

**MARGINALIZATION AND INSECURITY IN SOUTHEAST, NIGERIA:
A CASE STUDY OF ORLU LOCAL GOVERNMENT AREA, IMO STATE**

BY

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DEDICATION

This project is dedicated to God Almighty for His guidance and protection throughout the course of this study. It is also dedicated to my family for their unwavering support, encouragement, and belief in my academic journey.

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ABSTRACT

Insecurity in Nigeria presents a complicated challenge that has defied several management efforts by the government. The issues of terrorism, banditry, kidnapping, ritualism, trafficking, and the like have continued to appear at the front burner of national discourse. Yet, little progress has been made to address these issues. However, one area that has not attracted sufficient attention is marginalization, which studies have established as the nexus between marginalization or its variant, exclusion, and insecurity. This study examined the relationship between marginalization and insecurity in Southeast Nigeria, using Orlu Local Government Area as a case study. Orlu was chosen due to its notoriety as one of the centres in the Southeast where insecurity is pervasive. The study utilized a structured questionnaire to elicit responses from a randomly selected 100 respondents from Orlu Local Government Area. The entire study was anchored on the frustration-aggression hypothesis that argues that when a person or group is frustrated, the result can be aggression. The study found that the Igbos are marginalized, being excluded from holding key political positions in Nigeria, disallowed from partaking in the decision-making process in Nigeria, and overlooked by the Nigerian government in many issues challenging the region; restricted from accessing basic infrastructure in Nigeria, empowerment initiatives in Nigeria, and approved loans in Nigeria; and restricted from effectively relating with other ethnic groups, as well as discriminated against due to their ethnic background. Furthermore, the study found that the name 'Igbo', which carries identity and stereotype, the experience of the civil war, envy for the entrepreneurial skills of Igbos, and the industry of Igbos, were the causes of marginalization of the region. The study recommends that the government need to convene a regional meeting to address specific challenges faced by the region; intensify actions towards separating genuine agitators against marginalization and opportunists; and compensate the victims of the Civil War as promised post-war.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

Nigeria is faced with numerous security crises that threaten the corporate existence of the country. Terrorism, insurgency, banditry, kidnapping for ritual and ransom purposes, cultism, human and drug trafficking and piracy are some of the crises staring Nigeria in the face. These security crises pervade all the geopolitical zones of the country, albeit each zone experiences varying degrees of the crises. The Nigerian state has employed known strategies to address these crises, but with limited success. For instance, in the Niger Delta region, where militancy is the only language understood by most of the youths in the region, the Nigerian government granted amnesty to them with the belief that it would help assuage the militants and return normalcy to oil operations in the region. The same strategy has been applied, albeit not popularly, to some notorious warlords in the Northeast and Northwest, to address persistent attacks on the residents and the Nigerian troops. Beyond soft measures, kinetic measures have also been deployed. The militarization of regions with the most incidents of insecurity has been apparent with little result. Moreover, the criticisms that have continued to trail the deployment of a militaristic strategy amid allegations and evidence of extra-judicial killings, rape, disappearances and other human rights abuses by the security agents, have de-popularized the strategy as anti-human ((Ebonine, 2022).

The implication is a continued onslaught by non-state actors who have seized the opportunity of the apparent lack of state capacity to unleash mayhem on Nigerians. According to the National Bureau of Statistics [NBS] (2024) (quoted by Daily Trust, 2024), no fewer than 614,937 people were killed nationwide between May 2023 and April 2024. The banditry-ravaged Northwest got

the highest share with 206,030, followed by the terror-ravaged Northeast with 188,992, while the least was in the Southwest with 15,693. In terms of kidnapping, the report also claimed that over 2 million Nigerians were kidnapped within the same period, and a total of N2,231,772,563,507 (\$1,438,040,707.01) was paid as ransom, with 1.7 million being rural dwellers, compared to 567,850 urban dwellers. Beyond human casualties, the human security implications have also extended to displacements, food insecurity and inflation. According to the Foundation for Investigative Journalism (2025), 31.8 million Nigerians faced food insecurity in 2024, the highest in Africa and among the largest globally. Over 5.4 million children under five were affected, including 1.8 million with severe acute malnutrition. The report also claimed that Nigeria's displaced population rose to 3.4 million, with around 100,000 refugees. While these figures are mind-blowing, the insecurity in the Southeast, though not always in the national discourse, merits investigation.

Southeast Nigeria, once a relatively calm region due to its expertise in commerce, has turned violent against both its people and foreigners. The activities of the Unknown Gunmen (UG) and other non-state actors, operating under the guise of secession, have unleashed sleepless nights and raised jitters down the spines of the region's inhabitants. The Monday sit-at-home order, which runs contrary to the wishes of many residents in the region and has been condemned from every quarter of the country, is enforced by non-state actors, paralyzing economic activities and obstructing the free movement of persons (Nwagbo & Ofoke, 2025). A recent Crime Experience and Security Perception Survey (CESPS) by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) (2024) reported that the crime incidents in the region stood at 6.2 million in 2024 (quoted by Salau, 2025).

Attempts at describing the cause of the insecurity have been raging, yielding mixed findings. However, at the base of the insecurity lies a question of marginalization.

This study examines the marginalization-insecurity nexus in Southeast Nigeria. It makes a case that marginalization is at the root of the cause of insecurity in Southeast Nigeria. Insecurity and marginalization are closely related because insecurity can be exacerbated by marginalization, which entails being shut out of opportunities, resources, and power, as well as by economic hardship, political exclusion, and resource shortages (Gor, 2023). Increased frustration, social unrest, and conflict may result from this, since marginalized groups may turn to crime or violence in an attempt to obtain resources or attention (Budd and Donadio, 2014). Insecurity, on the other hand, can worsen marginalization by fostering an atmosphere that makes some groups more susceptible or further excluded, thereby creating a vicious cycle.

1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The level of insecurity in Southeast Nigeria merits deep scrutiny, because it people have been known for their doggedness, resilience, entrepreneurship, industry and intelligence. In fact, they have often been described as ‘Japan of Africa.’ As with these positive images, they are also badly constructed based on their revolt against the Federal Government that led to the first-ever Nigerian Civil War between 1967 and 1970. The loss of that war has been equated as a loss of a country, while the people continue to bear the brunt of the secession attempt. The recent level of post-war insecurity in the region has attracted attention of scholars, with mixed results.

Studies have attributed the cause of insecurity in the Southeast region to many factors, such as the reality of unrealized Biafran nation (Daly, 2023), self-determination struggle, ethnic nationalism (Ejiofor, 2025; Onuoha, 2011), Nigeria’s identity crisis (Okeke, 2016), elites’ sabotage (Chukwuma, Ojukwu and Samuel, 2018), the rise of non-state actors like the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), Unknown Gunmen and the Eastern Security Network ((Nwagbo & Ofoke, 2025; Ebonine and Akinyetun, 2021), the proliferation of small arms (Adeforiti and Abang, 2024),

militarization of the region (Adeforiti and Abang, 2024; Nwangwu, 2023; Ebonine and Akinyetun, 2022)), state failure, state incapacity and neglect (Okojie and Onuoha, 2024). While these factors explain parts of the broader dynamics of the insecurity, few studies have focused on marginalization, which appears to be the remote cause of the other causes identified by the scholars above. It is this gap that the study intends to fill.

1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

1. In what ways, if any, have the people of the Southeast region of Nigeria (Igbos) in Orlu Local Government Area been marginalized?
2. What, if any, is the cause of marginalization of Igbos in Orlu Local Government Area?
3. Is marginalization the result of insecurity in Orlu Local Government Area?
4. What recommendations can be offered to address the marginalization and, by extension, the insecurity in the southeast region of Nigeria?

1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

1. To understand the ways the people of the Southeast region of Nigeria (Igbos) in Orlu Local Government Area have been marginalized
2. To examine the cause of marginalization of Igbos in Orlu Local Government Area
3. To understand whether marginalization is the result of insecurity in Orlu Local Government Area
4. To make recommendations that address the marginalization and, by extension, the insecurity in the southeast region of Nigeria

1.5 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

This study will benefit policymakers by providing a policy blueprint that can help address the lingering security crisis in the Southeast region of Nigeria. Addressing marginalization through robust implementation of the recommendations of the study would help in assuring the people of the region that they are part of the Nigerian project.

Lastly, the study will expand the frontiers of knowledge on insecurity in the Southeast region. As earlier stated, previous studies in the subject matter have focused on the outcomes of marginalization without focusing on marginalization as the root cause. This obscures a holistic understanding of the subject matter, prompting biased conclusions and the deployment of wrong strategies.

1.6 SCOPE OF STUDY

This study focuses on marginalization and insecurity in Southeast Nigeria. It is delimited to Orlu Local Government Area (LGA) in Imo State, where the level of insecurity is the most severe.

1.7 DEFINITION OF TERMS

Insecurity: In the context of this study, insecurity refers to a state of vulnerability and instability brought on by a group's isolation from the majority of society, which reduces access to opportunities and resources and increases the likelihood of unfavorable outcomes. This can manifest as social insecurity (being excluded from decision-making, being isolated), economic insecurity (not having enough money or resources), or even physical insecurity (having a higher chance of getting hurt or having bad health).

Marginalization: Marginalization or social exclusion is when particular groups of individuals are excluded from certain facets of society. This denial of access to opportunities and institutions can be caused by a variety of circumstances, such as a lack of money and historical bias. Marginalized people do not always fit into one specific group: Ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, age, socioeconomic status, and handicap status are all factors that contribute to marginalization. Marginalized populations frequently face barriers to accessing quality healthcare, education, and jobs that would enhance their quality of life.

Southeast, Nigeria: The South East is one of Nigeria's six geopolitical zones, which represents the interior southeast of the country as a whole as well as a geographical area. The states that make up this region are Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, and Imo. The region is bordered on the west by the Niger River, on the east by the Cross River, on the north by the flat North Central, and on the south by the riverine Niger Delta. The Guinean Forest–savanna mosaic in the drier north and the Cross–Niger transition forests ecoregions in the south make up its boundaries. In terms of culture, Igboland, the native country of the Igbo people, who comprise the largest ethnic group in the Southeast, occupies the great majority of the zone.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.2 CONCEPTUAL LITERATURE

2.2.1 The Concept of Marginalization

The concept of marginalization is complex and elusive. Communities and classes can be excluded from the prevailing social order, and entire societies can be marginalized on a worldwide scale. In a similar vein, local communities may marginalize families, ethnic groups, or individuals. Marginalization is a dynamic phenomenon that is somewhat correlated with social standing (Mowat, 2015). For instance, people or groups may have a high social standing at one point, but as society changes, they lose their status and start to be excluded. In a similar vein, people's marginalized status may alter as life phases do.

Let's take a moment to reflect on the role that numerous civic organizations played in South Africa throughout the apartheid era. These groups played significant roles in the struggle against apartheid despite being marginalized. Their status altered after apartheid. Prominent members of resistance groups, as well as some of the groups themselves, were absorbed into the government. At the local level, however, those young men who had gained prominence as "freedom fighters" virtually overnight were shunned since the new South Africa's rhetoric did not support their use of violence to combat violence (see Noyoo, 2000). These are instances of how social and political transformation are accompanied by changes in marginalization. Communities or segments of communities where social and economic shifts push people into marginality provide a different kind of illustration.

Although it is frequently mentioned in contemporary literature, the term "marginalization" is rarely defined (Messiou, 2012). In fact, social exclusion and marginalization seem to be synonymous, and when it is articulated, it is typically in relation to the ideas of inclusion and (social) exclusion. Armstrong et al. (2011) and Hansen (2012) contend that exclusion and inclusion are two interconnected and interdependent processes, but they also contend that it is simple to think of exclusion as the antithesis of inclusion (or vice versa). According to Messiou (2012), marginalization has several conceptualizations and is not a single idea. She offers four distinct perspectives on marginalization as shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Messiou's Conceptualizations of Marginalization

Experience of marginalisation	Recognition of marginalisation
Experienced by the individual	The individual and others
Experienced by the individual	Not recognised by others
The individual is construed by others as belonging to a marginalised population	Not recognised by the individual
Experienced by the individual	Denied by the individual

Source: Messiou (2012)

Messiou's work is noteworthy because it acknowledges the subjective nature of the construct by distinguishing the experience of marginalization (as seen by the individual or others) and the recognition of it (by the individual and/or others). But it also poses the crucial question, "If a person does not perceive their life as marginalized (which suggests that they do not live it in this manner), by what authority can they be regarded as such by others?" This question is especially relevant to public policy.

The likelihood of marginalization rises or falls with different life phases. For instance, children and young people may become less marginalized as they age, adults may become more marginalized as they age, single mothers' marginalized status may shift as their children mature,

and so on. However, within specific social groups at risk of marginalization, there are various hazards. For instance, Eldering and Knorth (1998) show that the risks of immigrant juvenile marginalization in Europe differ by ethnicity, independent of the specific host nation or level of acculturation. In a similar vein, Taywaditep (2001) and Wenzel, Keogel, and Gelberg (2000) highlight the distinct risks that homeless women experience in comparison to homeless men. explains how homosexual guys are marginalized in several ways.

There are several ways in which one may experience marginality. Some people's lived experiences are significantly influenced by their marginalization, which is usually lifelong for those who are born into particularly marginal groups (such as members of discriminatory ethnic groups like the Roma in Europe, Indigenous people in Australasia and the American continent, or African Caribbean people in Britain). Others gain marginality as a result of social and economic system shifts or subsequent disability. Millions of people lost their jobs when the Soviet Union fell apart. The historic industrial base of Manchester, our own city, was shut down by neoliberal economic policies, which resulted in unemployment and a variety of patterns of precarious and irregular work for many. A growing number of communities lose their lands, means of subsistence, or networks of social support as global capitalism spreads and absorbs more people (Chomsky, 2000; Petras and Veltmeyer, 2001; Potter, 2000; Pilger, 2002). Indeed, we contend that while capitalism continues its current globalizing phase, it inevitably leads to a growing degree of marginalization globally, especially since collective safeguards like government welfare programs, labour unions, and indigenous cultures are under attack.

Fundamentally rooted in marginalization is exclusion from complete and satisfying social lives on an individual, interpersonal, and societal level. Marginalized individuals may experience stigma and are frequently the target of unfavourable public perceptions; they also have very little control

over their lives and the resources at their disposal. They might have few chances to contribute to society, and they might grow to have low self-esteem and confidence. For instance, individuals can have few opportunities to socialize and risk isolation if they are unemployed and living with service assistance. They are unable to engage in local life because they lack supportive and positive interactions, which creates a vicious cycle that further isolates them. They may have comparatively limited access to important social resources like employment, housing, income, leisure activities, and health and education services due to societal laws and practices. Notwithstanding the causes and mechanisms of marginalization, whether or not they can be traced back to societal opinions (such as those regarding disability, sexual orientation, ethnicity, and so forth), the effects of marginalization in terms of social exclusion are comparable. or societal circumstances (such as job closures, a lack of reasonably priced housing, etc.).

Having stated that, people's responses to marginalization would vary based on their social and personal resources. However, a few typical social psychology processes can be recognized. We focus especially on mechanisms that either support or impede group social action (see Burton & Kagan, 1996).

2.2.2 Forms of Marginalization

There are various forms of marginalization. They include social, economic and political marginalization.

2.2.2.1 Social Marginalization

In social marginalization, people on the margins of society are mainly denied access to social chances. People who belong to ethnic groups face discrimination, or else they are born into marginal groups, such as lower castes in India. It is usually a lifetime of marginality. They do not have the cultural and social capital necessary to engage in normal growth processes. They are

fragile and have weak social networks. Resources, including cultural, educational, economic, and other support networks, are denied to them. This restricts their involvement in the process of growth and causes social isolation.

Scholars have recently attacked the term "social marginalization" for being used indiscriminately, pointing out that it frequently describes underprivileged groups in an ambiguous manner, which exacerbates stigmatization and exclusion (Munari et al., 2021). According to Causadias and Umaña-Taylor (2018), scholars share this worry and contend that the phrase urgently needs to be clarified to avoid the existing implication that people from socially marginalized groups are fundamentally flawed or inferior. This could have an impact on both research and policymaking. Numerous significant organizations, including the World Bank, the United Nations, and the World Health Organization, issue press releases and reports on marginalization and suggest ways to counteract it (Holzmann et al., 2020; United Nations, 2009; World Bank, 2013; World Health Organization, 2024). However, the lack of a widely recognized definition makes it difficult for these groups to identify who is marginalized and how, as the UN (2009) noted. According to a popular online dictionary, the verb "to marginalize," which means "to relegate to an unimportant or powerless position," was among the top 1% of the most searched terms in 2021 (Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, 2021). In the scholarly literature, the words "social marginalization" and "socially marginalized groups" continue to gain a lot of traction (Baah et al., 2019; Hall and Carlson, 2016; Vasas, 2005). Furthermore, substantial public investment still focuses on initiatives to lessen socioeconomic marginalization despite this ambiguity (Breidahl and Clement, 2010).

Ironically, the widespread scholarly interest in social marginalization may have unintentionally masked its definition, making it more difficult to comprehend who is impacted as well as how and where (Kerr and Jackson, 2016). The field is more often confused than clarified by the wide range

of research viewpoints and operationalizations of social marginalization. In particular, attempts to define marginalization without doing so risk weakening the idea, which could result in unclear findings, operationalization issues, and incomparable outcomes (Vasas, 2005).

Social marginalization was closely associated with people adjusting to cultural shifts, particularly immigrants and refugees, who were thought to face psychological difficulties. After being first associated with foreigners, the idea of social marginalization progressively spread to include other "other" groups, such as Black people, working women, and Native Americans. The definition of socially marginalized groups has changed over time to encompass a wide range of sociodemographic categories, distinguished by differences in gender, age, class, race, disability status, sexual orientation, socioeconomic status, and more, as noted by Arrington-Sanders et al. (2020) and Glover et al. (2020).

This tradition's definitions emphasized how social norms play a part in marginalization processes (Burton, 2019; Glover et al., 2020; Zelano, 2019). Definitions specifically highlighted the significance of being recognized as the "other" by deviating from conventional ways of speaking, thinking, and acting (Burton, 2019: 6). According to the same school of thought, Zelano (2019: 376) proposed that marginalization be defined as "transgressing" socially acceptable norms. Furthermore, definitions of social marginalization were believed to be context dependent because social norms vary across time and space. To demonstrate this, Glover et al. (2020) proposed that as social norms surrounding sexual desire expanded, lesbian, gay, and bisexual people were less ostracized.

Furthermore, it was claimed that organizations like the welfare state, the police, the legal and educational systems, and others played a significant part in creating and maintaining these standards, so solidifying the designation of particular groups as the "other." One term for this idea

is "structural marginalization" (Arrington-Sanders et al., 2020: 7). Importantly, being the "other" meant not just being different but also being inferior, less significant, silent, unseen, and unwelcome (Arrington-Sanders et al., 2020; Buchta and Štulrajter, 2008; Ecks and Sax, 2005; Juliano, 2016; Knoke, 1972; Lockyer, 2010).

An alternative group of writers defined marginalization differently from how migration researchers did, mainly in terms of geography (Andrews-Speed and Ma, 2008; Ecks and Sax, 2005; Lombard, 2015; Buchta and Štulrajter, 2008; Birnholtz et al., 2020). For instance, "geography and marginality have long been intertwined, with unequal access to resources such as prime land or urban cores often a precursor to social, economic, or geographic marginality," according to Birnholtz et al. (2020: 2). According to this theory, the term "margin" (margo), which originally meant a border or edge, is where marginalization originated. Scholars in this field frequently define marginalized groups using phrases like "on the edge of society," "in the periphery," or "in the margins" (Anttonen, 2008; Bjerger et al., 2020; Buchta and Štulrajter, 2008; Gidron and Hall, 2020).

Crucially, this method maintained that margins could only be described in relation to a center and saw marginalization as a social construct. Marginalization is "a thoroughly relational term because people and places are defined as 'marginal' only in relation to a 'center,'" according to Ecks and Sax (2005: 200). Relatedly, several scholars have emphasized social marginalization as a process, including Hall and colleagues (1999; 1994; 2016). "A process by which persons or groups are socio-politically peripheralized from dominant, central experiences, that is, deprived of mobility, control over self will, and/or critical resources, undignified and humiliated, exposed to toxic environments, and/or exploited physically or mentally," is how Hall and Carlson (2016: 202) defined marginalization.

Marginalization is seen as a notion that emphasizes the dynamic and fluid division between mainstream society and the periphery, much as the migration definition-theme (Glover et al., 2020). Regarding how far out of the centre marginalized people are thought to be, academics disagree with one another. While some positioned them at or even beyond the frontiers of society (Alexander et al., 2003; Anttonen, 2008), others positioned them in the transitional region between complete inclusion and exclusion (Breidahl and Clement, 2010). In summary, the spatial approach views social marginalization as a socially constructed dynamic that shifts between a symbolic center and the periphery, where being on the margins frequently means having less access to resources.

2.2.2.2 Political Marginalization

When a group is politically marginalized, they are deprived of their democratic right to vote and all other social, political, and economic advantages. Lack of political empowerment impacts a wide range of individuals in every culture, including women, members of ethnic minorities, immigrants, people with disabilities, and the elderly (Master Class, 2022). Political marginalization, at its most basic level, refers to the process by which particular persons or groups are driven to the periphery of political influence and power. This classification suggests a decrease in or lack of active involvement in the choices that influence their communities and way of life (Chakma, 2025). Imagine living in a community where some people's opinions are routinely ignored, their issues go unresolved, and their needs are not taken into consideration when policies are being made and carried out. Political marginalization in action is depicted in this scenario.

Being in the minority is only one aspect of political marginalization; another is a systematic lack of authority. This distinction sets it apart from straightforward disagreement or divergent political views in a robust democracy. It has to do with policies and procedures that deliberately deny some

groups the ability to exercise and access political agency. These systems may be overt, like laws that discriminate, or covert, like institutionalized biases (Sustainability Directory, 2025a). Recognizing the impact of political marginalization is also necessary to comprehend its description at this novice level. It results in judgments and policies that fail to sufficiently take into account the needs and viewpoints of excluded groups.

In an intermediate sense, political marginalization means comprehending its structural structure. It involves deeply embedded patterns and behaviours inside institutions and societal norms rather than just individual instances of discrimination (Sustainability Directory, 2025a). To provide this explanation, it is necessary to look at the historical settings and power structures that have shaped the current situation. For example, the effects of colonialism, slavery, and patriarchal systems still have a lasting impact on modern political marginalization.

According to academic definitions, political marginalization is a multifaceted process that includes the systematic exclusion of particular groups from fair access to and influence within the official and informal institutions of political authority (Sustainability Directory, 2025a). By requiring a careful examination of the intricate interactions between historical, social, economic, and cultural factors that create and sustain marginalization, this concept goes beyond crude ideas of exclusion. This phenomenon is positioned as a primary concern within political science, sociology, and related fields by the academic meaning, which explores its theoretical foundations, empirical manifestations, and normative consequences. Thorough theoretical and methodological frameworks are necessary for the scholarly analysis of political marginalization. In an effort to comprehend the causal chains, feedback loops, and structural factors that contribute to marginalization, it goes beyond descriptive narratives to interact with explanatory and predictive models. To fully comprehend this statement's complex character, it is necessary to draw on a

variety of theoretical stances, such as feminist political theory, intersectionality, postcolonial studies, and critical theory. At this level, it is important to examine the processes that create and sustain marginality rather than just identifying marginalized groups.

2.2.2.3 Economic Marginalization

The term "economic marginalization" describes differences in acquiring wealth or employment. Racial minorities, for instance, are marginalized in many types of employment because of negative perceptions about the kinds of people who make effective managers or employees (Philip, 2010). The fundamental definition of economic marginalization is that it is a situation in which people, organizations, or communities are forced to the outskirts of economic activity and are unable to actively contribute to the creation and allocation of resources and wealth. It is a practice of purposeful exclusion, frequently systematic, that restricts access to possibilities necessary for financial well-being, setting it apart from ordinary poverty. The basic description entails a lack of economic action and potential, in addition to poverty. This first assertion makes it clear that economic marginalization is a dynamic process rather than only a fixed result. It includes institutional, social, physical, or technological obstacles that keep some groups from participating in markets, getting credit, finding respectable work, or taking advantage of public goods and services. Simply put, it is being left behind or purposefully excluded from the economic engine.

The notion of economic marginalization becomes much more complex as one moves toward an intermediate understanding. Persistent disadvantage is caused by a complex interaction of socioeconomic factors rather than just exclusion. This ambiguous remark acknowledges the cyclical character of marginalization, in which early disadvantages exacerbate over time, frequently spanning generations. It entails examining the processes by which economic systems maintain this exclusion. This level of interpretation entails analyzing how market dynamics,

economic structures, and regulations can purposefully or unintentionally produce and sustain inequities (Sustainability Directory, 2025b). It necessitates analyzing the systems and seeing beyond the person. The importance is in realizing that treatments need to address these systemic problems rather than merely treat their symptoms. Investigating the feedback loops that maintain marginalized people on the periphery is necessary to fully grasp the significance.

According to the intermediate explanation, the idea of economic marginalization encompasses varying degrees of vulnerability to economic shocks, including recessions or natural catastrophes. People with fewer resources and less robust safety nets are disproportionately affected by these occurrences, which further isolates them from the centre of the economy. Their current marginalized status directly contributes to their susceptibility. A greater comprehension of the interdependence of economic, social, and environmental issues is made possible by approaching this subject at an intermediate level. It prepares the ground for investigating more intricate solutions that call for innovative policymaking and cross-sectoral cooperation. The conclusion is obvious: isolated interventions are not enough.

At the scholarly and professional level, economic marginalization is defined as a multifaceted, intricate process of systemic disempowerment and dispossession that goes beyond mere exclusion. It is frequently based on historical injustices and is sustained by current power dynamics. Instead of seeing economic disadvantage as merely a passive state of being left behind, this perspective focuses on how markets, institutions, and social norms actively produce it. It makes a vital point about the underlying injustices present in the dominant economic theories. A thorough examination of the causal chains and feedback loops that lead to and maintain marginalization is necessary for the scholarly explanation. It necessitates a thorough comprehension of how globalization, technical advancement, capital accumulation, and environmental deterioration

interact to continuously disadvantage certain populations and alter economic landscapes. The main focus of this approach is identifying the processes of opportunity hoarding and value extraction that create and strengthen the economic periphery while consolidating economic dominance.

According to experts, economic marginalization is frequently the result of economic systems' design or neglect rather than an accident. To comprehend how power disparities are converted into economic results, this specification entails analyzing critical theories of political economics, dependency theory, and critical race theory. To expose their disparate effects, it is necessary to dissect ostensibly neutral market systems. The importance of intersectionality is an important part of academic understanding. Discrimination based on race, gender, ethnicity, disability, geography, or other social characteristics frequently exacerbates economic marginalization rather than causing it to happen alone. This implies layered disadvantage, where several oppressions combine to produce distinct and frequently severe types of economic exclusion. The way that identity influences economic vulnerability and resilience is highlighted by research by academics such as Crenshaw (1989) and later work in critical geography and feminist economics (e.g., Pulido, 2000; Seguino, 2007).

For instance, past land dispossession, continued resource extraction on their lands without fair benefit sharing, and limited access to mainstream banking and educational institutions are some of the reasons why Indigenous communities around the world frequently experience economic marginalization. Their political and historical background is closely intertwined with their economic standing, a crucial perspective that is not adequately represented by solely economic models. Sustainability is the ability of human society to live in harmony with the biosphere of the planet. is important since these communities frequently care for important ecosystems, and

successful conservation and climate action depend on their economic security (United Nations, 2023).

2.3. The Concept of Insecurity

The idea of insecurity has multiple interpretations and is semantically complicated (Sonia and Valeria, 2018). According to Achumba, Igbemereho, and Akpo (2013), insecurity is the opposite of security. Insecurity is defined as not feeling secure or being exposed to danger, hazard, uncertainty, lack of confidence, doubt, inadequate protection or guarding, instability, trouble, lack of protection, and unsafe (Jafaru, Alhaji, & Musa, 2024), whereas security is defined as being free from all threats, attacks, fears, and anxiety (Abdulazeez & Magaji, 2023). Various academics have used each of these to define the term "insecurity." Therefore, a state of susceptibility to damage and loss of life, property, or livelihood is referred to as insecurity.

Science disciplines like psychology, social psychology, and psychiatry handle security and insecurity in different ways, and they provide the first discussions and ideas around the necessity of developing these ideas. For instance, one of the academics who published about inferiority complexes was Erich Fromm (2000). He highlighted security as a necessity to prevent loneliness and to feel like you belong. Alfred Adler examined security as a fundamental need in 1964 and 1971. Humans attempt to select objectives that will secure a niche, avoid inferiority complexes, boost self-esteem, and provide security.

One of the earliest attempts to introduce these ideas into the social sciences was the critical examination of security and insecurity by Cameron and McCormick (1954), who concluded that there was a deficiency in theory development, consistent definitions, and necessary empirical testing of the hypotheses. According to Cameron and McCormick, earlier studies on security and

instability were ambiguous and prone to tendencies. They recommended empirical inquiry and the formation of concepts.

The next study of these ideas didn't come out for nearly twenty years. Kaufmann (1970), who produced an extensive book about security as a sociological and social-political dilemma, provided one of the most insightful insights. His study had the intriguing quality of presenting security as both a system or a notion at the social level, as well as a subjective experience or the connection between subjective feelings and objective circumstances. Kaufmann claimed that the fundamental security issue was the shattered link between internal experiences and external circumstances. The need for order and continuity, the desire for inner, mental balance, and attempts to defend and protect oneself from threats are all manifestations of the need for security (Kaufmann, 1970, 24-27). Kaufmann's idea of security encompassed both orientation to the outside world and personal security of the "self."

Personal security is directly related to society, to reciprocal, personal interactions, and to persons we don't know, according to Berki (1986). Although the social paradox of security implies that people are at risk in their interactions, in its most severe manifestation, people may also perceive one another as adversaries and dangers. Security concerns also raise ethical concerns about the structure of society and the way security is governed by laws and regulations. Political decisions are therefore necessary to ensure security and reduce social insecurity. For instance, in the fields of child protection and crime prevention, these demands may lead to a significant amount of law.

Many different aspects of insecurity have been generated by theories around the subject. One intriguing query relates to this phenomenon's dynamics. How can people and their relationships in society be affected by insecurity? A thorough and comprehensive examination of security, its establishment, and upkeep in society was given by Berki (1986). In its most profound form, he

asserted, the need for security constituted an existential impulse. Therefore, by pursuing security in an apparent (and deliberate) attempt to preserve and extend our lives, we are actually courting insecurity, if not actively pursuing it, according to Berki (1986, 39).

These ideas of security and insecurity serve as crucial markers for characterizing how an individual feels about their group and the wider world. They have implications on how an individual views society and a changing world. Although it is difficult to describe, experiences of security or insecurity can be linked to several problems. McDonald (2002) asserts that security is not only ontological but can also vary significantly based on the actor and the particular political and cultural setting. Pauli Niemelä's theoretical model of security and this are similar. Numerous methods acknowledge both the individual level of security and its links to social, cultural, and international concerns. It can be difficult to understand how remote problems affect individual feelings of insecurity.

But according to Zygmunt (1999), referenced in Andrea (2018), insecurity has three primary dimensions: Cognitive uncertainty, which is associated with the increasing loss of predictability and intelligibility of modern societies; existential insecurity, which is associated with the expanding social and geographic mobility and the continuous changes in the labor market due to the obsolescence of professional roles and specialized skills, as well as the deterioration of social relations that affect all of us; and insecurity associated with personal safety and property. According to this definition, the idea of perceived insecurity is highly diverse and encompasses a wide variety of factors, such as social integration, personal well-being, trust in public institutions, and justice, in addition to actual crime rates (Andrea, 2018). According to Chris (2021), insecurity is the feeling of worry or anxiety brought on by a real or perceived lack of safety. Physical insecurity, the most obvious type of insecurity, is reflected in this description. It contributes to a

variety of other types of insecurity, including political, social, economic, and environmental instability. According to the definitions given above, insecurity is a state or sensation that jeopardizes a person's social survival and has an impact on the development of human capital.

2.4. Insecurity in Nigeria

Nigerian insecurity has a very complicated nature. Considered by many to be the largest country in Africa, Nigeria has seen unprecedented levels of insecurity brought on by Fulani ethnic group herdsmen, Boko Haram militant groups, armed robbery attacks, kidnapping, political unrest, religious disasters, assassinations, Niger Delta fighters destroying petroleum resources, kidnapping, trafficking, and other issues (Ndubuisi-Okolo and Anigbuogu, 2019). Automobile damage, the demolition of law enforcement and educational buildings, healthcare facilities, stores, military barracks, civilian homes, religious centers, and foreigners' abduction are among the other violent crimes committed by the Islamic organization (Ndubuisi-Okolo and Anigbuogu, 2019). Additionally, there is a lack of suitable food supply as a result of Fulani Herdsmen's invasions of farmlands and attacks on farmers.

According to Udoh, Prince, Udo and Kelvin-Iioafu (2019), the "Resource Curse," which explains how natural resources tend to result in poor outcomes, civil unrest, or war, and a socioeconomic state in which a country receives a sufficient amount of money from the export of its mineral assets but suffers an economic loss when directing the revenues towards the development of its people, is the best way to characterize insecurity in Nigeria. Nigeria has a wealth of natural resources and people, but its human capital development is deteriorating. According to Wojuade and Alayande (2021), unemployment and ethnic and religious conflicts are two of the factors contributing to Nigeria's instability.

According to the empirical research of several academics (Awojobi,2014; Etim, Duke and Ogbinyi, 2017; Oduwole, 2015; Okolie, Onyema and Basey, 2019), poverty and inequality breed animosity, conflict, and insecurity. More than just drones and guns are needed to combat insecurity; good education, effective government, and the creation of jobs for the many young people who are restless and furious because their employment prospects appear dire are also necessary (Akinsowon, 2021). Social dislocations, resident displacement, and disturbances of familial and social relationships are only a few of the ways that security concerns impact Nigeria's socioeconomic development (Wojuade and Alayande (2021).

Okolie et al. (2019) examined the connection between Nigerian economic distress and insecurity. The descriptive method was applied, and non-probabilistic sampling techniques were used to collect data from a survey of 600 participants. The results of the data examination showed a strong and positive correlation between poverty and insecurity in Nigeria. Zubairu (2020) examined the root causes and solutions for Nigeria's growing insecurity. According to the findings, the main causes of insecurity in Nigeria were the following: nepotism, cultural and theological divisions, elite profiteering, threats of unemployment and poverty, insufficient security, unsafe borders, discrimination and unfairness throughout the country, and poor management and administration.

Nigerians are undoubtedly in a state of great despair as a result of the country's growing insecurity, with most economic activities ceasing. Peace is the most crucial component of human existence, and its absence implies that social, political, and economic advancements will be impossible (Charas, 2015). Every nation in the world works to preserve and strengthen its core principles so that its citizens can live in safety and security according to their common ideals while preserving their sense of national pride, identity, and independence (Zubairu, 2020).

Insecurity still poses a threat to Nigeria's governance and economic growth. Joblessness, religious differences, ethnic disputes, and other socioeconomic and governmental problems are all contributing to Nigerian unhappiness and escalating criminal activity and instability (Udoh, 2015). Given the leadership's lack of action or response, it is thought that the Nigerian government is having a terrible time protecting its citizens (Shavah, 2022). The threat keeps growing unchecked despite the enormous continuous investment in internal stability at the federal and state levels. Citizens spend a significant amount of money protecting their families and assets in their many privileges, workplaces, and homes (Shavah, 2022). Since the terrorist group Boko Haram, which incites insecurity, only operates in a few northern districts where farming remains the main economic activity, rendering these areas less vulnerable to instability, the Nigerian experience seems to be unique (Nkwatoh and Hiikyaa, 2018).

According to (Ozoigbo, 2019), among many other factors, the fundamental causes of insecurity include a lack of education, unemployment, poor leadership, the vulnerability of our borders, the increased accessibility of firearms, and a disregard for legal standards. There have been reports of underdevelopment, poverty, hunger, rebellion, militant activity, restlessness among young people, kidnapping, violent burglaries, panic, drug abuse, governmental invasion, and violent takeovers of power, among other detrimental effects of insecurity (Ozoigbo, 2019). Nigeria saw 448 terrorist killings in 2021, the fewest since 2011, and approximately half as many deaths linked to terrorism as the previous year (Global Terrorism Index, 2022). However, between 2020 and 2021, the number of terrorist attacks increased by 49%. Of these, 36% were attributed to Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA), 8% to Boko Haram, and 44% to no organization (Global Terrorism Index, 2022). The gang known as "unknown gunmen," who use guns to murder defenceless individuals and damage government property, has been responsible for the most recent and upsetting terrorist

attacks. Attacks by these anonymous shooters are frequent and indicative of a weak state where discrimination, instability, and insecurity are prevalent and the government's grasp on power is threatened (Akinyetun, Ebonine and Ambrose, 2023).

Empirical data support the notion that insecurity hinders economic growth (Bilgel and Karahasan, 2016; Blomberg, Hess and Weerapana, 2004; Davis, Esther and Ifeanyi, 2022; Dauda, 2014; Fatima, Latif, Chughtai, Nazik and Aslam, 2014; Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2009; Sandler and Enders, 2004; Shabir, Naeem, and Ihtsham, 2015). Empirical research on the factors that contribute to insecurity in developing regions is still scarce and understudied, despite the detrimental effects of terrorist activities on economic growth in emerging nations. More startling is the paucity of empirical research on the close and long-term connections between terrorism, the social conditions that render developing nations vulnerable to terrorist attacks, and inadequate governance. Global Terrorism Index (2022) states that Nigeria is the sixth most infected country globally and the third most afflicted in Sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore, the current study examines social elements and governance issues that fuel insurgency and other forms of instability in Nigeria in an effort to fill the perceived void.

2.5 Insecurity in Southeast Nigeria

The South-East region, which was once one of Nigeria's more tranquil areas, is seeing an increase in insecurity due to frequent attacks by unidentified gunmen and herders. The ongoing conflicts between herders and their host communities were the main cause of the instability in the South-East area right after President Buhari's administration took office in 2015. Conflicts between farmers and herders have continued in the southeast since 2016, when the well-known case of herdsmen killings was initially documented in Nimbo Community in the Uzo-Uwani Local Government Area of Enugu state. As a result, the herdsmen have killed multiple innocent farmers.

According to Okibe (2022), there is a significant loss of life and property as a result of the ongoing conflicts between farmers and herdsmen. As a result, they have weakened the region's economic productivity, endangered its security, and exacerbated the food crisis in the impacted populations (Statista, 2022). It appears that farmers have been displaced as a result of herdsmen's ongoing attacks and killings of rural farmers, while their agricultural products, including yams, rice, and cassava, have been destroyed. Many farmers have stopped producing because they are afraid of being attacked by the herders. This has significantly decreased agricultural output and led to a scarcity of farm produce in both rural and urban markets. The skyrocketing costs of necessities in certain regions serve as proof of this (Ortom, 2022). Many overseas investors typically use these vital agricultural products as a raw material, and their unavailability would cause many international firms to fail.

The southeast region has been terrible in recent years because of the rise in IPOB's operations, a group that advocates for the region's independence, and the actions of criminals who pose as unidentified gunmen. To carry out their illegal actions, they take advantage of the IPOB-promoted sit-at-home. The peace, security, and economic growth of the country have all been seriously threatened by this. In other words, the actions of unidentified shooters have hindered the region's potential for economic progress (Okeoma, 2021). The unidentified gunmen have attacked both security personnel and civilians in several public locations, including markets, schools, churches, police stations, military checkpoints, and barracks. Conflicts between security forces and IPOB supporters, extrajudicial executions, kidnappings, and banditry are the main causes of wanton killings in the area. These include the ongoing murders by "unknown gunmen,"

The region has seen a rise in insecurity and civil unrest since August 2021, when the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) instituted a weekly Monday sit-at-home in the South-East to protest the ongoing detention of its leader, Nnamdi Kanu, by Nigeria Security Operatives. This has hurt the socioeconomic development of the region. The situation in the southeast is distinct from that of other parts of the nation, which continue their regular weekly economic and commercial activity without any disruption. Markets, schools, banks, and workplaces are closed every Monday, which is ostensibly the first workday of the week, as a result of the sit-at-home trend. Additionally, several highways are frequently empty as locals watch the exercise out of concern that they may be attacked; according to a Punch News report from July 13, 2023, some businesses have been targeted by unidentified gunmen who are said to be implementing the sit-at-home directive. This, according to Azeez (2022), has grounded social, economic, and human activity in the area. According to ICIR (2023), the trade and commerce sector has been particularly hard-impacted, with investors leaving the region due to the worsening insecurity and revenues totaling trillions of naira lost since the sit-at-home exercise started.

In response to this terrible circumstance, the governments of the South-East states of Abia, Anambra, Ebonyi, Enugu, and Imo have worked together to combat insecurity by forming a civilian security group called Ebubeagu. This group has largely been operational in Ebonyi state, although many citizens have accused corrupt government officials of using the group to repress their perceived opponents or opposition (Ugwu, 2022). Additionally, the government used harsh militarization, security crackdowns, and mass arrests of teenagers and supporters in response to separatist agitation. One of these well-known military operations is Operation Python Dance 1&2, which took place from November 26, 2016, to December 27, 2017 (Daily Trust, 2021).

Insecurity has persisted despite the government's security measures. In an attempt to stop the ongoing attacks by the Unknown Gunmen and herdsmen in the area, the government's security effort appears to be ineffective due to opposition from the Eastern Security Network (ESN), which is thought to be an IPOB security group. The bandits, posing as unidentified gunmen, frequently targeted security personnel at their stations or checkpoints as the herders persisted in attacking farmers in the rural agricultural and woodland area; the personnel were killed, and their vehicles and duty posts were set on fire. In the first five months of 2021, there were attacks on around ten police stations in the South-East, resulting in the deaths of numerous police officers (Esho, 2022). Additionally, the gunmen have targeted official buildings like courts, jails, and the offices of the Independent National Electoral Commission. The unidentified gunmen's jailbreak in early April 2021 at the correctional facility in Owerri, Imo state, freed 1,844 prisoners, which increased insecurity and allowed more offenders to reenter society (Premium Times, 2021). Having more firearms in their hands has made attackers more daring and has led them to engage in other illegal acts like kidnapping for ransom, which is essentially banditry. Although the South-East region's insecurity occurrences have claimed thousands of lives and destroyed livelihoods, companies are also severely impacted. The economic development of the southeast region as a whole has been so impacted.

2.6 The Connection between Marginalization and Insecurity

It is thought that the marginalization of those with significant economic stakes and recurring security risks is directly related. In general, there is a causative (promotional) relationship between marginalization and insecurity. The promotion of the causative variables that lead to insecurity within an organization is the focus of the causal nexus. The noteworthy consequence of this is that the prevalence of insecurity is frequently directly impacted by the efficacy of public administration

malpractices, especially marginalization in hiring and selecting procedures and sharing of the national cake. Without hesitation, the circumstances that address the structural imbalances in the political and economic spheres must be established to prevent this.

Marginalization leads to organizational issues such as low productivity and subpar service delivery to the nation and possibly the entire planet. According to Igbokwe-Ibeto, Chukwuemeka, and Okechukwu (2014), the reason is that "...it is basically the active participation of people with the know-how in the human capital development process and the consequent need to have higher institutions that permit and indeed encourage that participation can guarantee the availability of quality human capital that could meet the need of the global labor market." It is sufficient to state that the federal concept was neglected and marginalized, as evidenced by federal appointments made since 2015, in an effort to stoke the flames of marginalization. The quality of services provided by people who embezzled the commonwealth—quack workers from other regions of Nigeria who were dishonestly given preference and appointed to positions in this nation's civil and public services—has decreased as a result. However, because they help determine the political will of the state, the political elites, particularly the nonruling elites, have a comparative advantage in handling the issues brought on by bad practices in public administration. Therefore, since they are still a part of the game, the leadership has no strategic issues with comprehending and adjusting to the trend, especially in their manufacturing procedures and service delivery.

A well-designed mechanism within a bureaucratic institution allows all of its constituent pieces to operate effectively, without interruption, and toward well-defined objectives (Weber, 1947). According to relativism, we can see that Nigeria's constituent parts are inefficient, let alone distraction-free. Therefore, in a marginalized economy, marginalization is a major deterrent to effective resource usage. However, the current state of insecurity is a symptom of a long-standing

and systemically ingrained problem of development that fosters the creation of poverty, unemployment, and inequality in the nation. Frustration, alienation, and eventually social unrest that breeds violence and insecurity follow from them (Katsina, 2012:107). Therefore, we concur that "if an organization is adequate to the demand on it, it is technically efficient." Arhuidese cites Spreight (2003:4). Unfortunately, such an organization does not exist in Nigeria. This is because, according to Izueke (2017), "good governance emphasizes efficient and effective government to enhance speedy development of a nation and its citizens." In Nigeria, however, this is the exact opposite. Regarding good governance, Onwe, Salifu, and Onwe (2020:43 44) asserted that its goal is to establish a fair society founded on the values of equality, liberty, inclusivity, and collaboration.

2.7 Theoretical Framework: Frustration-Aggression Theory

In 1939, John Dollard, Neal Miller, Leonard Doob, Orval Mowrer, and Robert Sears proposed the frustration–aggression hypothesis, also called the frustration–aggression–displacement theory. Neal Miller and Leonard Berkowitz expanded on this theory of aggression in 1941 and 1989, respectively (Berkowitz, 1989). A person's attempts to achieve a goal are obstructed or frustrated, according to the notion, which leads to aggression (Friedman and Schustack, 2014). According to the original idea, aggression is always the inevitable result of frustration, and frustration always precedes aggression (Dollard, et al., 1939). However, Miller (1941) and Sears (1941) revised the theory two years later to imply that although frustration makes one want to react, aggressiveness is one potential result. Thus, the reformulated hypothesis said that while frustration may or may not lead to aggressive conduct, frustration itself is the cause of any aggressive action, making frustration a required condition for aggression rather than a sufficient one (Zillmann, 1979).

The theory aims to explain why people choose to blame others (Whitley and Kite, 2009). Attempts are made to explain the origins of violence. In contrast to aggression, which Dollard and colleagues define as "an act whose goal-response is injury to an organism (or an organism surrogate)," frustration is the "condition which exists when a goal-response suffers interference." According to the theory, violence is a result of frustration, but when the source of the frustration is not addressed, the aggression is directed at an innocent person. For instance, a man can take his aggravation and rage out on his family at home if he is humiliated and treated disrespectfully at work and is unable to react because he fears losing his job. This theory is often used to explain revolutions and riots, which are seen to be brought on by the poorer and more marginalized segments of society, who may utilize violence as a way to vent their pent-up resentment and rage.

Numerous empirical studies were able to validate the idea as is (Buss, 1963; Kregarman and Worchel, 1961), despite some researchers criticizing it and suggesting moderating elements between aggression and frustration (Pastore, 1952; Cohen, 1955). The concept was further developed by Berkowitz in 1989, who proposed that personal attributions and negative affect are important factors in determining whether frustration leads to aggressive action (Berkowitz, 1989).

This framework clarifies the underlying causes of insecurity in South-East Nigeria. For example, low economic opportunities, poor infrastructure, and perceived government neglect have heightened feelings of resentment, leading to protests, attacks, and demands for secession. High levels of unemployment, political exclusion, and socioeconomic marginalization have fostered widespread frustration, fueling aggressive responses, which have fueled the rise of groups like the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) and the surge in violence in the region. Dollard et al. argued that frustration always leads to aggression, while Berkowitz stressed that aggression is more likely when people perceive it as unjust.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter explains the steps taken to gather and analyse data. Research methodology is the methodical, scientific technique for conducting research, examining issues, and compiling data and information for a certain goal. Therefore, This chapter explains certain concepts relating to the study's methodology such as research design, population of study, sample size and sampling technique, instrumentation, validity of instrument, reliability of instrument, method of data collection and technique of data analysis.

3.2 Area of Study

In Imo State, South East Nigeria, Orlu is the second-biggest city, home to 420,600 people (Onuoha and Omeje, 2024). The Organization of African Unity (OAU) and aid organizations used it as their headquarters during the Nigeria-Biafra Civil War. The British Cheshire Home has its Nigerian headquarters in the city. It is Imo State's second most developed city, behind Owerri. The unofficial "commercial capital" of Imo state, Orlu, is a hub for business and industry. The IMO West Senatorial Zone is composed of twelve local government areas, from which many prosperous Nigerian merchants and manufacturers come. Oguta, Ohaji/Egbema, Orlu, Orsu, Isu, Njaba, Nwangele, Nkwerre, Ideato North, Ideato South, Oru East, Oru West, and Njaba are among them. The towns in the local government area are located in the host communities of Amaifeke, Ihioma/Ebenese, Umuna, Umuowa, Umutanze, Okporo, Orlu-Gedegwum, Amike, and Owerre-Ebeiri. The estimated population of Orlu is close to 3,000,000 when all of the LGAs in the zone are taken into account (Nwachukwu and Osita-Njoku, 2024).

Numerous state and federal organizations, such as the Imo State University Teaching Hospital, the state-owned cardboard industry in Owerri-Ebeiri, the recently constructed Imo State School of Nursing and Health Technology at Okporo, and numerous small and medium-sized chemical and pharmaceutical companies, have made Orlu their permanent home (Nelson, 2024). Because of the large number of Orulites working in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries, Orlu is home to the multifunctional Imo International Market, which is one of the three most significant pharmaceutical markets in West Africa. Thus, on the entire African continent, the Orlu Zonal Area has the largest concentration of local pharmaceutical producers and distributors. The Ogboisi Timber Centre is situated in the city centre and the rapidly growing Orlu Urban District. The Technological Skills Acquisition Center (TESAC) and the Nigeria Immigration Training School (NITS) are both located at Umuowa in Orlu City (Onwubuariri, Ikeme, Ugochukwu, Agoha, Ugwu, Osaki and Mgbeojedo, 2024).

3.3 Research design

The study adopted a survey research design. By this, it utilized a designed questionnaire. The design was considered appropriate for this study as the researcher set out to determine the relationships that existed between variables. In this context, surveys are defined as a method to gather information from a sample of individuals (Ponto, 2015), with systematic sampling serving as the foundation for source selection and interviews serving as the information source (Zimba & Gasparyan, 2023). They serve as tools for determining how societal traits are distributed. Survey items and questions are regarded as markers for a hidden construct (such as opinions or attitudes) or dimensions. Personal information is not of interest to survey researchers. Rather, it is more curious about data about larger organizations, even societies. We refer to these target groupings as

populations. Inferences about the population under study are drawn from the data obtained from interviewing people.

3.3 Population of the Study

A population is the whole group you wish to make inferences about. A population in a study doesn't always relate to human beings (Hu, 2014). This study was conducted in the Orlu Local Government Area of Imo State. The local government area was purposively selected because it is the hotspot for insecurity in the Southeast region. It therefore provided a target population for which the study applied. The population of Orlu Local Government is 420,600 people (Onuoha and Omeje, 2024).

3.4 Sample Size and Sampling Technique

The particular group that you will gather data from is called a sample (Thacker, 2020). The sample size is always smaller than the population's total size (Thacker, 2020). A sample size of four hundred (400) respondents that comprised youths between the ages of 18 and 34 was randomly selected. The choice of the sample was drawn from Taro Yamane's formula for sample size determination, as defined:

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + (N \times e^2)}$$

Where; n= Sample size; N = Population, 1= Constant value and e =Margin of error given as (0.05).

Hence, given that the population (N) = (420,600), e = 0.05

$$n = \frac{420,600}{1 + (420,600 \times 0.05^2)} = 399.65 = \text{aprox. } 400.$$

3.5 Instrumentation

The main instrument for data collection in this research was the structured questionnaire. Structured questionnaire is one tool used to gather information from respondents (Cheung, 2014). This kind of questionnaire consists of standardized closed questions with predetermined answers that respondents must select from (Cheung, 2021). The questions were posed in a predetermined order and had a predetermined phrasing. Part A of the questionnaires sought to know the bio-data of the respondents. Part B contained questions bordering on marginalization and insecurity in Southeast, Nigeria, with a case of Orlu Local Government Area of Imo State.

The closed-ended questions were designed to elicit direct responses from the respondents as well as for ease of analysis. It involved Likert format of Strongly Agree (SA), Agree (A), Disagree (D), Strongly Disagree (SD) and Undecided (U).

3.6 Validity of the Instrument

Validity is the degree to which an instrument measures what it was designed to measure (Sullivan, 2011). Consequently, if an instrument measures what it was intended to measure, it is deemed "valid" (Cook & Beckman, 2006). Quantitative data collection is linked to validity, which must be established using a variety of statistical concepts and methodologies (Sullivan, 2011). In determining the validity of the instruments used in this study, the copies of the instruments were face validated by the researcher's supervisor. The corrections made were effected before the proper administrations of the questionnaires were made.

3.7 Reliability of the Instrument

In terms of assessment tools, reliability is the consistency of the results obtained from them when administered to the same people in the same environment (Sullivan, 2011). For the most part,

consistency or dependability refers to outcomes. Evaluation of validity includes reliability as well. To determine the reliability of the instrument, it was trial tested on 20 Igbo Political Science students who were conversant with the subject matter. The Cronbach Alpha method was adopted to measure the internal consistency coefficient of the questionnaire.

3.8 Method of Data Collection

Data for this study were generated from two sources: primary and secondary sources. The primary source consists of the major source of data that was obtained through the administration of a structured questionnaire in line with the statement of the objectives. The secondary source involved the use of archival materials such as journals/articles, publications, conferences, newspapers and internet materials.

3.9 Techniques of Data Analysis

The data generated was analyzed using simple percentages, mean and standard deviation for the analysis of the respondents' bio-data. Also, charts and graphs were used to represent the data generated in the field. The data were coded and analyzed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS version 25.0).

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents data gathered from the field. Items in Section A of the questionnaire that entail the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents are presented in simple percentages, mean and standard deviation where necessary. Items in Section B of the questionnaire that capture the marginalization and insecurity in Orlu Local Government Area of Imo State are presented in simple percentages, mean and standard deviation where appropriate.

4.2 SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RESPONDENTS

Sex Distribution of Respondents

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1.00	60	60.0	60.6	60.6
	2.00	39	39.0	39.4	100.0
	Total	99	99.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.0		
Total		100	100.0		

Source: Field Study (2025)




Figure 1: Sex Distribution of Respondents **Source:** Field Study (2025)

From table 1 and Figure 1 above, the results of the survey according to sex distribution of the respondents presented show that out of the 100 respondents surveyed, 60 representing 60% of respondents are males (coded as 1) while 39 representing 39% of the respondents are females (coded as 2). Also, 1 respondent representing 1 percent did not disclose his/her sex status. Thus, more males participated in the study than the females.

Marital Status of the Respondents

Table 2: *Orlu LGA*

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1.00	28	28.0	28.3	28.3
	2.00	63	63.0	63.6	91.9
	3.00	8	8.0	8.1	100.0
	Total	99	99.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.0		
Total		100	100.0		

Source: Field Study (2025)




Figure 2: Marital Distribution of Respondents. **Source:** Field Study (2025)

From table 2 and Figure 2 above, the results of the survey according to the marital status of the respondents presented show that out of the 100 respondents surveyed, 28 representing 28% of respondents are single (coded as 1), 63 representing 63% of the respondents are married (coded as 2) while 8 representing 8% of the respondents are widowed (coded as 3). Also, 1 respondent representing 1 percent did not disclose his/her marital status. Thus, respondents who are married participated the most in the survey.

Age Distribution of Respondents

Table 3: Orlu LGA

Mean	Std. Error of Mean	Std. Deviation	Range	Min.	Max.
35.4444	0.85585	8.51556	49.00	16.00	65.00

Source: Field Study (2025)

From table 3 and Figure 3, the average mean age of the respondents is 35 years while the standard deviation is 9. This implies that the age cluster of the respondents is within mid-30s with moderate

deviation. The difference between the maximum age (65) and minimum age (16) (range) is 49 years. The minimum age is 16 years and the maximum is 65 years.

Occupational Distribution of Respondents

Table 4: Orlu LGA

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1.00	23	23.0	23.2	23.2
	2.00	12	12.0	12.1	35.4
	3.00	53	53.0	53.5	88.9
	4.00	3	3.0	3.0	91.9
	6.00	8	8.0	8.1	100.0
	Total	99	99.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.0		
	Total	100	100.0		

Source: Field Study (2025)




Figure 3: Occupational Distribution of Respondents. Source: Field Study (2025)

From table 4 and Figure 3 above, the results of the survey according to the occupational background of the respondents presented show that out of the 100 respondents surveyed, 23 representing 23% of respondents are farmers (coded as 1), 12 representing 12% of the respondents are civil servants (coded as 2), 53 representing 53% of respondents are traders (coded as 3), 3 representing 3% of respondents are students (coded as 4) while 8 representing 8% of respondents are have other occupation (coded as 6). Also, 1 respondent representing 1 percent did not disclose his/her occupational status. Thus, respondents who are traders participated the most in the survey.

Religious Background of the Respondents

Table 5: Orlu LGA

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	1.00	68	68.0	68.7	68.7
	2.00	24	24.0	24.2	92.9
	3.00	7	7.0	7.1	100.0
	Total	99	99.0	100.0	
Missing	System	1	1.0		
Total		100	100.0		

Source: Field Study (2025)




Figure 4: Religion Distribution of Respondents. **Source:** Field Study (2025)

From table 5 and Figure 4 above, the results of the survey according to the religious background of the respondents presented show that out of the 100 respondents surveyed, 68 representing 68% of respondents are Christians (coded as 1), 24 representing 24% of the respondents are Muslims (coded as 2) while 7 representing 7% of the respondents practise traditional religion (coded as 3). Also, 1 respondent representing 1 percent did not disclose his/her religious status. Thus, respondents who are Christians participated the most in the survey.

Table 6: Academic Qualification of Respondents

Level of Education	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
SSCE/GCE	37	37	37	37
Graduate	29	29	29	66
Undergraduate	24	24	24	90
None	9	9	9	99
Missing	1	1	1	100.0
Total	100	100	100	

Source: Field Study (2025)




Figure 5: Educational Distribution of Respondents. **Source:** Field Study (2025)

From table 6 and Figure 5 above, the results of the survey according to the educational level of the respondents presented show that in Orlu LGA, out of the 100 respondents surveyed, 37 representing 37% of respondents have SSCE/GCE certificates, 29 representing 29% of the respondents are graduates, 24 representing 24% of respondents are undergraduates, while 9 representing 9% of respondents have no education. Also, 1 respondent representing 1 percent did not disclose his/her educational status. Thus, respondents who have primary education participated the most in the survey.

4.3 ANALYSIS OF THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS

This section analyses the respondents' responses according to the research questions. The questions are answered according to the relevant items as contained in the questionnaire.

4.3.1 Q1: In what ways, if any, have the people of the Southeast region of Nigeria (Igbos) in Orlu Local Government Area been marginalized?

Nos	Cluster A: The ways the people of the Southeast region of Nigeria (Igbos) in Orlu Local Government Area have been marginalized	SA	A	U	D	SD
	Political Marginalization					
1	Igbos in Orlu Local Government Area have been excluded from holding political positions in Nigeria	45 45%	32 32%	-	8 8%	15 15%
2	Igbos in Orlu Local government are not allowed to partake in decision making of Nigeria	24 24%	52 52%	-	14 14%	10 10%
3	Igbos in Orlu Local government have been overlooked by the Nigerian government regarding many issues challenging the region	55 55%	27 27%	-	11 11%	7 7%
	Economic Marginalization					
4	Igbos in Orlu Local government have been restricted from access to basic infrastructure in Nigeria	14 14%	65 65%	-	3 3%	18 18%
5	Igbos in Orlu Local government have been restricted from access to empowerment initiatives in Nigeria	42 42%	35 35%	-	11 11%	12 12%
6	Igbos in Orlu Local government have been restricted from access to loans in Nigeria	41 41%	30 30%	2 2%	12 12%	15 15%
	Social Marginalization					
7	Igbos in Orlu Local government have been restricted from effectively relating with other ethnic groups in Nigeria	25 25%	52 52%	7 7%	6 6%	10 10%
8	Igbos in Orlu Local government are discriminated against due to their ethnic background	20 20%	57 57%	4 4%	8 8%	11 11%

Source: Field Study (2025)

From table 4.3.1 above, the respondents' distribution based on the political ways the people of the Southeast region of Nigeria (Igbos) in Orlu Local Government Area have been marginalized shows that a majority of 45 and 32 respondents constituting 45% and 32% respectively strongly agreed and agreed respectively that the Igbos in Orlu Local Government Area have been excluded from holding political positions in Nigeria., while 8 and 15 respondents, constituting 8% and 15% respectively, disagreed and strongly disagreed, respectively, Thus, a majority of 77 respondents representing 77% agreed that Igbos in Orlu Local Government Area have been excluded from holding political positions in Nigeria , while 23 respondents representing 23% disagreed.

Furthermore, a majority of 24 and 52 respondents, constituting 24% and 52% respectively, strongly agreed and agreed respectively that the Igbos in Orlu Local government are not allowed to partake in decision making of Nigeria, while 14 and 10 respondents, constituting 14% and 10% respectively, disagreed and strongly disagreed. Thus, a majority of 76 respondents representing 76% agreed that the Igbos in Orlu Local government are not allowed to partake in decision making of Nigeria, while 24 respondents representing 24% disagreed.

Again, a majority of 55 and 27 respondents, constituting 55% and 27% respectively, strongly agreed and agreed respectively that the Igbos in Orlu Local government have been overlooked by the Nigerian government regarding many issues challenging the region, while 27 and 20 respondents, constituting 11% and 7% respectively, disagreed and strongly disagreed respectively. Thus, a majority of 82 respondents representing 82% agreed that the Igbos in Orlu Local government have been overlooked by the Nigerian government regarding many issues challenging the region, while 18 respondents representing 18% disagreed.

The respondents' distribution based on the economic ways the people of the Southeast region of Nigeria (Igbos) in Orlu Local Government Area have been marginalized shows a majority of 14

and 65 respondents constituting 14% and 65% respectively strongly agreed and agreed respectively that the Igbos in Orlu Local government have been restricted from access to basic infrastructure in Nigeria., while 3 and 18 respondents, constituting 8% and 15% respectively, disagreed and strongly disagreed, respectively, Thus, a majority of 79 respondents representing 79% agreed that the Igbos in Orlu Local government have been restricted from access to basic infrastructure in Nigeria, while 21 respondents representing 21% disagreed.

Furthermore, a majority of 42 and 35 respondents, constituting 42% and 35% respectively, strongly agreed and agreed respectively that the Igbos in Orlu Local government have been restricted from access to empowerment initiatives in Nigeria, while 11 and 12 respondents, constituting 11% and 12% respectively, disagreed and strongly disagreed. Thus, a majority of 77 respondents representing 77% agreed that the Igbos in Orlu Local government have been restricted from access to empowerment initiatives in Nigeria, while 23 respondents representing 23% disagreed.

Again, a majority of 41 and 30 respondents, constituting 41% and 30% respectively, strongly agreed and agreed respectively that the Igbos in Orlu Local government have been restricted from access to loans in Nigeria, 12 and 15 respondents, constituting 12% and 15% respectively, disagreed and strongly disagreed respectively, while 2 respondents representing 2% were undecided. Thus, a majority of 71 respondents representing 71% agreed that the Igbos in Orlu Local government have been restricted from access to loans in Nigeria, while 27 respondents representing 27% disagreed.

The respondents' distribution based on the social ways the people of the Southeast region of Nigeria (Igbos) in Orlu Local Government Area have been marginalized shows a majority of 25 and 52 respondents constituting 25% and 52% respectively strongly agreed and agreed respectively that the Igbos in Orlu Local government have been restricted from effectively relating

with other ethnic groups in Nigeria, 6 and 10 respondents, constituting 6% and 10% respectively, disagreed and strongly disagreed, respectively, while 7 respondents representing 7% were undecided. Thus, a majority of 79 respondents representing 79% agreed that Igbos in Orlu Local government have been restricted from effectively relating with other ethnic groups in Nigeria, while 16 respondents representing 16% disagreed.

Again, a majority of 20 and 57 respondents, constituting 20% and 57% respectively, strongly agreed and agreed respectively that the Igbos in Orlu Local government are discriminated against due to their ethnic background, 8 and 11 respondents, constituting 8% and 11% respectively, disagreed and strongly disagreed respectively, while 4 respondents representing 4% were undecided. Thus, a majority of 77 respondents representing 77% agreed that the Igbos in Orlu Local government are discriminated against due to their ethnic background, while 19 respondents representing 19% disagreed.

4.3.2 Q2: What, if any, is the cause of marginalization of Igbos in Orlu Local Government Area?

	Cluster B: The Cause of Marginalization of Igbos in Orlu Local Government Area	SA	A	U	SD	D
9	The name 'Igbo' is responsible for the marginalization of Igbos in Orlu Local Government Area	14 14%	65 65%	-	3 3%	18 18%
10	The civil war is the reason for the marginalization of Igbos in Orlu Local Government Area	42 42%	35 35%	-	11 11%	12 12%
11	The envy for the entrepreneurial skills of Igbos is responsible for the marginalization of Igbos in Orlu Local Government Area	41 41%	30 30%	-	12 12%	15 15%
12	The industry of Igbos is responsible for the marginalization of Igbos in Orlu Local Government Area	14 14%	65 65%	-	3 3%	18 18%

Source: Field Survey (2025)

From table 4.3.2 above, the respondents' distribution based on the cause of marginalization of Igbos in Orlu Local Government Area shows that a majority of 14 and 65 respondents constituting 14% and 65% respectively strongly agreed and agreed respectively that name 'Igbo' is responsible for the marginalization of Igbos in Orlu Local Government Area., while 3 and 18 respondents, constituting 3% and 18% respectively, disagreed and strongly disagreed, respectively, Thus, a majority of 79 respondents representing 79% agreed that name 'Igbo' is responsible for the marginalization of Igbos in Orlu Local Government Area, while 21 respondents representing 21% disagreed.

Furthermore, a majority of 42 and 35 respondents, constituting 42% and 35% respectively, strongly agreed and agreed respectively that the civil war is the reason for the marginalization of Igbos in Orlu Local Government Area, while 11 and 12 respondents, constituting 11% and 12%

respectively, disagreed and strongly disagreed. Thus, a majority of 77 respondents representing 77% agreed that the civil war is the reason for the marginalization of Igbos in Orlu Local Government Area, while 23 respondents representing 23% disagreed.

Again, a majority of 41 and 30 respondents, constituting 41% and 30% respectively, strongly agreed and agreed respectively that the envy for the entrepreneurial skills of Igbos is responsible for the marginalization of Igbos in Orlu Local Government Area, while 12 and 15 respondents, constituting 12% and 15% respectively, disagreed and strongly disagreed respectively. Thus, a majority of 71 respondents representing 71% agreed that envy for the entrepreneurial skills of Igbos is responsible for the marginalization of Igbos in Orlu Local Government Area, while 17 respondents representing 17% disagreed.

Furthermore, a majority of 14 and 65 respondents, constituting 14% and 65%, respectively, strongly agreed and agreed that the Igbos' industry is responsible for the marginalisation of Igbos in Orlu Local Government Area, while 3 and 18 respondents, constituting 3% and 18%, respectively, disagreed and strongly disagreed. Thus, a majority of 79 respondents representing 79% agreed that the industry of Igbos is responsible for the marginalization of Igbos in Orlu Local Government Area, while 21 respondents representing 21% disagreed.

4.3.3 Q3: Is marginalization the result of insecurity in Orlu Local Government Area?

	Cluster C: Marginalization and insecurity in Orlu Local Government Area	SA	A	U	D	SD
13	Marginalization in the reason for killings in Orlu Local Government Area	24 24%	50 50%	-	3 3%	23 23%
14	Marginalization in the reason for attacks in Orlu Local Government Area	40 40%	30 30%	-	13 13%	17 17%
15	Marginalization in the reason for kidnapping in Orlu Local Government Area	40 40%	25 25%	-	17 17%	16 16%
16	Marginalization in the reason for the rise of non-state actors in Orlu Local Government Area	34 34%	40 40%	-	8 8%	18 18%
17	Marginalization in the reason Monday-Sit-At-Home in Orlu Local Government Area	30 30%	42 42%	-	12 12%	16 16%

Source: Field Study (2025)

From table 4.3.3 above, the respondents' distribution based whether marginalization of Igbos in Orlu Local Government Area is responsible for insecurity in the region shows that a majority of 24 and 50 respondents constituting 24% and 50% respectively strongly agreed and agreed respectively that marginalization in the reason for killings in Orlu Local Government Area, while 3 and 23 respondents, constituting 3% and 23% respectively, disagreed and strongly disagreed, respectively. Thus, a majority of 74 respondents representing 74% agreed that marginalization of Igbos in Orlu Local Government Area is responsible for insecurity in the region, while 26 respondents representing 26% disagreed.

Furthermore, a majority of 40 and 30 respondents, constituting 40% and 30% respectively, strongly agreed and agreed respectively that the marginalization in the reason for attacks in Orlu Local Government Area, while 13 and 17 respondents, constituting 13% and 17% respectively, disagreed and strongly disagreed. Thus, a majority of 70 respondents representing 70% agreed that the marginalization in the reason for attacks in Orlu Local Government Area, while 30 respondents representing 30% disagreed.

Again, a majority of 40 and 25 respondents, constituting 40% and 25% respectively, strongly agreed and agreed respectively that marginalization is the reason for kidnapping in Orlu Local Government Area, while 17 and 16 respondents, constituting 17% and 16% respectively, disagreed and strongly disagreed respectively. Thus, a majority of 65 respondents representing 65% agreed that marginalization is the reason for kidnapping in Orlu Local Government Area, while 33 respondents representing 33% disagreed.

Furthermore, a majority of 34 and 40 respondents, constituting 34% and 40% respectively, strongly agreed and agreed respectively that marginalization is the reason for the rise of non-state actors in Orlu Local Government Area, while 8 and 18 respondents, constituting 8% and 18% respectively, disagreed and strongly disagreed. Thus, a majority of 74 respondents representing 74% agreed that marginalization is the reason for the rise of non-state actors in Orlu Local Government Area, while 26 respondents representing 26% disagreed.

Furthermore, a majority of 30 and 42 respondents, constituting 30% and 42% respectively, strongly agreed and agreed respectively that marginalization is the reason for the Monday-Sit-At-Home observed in Orlu Local Government Area, while 12 and 16 respondents, constituting 12% and 16% respectively, disagreed and strongly disagreed. Thus, a majority of 72 respondents representing 72% agreed that marginalization is the reason for the Monday-Sit-At-Home observed in Orlu Local Government Area in Orlu Local Government Area. In comparison, 28 respondents representing 28% disagreed.

4.4 DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

The study made illuminating findings regarding marginalization and insecurity in Southeast Nigeria. Firstly, the study discovered various ways in which the region is being marginalized in

Nigeria. They are political, economic and social forms of marginalization. In the political marginalization context, Igbos are marginalized, being excluded from holding key political positions in Nigeria, disallowed from partaking in the decision-making process in Nigeria, and overlooked by the Nigerian government in many issues challenging the region. In the economic marginalization context, the study found that Igbos are restricted from accessing basic infrastructure in Nigeria, empowerment initiatives in Nigeria, and approved loans in Nigeria. By social marginalization, the study found that the Igbos are restricted from effectively relating with other ethnic groups, as well as discriminated against due to their ethnic background. These findings are consistent with previous findings in the subject matter.

For instance, Ebonine and Akinyetun (2022) observed that the marginalization of the region can be seen from the prism of economic asphyxiation through heavy militarization and extortion of businessmen and women. The authors noted that the Nigerian state's economy determines whether a state and its citizens survive. To put it another way, once a people's economic activities are suppressed, they perish. This seems to be the case with the Igbos in Nigeria compared to the rest. The state uses modern strategies of economic asphyxiation, including poor financial allocation, poor health care facilities, bad roads, poor education, limited representation in political appointments, and stereotyping. Similarly, this was recognized by renowned South East lawyer Olisa Agbakoba, who sued the federal government for neglecting the area in the distribution of federal projects, failing to maintain federal roads and bridges, failing to develop oil and gas resources, abandoning the Enugu colliery, failing to develop ports and airports, and over policing, all of which have a detrimental impact on regional investment (Ukiwo, 2012). To accomplish its goal once and for all, the state seems to be at odds with the populace in more recent times. Through a variety of military actions, including extortion, the economy of the region is violently destroyed.

In another study, Ebonine and Akinyetun (2021) found that since the end of the Civil War, the Igbos have been relegated in the political scheme of the country. For instance, in the first tenure of former President Muhammad Buhari, to the prejudice of the Southeast, which was appointed last, the North was given more preference when it came to important jobs. An examination of the president's 157 appointments reveals that 84 were made to the South (South East; 22, South West; 41 and South-South; 21) and 73 were made to the North (North East; 24, North West; 28 and North Central; 21). Further investigation, however, reveals that the South East was not given lucrative positions. The Chief of Staff, Chief of Army Staff, National Security Adviser, Accountant General, Chief of Air Staff, Chief Defence Intel, State Security Services, Independent National Electoral, and Secretary General of the Federation positions are a few examples. The Northern area was the exclusive zone for the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, the Nigeria Ports Authority, and the Commission.

Secondly, the study found that the causes of the marginalization of the people of the Southeast region are the name 'Igbo', which carries identity and stereotype, the experience of the civil war, envy for the entrepreneurial skills of Igbos, and the industry of Igbos. This finding is consistent with earlier studies that found that identity politics and the events of the civil war are responsible for the marginalization of the Igbos in Nigeria. For instance, Chukwuma, Ojukwu and Samuel (2018) found that while the avowal of identity politics has come to be seen as having an intrinsically divisive nature, in Nigeria, the characteristics of identity politics and the dialectics of Biafran agitations are self-created, internally crafted, and driven by the country's elites, thereby fracturing Nigeria's political and social unity.

Lastly, the study found that marginalization is responsible for the insecurity in the Southeast. This finding is consistent with several other studies made on the subject matter. Nwangwu (2023)

argues that the repressive disposition of the Nigerian state towards Biafran separatism is at the base of the current mutation of the Indigenous People of Biafra's strategy from the non-violent option to the armed movement. This article relies mainly on the analysis of secondary data on Biafra separatism and state repression in Nigeria. Drawing from the basic assumptions of the theory of state repression, this study concludes that the wanton deployment of the kinetic approach involving harassment, proscription, arrests, extraordinary rendition, torture and mass killing of pro-Biafra agitators tends to stimulate insecurity in the South-East. Similarly, Ukwu, Mamah and Ojonta (2024) found that the region's instability is influenced by several elements, including the government's selective justice, herders, security forces, and agitators for self-determination.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 SUMMARY

Insecurity in Nigeria presents a complicated challenge that has defied several management efforts by the government. The issues of terrorism, banditry, kidnapping, ritualism, trafficking, and the like have continued to appear at the front burner of national discourse. Yet, little progress has been made to address these issues. The implication is that the Nigerian people continue to suffer hurts in the hands of the non-state actors, with daily occurrences of killings, destruction, kidnapping, and displacements found in the national dailies. Despite these national crises, which pervade every geopolitical zone of the country, it appears that insecurity in Southeast Nigeria is becoming the most worrisome, given the complex nature of the crises, which merge genuine secessionist agitation and brazen criminal activities, popularly perpetrated by unknown gunmen and other criminal elements.

Several causes of the insecurity in the Southeast region have been proffered, sometimes along ethnic, religious, and cultural lines. However, one area that has not attracted sufficient attention is marginalization, which studies have established as the nexus between marginalization or its variant, exclusion, and insecurity. Moreover, it is surprising that the spate of insecurity in the region has not attracted the expected national discourse, given the position the region occupies in Nigeria. The region has often been described as the ‘Japan of Africa’ due to its dexterity in commerce and entrepreneurship.

This study examined the relationship between marginalization and insecurity in Southeast Nigeria, using Orlu Local Government Area as a case study. Orlu was chosen due to its notoriety as one of

the centres in the Southeast where insecurity is pervasive. The study was guided by a priori knowledge that insecurity in the region is the result of perennial marginalization that has relegated the region to the political, social, and economic background. The study aims to examine ways in which marginalization occurs, the causes of marginalization, and the synergy between marginalization and insecurity. The entire study was anchored on the frustration-aggression hypothesis that argues that when a person or group is frustrated, the result can be aggression. In the Southeast Nigerian context, what orchestrates the insecurity is the structural marginalization that de-powers the region from laying claims to national bounties like other regions.

The study discovered that marginalization and insecurity interact in the context of Southeast Nigeria. The experience of Civil War, in addition to the government's failure to fulfil its promises to the people of the region, has revived a consciousness of identity politics, which is part of the structural process in Nigeria. The rise of neo-separatist agitation is attributable to the government's failure to assuage the concerns of the people of the region. Different non-state actors have continued to exploit the raging agitation and disgruntlement to perpetrate crimes and champion both personal and group interests. It is behooves on the government to address the concerns of the region, particularly as it relates to marginalization, which would douse the growing insecurity in the region.

5.2 CONCLUSION

Based on the findings made, the study concludes that marginalization is the cause of insecurity in Southeast Nigeria. The study discovered various ways in which the region is being marginalized in Nigeria. They are political, economic and social forms of marginalization. In the political marginalization context, Igbos are marginalized, being excluded from holding key political positions in Nigeria, disallowed from partaking in the decision-making process in Nigeria, and

overlooked by the Nigerian government in many issues challenging the region. In the economic marginalization context, the study found that Igbos are restricted from accessing basic infrastructure in Nigeria, empowerment initiatives in Nigeria, and approved loans in Nigeria. By social marginalization, the study found that the Igbos are restricted from effectively relating with other ethnic groups, as well as discriminated against due to their ethnic background. These findings are consistent with previous findings in the subject matter. Furthermore, the causes of the marginalization of the people of the Southeast region are the name 'Igbo', which carries identity and stereotype, the experience of the civil war, envy for the entrepreneurial skills of Igbos, and the industry of Igbos.

5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the finding, the study recommends the following. The government need to convoke a regional meeting to address specific challenges faced by the region. This meeting shall comprise governors of the five states in the region, the representatives of traditional rulers, youths, men and women, civil society groups, religious groups and the media. The essence is to have a deep conversation on how the marginalization challenge could be addressed to address the lingering security crisis in the region.

Second, the government should intensify actions towards separating genuine agitators against marginalization and opportunists. This is important given the onslaught of non-state actors that wield guns and arms to wreak havoc on inhabitants. The security agencies should intensify actions to apprehend criminals and prosecute them to serve as a deterrent to others.

Lastly, the government should compensate the victims of the Civil War as promised post-war. The lived experiences of those who survived the war are also responsible for the oxygenation of

insecurity in the region. Adequate compensation will help instil a sense of belongingness and challenge the beneficiaries for national integration and unity.

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APPENDIX A

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR RESPONDENTS

Department of Political Science,
University of Benin,
Benin City.

Dear Respondent,

REQUEST FOR YOUR COOPERATION IN COMPLETING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE

I am an undergraduate student of the above-mentioned Department and University, researching **Marginalization and Insecurity in Southeast, Nigeria: A Case Study of Orlu Local government Area, Imo State** as part of the Requirements for the Completion of my Programme.

In order to gather relevant data for the study, it would be highly appreciated if you could respond to these questions as frankly and objectively as possible. All information you supply is strictly for the study and will be treated confidentially.

Yours faithfully,

The Researcher.

APPENDIX B

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR THE RESPONDENTS

SECTION A: BIO-DATA

Please **TICK** [] the option that best suits your description.

1. **Sex:** Male [] Female []
2. **Marital Status:** Single [] Married [] Divorced []
3. **Age:** 18-20 [] 21-23 [] 24-26 [] 27 - 29 [] 30-32 [] 33-35 []
4. **Occupation:** Farmers [] Civil Servants [] Traders [] Students [] Other Occupation []
5. **Religion:** Christianity [] Muslim [] Traditional Religion []
6. **Academic Qualification:** None [] SSCE/GCE [] Graduate [] Undergraduate []

SECTION B: Please **TICK** [] the option that best suits your description.

Nos	Cluster A: The ways the people of the Southeast region of Nigeria (Igbos) in Orlu Local Government Area have been marginalized	SA	A	U	D	SD
	Political Marginalization					
1	Igbos in Orlu Local government have been excluded from holding political positions in Nigeria					
2	Igbos in Orlu Local government are not allowed to partake in decision making of Nigeria					
3	Igbos in Orlu Local government have been overlooked by the Nigerian government regarding many issues challenging the region					
	Economic Marginalization					
4	Igbos in Orlu Local government have been restricted from access to basic infrastructure in Nigeria					
5	Igbos in Orlu Local government have been restricted from access to empowerment initiatives in Nigeria					
6	Igbos in Orlu Local government have been restricted from access to loans in Nigeria					
	Social Marginalization					

7	Igbos in Orlu Local government have been restricted from effectively relating with other ethnic groups in Nigeria					
8	Igbos in Orlu Local government are discriminated against due to their ethnic background					
	Cluster B: The Cause of Marginalization of Igbos in Orlu Local Government Area					
9	The name 'Igbo' is responsible for the marginalization of Igbos in Orlu Local Government Area					
10	The civil war is the reason for the marginalization of Igbos in Orlu Local Government Area					
11	The envy for the entrepreneurial skills of Igbos is responsible for the marginalization of Igbos in Orlu Local Government Area					
12	The industry of Igbos is responsible for the marginalization of Igbos in Orlu Local Government Area					
	Cluster C: Marginalization and insecurity in Orlu Local Government Area					
13	Marginalization in the reason for killings in Orlu Local Government Area					
14	Marginalization in the reason for attacks in Orlu Local Government Area					
15	Marginalization in the reason for kidnapping in Orlu Local Government Area					
16	Marginalization in the reason for the rise of non-state actors in Orlu Local Government Area					
17	Marginalization in the reason Monday-Sit-At-Home in Orlu Local Government Area					

