensure more deployment of UN staff required.	
17th of November, 2016	S/RES/2319	A one year extension of JIM's mission in Syria to recognize	

		offenders/violaters of the illegal use of chemical weapons in the Syrian dispute/civil war	
31st of October, 2016	S/RES/2314	18 days extension of organisation for the prohibition of chemical weapons (OPCW) UN and JIM (Joint Investigation Mechanism) to identify the illegal use of chemical weapons in Syria till November 18th, 2016.	
26th of February, 2016	S/RES/2268	Ending hostilities and grant for humanitarian aid workers entrance into Syria as co-chaired by U.S and Russia under the auspices of the International Syria Support Group (ISSG)	
22nd of December, 2015	S/RES/2258	A one year permission to allow free access of assistance into Syria in accordance with the 2014 resolution.	
18th of December, 2015	S/RES/2254	UN facilitated strategy for a peaceful processes amongst the government and rebel forces laying out a nationwide ceasefire plan and Syrian political transition processes were also carefully spelt out.	
7th of August, 2015	S/RES/2235	Strong condemnation of the illegal use of chemical weapons and to recognize people, government agencies and entities involved in the use of chemical weapons on innocent civilians in Syria, since the endorsement of Resolution 2209 in March 2015 set up OPCW &JIM to inquire about the culprits in the allegation.	

6th of March, 2015	S/RES/2209	UN condemnation of chlorine gas chemical weapon usage on Syrians it therefore, threatens apply action as contained in UN Chapter VII and 'use force' if chemical weapons are used again in the conflict and if resolution 2118/2013 which earlier permitted the demolition of Syria's chemical weapons scheme is not complied with.	
17th of December 2014	S/RES/2191	Calls for the free entrance of humanitarian aid across the Syrian border and establishment of a monitoring team apparatus in Syria	
14th of July, 2014	S/RES/2165	UN again ordered the delivery of humanitarian relief entrance into four more borders not under the control of the Syrian government, set up a monitoring apparatus to checkmate the free loading on compassionate grounds.	
22nd of February, 2014	S/RES/2139	Calls for all combatants in the dispute to allow for a free entrance of humanitarian aids with the intention of sanctioning any party or parties who refuses to comply to this directives	
27th of September, 2013	S/RES/2118	Adopted the demolition of Syria's chemical weapon's scheme. Consequently threatens to enforce UN Chapter VII action in the case of non-compliance to the order	
20th of July, 2012	S/RES/2059	Extends the Syrian observation/supervision mandate for another 30	

		days.	
21st of April, 2012	S/RES/2043	Creation of the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) to observe the mandate for the implementation of the Kofi Annan Peace Plan in Syria for 90 days with about 300 military men without arms	
14th of April, 2012	S/RES/2042	Approves a monitoring team to negotiate with combatants and report same on the implementation of a complete end of armed violent attacks in all its forms by the belligerents, with about 30 military men without arms to observe the enforcement situation on ground of Envoy's Six Point Proposal	

Table 4: Brief outline of R2P and its successes and failures in the Libyan intervention

Specialists evaluation of R2P implementation in Libya	Professional inferences on the successes and failures of R2P's enforcement in Libya
The United Nations (UN) Secretary General, Barki-Moon (2012)	Stated "that R2P interventionist mission in Libya was a 'huge success' especially his appreciation of how the interventionist mandate has saved tens of thousands of lives in Libya".
Sakin J. (2012:2) in his journal "is the responsibility to protect an acceptable norm of international laws in the post-Libya era?"	Stated "that Libya had its first democratic election in the country after 48 years of Muar Mar Ghaddafi's autocratic rule.
The economist (2012) in his works "A big step for a battered country".	Reported "that about 1.77 million people voted and that the election was generally peaceful, free, fair and credible with absolute transparency without any influence from the government, malpractices or rigging of any sort fraud government.
Executive director of the Global Centre for Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P), Dr. Simon Adams (2017:7-14) granted an interview with the Natasha Hosford (STAIRS) St. Anthony's international review	Stated "that there will be defeats, setbacks and mistakes. As for the specifies of Libya, I was fiercely critical of the way some countries overstretched the R2P mandate in Libya"
Giselle Lopez (2015:121) in an interview granted by Thomas Friedman	Thomas Friedman said that former President Barrack Obama asserted that part of his foreign policy errors was his deficiency to anticipate the outcome of the Libyan

	interventionist deback when he said "I think we underestimated the need to come in full force, the day after Gaddaffi is gone, at that moment, there has to be a much more aggressive efforts to rebuild a society that did not have any civic traditions".
Lopez (2015:122) in his article titled "Responsibility to Protect is at a Cross Roads: The Crisis of Libya".	Carefully analysed the circumstances in which foreign forceful military intervention was authorised in Libya, characteristics of R2P enforcement and its aftermath.

Table 5: Kildron's 2012 four prerequisites of a successful forceful military intervention instruments in Libya

Basic standards for a successful military operation in Libya	Using the Libyan model for clarification for the use of military force in Libyan state
The mission was authorised by UNSC	Unanimity of purpose was obtained at first in the floor of the UNSC following a 10 votes for, non against and 5 abstentions. The UNSC members states thereafter invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter with Resolution 1973 permitting the use of military force in Libya.
It was an extensive international alliance to save the innocent civilian population in Libya	The U.S. led international alliance was a call on Africans, France, U.K and Italy (NATO) and enclosing other Arab states.
Middle East provided the required regional support as impetus for NATO to intervene	Countries like Kuwait, Qatar and Jordan used their military aircraft to support the no-fly zone implementation impose on Libya thereby giving regional momentum for the international mandate to forcefully intervene in Libya.
Basic standards for a successful military operation in Libya	Clarification for the use of military force in the Libyan state.
An already accepted opposition force with an orchestrated game plans	NATO already acknowledged the Interim Transitional National Council (ITNC) to support an already recognised ground force with a topographically shielded location and arrangement with air power support from the air by NATO to defeat Muarmar Gaddafi.

Table 6: The Humanitarian Impacts of the Crisis in Syria

International organizational assessment of the humanitarian impacts of the crisis in Syria.	**International institutional assertions on the humanitarian impacts of the crisis in Syria**
Global Centre for Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P, 2020) UN Human Rights Council Resolutions Referencing R2P's July 12, 2020.	"UNSC members has failed to perform its obligations for the maintenance of international peace and security by not ending indiscriminate air strikes in Syria, and the use of illegal weapons, barrel bombs and atomic bombs and ensuring humanitarian access".
The Human Rights Watch, 2012 "World Report Syria, 2012"	"Reported the use of barrel bombs and chemical weapons on the citizens by the Assad government forces which reached the level of atrocity crimes against humanity in cities all over Syria".
(UNICEF) United Nations International Children	"Millions of children in Syria require humanitarian

Emergency Fund (UNICEF, 2021) Counting Office Annual Report, 2021.	assistance including access to education, proper nutrition and psychological support".
House of Commons Library HCL, 2021) the Syrian civil war. Timeline and Statistics Research Briefing, 9381 July 4.	"There is high rate of malnourishment, food shortages, lack of water supply and medicare services".
United States Departments of States, 2021.	"Over 221,112 people have died in Syria".
The Syrian Network for Human Right (SNHR, 2021) "victims of the conflict in Syria in the whole of 2011-2021 are enormous	"Indiscriminate arrest, torture and disappearance of women and children were prevalent in Syria".
House of Commons Library, (December 2021) refugees. "The Syrian civil war. Timeline and Statistics, Research Briefing, 9381, July 4.	"Over 6.8 million Syrians have fled the country as refugees, primarily to neighbouring countries like Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. Another 6.7 million people are internally displaced within Syria having fled their homes but remained within the country's borders.
Syrian Observation for Human Rights (2021). Total death toll over 606,000 people killed across Syria since the beginning of the Syrian Revolution, including 495,000 documented by SOHR June 1st 2021.	"Reported that between March 2011 and June 2021, about 606 people have died while 2.1 million civilians have been injured or permanently disabled.