

**NON-VIOLENT REVOLUTION AS A MEANS OF DEMOCRATIC CHANGE
IN AFRICA: NIGERIA AND EGYPT IN PERSPECTIVE**

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UNIVERSITY OF BENIN

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**AN ORIGINAL RESEARCH ESSAY (PROJECT) SUBMITTED TO THE
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PARTIAL FULFILLMENT FOR THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE AWARDS
OF BACHELOR OF SCIENCE (B.SC) IN POLITICAL SCIENCE**

OCTOBER, 2025

DECLARATION

I, Saviour Odudu **INWANG**, with Matriculation Number, **SSC2105709**, hereby declare that this research topic: ***NON-VIOLENT REVOLUTION AS A MEANS OF DEMOCRATIC CHANGE IN AFRICA: NIGERIA AND EGYPT IN PERSPECTIVE*** was carried out by me. I declare that this project is the result of my research investigations and findings. Sources of information other than my own have been acknowledged and a references' list appended. This work has not been previously submitted to any other university for the award of any type of academic degree. **SAVIOUR ODUDU INWANG** with Matriculation Number, **SSC2105709** and it was not plagiarized.

Signature

Date

CERTIFICATION

This original research essay (project) entitled “*No-Violent Revolution as A Means of Democratic Change In Africa: Nigeria and Egypt In Perspective*” was submitted by Saviour Odudu **INWANG**, with Matriculation Number, **SSC2105709** in the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Benin, Benin City, and is adequate in scope and quality in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the award of the degree of Bachelor of Science degree (B.sc.) in Political Science.

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DEDICATION

This original research essay (project) is dedicated to Almighty God for His grace, protection and provision throughout my stay in school and to my parents, Comrade Bassey Inwang and Deaconness Ini Inwang.

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The success of any individual in any activity is never achieved by a singular and isolated effort made by such an individual; assistance is received one way or the other.

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Abstract

Though political violence seems irrational, Nigeria's return to democracy in 1999 brought about considerable political changes, particularly in the way multi-party elections were conducted. The purpose of this study is to investigate how Nigeria's democracy has been weakened by the prevalence of political violence. The analysis uses survey data to answer the queries about political violence and democracy. The research offers a more thorough analytical investigation and builds on the theories of group violence and frustration-aggression. The study contends that certain democratic principles such as freedom, equality, accountability, and the rule of law constitute a "universal pattern" in democratic practice, making it crucial to evaluate the Nigerian and Egyptian experience critically. As a result, our findings imply that the political elite's vested interests are fundamentally a factor in the prevalence of political violence.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the study

The history of the 20th century is full of examples that demonstrate that violence resistance against unjust power systems, dictators or external occupation is likely to generate further violence as was seen for example, in the Russian and Chinese revolutions and decolonization wars in Africa and Asia (Alexander, 2020). But it has also been characterized by many powerful nonviolent struggles; some of these are widely known, for example, the Gandhian freedom struggles in India, Martin Luther King Jr's civil rights campaigns in the United States among others. Although the power of nonviolent resistance does seem weak and inefficient in the face of accent power asymmetries, it has proven to be a very strategic tool in the hand of marginalized communities to redress structural imbalances and claim right of justice and self-determination (Hassan, 2021).

Fundamentally the events that began in the beginning of 2021 in the Arab world were unprecedented in history. In the words of Oviasogie (2020) there was mass public protest that swept through the region with attendant effect for the future.

The demonstration sent away long serving presidents out of their countries who prior to then saw themselves as manifest destinies or God ordained right to rule. The government and regimes in the regions prior to Arab spring were a salad of autocrats that viewed any other centre as competition. Persistence was the hall mark of the regimes. For instance, the Al-sand governed Saudi Arabia since 1932, Sultan Assad family reigned in Syria since 1970, and Qaddafi ruled Libya since 1969, Mubarak since 1981 and Ali Abdullah Sallah ruled in Yemen Arab Republic in 1978 and again as the President of Unified Yemen in 1990 to mention just a few cases of longevity (Sorenson, 2019, Anderson, 2019). These mighty men kept their regimes by embracing patron age, the violation of human right, repression by state security agents among other mediums. The Arab spring according to Maogoto and Coleman (2019) is an example of the pitfall of centralism.

In Egypt, the story was not different, Egypt before the Arab spring was in a deep multi-dimensional crisis (Shorbagy, 2019), the nature of democratic practices in Egypt had assumed diverse dimensions. The constitution of modern Egypt has always given the president virtual monopoly over the decision making process, devoting thirty 30 articles 15% to Presidential prerogatives. Bassem (2022) viewed number of republic embracing Arab socialism such as Syria and Egypt regularly hold elections and these are not fully multiparty system. Most importantly they do not allow citizens to choose

between lots of different candidates for presidential elections in addition to corrupt practice with the elections. These are the nature of messed democratic practice in Egypt until 2011 when Egyptian decided to take the bull by the horn by engaging in non-violent revolution aimed at getting Hosni Mubarak out of office.

In spite the legitimate and moral demands of Egyptian protesters, they resolved not to be satisfied until justice had become the yardstick in enthroning democratic values and changes in Egypt. Prior to the above scenario, Mubarak had before been reelected by majority votes in a referendum for successive terms on four occasions in 1987, 1993, 1999, and 2005. The referendum in itself and its results are questionable. No one could run against the president due to a restriction in the Egyptian constitution in which the People's Assembly played the main role in electing the president.

However, after increased domestic and international pressure for democratic reform in Egypt, Mubarak asked the Parliament on 26th February 2005 to amend the constitution to allow multi-candidate presidential election by September 2005. Previously, Mubarak got his position by having himself nominated by parliament, then confirmed without opposition in a referendum, but electoral institutions and security apparatus remain under the control of the president.

After Mubarak's re-election in 2005, several political groups both in the left and right announced their sharp opposition to the inheritance power. These political groups were some of the major opposition parties that filled candidates to compete with Mubarak in the 2005 Presidential election. These are New Wafd Party, Tomorrow Party, Solidarity Party, Democratic Union Party, Umma Party, National Conciliation Party, Egypt 2000 Party, Constitution Party and Egyptian Arab Socialist Party. Sharp (2015)) noted that the election which was scheduled for 7th September, 2005 involved mass rigging activities. Notably, before 2011, Egyptians especially Muslim Brotherhood has been nursing the anger of the 2005 rigged presidential elections. The worsening part of it is the banning of Muslim brotherhood from contesting any election in Egypt. The Muslim brotherhood is considered the largest Islamic group in Egypt. Sharp (2015) maintained that Egypt's largest Islamic group, the Muslim brotherhood was not permitted to stand candidates for 2005 elections because the organization was banned by government which prohibits political parties with stated religions agenda from contesting election.

The Egyptian presidential election held in 7 September 2005 was largely rigged in favour of Hosni Mubarak. The Egyptians were nursing the anger before being moved to engage in non-violent protest movement with the successful ousting of President Ben Ali of Tunisia by Tunisia protesters. Added to the issue of electoral rigging were

the issue of deep political, economic and social problems and the absence of reform in the name of consolidating power and authority.

The protest by Egyptians over these abnormalities signifies giant strides in the history of Egypt. It awakened the civil societies that had been dormant for a long period of time and signaled the birth of political consciousness and to this effect, this study aims at examining the non-violent revolution in Egypt and the attendant democratic changes in Africa.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Democratic governance envisages that those in the commanding heights of the economy like our leaders must strive to ensure that those essential life needs must be made available to the peoples. This is not so with the people of Egypt, rather what we see are human societies wearing community features manifested in corruption, bad road difficulty in transportation, lack of good drinking water, rigged election, power failures, unemployment, poor health facilities, general poverty, inadequate accommodation among others.

The fundamental then question: is how could a regime change be ensured thereby bringing an end to this autocratic and oppressive regime. Basically two schools of thought emerged with different views on how to ensure regime changes, the Realistic

school and the Strategic school of thought. The Realistic school argued that the best way to bring about change to an autocratic regime is through violent revolution. Scholars attributed to this view are Rogan (2019), Dankiract (2020) and Nwabueze (2019). To this group of scholars, the autocrat wields a lot of power and the only way to oust him from office will be through violent revolution. On the other side of this ideological divide, the Strategic school of thought is of the view that the best way to ensure a regime change in an autocratic dispensation is through non-violent revolution. Contributions of non-violent scholars such as Arthur Romano (2021), Greene Sharp (2019), Greene Sharp (2019), Greene Sharp (2019), Hand Judith (2020), Henry David Thoreau (1848), Luther King Jr (1967) among others have confirmed that non-violent demonstration remains the only way of making government change its policies when citizens feel unhealthy over such policies. These scholars foresaw a time when non-violent revolution would be geared towards a regime change entirely as was the case in Egypt. Generally, it is notable that, Egypt during the reign of Hosni Mubarak was characterized with poor national economic performance, high level of corruption, joblessness, rising cost of food, regime misbehaviors and a loss of faith in the electoral system (Sorenson and Mazo 2019). This precipitated the non-violent revolution aimed at bringing about democratic change in Egypt. Notably, the Egyptian revolution was not of authoritarianism or repression, it was that of the problem of personalization of

power. In other words, the revolution in Egypt had political, moral and economic causations as such it was a moral, political and economic one. Moral in the sense that it fought against corruption, political as in the quest for political freedom, the rule of law and respect for human rights and Economic freedom in that the citizens want to have a stake in the wealth and resources of the country and also have the poverty level reduced. It was a revolution of rising expectations, the quest for a better life, respect for human rights, reforms, political change, sovereignty and economic independence from indigenous colonial lords. It was a struggle for political transformation in the term that encapsulates the desires of the people. Generally, the protests were motivated or fueled by the quest for democratization and expanded citizen's participation in politics. It is against this backdrop that this study examines the extent to which this non-violent revolution has brought about democratic changes in Egypt.

The problem of the study is therefore articulated in the following research questions.

- i. To what extent has the Egyptian non-violent revolution brought about democratic change in Egypt?
- ii. Has the democratic change enhanced the standard of living of the people of Egypt?
- iii. How have the activities of the elites, the military and Islamic forces, against Hosni Mubarak contributed in ensuring democratic change in Egypt?

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The broad objective of this study is to examine how non-violent revolution by the people of Egypt contributed in achieving democratic changes in Egypt. The specific objectives are;

- i. To examine the extent to which the Egyptian non-violent revolution brought about democratic changes in Egypt.
- ii. To ascertain if the democratic changes enhanced the standard of living of people of Egypt.
- iii. To determine how the activities of the elites, the military and Islamic forces against Hosni Mubarak contributed in ensuring democratic changes in Egypt.

1.4 Research Hypotheses

The following hypotheses were posited to guide the study

- i. The Nigerian non-violent revolution has brought about democratic change in Nigeria
- ii. The democratic changes have fundamentally enhanced standards of living of the people of Nigeria

iii. The activities of elites, military and Islamic forces against British contributed essentially in ensuring democratic changes in Nigeria

1.5 Significance of the Study

The study has both theoretical and empirical significances. Theoretically, the study contributes to the literature on revolution. It will open new vista of knowledge on the subject, thus providing concerned stakeholders opportunity of understanding the causal factors of revolution, the establishment of an autocratic regime and mechanism despots use to entrench themselves in power.

Empirically, the study brings out the role of the civil societies in a successful non-violent revolution and seeks to enumerate elements that help in understanding that a democratic dispensation could be established. This is significant in the sense that it brings to bare factors that pull toward a protest or revolution within a country of study. Also the study is significant in that it attempts to proffer solutions towards solving the problem of autocratic rule through a vibrant civil society thereby leading to mass participation in politics.

1.6 Scope and Limitations of the Study

The study concentrates on non-violent revolution as a means of democratic change in Africa with particular focus on Nigeria. The study covers the period of 1960 which

was the period that witnessed the non-violent revolution by Nigerians against the dictatorial rule of British to 2011

The research was constrained by lack of relevant editions at materials of the subject matter, also official secrecy of information which are empirically, scientifically and analytically valuable to the research was a source of concern.

Time was also another constraint since academic work of this nature is time limited.

1.7 Operationalization and Clarification of Key Concepts

In every academic endeavour such as this characterized by utmost magnitude and significance, words or groups of words are always borrowed to assist in the achievement of stated objectives. In order to properly situation the research in right perspective, it is indeed very important that words used in this research are explained.

There are:

Non-violent: It means being peaceful, i.e. devoid of harm, clashes, wounds and the likes.

Revolution: - It means an uprising aimed at enthroning new pattern of governance in government.

Democratic: - The state of government being determined by majority.

Change: - Alter the pattern before now or shift from existing pattern to a new method.

1.8 Organization of Work

The organization of work refers to the arrangement of ideas and details in a perceptible order in the project which are: format for writing undergraduate proposal and final project

The study is divided into five chapters. The following is a breakdown of the project work organization;

Chapter One: This is the general introduction of the study and it contains the background to the study, statement of the problem, objectives of study, scope of study, significance of the study, limitations to the study and definitions of terms.

Chapter Two: Chapter two covers the review of existing literatures on the subject matter. It consists of the conceptual review, the empirical review and the theoretical framework.

Chapter Three: Chapter three discusses political leadership and governance in Egypt and Nigeria

Chapter Four: This focused on the research methodology.

Chapter Five: Chapter five is on the interpretation and discussion of findings.

Chapter Six: Finally, chapter five consists of summary, conclusion and recommendation.

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CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter will first present the definition of the concept democracy. Following is a presentation of previous research on democratization. The previous research has produced two major schools regarding the path to democracy. On the one side are the structural theories, modernization theory and historical sociology arguing that economic, cultural or institutional elements are necessary for a transition from authoritarianism to begin (Pripstein Posusney 2015, p.3). On the contrary side is the agency approach, arguing democracy can occur under a verity of socioeconomic and cultural conditions (ibid). The agency approach stresses mainly factors such as power relations among political actors.

2.1 Democracy

A key element in the debate of what makes and consolidates democracy is the lack of consensus on the meaning of democracy (Diamond 2019, p.7). The concept of democratization has generally been taken for granted and rarely been properly problematized (Diamond 2019, p.7). The choice of definition is not just a theoretical question. It is also crucial to research and the collection of empirical data. In political

studies the concept of democracy has been understood from a thin-thick perspective (Grugel 2014, p.6).

This essay will use a slightly thin definition articulated by Robert Dahl. The thin definition is limited to the political part of a society where the concept is affiliated with political processes. A democratic process according to Dahl (1) must make effective participation and voting equality to all the citizens who are subject to the binding collective of society (Dahl, 2020, p.37). (2) Democracy must provide citizens with opportunities for understanding civic issues and allow them to have control over matters that reach the decision-making agenda (Dahl, 2020, p.37-38). When speaking of democracy from here on, the essay assumes Robert Dahl's definition of the concept. This means democracy entails fair and regular elections, introduction of basic norms that makes free elections possible in addition to liberal individual rights such as freedom of assembly, religious freedom and a free press (Grugel 2014, p.6). When speaking of democratization or transition the essay refers to (3) the interval of going from authoritarian rule to one based on a democratic political process as defined by Robert Dahl. The use of a thin definition in empirical research makes it possible to identify theoretical factors in a case study. Further, explicit definitions generate more credible results.

2.2 The Egyptian Non-Violent Revolution Has Brought About Democratic Change in Egypt

First, let us consider the extent to which the two cases are similar. In the wake of Egypt's Arab Spring in early 2011, a number of scholars came out with predictions for Egypt's transition, using Indonesia's past trajectory of democratic reform as a road map. Pointing out the similarities between the two countries after Egypt's presidential election in 2012, Indonesian researcher John Sidel described a future for Egypt that follows Indonesia's trajectory during the last ten years. He makes the following prediction:

The military establishment will cede formal power to a civilian government but continue to enjoy informal power and prerogatives for years to come. Overall, the years ahead will see the entrenchment of an oligarchic democracy, one in which the politics of money and machinery predominate while the military continues to exercise considerable influence.”

Sidel's predictions rely on multiple assumptions that overlook important differences between Indonesia and Egypt. These include differences in Egypt's relationship with foreign donors, the conditions of its economy, and the particular arrangement of Egyptian partisan politics. External factors differed in terms of the U.S.-Egyptian

donor relationship, which had a more significant effect on events in Egypt than in Indonesia. The significant flow of aid money to Egypt from the U.S. in theory gave the U.S. government more power to influence the decisions of leaders in Egypt. By contrast, trade sanctions had already been imposed by congress on the Indonesian military, meaning that the U.S. government had less financial leverage on Suharto and Indonesia's generals (Haseman, 2019). However, external pressure for reform from international organizations such as the IMF on the regime in Indonesia would have had a comparable effect on Suharto as Mubarak, neutralizing that difference. The internal economic conditions of the two countries also differed in major ways. Egypt's economy had not experienced the same level of sustained growth as Indonesia's economy did beginning in the 1960s, although it had experienced modest growth rates since the 1980s. Also, in Egypt, a collapse in economic conditions did not become the instigator of popular revolts that led to a regime change as it did in Indonesia following the rapid devaluation of the Indonesian currency in 1997.³ However, economic grievances were similarly at the core of protesters' demands in Egypt (Kuhn, 2012).

The most important difference that has relevance to the argument of this paper is in the role of political Islam in these two cases. Despite the fact that both countries have large Muslim populations with important consequences for national politics, the

particular shape taken by political Islam in each of these countries differs greatly. In Egypt, the Muslim brotherhood, the most successful political party during the post-transition elections, does not have a corollary in Indonesian politics. While it may be tempting to directly compare the role of the Brotherhood and President Morsi in Egypt with that of the Muslim group, NU4, in Indonesia, it would be a mistake. Although the presidential candidate of the NU, Abdurrahman Wahid, had a strong Muslim identity, he nevertheless openly opposed an Islamist agenda in Indonesia. By contrast, the Mohamed Morsi's platform in the Egyptian case was explicitly Islamist.

While far from being “separated at birth,” however, neither are these two cases “completely separate”. A number of relevant similarities exist between the two cases that enable comparisons of the transition process. For example, the fact that the transfer of power underwent similar phases of negotiations between politicians and military leaders has greater relevance for this question than the presence of largely Muslim populations in both countries. In both cases, the pressures for democratic reform were directed at a well-entrenched military regime with an authoritarian leader. Although Indonesia had aspects of a “personalist” regime just before the transition, both countries had long histories of rule by the military, which had become heavily tied into national politics. In both cases, the military would play a central role in the transition from the previous regime to a democratic system as it would hold all the

power to either guarantee stability or to crack down on civilian reformers with force. As a result, the senior officers in the military and a few influential leaders in civil society had an immense amount of power over the direction that the transition would take in each case.

Coup Theory

The comparison of Egypt and Indonesia in this paper relies on several other theories both about the causes of military coups in the context of democratizing countries. Focusing analysis on the behavior of key actors in government, other theoretical models provide a useful framework for understanding motivation of military leaders to intervene. From Edward Luttwak's depiction of the coups in *Coup d'état: A Practical Handbook* comes a segment of theory on military interventions around the concept of "coup-proofing." James Quinlivan defines this as the "creation of structures that minimize the possibilities of small groups leveraging the system" to quickly seize power over the state (Quinlivan, 2019, p.133). However, while Coup-proofing identifies factors that make a government more susceptible to military intervention and addresses ways of preventing it, the concept has limited scope. Quinlivan's study describes the tactics of political leaders for increasing state control over the military in Iraq, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, but all of these examples focus specifically on dynamics within authoritarian regimes.

Much of the scholarly work on “coup-proofing” analyzes how authoritarian governments stay in power by containing the military, but it provides fewer analyses about establishing civilian- supremacy in fledgling democracies. The methods referred to in this concept, “creation of an armed force parallel to the military,” the “development of multiple internal security agencies,” or “exploitation of... loyalties for coup-critical positions” (Quinlivan, 2019, p.133) are tactics for increasing authoritarian control, not for consolidating a democracy. These have little use in new democracies attempting to preempt a slide into authoritarianism and scholars studying this idea have pointed out its limited applicability (Pilster, 2022).

Cultural explanations about military intervention have focused on the values of military officers that shape their motivations. Some scholars in this line of thinking have identified a large flaw inherent to many theories about military intervention. Theories based on an opportunistic military in search of political power risk oversimplifying the motivations that drive behavior of military actors. Eric Nordlinger makes the following point about the interests of military officers who had participated in a coup: “Only a small proportion originally entered the military in the hope of attaining governmental offices. Many praetorians took up the reins of government with little enthusiasm. Most of them would probably have much preferred to remain in the barracks if their objectives, particularly the defense or enhancement of the military’s

corporate interests, could have been realized from that vantage point” (Nordlinger, 2017, p.142). Rather than being motivated by all kinds of political power, many military leaders are more likely to be interested in a more specific set of political issues. Policies that pertain to national security and the internal organization of the military, for example, have greater relevance to most leaders in a military tradition. In militaries with a high esprit de corps and a strong corporate interest, officers are especially protective of the internal command structure of the military, which forms the basis of its effectiveness.⁸ The analysis of military leaders in this paper will rest on the assumption that they are primarily motivated by these factors and will not necessarily seize power as soon as an opportunity presents itself in the form of contentious politics.

Several rational choice theories further analyze the decisions of military leaders about whether to stage a coup at the individual level. Barbara Geddes’ research on authoritarian regimes provides a useful framework for understanding officers’ behaviour. Her “barracks game” models the choices of military officers as they decide whether or not to engage in a coup to replace the government. In a two-by-two matrix, the majority and minority factions face different payouts resulting from the decision to either have a coup or “return to the barracks.” In this way, rather than analyzing the behavior of individual officers, this model builds on the assumption that strong

corporate interests drive their decisions. The model reflects a situation in which large factions within the military must coordinate with each other to produce the highest payouts. The best outcome for both groups results when they collectively engage in a coup or all return to the barracks. Conversely, the lowest payouts result from a half-way committed military. Whether the majority faction succeeds in a coup without the minority faction or the minority faction launches a failed coup, the integrity of the military is damaged, which is the least desirable outcome (Geddes, 2019, p.126).

In group dynamic theories that explain the interaction between civilians and the military, the concept of military professionalism appears frequently. It suggests that, by developing a professional culture in the military, the civilian government can establish more control over the military. With professionalism, officers become less interested in politics as they become more narrowly focused on military matters. However, rather than preventing coups from taking place, professionalism also could have the opposite effect of increasing the military's interest in matters outside of war (Stepan, 2021). Also, with its emphasis on the military, this theory overlooks other factors that could be crucial for determining the success of democratic transitions. In particular, it disregards the role that civilian actors play in ensuring their success. Recent studies have concentrated more heavily on civil society in democratic transitions and have identified this as a common weakness of civil-military relations

theory (Mietzner, 2019; Cottey *et al* 2015). As a result, group-dynamic explanations of civil-military relations rectify this by analyzing the interaction between the military and civilians as the crucial element of the transition process.

2.2 “Tyranny of the Multitude”: Egypt’s Experiment with Democracy

In December, 2010, a series of protests against the Tunisian regime set off a chain reaction of political protests targeting authoritarian regimes throughout the region. Inspired by events in Tunisia, Egyptian crowds rapidly organized in Cairo in January, 2011, to protest the long-standing Mubarak regime. Following an unexpectedly quick victory for the protesters in Tahrir Square, an interim government was established and Egypt subsequently witnessed its first free election in over sixty years. With more than 84 million people (CIA World Factbook 2014), Egypt has the largest population in the Middle East and, like Indonesia, it contains an extremely diverse society. If the tide of democratization brought by the Arab Spring was to succeed in Egypt, it would need to overcome the serious disagreements found between the major political actors. Over the course of the next two and a half years, Egypt’s democratic transition quickly became mired in the historical divisions of Egyptian society and tragically ended early. Why did Egypt fail to achieve consensus in its new, elected government and consolidate its democracy? What factors drove the military to intervene in the summer of 2013? During the period following Egypt’s January Revolution, certain aspects of its social

divisions contributed to the un-resolvable tensions that eventually ended in conflict with an intervention by the military. These include the low factionalism in the elected government after 2011 with a single dominant civilian faction, a weak institutional framework for ensuring consensus in the new government, and low factionalism in the military, which enabled it to take action against the civilian government.

From the start of the protests in January, 2011, the military found itself in a difficult position. While it had a close association with the regime – the last three presidents had all come directly from military service – it had been largely sidelined from a central role in politics by President Mubarak in recent years. As part of his strategy to reduce the threat of the military to his power, Mubarak maintained strong central control over the military without incorporating the military into the political structure. Senior generals and top ministers received appointments by the president, but generals did not take an active part in running the state (Ivekovic, 2017, p.174), as they did in Indonesia. The effects of this were two-fold: first, the Egyptian military had not undergone a process of politicization that commonly occurs in military regimes, preventing political divisions and keeping factionalism low; second, the fates of the generals were not clearly intertwined with the regime as they had been in Indonesia, leaving it freer to form new alliances. Thus, the allegiances of the military were not clear at the time of the revolution. At an earlier point in history, Egypt's government

could have been categorized as a military regime,³⁹ but the military alignment had shifted away from the regime because of disagreements over divergent interests. Mubarak's policy of economic liberalization had begun to threaten the military's control over parts of the economy it directly managed. While the exact proportion of the economy controlled by the military is unknown, it directly manages the military industrial complex as well as several food-stuff industries (Ivekovic 2017, p.176). Unlike Indonesia, the Egyptian military's control over these industries was well documented, making them easily targeted by the civilian government for reforms (Mietzner, 2017). Because of its weakened association with the regime and the threat to its fiscal interests, the military had incentives to withdraw itself at the moment of the crisis.

During the crisis, the military had developed a popular public image among the protesters as an organization distinct from the Mubarak regime. The military increasingly became seen as a third party in the contest between protesters and the Mubarak regime that could guarantee the success of either side if it was won over. A commonly heard chant of protesters in Tahrir Square was "the army and the people are one hand" (Tschirgi *et al*, 2013; El-Bendary, 2013). During the uprisings, the commander of SCAF⁴⁰ during the January Revolution, Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi, very carefully exercised restraint in regard to the protests. Although the

military at first refrained from intervening to protect the protesters from the armed bands of state security, the regime's internal security force, it eventually deployed troops on the streets to protect the protesters as it became more apparent that the regime was going to fall. With the writing on the wall, President Mubarak finally resigned on February 11, 2011, despite his earlier refusal to do so. The timing of the resignation suggested that the military's ambivalence about the regime had a great deal to do with his sudden change in stance.

After Mubarak's resignation, Egypt entered a period of careful negotiations between civilian groups and the military over the terms of the political transition. With strong institutional integrity, the military was able to maintain control over the pace of reforms during the initial period. The head of SCAF, Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi, immediately began a process of "national dialogue" meant to breach the gap separating the military from various political groups (Fahmy, 2011). From the start, the military leadership faced serious difficulties in negotiating with civilian groups as it remained unclear who the representative leaders were. No single leader could claim to represent a majority of the groups involved in protesting the regime. Under the regime, only a small number of parties in the "tolerated opposition" had been allowed to exist within the official system, but these groups were hardly representative of the newly emergent student groups that led the protests. The political parties during the Mubarak regime

had served no other purpose than to create legitimacy for the state (Blaydes, 2018). To find civilian political allies that could be reliably controlled by the military, Tantawi turned to one of the only civilian parties not directly associated with the regime, the Wafd Party, to find representatives for an interim government. SCAF picked three Wafd Party members, one of which was a Coptic Christian, to fill cabinet positions (Ivekovic, 2013, p.184). However, this strategy failed because it excluded the new civilian political organizations that had a stake in the January Revolution. This worsened the image of the military by aligning it with a weaker civilian faction that had been associated with the old regime.

At this time, civilian political organizations spanned a wide array of overlapping and conflicting ideologies. In the suddenness of the January protests, the various groups had not had enough time to coalesce into effective party structures, but the groups could be broadly conceived of as belonging to two blocs representing different political interests (Tschirgi *et al.* 2013, p.5). In the first bloc were the Islamist organizations, consisting mainly of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafists. Because of its historical opposition to the regime, the Muslim Brotherhood had long experience functioning outside of the formal political system and the community networks through mosques gave the Islamist bloc a strong, integrated support base. It quickly would emerge as the most effectively-run organization in post-Mubarak Egypt. The

second bloc, the secular-liberal political organizations, consisted mainly of students and urban intellectuals. A few of the student organizations had been organizing in the years leading up to the January Revolution, but even these were much less developed than the Islamist groups. A large number of small student groups participated together in the protests, but had no clearly defined set of aims beside the removal of the Mubarak government. Several other liberal parties emerged during this period of the transition, but these were so numerous and uncoordinated that an effective liberal coalition could not form. In opposition to both the Islamist and secular-liberal blocs were the “secular-conservatives,” the remnants of the old regime that consisted mainly of the oligarchic elite with strong economic ties to the Mubarak’s presidency. These were led by the National Democratic Party (NDP), which had been the main party structure of the Mubarak regime.

The student groups of the secular-liberal bloc were the newest and least established without a strong party to unite them. These organizations emerged as a response to the economic situation in Egypt at the time of the revolution. In spite of the rapid growth in the economy, unemployment had steadily increased during the early 2000s due to the concentration of economic power among those with connections to the regime. Simultaneously, a rapid increase in the number of people with secondary and tertiary education had resulted in a growing number of educated young people who could not

find work during the 1990s and 2000s (Ivekovic, 2013, p.177). Consequently, by 2011, 90% of unemployed Egyptians belonged to the age cohort younger than 25, creating conditions for political activism among the youth (El-Bendary, 2013, p.5). This urban, educated segment of society began agitating for economic reform and the liberalization of the political system during the 2000s, culminating in the “bread riots” of April, 2008, which concentrated on the issue of the growing income disparity between the conservative oligarchy and the younger generation of Egyptians. By the time of the January Revolution, this bloc could be most clearly identified by its preoccupation with economic reform and it primarily attracted students, intellectuals, and some of the urban poor. However, these groups remained disorganized and highly fragmented by the time of the revolution. The ad hoc nature of the political movements meant that they spanned a number of unclear and conflicting political agendas. While the student bloc would field several different parties to compete in the elections, they never became cohesive enough in their structure to compete with the very solid Islamist bloc.

Following the transition, the largest and most well organized group that had been involved in the uprising was the Muslim Brotherhood. By contrast to the student groups, the Muslim Brothers had emerged from decades of experience running their organization outside of the regime-sanctioned system and had continued to function

effectively despite periodic crackdowns. Because of the strong network that existed through Muslim communities, the “uneven political liberalization under Sadat and Mubarak created a political system with a hollow core and a dynamic periphery,” (Wickham, 2018) which resulted in a comparatively strong Muslim political organization. This posed a dilemma for the military junta led by General Tantawi as it was reluctant to negotiate with a group that it had historically opposed. However, the effective organization of the Brotherhood and its ability to acquire a following in many of the rural areas in Egypt enabled it to become a dominant voice in the process of creating the new government. It controlled a large volunteer structure through its network of mosques and had access to a vast line of financial support that extended beyond Egypt’s borders.

2.3 Previous Research and Theoretical Framework

The political sociologist, Seymour Martin Lipset was one of the first proponents of modernization theory, declaring democracy as a direct result of economic growth. Until 1959 democratic studies were mainly in the field of political philosophy. When Lipset’s article was published, a new perspective towards democracy was introduced. Lipset democratization theory has a major foothold in democracy research today, and many scientists have worked to explain the relationship between economic development and democracy, one of which is political sociologist Larry Diamond.

According to Diamond, one factor stressed as important for democracy to take root is the crisis of legitimacy of the ruling authoritarian government. When the general public comes to believe the system of government lacks the moral authority to rule, the system is threatened (Diamond,2018, p.89). All regimes depend on some mix of legitimacy and force. Meaning that no country, no matter how brutal and totalitarian, relies only on force to survive. A large pool of organized, confident citizens, who actively reject the legitimacy of an authoritarian rule, becomes a threat to the dictating force (ibid). Meaning, when the opposition in an authoritarian system can organize and mobilizes a majority of the public, it can bring about a change in the regime (ibid). Over the past few decades, democratic ideas have increasingly constituted the legitimate form of rule, making it more difficult to maintain straightforward authoritarian rule. Authoritarian regimes today, with some exceptions like Saudi Arabia and North Korea, have to justify themselves in large measures based on their performance. In doing so, any dictatorship faces an intrinsic dilemma. If it does not deliver order and economic development it loses its only basis of legitimacy (ibid, p.90). From the structural perspective, economic development enlarges the middle class and raises levels of education and information among the people. When a country achieves an average level of development and national income, inequality tends to fall, which in turn reduces social distance and political polarization between classes. For

Lipset this constitutes the very foundation of his theory. Shifting political values – due to economic development or due to brutal repression, can trigger a revalorization of democracy (ibid, p.103). Profound changes in the society may also arise from the growth of formal and informal organizations in civil society. Their capacity, recourse, autonomy and initiatives, all of which can in a radical way bring change in the balance of power (ibid). Much of the success of democratization depends on the ability of the civil society to unite across competing political parties and disparate social classes into a broad front or movement (ibid, p.105).

Another society-centered theory is the school of historical sociology. Historical sociologists concerned with democracy, trace the transformation of the state through class conflict over time in order to explain how democracy has sometimes emerged (Grugel 2014, p.82). Historical sociology also emphasizes political economy. However, in contrast to modernization theory, economic development is not the driving force in democratization. Historical sociologists argue that expansion of the market leads to class conflicts which in turn disrupts the existing power structure and creates an opportunity for new structures to shape. The fundamental principle of historical sociology is that democracy is basically a matter of power (Rueschmeyer, Stephens, Stephens 2019 p.5). It is power relations that most importantly determine whether democracy can emerge, stabilize and uphold, even in the most unfavourable

conditions (ibid). Historical sociologists further argue that democracy requires a balance between the state and independent classes, in which the state is either completely autonomous from dominant classes or captured by them, creating a space where civil society can flourish (Hinnebusch 2017, p.378-379). Even though the main focus is on civil society, this approach later comes to highlight the importance of the state as an actor. The state as an actor plays for instance a major role due to the monopoly of the use of coercion. The specific role played by the means of coercion in a given state structure and in its relation to the wider society can be decisive for the chances of democratization (Rueschemeyer et al 1992 p.67). If the organization of coercion and violence – the police and military – are strong within the overall state apparatus, the situation is quite unfavourable for democracy. A strong military is one of the major obstacles to successful democratization in developing countries (ibid, p.67-68).

In contrast to both modernization theory and historical sociology is the agency approach. The agency approach argues that democracy can be created, if not independently of the structural context, certainly with fewer structural constraints (Grugel 2014, p.87). Democracy is seen as a result of action taken by conscious, committed actors, with some degree of luck, who are able to compromise (Grugel 2014, p.87). The approach emphasizes on actors' strategies and choices in the process

of political change. In contrast to structural theorists, advocates of the agency approach argue – with the exception of national identity – no set of preconditions must exist in order for democracy to take root. When different actors – trade unions grass-roots movements – religious groups and defender of human rights come together it creates a strong united force, which is a threat to an authoritarian regime (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, p.54). The agency approach puts greater stress on negotiations and interactions between the opposition and the ruling government.

Any government, democratic or authoritarian needs to navigate among various political forces and needs to build a crucial coalition in order to stay in power (Gandhi & Przeworski 2007, p.1280). When authoritarian regimes feel a threat from large groups within the society, the strategy to neutralize the threat is by co-opting³ the opposition (ibid, p.1281). Similar to modernization theory this approach also emphasizes the importance of economic performance in order for dictators to stay in power. Unless they can rely on exporting natural resources, dictators will eventually need to seek economic and political cooperation and negotiate with important groups in the society. Dictators who can obtain rents from mineral resources will need little co-opting, the rest must rely on extensive co-operation with important actors (Gandhi & Przeworski, 2017, p.1281). A democratic transition comes thus from power struggle in forms of negotiations between the regime and opposition. The political

change occurs in three phases, transition, liberalization and democratization. The transition phase is characterized as the period where dictators for whatever reason, modify their rules in the direction of providing more secure guarantees for rights of individuals and groups (O'Donnell and Schmitter, 1986, p.6). Liberalization refers to the process of making policies that protect individual rights and social groups from arbitrary or illegal acts committed by the state (ibid, p.7). Democratization in this context thereby refers to the process where the rules and procedures of citizenship are either applied to existing political institutions or expanded to include persons not previously enjoyed such rights and obligations (ibid, p.8). Both the liberalization and democratization phase requires mobilization and organization of large number of individuals. This derives from a high degree of indeterminacy of social and political action (ibid, p.19). Incorporation of new actors, shaping and renewal of political identities are some important factors. All transitions begin with the consequences of important divisions within the authoritarian regime itself, principally along the unstable cleavage between hard-liners⁴ and soft liners (ibid).

2.3.1 Theoretical Delimitation

The Tunisian case will be analysed on the basis of the theories presented above. All three theories are comprehensive and have been developed over a long time. It is thus crucial to mention that this essay has only presented the important aspects relevant for

this case study. It has for instance not highlighted the external factors, which are stressed in Larry Diamond's theory. External factors are for instance, foreign pressure.

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CHAPTER THREE

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND GOVERNANCE IN EGYPT AND NIGERIA

3.1 Introduction

The chapter is presented under the following sub headings:

- The political history of leadership and governance in Egypt
- The political history of leadership and governance in Nigeria

3.2 POLITICAL HISTORY OF EGYPT

Middle Eastern nations that still exist as independent entities today were a part of the Ottoman Empire up until the First World War. But compared to the central government, the Ottoman Empire's administration in Egypt exhibited significant changes. In Egypt, a system was put in place where local authorities could continue to exercise their authority by seizing property by force and collecting taxes on the income generated by these holdings (Winter, 2001, p. 128). Particularly after the last quarter of the 19th century, Western colonization efforts in Egypt while the response to such events took place within "the Egyptian national movement," it was in European countries. The reforms carried out by Mehmet Ali Pasha, who is recognized as the founder of Egypt, and the European influence that began with Napoleon Bonaparte's expedition in the years 1798–1801, prepared the way for numerous changes that were going to happen later (Djurant, 2001, p. 404). Following the British occupation of

Egypt in 1882, civic organizations working for change tried to express their efforts through the idea of "Islamic Union and the Islamic Resurrection" (Qevaqebi, 2007, p. 49). They attempted to start a political movement to counter the rise of the aforementioned view and lifestyle with the spread of European views. Academics like Jamaledin Afghani urged for cooperation in opposition to the "British sortie" (Abduh, 1993, p.14).

They began focusing on the need for strong administration and religious reform, playing a significant part in developing the idea of "Arab nationalism." Due to its homogeneous population, Egypt had an administration and consolidated prosperity compared to other Arab nations thanks to the cooperation of its minorities. Ibn Khaldun, in his sociological writings, stressed this element by stating that it is not necessary for the state to rely on the strength of the tribes to stand strong in a society like that of Egypt, where there are no tribes of distinct divisions. He therefore thinks that transitioning to urban life and establishing the state are easier (Ibn Khaldun, 2004, p. 121). The Memluk Movement in Egypt continued because it was now governed by the Ottoman Empire. In other words, Memluk Begs acquired real leadership even if Sultan Osman owned the country's territory and the Ottomans ruled Egypt. In their function as local authority, they had taken over control of land use, tax collection, and payment of vassalage to the Sultan. They did, however, continue to hold onto their

political influence. Memluks took involved in a number of uprisings against the Sultan or other power struggles during this time (Husain, 2010, p 679). Egypt has not suffered another foreign occupation since Yavuz Sultan Selim's rule until 1798. Since that time, however, English and French imperialism have begun to exert a military, cultural, economic, and political influence on the former Ottoman Empire's realms. In fact, blocking the British route to India through the Red Sea was one of the main goals of Napoleon's war in Egypt (Winter, 2001, p. 42). Napoleon's Egyptian expedition, which can be viewed as the start of the "French colonial movement," must be viewed as the first instance of French influence in the political and cultural spheres of the colonies.

Napoleon had made an effort to engage the populace directly during the Egyptian campaign by printing booklets of his speech in Arabic. Napoleon, who made sure to begin each speech with "In the Name of God," or "Kelime-i Tawhid" had frequently emphasized that this was the best approach to win the Egyptians' hearts. He also criticized the Memluks in these pamphlets, attempting to justify French occupation by doing so. The French occupation of Egypt was ended in 1801, thanks to the combined efforts of Ottoman and British soldiers. Thus, the Mehmet Ali Pasha era in Egypt will begin. He traveled there in the first part of the 19th century with the Ottoman navy and managed to become one of the most powerful individuals. In 1805, Sultan Osman

bestowed upon Mehmet Ali Pasha the title of "Vali of Egypt," therefore separating Egypt from the core of the Ottoman Empire's government. (Ozer, 2007, p. 78).

3.2.1 Monarchy Period

Egypt is regarded as the first Arab state of the modern era due to its 5,000-year-old history. Mehmet Ali Pasha, who represents the Ottoman military in this process, holds a particular place. He is viewed as a statesman who oversaw significant reforms that are comparable to those of Tanzimat. He was able to create an Egypt that could stand on its own two feet, separate from the Ottoman Empire (Ozer, 2007, p. 96-102).

Mehmet Ali Pasha's influence alone cannot account for the significant transition Egypt underwent in the 19th century because this time period for Egypt has numerous other dimensions and effects. However, Mehmet Ali Pasha's reforms and accomplishments—particularly in the military realm—lay the framework for it. Mehmet Ali Pasha enjoyed remarkable success in Sultan Osman's name during the early years of his administration because he was careful to maintain unbroken relations with the Ottoman Empire. However, the competition of the "Great Powers" in the case of Egypt was brought about by the fact that Egypt under Mehmet Ali Pasha was no longer an internal matter of the Ottoman Empire starting in the 1830s. Mehmet Ali Pasha started to increase his influence by requesting greater rights for his sons from the Ottoman Empire throughout the years 1831 to 1840. The "Property System" was in

place when Mehmet Ali Pasha came in Egypt in the 19th century, and the villagers planted and gathered the crops on the land. During this time, the bulk of Egyptians who were Arabs were peasants who worked in agriculture, making up about four out of every five of them. Despite changes and clarifications to legal terminology, the "Private Property System" was first applied in the second part of the 19th century (Gurbal, 2012, p. 24-27). Despite not being of Arab descent, Mehmet Ali Pasha was a statesman with global perspectives. Despite the lack of a stream that might serve as a representation for this nationalism, it is well known that Egypt was where the first Arab nationalism ideologies took birth.

Mehmet Ali Pasha died, and his successors as Wali (ruler) of Egypt were Abbas Pasha (1848–1844), Said Pasha (1854–1863), and Ismail Pasha (1863–1879). Beginning with the accession of Mehmet Ali Pasha's son Said Pasha (1854–1863), who succeeded Abbas Pasha and gained notoriety in particular for his new policies implemented in 1861, to this position, the debt-reduction process of Egypt began (Emin, 2012, p. 17). Colonel Ahmet Arabi led his soldiers in an uprising in 1882. The reformist branch of Arab intellectuals in Egypt as well as army officers backed the Arabi Pasha Movement. The Movement was also backed by the fired employees who lost their employment as a result of the economy's decline, tax increases, and the implementation of safety measures. Due to the emergence of a nationalist consciousness in Egypt and the

subsequent organization on September 9, 1881, the protesters gathered in Abidin Square emphasized their desire for the national parliament to convene and to remove Minister of War Rifkin Pasha, who, despite being of Turkish descent, was acting unfairly in favor of foreign officers who served in the Egyptian army. Due to these developments, the "Egypt issue" might be seen as a challenging situation handled by the Ottoman Empire in recent decades. In this context, on October 24, 1885, an agreement about the governance of Egypt was reached between the Ottoman Empire and England. England had won the right to equal say with the Ottoman Empire regarding the changes to be made in Egypt before debating the topic of relocation (Cole, 2001, p. 154).

The beginning of the First World War, which coincided with these events in Egypt, may be seen as a turning point in the evolution of the "Egyptian National Movement." However, the start of the First World War in 1914 and the Ottoman Empire's involvement in the conflict alongside Germany led England to first impose a curfew in Egypt on November 2, and on November 18–19 of the same year, it proclaimed a "Protectorate," after making an open declaration that it intended to take control of Egypt. In terms of politics, the Protectorate simply served to legalize the rule, which persisted for almost 30 years (Mitchell, 2013, p.55). Due to these events, Egypt was formally separated from the Ottoman Empire. During World War 1, Egypt served as a

base for the Gallipoli and Palestinian fronts as well as a crossing point for allied forces traveling from Asia to Europe. By recognizing Egypt's independence in 1922, Britain stated that its guardianship over the nation was over. However, the 1922 agreement demonstrates that this Britain's declaration was not put into practice because it continued its management in an indirect manner because this agreement gave Britain the authority to control and coordinate the process of establishing a government in Egypt. It also allowed Britain to maintain control over the Suez Canal.

3.2.2 Period of Jamal Abdul

Similar to the Soviet Union, the United States first struggled with how to deal with the "Free Officers" who took control of Egypt in a coup in 1952 since the sudden change that occurred astonished both countries. The People's Republic of China perceived the free government officers as a "anti-revolutionary tyranny," whilst the Soviet Union considered them as "a movement affiliated with the USA." In such a setting, Egypt's Nasser government maintained connections with the Soviet Union and other socialist nations in a practical manner.

On the other hand, Arab populists were irritated with Westerners as a result of their colonial experiences. The establishment of the Israeli state and the emergence of the

Palestinian-Israeli conflict served as another catalyst for opposition against Westerners (Said, 2002, p. 123).

During the years 1953 to 1954, the Soviet Union supported Egypt's stance toward England, and in January 1954, the Egyptian Minister of Defense conducted a lengthy visit to the Soviet Union. Following these discussions, the Soviet Union used its veto power at the UN Security Council to block Israel's use of the Suez Canal for the first time. In this sense, the Soviet Union continued to back the Egyptian government, and the relationship between the two countries grew until 1955.

The fact that the Egyptian foreign policy started to pick up speed during this time period makes the year 1955 notable. The creation of the Baghdad Pact during the Cold War exacerbated the polarization of the Arab world and resulted in significant changes to the West wing axis. Egypt decided against participating in the Baghdad Pact because it thought it would undermine the 1950 Arab Defense Agreement. Egypt encouraged campaigns to topple the regime in this nation by accusing Iraq of complicity (Alkaid, 2008, p. 36). Jamal Abdul Nasser's close relationship with the Soviet Union can be attributed to the Baghdad Pact. Along with Pakistan and Turkey, Iraq participated in the Baghdad Pact, breaking Egypt's obligations under the "Arab Protection System," while on February 28, Israel assaulted military installations in Gaza, killing 38 Palestinians.

The Bandung Conference in April of that year was the third significant occasion in 1955, in which Nasser had taken part (Said, 2002, p. 106). In response to Nasser's rejection of the Baghdad Pact, the United States and England withdrew their financial backing for the power plant that was slated to be constructed in Aswan. In response, the Suez Canal was "nationalized" by Nasser's government in July 1956. Following these mutual reactions, Britain and France enforced a trade boycott (Ridvan, 1986, p. 63).

The Israeli invasion of the Gaza Strip on February 28, 1955, while it was being controlled by the Egyptian military, compelled Nasser's regime to purchase weaponry from the United States. However, the sheer fact that Israel's security and existence were important to US foreign policy led the US Senate to extend the requirements for Nasser's purchase of weapons, and as a result, his government agreed to purchase the weaponry from Czechoslovakia on September 27, 1955. Egypt conducted concurrent talks with the United States up until the moment when the Soviet Union finally bought the weapons, but then-secretary of state John Foster Dulles required Egypt to join the West Axis in order for the weapons to be acquired.

Because Syria and Egypt agreed to unite, creating the United Arab State, in 1958, it may be said that this was the year when Russian-Egyptian relations experienced a rise and collapse. As a result, Nasser's influence over the Arabs increased. Iraq experienced

a coup d'état on July 14 that installed General Qasim Abdulkerim in charge and raised the prospect of Iraq joining the Union (Shadi, 2005, p. 23).

Nasser made his first trip to the Soviet Union in April 1958, when he was hosted for 18 days by Nikita Hrushev, who was the president of the Soviet Union at the time. Thus, Nasser's good connections with him were crucial since the Soviet Union attempted to strengthen its influence in the Middle East through Egypt. Abdul Hakim Amir, Egypt's chief of general staff, traveled to Moscow in October 1958. Because the money had gone overseas and incomes were needed for investments, Nasser's administration started looking for loans during this time. At first, it was believed that the US and the UN could supply the funding for all of the projects. Even Times magazine selected Nasser as "Man of the Year" in 1956. However, the events of the time allowed the Arab and Egyptian governments to prioritize socialist principles in order to declare independence and create economic models (Fauzi, 1990, p.33). When Nasser assumed the position of leader of the Arab world, good relations with the United States started to deteriorate.

The United States chose to sell weapons to Iraq in April 1954, stepping up its campaign against that nation. In this situation, America chose to entrust the traditional elected officials in Iraq's government rather than engaging with a political history of a modern Egypt nationalist leader like Nasser. When Nasser began to cultivate positive

relationships with the leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement Countries, including Jawaharlal Nehru and Josip Broz Tito, Egypt's preferences and position started to take shape. An important development for Egypt's internal politics and its connection to Third World nations may be attributed to the time when the Movement first emerged and Nasser's determination to gain from his participation in it. From that point on, Nasser's significance in international relations and Egypt's independent and impartial attitude will grow, notably in the late 1960s. Over twenty African countries proclaimed independence in 1961 as a result of Egypt's increased involvement in African politics after 1959 and backing for those wars (Hejkel, 2003, p. 18).

Egypt hosted a number of planning conferences and meetings for the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement. The Cairo Conference, which took place in 1957–1958 and began on December 26 at the University of Cairo, was arranged as part of the Bandung Conference preparations. The Cairo Conference, to which Nasser's administration gave a special significance, was organized by Anwar Sadat, the regime's number two, as well. At the Cairo conference, unlike the one in Bandung, representatives of opposition political movements from several nations were present in addition to governmental representatives.

Egypt gradually evacuated its forces in Yemen in 1967 after losing the armed Israeli-Arab confrontation. As a result, Nasser's influence in the region was waning while

governments like Saudi Arabia's and Jordan's were starting to stand out. Along with the defeat, the Suez Canal shutdown would cause Egypt to lose a significant amount of money. As a possibility, Egypt's petroleum may even be refined in Aden. Egypt began a process of redefining its relations with all Arab nations, including Saudi Arabia, as a result of these events. However, the US stopped providing Egypt with economic assistance and stopped exporting grains, which led Egypt to form an alliance with the Soviet Union. In conclusion, throughout his whole rule, Nasser was concerned in domestic political issues in addition to those relating to "Arab nationalism" and "Arab Union," in addition to dealing with foreign policy issues. Anwar Sadat assumed his position following his passing from a heart attack in 1970. (Hamood, 2000, p. 5).

3.2.3 Period of Anwar Sadat

Jamal Abdul Nasser passed away on September 28, 1970, leaving behind a fractured social structure, a regime in crisis, and morally degraded individuals. However, the most crucial issue was who would take over his position of authority. People were divided about the country's governance, and Nasser's deputy was meant to be chosen in accordance with the constitution to prevent any potential riots. As a result, his vice president Anwar Sadat assumed the presidency, and the public approved of his appointment in a vote on October 15, 1970. (Sadat, 1979, p. 286).

Anwar Sadat was frequently shown beside Abdul Nasser, despite the fact that he did not contribute significantly during Nasser's rule. Sadat oversaw "the Presidency of the Arab Socialists League" when Nasser suffered his first heart attack in 1969, and following his recovery, he was named a vice chairman of the Arab Summit held in Rabat. Anwar Sadat gave his approval to everything Nasser undertook, earning him the moniker "Yes President." Sadat is perceived as a person who applied pressure to get what he desired, despite this nickname. Despite overwhelming opposition, he decided to assume the position as head of state because of this quality (Emin, 2007, p. 101).

It is safe to assume that the opposition's support for Sadat's presidency was motivated by their perception of him as a "weak man"—through his actions, they believed he would not act as "the only man." Therefore, the opposition believed it could carry out its strategies, which is why they supported his candidacy. Fears that power could only be accumulated in the hands of one man, as it did during the reign of Abdul Nasser, were the primary cause of the conflict between the Free Officers and the elite representatives around Sadat. This is due to the fact that both parties wanted the power to be shared among them and tried to disguise the reality that it had all accumulated in Sadat's hands.

Anwar Sadat was given some important instructions regarding foreign policy during this process, including extending the ceasefire agreement with Israel, which had been signed in 1967 during the administration of Abdul Nasser and had ended in September 1970, until February 1971 on the grounds that Egypt was not yet prepared to fight. Anwar Sadat's belief that a peace treaty could be struck between Egypt and Israel was the reason why the majority of the opposition rejected his strategies. In his presentation to the parliament on February 4, 1971, he said that the Canal could be reopened, a peace treaty could be struck with Israel, and attempts could be made to strengthen ties with the United States. The opposition vehemently disagreed with his speech. He was the first president of an Arab state to say that a peace treaty might be struck with Israel, and his strategy was rejected by the opposition while being backed by the United States (Sadat, 1978, p. 143).

The issue of an alliance between Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon was another factor when opposition responses to Sadat peaked. While in Egypt, it was widely believed that the alliance with Syria could only endure three years, ending in 1971. As a result, preparations for an agreement between the three nations began after an assessment of the country's political and economic position. Anwar Sadat and other presidents signed the Plan for Proclamation of the Federation of Arab Republics on April 17, 1971, in Benghazi in the presence of the delegates of the three countries, in spite of the

opposition's objections. Sadat submitted a proposal to the Executive Council of the Arab Socialist League in order to have the plan implemented; however, his request was denied. The plan must first be publicized in multiple state organizations. Such a denial implies a denial by the highest state institution. Sadat requested that the plan be discussed in the Central Committee after the League of Arab Socialists rejected it, however in this case, the talks over the plan continued. As a result, Sadat tried to implement several amendments to ensure that his plan would be accepted. The most significant change was to require a unanimous vote from all presidents rather than a majority vote. On April 19, 1971, the Plan was formally approved by the Central Committee after this modification and discussion.

Anwar Sadat believed he had the required backing in internal politics and waited for a convenient time to crush the opposition in order to resolve the challenging situation. He then attempted to make some movements in foreign policy. He emphasised at the discussion with the Soviet Union's envoy that the nation cannot afford another power struggle and that is why he had chosen to fire Ali Sabri, who was rumored to have the support of the Soviet Union. Therefore, he pleaded with the Soviet Union not to take this action personally or as an insult. After Ali Sabri was fired, Anwar Sadat assured the ambassador that he would take care to maintain good ties with the Soviet Union.

In his address on May Day, Sadat made the accusation that Ali Sabri and his supporters believed they had inherited authority from Abdul Nasser, which they found to be intolerable. On May 2nd, 1971, Sadat relieved Ali Sabri of all responsibility and, as a follow-up, changed all representatives to the League of Arab Socialists. He was able to do away with the opposition in this way, ensuring his continued rule until his passing. The day after such elimination, May 15, was initially referred to as Audit Day by Sadat before being renamed as the Audit Revolutionary Day and became a national holiday.

3.2.4 Period of Hosni Mubarak

Hosni Mubarak would become the new leader when Anwar Sadat passed away in 1980 as a result of an attempted murder (Hamood, 1985, p. 9). Mubarak, who had agreed to take charge of the besieged nation, believed that adjustments and reforms were required not only politically but also economically. Mubarak thought that liberal approaches should be used in Egypt's political and economic life since these changes would hurt the societal structure. During this time, which corresponded with the fall of the Soviet Union and global democratic movements, Egypt also saw political unrest and calls for the release of several prisoners. Hosni Mubarak's rule saw an extension of certain rights when compared to earlier regimes in terms of human rights. Mubarak proposed a few measures in this regard to avoid restricting media freedom and asked

for a relaxation of these limitations, but the democratization process did not go to the necessary degree (Emin, 2011, p. 39).

Due to Mubarak's incompatibility with the world that was changing and the new global equilibrium, which may be described as a period in which state pressure on the populace remained with all of its might, no drastic measures were taken to satisfy the aspirations for freedom of the people. The expansion of his political power was more important to Mubarak than anything else. In terms of foreign policy, the Mubarak era followed the pro-Israel and pro-American stance that had been established under Anwar Sadat in an effort to change the public's poor perception of the situation (Qamil, 2012, p. 267).

Egypt received the second-highest amount of military aid behind Israel because the US regards it as a player who helped to contain radical elements in the area, particularly Iran, at the time. This condition, which in the case of Egypt might be viewed as a privilege, did not last during the Mubarak era, and diplomatic crises experienced in various circumstances were a reason for the strategic alliance between Egypt and the United States to suffer damage in some cases. In this sense, US President George Bush predicted a thawing of relations between the two nations following Mubarak's response to US policies in his speech at the opening of the Davos Forum in 2008. Bush expressed concern over Mubarak's government actions. Thus, starting in 2009, the two

billion dollars in aid that the US has provided to Egypt since 1979 will be reduced to 1.3 billion (Hejqel, 2012, p. 268).

On the other side, Mubarak's administration in 2005 elections had implemented certain legislative laws and taken other efforts to improve the existing ones, despite the protests in the nation. Given the rights outlined in Article 189 of the constitution during this time, Hosni Mubarak recommended amending the constitution to require secret ballots for presidential elections as well as the participation of several candidates. Following the revision of Article 76 of the constitution in 2005, Egypt implemented the procedure of multi-candidate presidential elections.

At this point, Egypt was governed by a system in which the parliament chose and introduced the presidential candidate to the electorate. However, the amendment to Article 76 of the Constitution made it feasible for more than one person to run for president. Although this procedure was crucial, it created challenges for the candidate selection process. For instance, the current rule mandated that the candidate running in the 2011 elections must receive at least 5% of the parliament's vote. Additionally, the current system included some other requirements that made it impossible for candidates who sought to run as independent candidates. To assure geographical representation, for instance, they had to get the endorsement of 10 of the 14 members of the Council of Mayors in addition to 65 MPs from the Parliament and 25

representatives from the Shura Parliament. These laws demonstrate that although Mubarak instituted "democratic reforms" for the presidential elections starting in 2005, these changes actually presented challenges for other contenders. Initially, the US and later many other European nations welcomed the advances to the legal side of things. For instance, when discussing Hosni Mubarak's changes, the then-High Representative of the European Union Javier Solana emphasized that they should be seen as a precursor to the Middle East's democratization process (Siraxhudin, 2016, p. 388). However, the Egyptian populace did not share Mubarak and American thought. People believed that Mubarak took these actions solely to consolidate his own power. Mubarak also publicly opposed the Muslim Brotherhood's proposed presidential run by stating that it was an illegal organization. Therefore, he attempted to make it difficult for someone with international prominence like Mohamed ElBaradei or other potential candidates to run for president. Ten candidates, in addition to Mubarak, ran for president of Egypt in the ensuing circumstances, which occurred on September 7, 2005. On September 9, the results of the election were made public. Mubarak received 88.7% of the Egyptians' votes, and he was re-elected as president for a further six years. He received 93% of the vote in the presidential election of 1999. The 2005 presidential elections were regarded as not reflecting the democratic results because only 23% of the 31 million eligible voters participated. This graph demonstrates that

Egyptians did not all hold Mubarak's regulations and democratic reforms in the same regard. Egypt also held elections for 454 Members of Parliament following the 2005 presidential contest. The three-phased legislative elections, which were held in a more democratic context than the presidential ones and completed in December, resulted in the victory of the party in power. The "Muslim Brotherhood," which is illegal, participated in elections and won 88 seats in the Parliament through independent candidates. Hosni Mubarak did not give radical political movements any chance up until this point throughout the roughly 30 years of his rule. Mubarak was able to maintain public disengagement from the government by frequently declaring a state of emergency throughout the nation. In order to prevent any potential coup, he increased the intelligence service and other security components. For this reason, in 2011, he chose not to appoint a vice president, which was against the law. Mubarak's action made the state's bureaucratic machinery uneasy since it suggested that his son Jamal Mubarak would be appointed to the position. Additionally, the Egyptian people turned against him due to his implementation of policies in favor of Israel's security, his pro-Israeli stance, and his failure to create a national strategy on the Palestine issue. Egypt managed to raise per capita income from 2005 to 2010 while Mubarak was in power, making it the 26th most developed nation in the world despite its failure in the political sphere. However, this expansion of the national economy also brought forth new

issues. More than half of Egyptians now live below the poverty line while the wealthy have become wealthier and the poor have become poorer. The administration of Hosni Mubarak was one that brought about significant issues for Egypt since, similar to Anwar Sadat's time in office, Mubarak also applied liberal politics by getting loans from the World Bank and the IMF, turning Egypt into a dependent nation. Hosni Mubarak's administration of the country forbade the formation of political parties with a religious bent. These parties used the components of the state of emergency to exert pressure on religious movements, which alarmed the populace. The lack of communication and the conflict between the populace and their leaders grew worse day by day and started to negatively impact social life. Due to the aforementioned reasons, protests began in January 2011 because individuals believed that the only way to voice their ideas was to demonstrate in public. Omar Suleiman was appointed vice president in response to these demonstrations, and Mubarak declared he would run in the 2018 presidential elections. Since the first day of the demonstration, Mubarak, who understood he could no longer withstand the pressure, has used the phrase "I wanted to die in Egypt," but the opposition parties and youth groups could no longer be banned.

Mubarak thus announced his retirement from office on February 11, 2011. People brought legal claims against him for violating human rights, mismanaging the nation, oppressing the populace, and the 800 people who were killed over the 30 years

Mubarak was in power. This also applied to his son Jamal Mubarak and Interior Minister Habib el-Adly, whose prosecution was also demanded. In this regard, 84-year-old Hosni Mubarak, who attempted to repress the demonstrations that began in January 2011, was found guilty of all crimes dating back to the "Egyptian revolution," and was given a life sentence (Shehib, 2011, p. 123).

3.3 POLITICAL HISTORY OF NIGERIA

Pre-Crisis Phase (October 1, 1960-January 14, 1966): The Federation of Nigeria formally achieved its independence from Britain and joined the Commonwealth of Nations (CON) on October 1, 1960. On October 1, 1960, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, founder of the Northern People's Congress (NPC), was appointed as prime minister (head of government) of the Federation of Nigeria. Benjamin Nnamdi Azikiwe, leader of the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, was appointed as Governor-General (representative of Queen Elizabeth II, the Nigerian head of state) on November 16, 1960. The Federal Republic of Nigeria was established on October 1, 1963, with Abubakar Tafawa Balewa as prime minister (head of government) and Benjamin Nnamdi Azikiwe as president (head of state). President Benjamin Nnamdi Azikiwe dissolved the House of Representatives on December 8, 1964. Parliamentary elections were held on December 30, 1964 and March 18, 1965, and the NPC won 162 out of 312 seats in the House of Representatives. The National Council of Nigerian

Citizens (NCNC) won 84 seats in the House of Representatives. The United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) boycotted the parliamentary elections. Regional elections were held on October 11, 1965. Chief Samuel Akintola of the Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP) was re-elected as prime minister of the Western Region on October 11, 1965. Some 160 civilians and seven government policemen were killed in political violence in the Western Region following the regional elections. Some 20 individuals were killed in political violence in Ilesha on January 12, 1966.

Crisis Phase (January 15, 1966 - July 5, 1967)

Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa was deposed and killed in a military coup led by Major Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu and Major Emmanuel Ifeajuna on January 15, 1966. Prime Minister Samuel Akintola of the Western Region and Prime Minister Ahmadu Bello of the Northern Region were also deposed and killed during the military coup on January 15, 1966. The Supreme Military Council (SMC) headed by General Johnson Aguyi-Ironsi, a member of the predominantly Christian Ibo ethnic group, took control of the government and suspended the constitution on January 16, 1966. Twenty-two individuals were killed during the military coup. Some 3,000 Nigerians fled as refugees to Dahomey (Benin). The government of Ghana provided diplomatic assistance (diplomatic recognition) to the military government on January

17, 1966. The Nigerian government abolished the four federal regions on May 24, 1966. Some 115 individuals, mostly ethnic Ibos, were killed in political violence on May 28-June 2, 1966. Major General Aguyi-Ironsi was deposed and killed in a military coup led by Lt. Colonel Murtala Muhammed on July 29, 1966. Some 30 individuals were killed in political violence in Lagos on July 29-August 1, 1966, and some 250,000 ethnic Ibos fled from the Northern Region to the Eastern Region following the military coup. Lt. Colonel Yakuba Gowon was sworn in as the head of the federal military government following the military coup, and he restored the four federal regions on August 31, 1966. Some 2,000 ethnic Ibos were killed in political violence in the Northern Region from September 29 to October 4, 1966. Lt. Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, military governor of the Eastern Region of Nigeria, declared that the region would no longer recognize Lt. Colonel Yakubu Gowon as head of the federal military government on March 2, 1967. Lt. Colonel Gowon assumed full powers as commander-in-chief of the armed forces and head of the military government on May 27, 1967. Lt. Colonel Gowon proclaimed a state-of-emergency on May 28, 1967. Lt. Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, military governor of the Eastern Region, declared the independence of the Republic of Biafra in southern Nigeria on May 30, 1967.

Conflict Phase (July 6, 1967-January 15, 1970)

Government troops launched a military offensive against Biafran rebels on July 6, 1967. The Egyptian government provided military assistance (military aircraft and pilots) to the Nigerian government. The presidents of Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and the Emperor of Ethiopia jointly appealed for a ceasefire and peaceful negotiations on July 8, 1967. The East African Community (EAC) offered to send a four-member conciliation commission (Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia) to Nigeria, but the mediation offer was rejected by the government. The Vatican City appealed for peaceful negotiations in July 1967. Foreign Minister Emile Zinsou of Dahomey offered to mediate negotiations in August 1967, but the mediation offer was rejected by the Nigerian government. The British government provided military assistance to the Nigerian government beginning on August 9, 1967. The government of the Soviet Union provided military assistance (military aircraft and 170 military technicians) to the Nigerian government beginning on August 19, 1967. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) heads-of-state condemned the rebellion, and established a six-member consultative commission (Cameroon, Congo-Kinshasa, Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Niger) chaired by Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia on September 14, 1967. CON Secretary-General Arnold Smith attempted to facilitate negotiations between Biafran rebel and government representatives beginning in October 1967. Government troops captured Enugu, the Biafran capital, on October 4, 1967. Prime Minister Alexei

Kosygin of the Soviet Union offered economic assistance to the government on October 16, 1967. Some 2,000 government soldiers were killed during an attack against Biafran rebels near Onitsha on October 18, 1967. The Switzerland-based NGO, World Council of Churches (WCC), established a mission to provide humanitarian assistance to individuals displaced during the conflict beginning on November 20, 1967. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) established a mission to provide humanitarian assistance to individuals displaced during the conflict beginning in January 1968. The Society of Friends (Quakers) established a three-member committee to facilitate negotiations between the parties beginning on February 3, 1968. The Vatican and WCC jointly appealed for a ceasefire on March 20, 1968, but the ceasefire appeal was rejected by the parties. Government troops captured Onitsha on March 22, 1968. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) established a mission ("International Airlift West Africa") to provide humanitarian assistance to individuals displaced during the conflict beginning in April 1968. The Tanzanian government provided diplomatic assistance (diplomatic recognition) to Biafra on April 13, 1968. The government of Czechoslovakia imposed military sanctions (suspension of arms shipments) against the government and Biafran rebels on April 24, 1968. CON Secretary-General Arnold Smith facilitated preliminary negotiations between the parties in London on May 2-15, 1968. The government of Gabon

provided diplomatic assistance (diplomatic recognition) to Biafra on May 8, 1968. Government military aircraft attacked rebel targets in Port Harcourt and Aba on May 9, 1968, resulting in the deaths of 150 civilians. The government of Ivory Coast provided diplomatic assistance (diplomatic recognition) to Biafra on May 15, 1968. Government troops captured Port Harcourt on May 18, 1968. The government of Zambia provided diplomatic assistance (diplomatic recognition) to Biafra on May 20, 1968. CON Secretary-General Arnold Smith and President Milton Obote of Uganda facilitated formal negotiations between the parties in Kampala, Uganda on May 23-31, 1968. The Dutch government imposed military sanctions (suspension of arms shipments) against the Nigerian government and Biafran rebels on June 6, 1968. The Belgian government imposed military sanctions (suspension of arms shipments) against the Nigerian government and Biafran rebels on July 5, 1968. The American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) established a commission of inquiry, which visited the region from July to September 1968. The ICRC appointed August Lindt of Switzerland as coordinator of the ICRC mission in Nigeria and Biafra on July 19, 1968. The OAU consultative committee, chaired by President of Hamani Diori of Niger, facilitated preliminary negotiations between the parties in Niamey, Niger on July 20-26, 1968. The French government expressed its support for the Biafran rebels on July 31, 1968, and provided military assistance (weapons and ammunition) to the

Biafran rebels beginning in August 1968. The OAU consultative committee, chaired by Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, facilitated formal negotiations between the parties in Addis Ababa between August 5 and September 9, 1968. Government troops captured Aba on September 4, 1968. The governments of Britain, Canada, Poland, and Sweden established a four-member fact-finding mission to investigate allegations of genocide by government troops beginning on September 7, 1968. Government military aircraft bombed the Aguleri market near Onitsha on September 16, 1968, resulting in the deaths of 510 individuals. Government military aircraft attacked Umuahia township on September 28, 1968, resulting in the deaths of 31 individuals. Government troops killed two ICRC personnel, two WCC personnel, and 100 civilians in Okigwi on September 30, 1968. OAU heads-of-state appealed for a ceasefire in September 1968. The Joint Church Aid (JCA) mission – which consisted of the Catholic Relief Service (CRS), Caritas International (CI) – the Vatican City humanitarian assistance organization, and Church World Service (CWS) – was established in 1968. The AFSC and the Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) established a mission to provide humanitarian assistance to Nigerians beginning in January 1969. The Common African, Malagasy, and Mauritanian Organization (Organisation Commune Africaine et Malgache – OCAM) established a conciliation commission on January 29, 1969. Prime Minister Harold Wilson of Britain attempted

to mediate a ceasefire agreement between Biafran rebel and government representatives on March 27-31, 1969. The OAU consultative committee facilitated negotiations between the parties in Monrovia, Liberia on April 17-20, 1969. The OAU consultative committee appealed for a ceasefire on April 20, 1969. UN Secretary-General U Thant appointed Said-Uddin Khan as his representative for relief activities in Nigeria on April 28, 1969. Government military aircraft shot down an ICRC aircraft on June 5, 1969, and the ICRC suspended its airlift operation in Biafra on June 10, 1969. August Lindt resigned as coordinator of the ICRC mission on June 19, 1969. The ICRC terminated its humanitarian mission in Nigeria on October 2, 1969. The Quaker mission ended its efforts to facilitate negotiations between the parties in November 1969. The OAU consultative committee was dissolved on December 15, 1969. Biafran leader Colonel Ojukwu fled the country on January 11, 1970. The governments of Denmark, Ireland, and the US provided humanitarian assistance to refugees beginning on January 12, 1970. The governments of Australia, Ethiopia, Italy, Norway, and West Germany provided humanitarian assistance to refugees beginning on January 13, 1970. The Nigerian government banned the JCA on January 14, 1970. Biafra formally surrendered to government troops on January 15, 1970. Some 45,000 government troops, 45,000 Biafran rebels, and 30,000 civilians

were killed, and some 500,000 individuals died as a result of starvation during the conflict. Some three million individuals were internally displaced during the conflict.

Post-Conflict Phase (January 16, 1970 - October 1, 1979)

Lt. Colonel Gowon was deposed in a military coup led by General Murtala Mohammed on July 29, 1975. The Libyan government provided diplomatic assistance (diplomatic recognition) to the government of General Murtala Mohammed on July 30, 1975, and the British government provided diplomatic assistance (diplomatic recognition) to the Nigerian government on August 1, 1975. The SMC appointed the 25-member Federal Executive Council (FEC) on August 6, 1975. General Murtala Mohammed appointed a 50-member committee to draft a new constitution, and the committee convened on October 18, 1975. Government troops and civilians clashed in Ugep on December 25, 1975, resulting in the deaths of nineteen individuals. General Murtala Mohammed and 24 other military personnel were killed during a military rebellion headed by Lt. Colonel Bukur Suka Dimka on February 13, 1976, and Lt. General Olusegun Obasanjo was appointed as head of the SMC on February 14, 1976. On March 11, 1976, more than 30 government soldiers, including Major-General Illya Bisalla and Lt. Colonel Dimka, were executed for their involvement in the military rebellion. On May 16, 1976, Lt. Colonel Dimka and six other individuals

were executed for their involvement in the military rebellion and assassination of General Murtala Mohammed. The 50-member committee appointed in October 1975 submitted a draft constitution to the SMC on September 14, 1976. The SMC formally established a 230-member Constituent Assembly on August 31, 1977, and the Constituent Assembly held its first meeting on October 6, 1977. Nine individuals were killed during demonstrations in Lagos on April 20-28, 1978. General Obasanjo ended the state-of-emergency and lifted the ban on political parties on September 21, 1978. On the same day, the Constituent Assembly submitted a draft constitution, which created a presidential system of government in Nigeria. Three political parties – the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), the Nigerian People’s Party (NPP), and the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) – were organized on September 22, 1978. Legislative elections were held on July 14, 1979, and the NPN won 168 out of 449 seats in the House of Representatives. The UPN won 111 seats in the House of Representatives. Alhaji Shehu Shagari of the NPN was elected president with 34 percent of the vote on August 11, 1979, and he was inaugurated as president on October 1, 1979. The new constitution went into effect on October 1, 1979.

Post-Crisis Phase (October 2, 1979 - December 30, 1983)

Government police and members of the Muslim fundamentalist (Yen Izala) sect headed by Malam Mohammadu Marwa clashed in Kano in northern Nigeria on December 18-31, 1980, resulting in the deaths of some 1,000 civilians and 50 government policemen. Some 5,000 individuals were killed in political violence in 1980 and 1981. Government police clashed with members of the Yen Izala sect in Maiduguri in the state of Borno and Kaduna in northeastern Nigeria on October 26-31, 1982, resulting in the deaths of some 100 government policemen and 400 civilians. The government banned the Yen Izala sect on November 18, 1982. The government expelled some 2.2 million illegal immigrants from the country between January 17 and February 28, 1983. Eight individuals were killed in political violence in Ibadan in the state of Oyo on July 8, 1983. President Shagari was re-elected for a second term with 48 percent of the vote on August 6, 1983, and he was inaugurated on October 1, 1983. The NPN won 13 out of 19 state governorships in elections on August 13, 1983. Eighty-two individuals were killed in political violence in the state of Ondo on August 18-20, 1983. Legislative elections were held on August 20-27, 1983, and the NPN won 60 out of 96 seats in the Senate and 306 out of 450 seats in the House of Representatives. The UPN won 16 seats in the Senate and 51 seats in the House of Representatives.

Crisis Phase (December 31, 1983 - May 29, 1999)

President Alhaji Shagari was deposed in a military coup led by Major General Muhammadu Buhari on December 31, 1983, and the 19-member Supreme Military Council (SMC) headed by General Buhari took control of the government on January 3, 1984. Government troops clashed with members of a Muslim fundamentalist sect headed by Musa Makaniki in Yola in the state of Gongola on February 27, 1984, resulting in the deaths of some 1,000 individuals. Government police clashed with members of the Muslim Fundamentalist sect Yen Izala headed by Yusufu Adamu in Gombe on April 26, 1985, resulting in the deaths of 150 individuals. General Buhari was deposed in a military coup led by Major General Ibrahim Babangida on August 27, 1985, resulting in the deaths of one government policeman. The 28-member Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) headed by General Babangida took control of the government on August 29, 1985. The government announced the discovery of a plot within the military to overthrow the government on December 20, 1985, and several hundred military personnel were arrested for their involvement in the plot. Thirteen military personnel were convicted and sentenced to death on February 25, 1986. Ten of the military personnel, including Major-General Mamman Vatsa, were executed in Lagos on March 5, 1986. A new constitution went into effect on May 3, 1989, and the ban on political parties was lifted. On October 7 1989, President Babangida dissolved

thirteen political parties that had applied for registration since May 1989. Government troops suppressed a military rebellion led by Major Gideon Orkar on April 22, 1990, resulting in the deaths of some 200 individuals. Forty-two military personnel were executed for their involvement in the military rebellion on July 27, 1990, and twenty-seven individuals were executed for their involvement in the military rebellion on September 13, 1990. Government police clashed with anti-government demonstrators in Lagos on May 4-13, 1992, resulting in the deaths of seven individuals. Some 300 individuals were killed in religious violence throughout the country on May 16-18, 1992. Legislative elections were held on July 4, 1992, and the Social Democratic Party (SDP) won 314 out of 593 seats in the House of Representatives. The National Republican Convention (NRC) won 275 seats in the House of Representatives. The Transitional Council (TC), a civilian government headed by Ernest Adegunle Shonekan, replaced the military government on January 4, 1993. Moshood Abiola of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) was elected president with 58 percent of the vote on June 12, 1993. President Babangida nullified the results of the presidential election on July 4, 1993, resulting in the deaths of eleven individuals during rioting in Lagos on July 5, 1993. The European Community (EC) imposed military sanctions (arms embargo) against the government on July 13, 1993. President Babangida resigned on August 26, 1993, and the Interim National Government (ING) headed by Ernest

Adegunle Shonekan formed a civilian government. General Sani Abacha deposed the civilian government and dissolved the parliament on November 17-18, 1993. The Provisional Ruling Council (PRC) headed by General Abacha took control of the government on November 24, 1993. Moshood Abiola was arrested and charged with treason on June 23, 1994. General Abacha lifted the ban on political activity on June 27, 1995. The military government convicted and executed Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other members of the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP) on November 10, 1995. The London-based non-governmental organization Amnesty International condemned the Nigerian government for the executions on November 10, 1995. The European Union (EU) condemned the Nigerian government for the executions on November 10, 1995. The CON imposed diplomatic sanctions (suspension of membership) against the government on November 11, 1995. The CON established an eight-member Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG-Nigeria) on November 11, 1995, which consisted of the foreign ministers of Britain, Canada, Ghana, Jamaica, Malaysia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, to monitor human rights and political conditions in the country. The EU imposed economic sanctions (suspension of economic assistance and travel ban) and military sanctions (arms embargo) against the Nigerian government on November 20, 1995. On December 22, 1995, the UN General Assembly approved a resolution

condemning the Nigerian government for the executions of MOSOP members. UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali sent a four-member fact-finding mission headed by Atsu Koffi Amega of Togo to investigate human rights conditions in Nigeria from March 28 to April 12, 1996. The United Democratic Front of Nigeria (UDFN) was established on April 1, 1996. The foreign ministers of the CON imposed military sanctions (arms embargo) and economic sanctions (travel embargo and freeze on foreign-held assets) against the government on April 24, 1996. The CMAG-Nigeria sent a 17-member fact-finding mission to the country on November 18-20, 1996. The government charged 15 individuals with treason on March 12, 1997. The Canadian government imposed diplomatic sanctions (suspension of diplomatic relations) against the Nigerian government on March 13, 1997. Government troops clashed with demonstrators in Ibadan on April 15, 1998, resulting in the deaths of at least three individuals. At least three individuals were killed in an explosion in Lagos on April 23, 1998. Legislative elections were held on April 25, 1998, and the United Nigeria Congress Party (UNCP) won 229 out of 282 seats in the House of Representatives. The Democratic Party of Nigeria (DPN) won 39 seats in the House of Representatives. Opposition political parties were banned from participating in the legislative elections and called for a boycott of the legislative elections. General Sani Abacha died on June 8, 1998, and was replaced by General Abdulsalami

Abubakar. Moshood Abiola died in prison on July 7, 1998. The EU lifted economic sanctions (travel ban) against the Nigerian government on November 1, 1998. Nigeria's National Electoral Commission (NEC) requested international monitoring of local, state, and national elections to be held between December 5, 1998 and February 27, 1999. Elections for local councils were held on December 5, 1998, and elections for state governors and assemblies were held on January 9, 1999. The CON sent 17 short-term observers to monitor the election process from November 30, 1998 to January 11, 1999. The Association of African Elections Authorities (AAEA) and the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES) sent 15 short-term observers headed by Kwadwo Afari-Gyan of Ghana to jointly observe the local elections from November 15 to December 8, 1998. Nineteen individuals were killed in political violence in the Niger Delta region on February 1, 1999. Legislative elections were held on February 20, 1999, and the People's Democratic Party (PDP) won 206 out of 360 seats in the House of Representatives. The All People's Party (APP) won 74 seats in the House of Representatives, and the Alliance for Democracy (AFD) won 68 seats in the House of Representatives. Olusegun Obasanjo of the PDP defeated Olu Falae of the APP by a margin of 63 percent to 37 percent to win the presidential election on February 27, 1999. The AAEA/IFES sent 28 short-term observers to jointly observed the elections from February 16 to March 2, 1999. The

OAU sent 50 short-term observers from 18 countries headed by Ali Hassan Mwinyi of Tanzania to monitor the legislative and presidential elections from February 18 to March 2, 1999. The CON sent 34 short-term observers from 23 countries headed by Ketumile Masire of Botswana to monitor the elections from February 12 to March 2, 1999. The National Democratic Institute (NDI) and The Carter Center (TCC) sent 60 short-term observers from 10 countries headed by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and Mahamane Ousmane of Niger to jointly monitor the legislative and presidential elections from February 17 to March 1, 1999. The International Republican Institute (IRI) sent 43 short-term observers headed by General Colin Powell of the U.S. to monitor the president election from February 22 to February 28, 1999. The EU sent 100 short-term observers to monitor the presidential election. The Organization Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) sent short-term observers to monitor the presidential election. General Abdulsalami Abubakar signed into law a new constitution on May 5, 1999. The CON lifted diplomatic sanctions (suspension of membership) against the Nigerian government on May 29, 1999. Olusegun Obasanjo was inaugurated as president on May 29, 1999.

Post-Crisis Phase (May 30, 1999-January 23, 2006): The EU lifted military sanctions (arms embargo) against the Nigerian government on June 1, 1999. The CON lifted military sanctions (arms embargo) and economic sanctions (travel embargo)

and freeze on foreign-held assets) against the Nigerian government on November 1, 1999. Some 100 individuals were killed in ethnic violence in Lagos on November 28, 1999. Governor Alhaji Ahmed Sani announced the introduction of Islamic law Sharia in the state of Zamfara on January 27, 2000. The state of Kaduna introduced Sharia in February 2000. Some 400 individuals were killed, and some 100,000 individuals were displaced as a result of violence in the city of Kaduna in the state of Kaduna on February 21-23, 2000. More than 50 individuals were killed in religious violence in the town of Aba in southeastern Nigeria on February 28, 2000. The ICRC provided humanitarian assistance to individuals adversely affected by the violence in the state of Kaduna beginning on February 28, 2000. President Olusegun Obasanjo met with the country's 36 state governors on February 29, 2000, and the group agreed to suspend Sharia in the states of Niger, Sokoto, and Zamfara. Government police arrested 40 supporters of an independent state of Biafra on April 19, 2000. Some 200 individuals were killed as a result of religious violence in the state of Kaduna on May 22-25, 2000. Some 25 individuals were killed in violence in Bambam in the state of Gombe on September 7-9, 2000. Bariya Ibrahim Magazu was given a sentence of 180 lashes for fornication by a Sharia court in the state of Zamfara in September 2000. Some 100 individuals were killed and some 20,000 individuals were displaced as a result of violence in Lagos in October 2000. Some 1,500 individuals were killed as a result of

violence in 2000. A reduced Sharia sentence of 100 lashes against 17-year old Bariya Ibrahim Magazu was carried out in the state of Zamfara on January 19, 2001. The government of Canada condemned the flogging on January 22, 2001. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) condemned the flogging on January 23, 2001. Government police arrested the leader of a Biafran secessionist movement, Ralph Uwazuruike, on February 8, 2001. Some 200 individuals were killed, and some 50,000 individuals were displaced as a result of violence in the state of Nassarawa on June 12-26, 2001. Some 1,000 individuals were killed in violence in the state of Bauchi in July 2001. Some 1,000 individuals were killed in religious violence in Jos in the state of Plateau on September 7-17, 2001. President Olusegun Obasanjo deployed government troops to suppress the violence in Jos on September 8, 2001. Members of the Tiv ethnic group killed 19 government soldiers in the village of Zaki-Biam in the state of Benue on October 11-12, 2001. Some 100 individuals were killed as a result of violence in Kano on October 13-14, 2001. Government troops killed some 200 civilians, and some 300,000 were displaced as a result of the violence in the state of Benue on October 22-24, 2001. Eleven individuals were killed as a result of violence in the state of Kaduna state in northern Nigeria on November 2-4, 2001. Some 20 individuals were killed as a result of violence in the village of Dagwom Turu in the state of Plateau on December 30,

2001. Some 400,000 individuals were displaced as a result of violence in 2001. Sani Yakubu Rodi was executed under Sharia in a prison in Kaduna on January 3, 2002. The U.S.-based NGO, Human Rights Watch (HRW), condemned the execution on January 8, 2002. Government police clashed with members of the Oodua People's Congress (OPC) in southwest Nigeria on January 12, 2002, resulting in the deaths of 36 individuals. Some 100 individuals were killed as a result of violence in Lagos on February 2-5, 2002. Government troops were deployed to suppress the violence in Lagos on February 5, 2002. The Nigerian government declared that certain aspects of Sharia were unconstitutional on March 22, 2002. The death sentence against Safiya Husaini for adultery was overturned by a Sharia appeals court on March 25, 2002. On April 20, 2002, the U.S. government agreed to provide \$4 million in military assistance to the government. Muslim clerics in the state of Oyo introduced Sharia on May 1, 2002, but the state government declared that it would not enforce Islamic law in the state. Some 15 individuals were killed as a result of violence in Jos in the state of Plateau on May 2, 2002. Some 100 individuals were killed as a result of violence in the town of Nembe in the state of Bayelsa on July 20-22, 2002. On August 3, 2002, President Olusegun Obasanjo announced a postponement of local elections, which were scheduled for August 10, 2002. The Nigerian House of Representatives demanded the resignation of President Olusegun Obasanjo on August 13, 2002, but the

demand was rejected on August 14, 2002. Six individuals were killed as a result of violence in the village of Kassa on October 14, 2002. Eight individuals were killed as a result of violence in Jos on October 22-23, 2002. On November 13, 2002, President Olusegun Obasanjo granted amnesty to 80 government soldiers who fought in the Biafran conflict on the side of the rebels between 1967 and 1970. Some 215 individuals were killed in violence in Kaduna and Abuja on November 20-23, 2002. Some 4,500 individuals were displaced in Kaduna. Some 25,000 Nigerians were refugees (externally displaced) in 2002. Six individuals were killed in political violence in the state of Benue on February 19, 2003. Some 64 individuals were killed in northeastern Nigeria on February 24-28, 2003. Fulani tribesmen attacked the village of Dumne on February 27, 2003, resulting in the deaths of 50 individuals. The U.S.-based NGOs, NDI and The Carter Center, sent a pre-election assessment mission to Nigeria on March 16-21, 2003. Government police clashed with supporters of the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) near the town of Owerri on March 29, 2003, resulting in the deaths of seven individuals. Legislative elections were held on April 12, 2003, and the People's Democratic Party (PDP) won 76 out of 109 seats in the House of Representatives, and the All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP) won 27 seats in the House of Representatives. President Olusegun Obasanjo was re-elected with 62 percent of the

vote on April 19, 2003. The African Union (AU) sent 21 observers headed by Abdoulaye Bathily of Senegal to monitor the presidential and legislative elections from April 3 to April 22, 2003. The EU sent seven election experts, 38 long-term observers, and 62 short-term observers headed by Max van den Berg of the Netherlands to monitor the elections from March 11 to May 20, 2003. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sent short-term observers to monitor the presidential and legislative elections. The NDI sent 50 short-term observers from 12 countries to monitor the legislative and presidential elections from April 7 to April 21, 2003. The CON sent fourteen observers and eight staff headed by Salim Ahmed Salim of Tanzania to monitor the presidential and legislative elections from April 8 to April 25, 2003. The IRI sent 55 short-term observers to monitor the legislative and presidential elections. Some 12,000 individuals fled as refugees as a result of ethnic/political violence in the Nigerian Delta region, including the town of Warri, in May 2003. Some 100 individuals were killed in ethnic violence in the town of Warri on August 15-19, 2003. Some 78 individuals were killed in religious violence in Yelwa on February 4, 2004. Some 630 individuals were killed in religious violence in Yelwa on May 2-4, 2004. President Olusegun Obasanjo declared a state-of-emergency in the state of Plateau on May 18, 2004. On May 9, 2005, government authorities charged some 80 members of the Movement for the Actualization of the

Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) with holding an illegal “secessionist rally” in southeastern Nigeria. On July 6, 2005, government authorities dropped charges against 53 Nigerian “footballers” (soccer players) who were arrested for playing in a soccer tournament organized by the banned MASSOB. Ralph Uwazuruike, leader of MASSOB, was arrested by government police on October 27, 2005. Ralph Uwazuruike, leader of MASSOB, and six supporters were charged with treason by government authorities in Abuja on November 8, 2005. Government police and ethnic-Ibo supporters of MASSOB clashed in Onitsha in southeast Nigeria on December 5-6, 2005, resulting in the deaths of at least three individuals.

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CHAPTER FOUR

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, we would describe how the study was carried out.

4.2 Research design

It is a term used to describe a number of decisions which need to be taken regarding the collection of data before they are collected. (Nwana, 2021). It provides guidelines which direct the researcher towards solving the research problem and may vary depending on the nature of the problem being studied. According to Okaja (2013) "research design means the structuring of investigation aimed at identifying variables and their relationship, it is used for the purpose of obtaining data to enable the investigator test hypothesis or answer research question by providing procedural outline for conducting research". It is therefore, an outline or scheme that serves as a useful guide to the researcher in his efforts to generate data for his study. This study adopts the survey research design. According to Babbie (2020) cited in Akarika, Ukpe and Ikon (2019:58) survey is probably the best method available to the social scientist interested in collecting original data for describing a population too large to observe directly.

4.3 Sources of Data

The data for this study were generated from two main sources; Primary sources and secondary sources. The primary sources include questionnaire, interviews and observation. The secondary sources include journals, bulletins, textbooks and the internet.

4.4 Population of the study

A study population is a group of elements or individuals as the case may be, who share similar characteristics. These similar features can include location, gender, age, sex or specific interest. The emphasis on study population is that it constitutes of individuals or elements that are homogeneous in description (Udoyen, 2019). In this study the study population constitute of all the senior lecturers from the department(s) of History and International relations and Political science department from some Universities in Edo State. These Universities includes:

Ambrose Ali University, Epoma

University of Benin, Benin City

Benson Idahosa University, Okada

4.5 Sample size determination

A study sample is simply a systematic selected part of a population that infers its result on the population. In essence, it is that part of a whole that represents the whole and its members share characteristics in like similitude (Prince Udoyen: 2019). In this study, the researcher used the [TARO YAMANE FORMULA] to determine the sample size.

4.6 Sample size technique

Yamane (1967:886) provides a simplified formula to calculate sample sizes.

ASSUMPTION:

95% confidence level

P = .5

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e)^2}$$

$$n = 300 / 1 + 300(0.05)^2$$

$$n = 300 / 1 + 300(0.0025)$$

$$n = 300 / 1 + 1.25$$

$$n = 133$$

4.7 Instrumentation

This is a tool or method used in getting data from respondents. In this study, questionnaires and interview are research instruments used. Questionnaire is the main

research instrument used for the study to gather necessary data from the sample respondents. The questionnaire is structured type and provides answers to the research questions and hypotheses therein.

This instrument is divided and limited into two sections; Section A and B. Section A deals with the personal data of the respondents while Section B contains research statement postulated in line with the research question and hypothesis in chapter one. Options or alternatives are provided for each respondent to pick or tick one of the options.

4.8 Reliability

The researcher initially used peers to check for consistence of results. The researcher also approached senior researcher sin the field. The research supervisor played a pivotal role in ensuring that consistency of the results was enhanced. The instrument was also pilot tested.

4.9 Validity

Validity here refers to the degree of measurement to which an adopted research instrument or method represents in a reasonable and logical manner the reality of the study (Udoyen, 2019). Questionnaire items were developed from the reviewed literature. The researcher designed a questionnaire with items that were clear and used

the language that was understood by all the participants. The questionnaires were given to the supervisor to check for errors and vagueness.

4.10 Method of Data Collection

The data for this study was obtained through the use of questionnaires administered to the study participants. Observation was another method through which data was also collected as well as interview. Oral questioning and clarification was made.

4.11 Method of Data Analysis

The study employed the simple percentage model in analyzing and interpreting the responses from the study participants. The hypothesis was tested with Chi-Square Statistical Tool.

4.12 Ethical considerations

The study was approved by my Project Supervisor in the Department. Informed consent was obtained from all study participants before they were enrolled in the study. Permission was sought from the relevant authorities to carry out the study. Date to visit the place of study for questionnaire distribution was put in place in advance.

CHAPTER FIVE

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

This chapter presents the analysis of data derived through the questionnaire and key informant interview administered on the respondents in the study area. The analysis and interpretation were derived from the findings of the study. The data analysis depicts the simple frequency and percentage of the respondents as well as interpretation of the information gathered. A total of twenty (100) questionnaires were administered to respondents of which all were returned. The analysis of this study is based on the number returned.

5.1 DATA PRESENTATION

Table 4.1: Demographic data of respondents

Demographic information	Frequency	percent
Gender		
Male	60	60%
Female	40	40%
Religion		
Christian	100	100%

Muslim	00	00%
Age		
4-5	00	00%
6-7	15	15%
8-9	29	29%
10 +	56	56%
Family Economic Status		
Very High	24	24%
High	32	32%
Very Low	21	21%
Low	23	23%

Source: Field Survey, 2025

ANSWERING RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Question 1: To what extent has the Nigerian non-violent revolution brought about democratic change in Nigeria??

Table 4.2: Respondents on Question 1

Options	Frequency	Percentage
Large extent	78	78
Low extent	22	00
Undecided	00	22
Total	100	100

Source: Field Survey, 2025

From the responses obtained to the extent to which the Nigerian non-violent revolution brought about democratic change in Nigeria as expressed in the table above, 78 respondents constituting 78% said that the Nigerian non-violent revolution brought about democratic change in Nigeria to large extent. While the remaining 22 respondents constituting 22% of the respondents said that the Nigerian non-violent revolution brought about democratic change in Nigeria to low extent. There was no record for undecided respondents.

Question 2: Has the democratic change enhanced the standard of living of the people of Nigeria?

Table 4.3: Respondents on Question 2

Options	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	60	60
No	19	19
Undecided	21	21
Total	100	100

Source: Field Survey, 2025

From the responses obtained as expressed in the table above, 60 respondents constituting 60% said yes. 19 respondents constituting 19% said no. While the remaining 21 respondents constituting 21% were undecided.

Question 3: How have the activities of the elites, the military against British contributed in ensuring democratic change in Nigeria?

Table 4.4: Respondents on Question 3

Options	Frequency	Percentage
High	56	56
Low	21	21
Undecided	23	23
Total	100	100

Source: Field Survey, 2025

From the responses obtained as expressed in the table above, 56 respondents constituting 56% said high. 21 respondents constituting 21% said low. While the remaining 23 respondents constituting 23% were undecided. This shows that the activities of the elites, the military against British contributed in ensuring democratic change in Nigeria.

TESTING OF HYPOTHESIS

- i. The Nigerian non-violent revolution has brought about democratic change in Nigeria
- ii. The democratic changes have fundamentally enhanced standards of living of the people of Nigeria.
- iii. The activities of elites, military and Islamic forces against contributed essentially in ensuring democratic changes in Nigeria.

HYPOTHESIS ONE

The Nigerian non-violent revolution has brought about democratic change in Nigeria

The result from research question one (i.e To what extent has the Nigerian non-violent revolution brought about democratic change in Nigeria?) was used to test this hypothesis

Contingency table

Options	Fo	Fe	Fo - Fe	(Fo - Fe) ²	(Fo - Fe) ² /Fe
Large extent	78	33.33	44.67	1,995.4089	43.688
Low extent	22	33.33	-11.33	-128.3689	-6.85
Undecided	00	33.33	-33.33	-1,110.8889	-33.33
Total	100				3.508

Source: Extract from Contingency Table

$$X^2 = \sum (fo - fe)^2/fe = 3.508$$

$$Fe = \frac{78+0+22}{3} = 33.33$$

$$\text{Degree of freedom} = (r-1) (c-1)$$

$$(3-1) (2-1)$$

$$(2) (1)$$

$$= 2$$

At 0.05 significant level and at a calculated degree of freedom, the critical table value is 5.991.

Findings

The calculated $X^2 = 3.508$ and is less than the table value of X^2 at 0.05 significant level which is 5.991.

Decision

Since the X^2 calculated value is greater than the critical table value that is 3.508 is less than 5.991, the alternate hypothesis which states that The Nigerian non-violent revolution has brought about democratic change in Nigeria is rejected and the null hypothesis which states that The Nigerian non-violent revolution has not brought about democratic change in Nigeria is accepted.

Hypothesis Two

The democratic changes have fundamentally enhanced standards of living of the people of Nigeria

Options	Fo	Fe	Fo - Fe	(Fo - Fe) ²	(Fo - Fe) ² /Fe
Yes	60	33.33	32.67	1,067.328 9	32.023
No	19	33.33	-14.33	-205.3489	-6.161
Undecided	21	33.33	-12.33	-152.0289	-4.561
Total	100				21.3

Source: Extract from Contingency Table 2025

$$X^2 = \sum (f_o - f_e)^2 / f_e = 21.3$$

$$f_e = \frac{60+19+21}{3} = 33.33$$

$$\text{Degree of freedom} = (r-1)(c-1)$$

$$(3-1)(2-1)$$

$$(2)(1)$$

$$= 2$$

At 0.05 significant level and at a calculated degree of freedom, the critical table value is 5.991.

Findings

The calculated $X^2 = 21.3$ and is greater than the table value of X^2 at 0.05 significant level which is 5.991.

Decision

Since the X^2 calculated value is greater than the critical table value that is 21.3 is greater than 5.991, the alternate hypothesis which states that The democratic changes have fundamentally enhanced standards of living of the people of Egypt is accepted and the null hypothesis which states that The democratic changes have not fundamentally enhanced standards of living of the people of Nigeria is rejected.

Hypothesis Three

The activities of elites, military and Islamic forces against British contributed essentially in ensuring democratic changes in Nigeria

Options	Fo	Fe	Fo - Fe	(Fo - Fe) ²	(Fo - Fe) ² /Fe
High	56	33.33	22.67	513.9289	18.23
Low	21	33.33	-12.33	-152.0289	-4.561
Undecided	23	33.33	-10.33	-106.7089	-3.201
Total	100				11.63

Source: Extract from Contingency Table 2025

$$X^2 = \sum (fo - fe)^2 / fe = 11.63$$

$$Fe = \frac{56+21+23}{3} = 33.33$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Degree of freedom} &= (r-1)(c-1) \\ &= (3-1)(2-1) \\ &= (2)(1) \\ &= 2 \end{aligned}$$

At 0.05 significant level and at a calculated degree of freedom, the critical table value is 5.991.

Findings

The calculated $X^2 = 11.63$ and is greater than the table value of X^2 at 0.05 significant level which is 5.991.

Decision

Since the X^2 calculated value is greater than the critical table value that is 11.63 is greater than 5.991, the alternate hypothesis which states that The activities of elites, military and Islamic forces against British contributed essentially in ensuring democratic changes in Nigeria is accepted and the null hypothesis which states that The activities of elites, military and Islamic forces against The British does not contribute essentially in ensuring democratic changes in Nigeria is rejected.

CHAPTER SIX

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The study on the Non -Violent Revolution as a Means Of Democratic Change In Africa, was carried out empirically and the following findings were made after testing the hypotheses using chi-square

From the first hypothesis the calculated $X^2 = 3.508$ and is less than the table value of X^2 at 0.05 significant level which is 5.991. Since the X^2 calculated value is greater than the critical table value that is 3.508 is less than 5.991, the alternate hypothesis which states that The Nigerian non-violent revolution has brought about democratic change in Nigeria was then rejected and the null hypothesis which states that The Nigeria non-violent revolution has not brought about democratic change in Nigeria accepted.

From the second hypothesis the calculated $X^2 = 21.3$ and is greater than the table value of X^2 at 0.05 significant level which is 5.991. Since the X^2 calculated value is greater than the critical table value that is 21.3 is greater than 5.991, the alternate hypothesis which states that The democratic changes have fundamentally enhanced standards of living of the people of Nigeria is accepted and the null hypothesis which states that

The democratic changes have not fundamentally enhanced standards of living of the people of Nigeria is rejected.

Lastly from the third hypothesis the calculated $X^2 = 11.63$ and is greater than the table value of X^2 at 0.05 significant level which is 5.991. Since the X^2 calculated value is greater than the critical table value that is 11.63 is greater than 5.991, the alternate hypothesis which states that The activities of elites, military and Islamic forces against the British rule contributed essentially in ensuring democratic changes in Nigeria is accepted and the null hypothesis which states that The activities of elites, military and Islamic forces against the does not contribute essentially in ensuring democratic changes in Nigeria is rejected.

6.2 CONCLUSIONS

The study has outlined the factors found to non-violent revolution as a means of democratic change in Africa. What is interesting is if these factors play a vital role in the long term. Is the role of education, for example, only important for the installation of a democratic system, or is it also crucial for the consolidation of democracy? In conclusion, it would be of great significance for further research to investigate what effect these seven factors play over a long time of period for democracy in the region of North Africa.

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QUESTIONNAIRE

Instruction: please endeavor to complete then question by taking the correct answer(s) from the option or supply the information required where necessary.

PART A: SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

Name of School:.....

Name of Department:.....

1: Respondents by their age distribution

Age	(Please tick)
20 – 29	
30 – 39	
40 – 49	
50 – above	

2: Educational Qualification

Educational qualification	(Please tick)
Diploma	
University/higher education	
Master	

How long have you been working here?

Duration on years	(Please tick)
Under 5years.	
6 - 10 years.	
11 - 15 years	
16 - more.	

Department / unit of the Respondents

Variable	(Please tick)
History	
International Relations	
Political Science	

SECTION B

Question 1: To what extent has the Nigeria non-violent revolution brought about democratic change in Nigeria??

Options	Please tick)
Large extent	
Low extent	
Undecided	

Question 2: Has the democratic change enhanced the standard of living of the people of Nigeria

Options	Please tick
Yes	
No	
Undecided	

Question 3: How have the activities of the elites, the military and Islamic forces, against British contributed in ensuring democratic change in Nigeria?

Options	Please tick
High	
Low	
Undecided	

Thank you for your time