

**AN ASSESSMENT OF THE LEVEL OF POLITICAL INTERFERENCE IN
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT IN PUBLIC
INSTITUTIONS.A CASE STUDY OF THE EDO STATE CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION**

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SSC1911696

**DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE
UNIVERSITY OF BENIN
BENIN CITY**

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**BEING A PROJECT WORK SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE,
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CERTIFICATION

We certify that this work was carried out by **IKHINMWIN FREDRICK** Of the department of public administration in the University of Benin, and is adequate in the scope and quality in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of Bachelor of Science (Bsc.) Degree in public administration.

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(Head of Department)

Date

Date

DEDICATION

This research work is first dedicated to God almighty.

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I have taken efforts in this project. However, it would not have been possible without the kind support and help of many individuals. I would like to extend my sincere thanks to all of them.

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ABSTRACT

The research project an assessment of the level of political interference in the implementation of public procurement in public institutions. The objective of this study aimed at assessing the level of political interference in the implementation of Public Procurement process, identifying other factors affecting public procurement implementation in public institutions and suggesting some possible remedies to preventing political interference in public procurement implementation in public institutions. For this study, the survey research design was adopted. The choice of the design was informed by the objectives of the study as outlined in chapter one. This research design provides a quickly efficient and accurate means of assessing information about a population of interest. The population for this study were workers in Civil Service Commission in Edo state, Nigeria. A total of 134 respondents were selected from the population figure out of which the sample size was determined. Public procurement activities suffer from neglect, lack of direction, poor co-ordination, lack of open competition and transparency, differing levels of corruption and most importantly not having a cadre of trained and qualified procurement specialists, who are competent to conduct and manage such procurements, in a professional, timely and cost-effective manner. Inflexible and bureaucratic systems of procurement contribute to unacceptable contract delays, increased costs, the potential for manipulation of contract awards and lack of fair competition, all of which create the perception in the population at large, that public expenditure is slow, ineffective, expensive and often corrupt

CHAPTER ONE

1.0 INTRODUCTION

This chapter gives a general view of the whole thesis and for that matter provides the background to the study, a statement of the problem, objectives, scope and significance of the study as well as the provides the research questions and the organization of study.

1.1 Background of the Study

This study is embarked on the topic, “an assessment of the level of political interference in the implementation of public procurement in public institutions: A case study of the Edo state civil service commission.” Public purchases across the globe are imperative component in service delivery and functioning of various departments of government institutions. It is therefore of essence for governments to ensure that goods, works and services are provided efficiently to the public (Peterson and Flanagan, 2009). Public procurement procedures are critical for this to be achieved. All goods and services for public use should be guided by the Public procurement requirement (Roodhooft and Abbeelee, 2006).

Public procurement is basically the process whereby public sector establishments, ministries, departments and local authorities acquire goods, works and services.

The Public Procurement Law, 2007 is a comprehensive legislation designed to eliminate the shortcomings and organizational weaknesses which were inherent in public procurement in Nigeria. The public sector comprises of government department and public institutions or the ministries, departments and Agencies. These entities supply goods, works and services to the public and are supplied through public procurement (Peterson and Flanagan, 2009). Political interference occurs when political leader(s) interfere with decision making in public administrative matters such as planning, organizing, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting, and budgeting as well as allocation and use of public funds. As stated by Dixit, and Pindyck, (2014) in the supply of roads, schools, hospitals in the developing countries, politics plays a role. Among various leadership challenges facing low developing democratic

countries especial African countries is the political interference in administrations (Wangwe, 2012). In many African countries, the public becomes a platform and the politicians want to maintain their faction in it and try to extend their domain in every other section of the public administration. Thus because of the political activities in the administration and the undue influence of the politicians, the public and administration institution gets politicized (Bendor, 2013). According to Duch (2014) politicization of the public administration institution involves the appropriation of administrative structures and resources and the displacement of administration goals by organized political and community interests. The typical division of government in Nigeria is into a legislature, an executive, and a judiciary. Nigeria constitution of 1977 requires the powers of one branch/pillar not to conflict with the powers associated with the other branches (Ntliziywana, 2019). Despite the above, power separation remains a big challenge confronting public institutions be it at the national or local government levels, where the political leaders have failed to adopt a healthy and positive attitude towards performance of public administration officers (Wangwe, 2012). Nigeria politicians interfere unnecessarily in public administration matters, exploit the public officers and present an exaggerated picture of public administration officers' works. They are encouraging societies to engage in demonstrations and agitations for narrow political gains (Mbilinyi, 2012; Wangwe, 2012). As a result, there is the growing intrusion of the politics into the public administration (Lodge, 2015). It has to be noted that when the administrative institution is politicized chances for corruption increase and the appointments to key posts are made not on the basis of merit but extraneous considerations (Bendor, 2013). Precisely, the public administration smells foul-play and all these provide occasions for communities to engage in riots and agitations in demanding for enquiry or dismissal of the concerned official. These protests adversely affect every section in the country.

Public procurement capacity is multi-faceted including individual, organizational and environmental elements (United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2006). The environmental facet relates to an enabling national environment which encapsulates the national legislation, policies and the broader institutional culture required for effective procurement (UNDP, 2010). The environmental factors border on the institutional arrangements related to public financial management, civil service, education and other civil society participation (Fayomi, 2013; World Bank, 2013; Ndercaj and Ringwald, 2014).

1.2 Statement of the Problem

The public procurement system in Nigeria is to ensure that in a harmonized procedure, all goods and services purchased by public institutions are done in a way that ensures a careful, economic and efficient use of public resources. It is also to ensure that transactions are devoid of corruption, but are done in fairly, plainly and in an impartial way, whereas encouraging competition among local industries. There are important economic and political implications related to Public procurement hence, the need to make sure that the process is efficient and economical.

Political interference with the procurement process poses a challenge to the implementation process and public procurement reforms. A good number of politicians think that they have the right to intervene in the procurement procedures thereby leading to capricious procurement decisions

Procurement encompasses the whole process of acquiring property and/or services. It begins when an agency has identified a need and employs public procurement as a vital instrument for achieving economic, social and other objectives (Arrowsmith, 2018), and is regrettably an area vulnerable to mismanagement and corruption (OECD, 2017). Besides, most of the studies on public procurement compliance have been conducted outside Nigeria and mostly in the developed world.

In Nigeria, a wave of procurement reforms that begun in 1999, culminated into the enactment of the Public Procurement Act 2007. Gelderman (2016) stipulate that compliance occurs when the target performs a requested action, but is apathetic about it, rather than enthusiastic, and puts in only a minimal or average effort. However, as an organizational outcome, compliance has traditionally been understood as conformity or obedience to regulations and legislation. It is on this premise that this study seeks to assess the level of political interference in the implementation of public procurement in public institutions.

Previous studies have only concentrated on factors affecting procurement performance in public sector in Nigeria but did not focus on political interference as a challenge. This has inspired the researchers to carry out this study and also to fill the vacuum created and add to literature to the

body of knowledge. This work seeks to investigate political interference as a factor that affects performance of the public procurement process in Nigeria's public sector.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The main objective of this study is to assess the level of political interference in the implementation of public procurement in public institutions in Nigeria. In other words, it seems to assess the extent to which politicians have interfered with public procurement processes in Nigeria.

Specific objectives include;

- i. To assess the level of political interference in the implementation of Public Procurement process.
- ii. To identify other factors affecting public procurement implementation in public institutions.
- iii. To suggest some possible remedies to preventing political interference in public procurement implementation in public institutions.

1.4 Research Questions

- i. What is the level of political interference in the implementation of public procurement process?
- ii. What other factors affect public procurement implementation in public institutions?
- iii. What are the possible remedies to preventing political interference in public procurement implementation in public institutions?

1.5 Research Hypotheses

Hypothesis I

H₀: There is no significant level of political interference in the implementation of public procurement process

H₁: There is a significant level of political interference in the implementation of public procurement process

Hypothesis II

H₀: There are no other factors affecting public procurement implementation in public institutions

H₂: There are other factors affecting public procurement implementation in public institutions

Hypothesis III

H₀: There are no significant remedies to preventing political interference in public procurement implementation in public institutions

H₃: There are significant remedies to preventing political interference in public procurement implementation in public institutions

1.6 Significance of the Study

This study contributes to procurement activities and strengthens the act of obtaining goods, works and services in the public institutions in Nigeria and also promotes transparency and accountability which are important components in the procurement practices. The study again contributes to the body of knowledge and offers some suggested remedies to reduce or eliminate political interference in public procurement implementation process in public institutions in Nigeria. This study will be of immense benefit to other researchers who intend to know more on this study and can also be used by non-researchers to build more on their research work. This study contributes to knowledge and could serve as a guide for other study.

1.7 Scope of the Study

This study is on assessing the level of political interference in the implementation of public procurement in public institutions. The research study will cover the Civil Service Commission in Edo state. All departments of the organization will be involved and both management and staff of the organization will be sampled in the collection of data for the study. The study will cover a fair balance of male and female employees of the company and cut across the entire staff of the organization, thus from junior staff to management staff.

1.8 Limitations of the study

The demanding schedule of respondents at work made it very difficult getting the respondents to participate in the survey. As a result, retrieving copies of questionnaire in timely fashion was very challenging. Also, the researcher is a student and therefore has limited time as well as resources in covering extensive literature available in conducting this research. Information provided by the researcher may not hold true for all businesses or organizations but is restricted to the selected organization used as a study in this research especially in the locality where this study is being conducted. Finally, the researcher is restricted only to the evidence provided by the participants in the research and therefore cannot determine the reliability and accuracy of the information provided.

Financial constraint: Insufficient fund tends to impede the efficiency of the researcher in sourcing for the relevant materials, literature or information and in the process of data collection (Internet, questionnaire and interview).

Time constraint: The researcher will simultaneously engage in this study with other academic work. This consequently will cut down on the time devoted for the research work.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter gives an insight into various studies conducted by outstanding researchers, as well as explained terminologies with regards to the influence on management. The chapter also gives a resume of the history and present status of the problem delineated by a concise review of previous studies into closely related problems.

2.2 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

2.2.1 Political Interference

Public procurement is considered an inherently political sensitive activity (Schapper, 2016). (Bolton, 2016) contended that in public procurement, managers take on the role of agent for elected representatives. However, Pillary (2014) argues that senior officials and political leaders use public office for private gain and this has weakened the motivation to remain honest. Raymond (2018) also opined that political office holders', ministers and political parties receive clandestine payments in government procurement. This ultimately interferes with the procurement process and constrains compliance. This is also re-echoed by Lodhia and Burrirt (2014), who recognized that social and political influences have an important bearing on public sector reform. In developing countries; one of the major obstacles to the procurement system is ministerial interference with the tender process where ministers intervene and influence tender awards. The threat of being suspended or fired has in many cases intimidated public officers into obeying illegal ministerial directives leading to non-compliance (Akech, 2015). In support of this, Hui,(2011) asserted that interference from the local politicians, businessmen and women, members of parliament and very influential top management individuals have interrupted the procurement processes and deterred transparency. Lodhia and Burrirt (2014) further stated that political influence in public sector management limits information, transparency and favor is extended without management being held to account. Coviello and Gagliarducci (2016) also

revealed that politicians influence public procurement through non-compliance acts such as collusion.

2.2.2 Public procurement in Nigeria

Prior to 2007, there was no statutory provision that directly regulate the award of public contracts in Nigeria and the result is that the award of contract becomes an avenue by which the government functionaries reward their friends and cronies and by which they too amass wealth. Most of the rich business men that we have in Nigeria today make their money through contracts that are awarded to them in the past by the governments, whether military or civilian government it is the same. Disgusted by the depth of corruption in the procurement system and its effects on the economy, the Federal Government commissioned the World Bank in 1999 in collaboration with some private sector specialists to review the country's public sector procurement structure, including the existing legal framework, organizational responsibilities and capabilities, and present procedures and practices, including how these may differ from the formal rules and procedures. Rather than enacting a statutory legislation to regulate public contracts, the government took a step to check the abuse in the system by establishing the Budget Monitoring and Price Intelligence Unit (BMPIU) in the Presidency with an objective among others to ensure that merit and due diligence are adhered to in the award and execution of contracts, procurement of products and services. However, on the 4th of June 2007, the then president of Nigeria President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua signed into law the Public Procurement Act (PPA) which is the first procurement law in the history of Nigeria. The purpose of the Act is to ensure transparency, competitiveness, value for money and professionalism in the public sector procurement system (Jacob, 2017). The Act provides for the establishment of the National Council on Public Procurement (NCPP) and the Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP) as regulatory authorities responsible for oversight, management and monitoring of public procurement practices and system.

2.2.3 Political Interference and Public Procurement

Public procurement is considered an inherently a politically sensitive activity. Pillary (2014) argues that senior officials and political leaders use public office for private gain and this has

weakened the motivation to remain honest. Raymond (2018) also opined that ministers and political parties receive clandestine payments in government procurement. This ultimately interferes with the procurement process and constrains compliance. This is also re-echoed by Lodhia and Burritt (2014), who recognizes that social and political influences have an important bearing on public sector reform. In developing countries; one of the major obstacles to the procurement system is ministerial interference with the tender process where ministers intervene and influence tender awards. The threat of being suspended or fired has in many cases intimidated public officers into obeying illegal ministerial directives leading to noncompliance (Akech, 2015). In support of this, Hui,(2011) asserted that interference from the local politicians, businesspersons, members of parliament and very influential top management individuals has interrupted the procurement processes and deterred transparency. Lodhia and Burritt (2014) further stated that political influence in public sector management limits information, transparency and favor is extended without management being held to account. Coviello and Gagliarducci (2014) also revealed that politicians influence public procurement through non-compliance acts such as collusion. It therefore implies that political interference has a negative effect on public procurement compliance.

2.3 FACTORS INFLUENCING POLITICAL INTERFERENCE

In their study, Mfuru, Sarwatt and Kanire (2018) analysed factors influencing political interference in public administration. The variables for analysing factors causing politicians to interfere with activities of politic administration were poor service delivery, seek for popularity faith, nature of authority/regime, time toward political election and order from their political parties. The result revealed that the root causes or predictors of political interference in public administration were time towards political elections, nature of authority and order from the political parties.

According to them, it was strongly commented that the focus of interest to politician is to win parliamentary elections. Almost every respondent showed to have accepted political interference in public administration to be very high when time for political election is approaching. It was further mentioned at the time toward political election, politician increase interference with

public administration in the ground that they have to face voters, therefore, they should have a say in every affair that affects public service delivery.

2.3.1 State Of Nigeria’s Infrastructure and Public Procurement

Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the regions with the poorest people in the world (United Nations Economic and Social Council (2016). Access to various types of infrastructure remains sparse (United Nations Economic and Social Council (2016). Although Nigeria is the largest economy in Africa (World Bank, 2017), the state of its infrastructure still mirrors the situation within its region. Infrastructure for power generation, transport, education, sanitation, health care, housing and other services is inadequate. For instance, housing shortage is estimated at 17 million units (Veitch, 2014) and approximately half of the rural population live more than 2km away from an all-season road (AfDB, 2013). Access to water and sanitation facilities is also low (Foster and Pushak, 2013).

Over the years, there have been efforts to address the infrastructure deficits through public procurement which incorporates *“all actions from planning and forecasting, identification of needs, sourcing and solicitation of offers, evaluation of offers, review and award of contracts, contracting and all phases of contract administration until delivery of the goods, the end of a contract, or the useful life of an asset”* (United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), 2014). Whilst public procurement in Nigeria has undergone reforms (e.g., Due Process Policy (Ocheni and Nwankwo, 2012), a prominent landmark in public procurement reforms in Nigeria has been the introduction of the Public Procurement Act 2007 (PPA 2007). The PPA 2007 has 13 parts and 61 sections with the broad aim of dealing exhaustively with all issues related to transparency and integrity in public procurement. The PPA 2007 requires the establishment of a National Council on

Public Procurement (NCPP) as an apex regulatory body with a Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP) as its administrative secretariat. The primary objectives of the BPP include: harmonization of procurement practices and policy; institution of due process in procurement; introduction of honesty, accountability and transparency in procurement; standardization of procurement procedures; procurement management; and performance evaluation. The key functions required of the BPP include: regulation of public procurement functions of procuring agencies and institutions; certification of procurement entities; monitoring of procured projects; coordination

of training and capacity building; and general oversight and advisory functions. Collectively the NCPP and the BPP are to supervise and regulate all public procurement activities together with the participation of civil society. Despite the establishment of the BPP, it is reported that the NCPP is not fully functional (World Bank, 2013). According to Adewole (2014) most states have not enacted the PPA 2007 despite Federal government, donor agency and civil society organizations promotion.

On the back of public procurement reforms, some benefits have been attained. Amongst the reported benefits attained are: reinstatement of wrongly awarded public contracts to deserving bidders; good governance of public funds and assets; reduction in corruption; improved transparency and accountability of government; and general restoration of public confidence in public procurement (Fayomi, 2013). Despite these benefits, procurement within the public sector is still fraught with capacity challenges.

2.3.2 Procurement Capacity

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2016) defines capacity as “*the ability of people, organizations/institutions and society as a whole to successfully manage their affairs*”. In relation to procurement capacity, UNDP (2010) describes procurement capacity development as the process through which individuals, organizations and societies obtain, strengthen, and maintain the capabilities to set and achieve development objectives. Public procurement capacity can be viewed as comprising three facets: individual (i.e. the skills, knowledge and experience of personnel); organizational (i.e. the policies, procedures and systems within an organization that support procurement functions); and an enabling environment.

The enabling environment aspect, which is pertinent to this study, is a term used to describe the broader national system within which procurement personnel and organization’s function, and it facilitates or hampers their performance (Ndercaj and Ringwald, 2014). Whilst this aspect of procurement capacity may not be easy to grasp tangibly, it is central to the understanding of capacity issues at the individual or organization level. The environmental level relates to the availability of legislation, policies as well as broader institutional culture required for effective procurement (UNDP, 2016; Jensen and Refsgaard, 2018). Capacity at the environmental level also include power relations and social norms which govern public procurement mandates,

priorities, modes of operation and civic engagement across different parts of society (Jensen and Refsgaard, 2018). The OECD-DAC tool for capacity assessment also focuses on four pillars that can be applied to the environmental aspect of procurement capacity assessment namely: legislative and regulatory framework; institutional framework and management capacity; procurement operations and market practices; and integrity and transparency of the procurement institutions (OECD and World Bank, 2014). Based on a meta-analysis of procurement studies in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), Ndercaj and Ringwald (2014) categorized procurement challenges as follows:

- Legislation and regulatory framework - Challenges related to irrelevance of public procurement Acts and frameworks due to rapid and dynamic changes in economy, society and the environment;
- Institutional issues - Challenges related to lack of strong procurement institutions and professionals or inadequate training programs throughout government, private or civil services agencies;
- Operational and management - Challenges related to limited recognition of procurement as a specialist and strategic function; and
- Control and integrity - Challenges related to inadequate trust, honesty, transparency, integrity, compliance, monitoring, and accountability.

These challenges, some of which have been reported in other procurement studies in Nigeria and other sub-Saharan African countries, in the main are issues that relate to an enabling environment for procurement. Table 1 presents a variety of challenges (drawn from literature) that relate to an enabling environment for procurement. The challenges have also been clustered along the lines of Ndercaj and Ringwald's (2014) categorization and the pillars of the OECD-DAC capacity assessment tool (OECD and World Bank, 2004). Based on this categorization, it can be seen that the institutional challenges are the most common, followed by challenges related to control, integrity and transparency. The operational challenges are the least common. Despite recognition of these challenges within the extant literature, an assessment of the extent to which they adversely impact the effectiveness of infrastructure procurement by public institutions at state and local government levels within the Nigerian context is lacking. Such assessment could enable determination of the critical challenges affecting infrastructure procurement.

2.3.3 The Perceived Causes of Corruption in the Federal Public Service

The causes of corruption in the Federal Public Service are varied and dynamic. Ribadu (2016) attributes it to the country's history of prolonged military rule that dominated the political scene, subdued the rule of law, facilitated wanton looting of public treasury, depicted public institutions and instituted a secret and opaque culture in the running of government business. TI (2018) observes that, corruption is a product of environmental variables. It thrives where temptation co-exist with permissiveness; where institutional checks on power are missing; where decision making remains obscure; where civil society is thin on the ground; and where great inequalities in the distribution of wealth condemn people to live in poverty.

The Federal Government of Nigeria in 2001 assigned a consortium of Federal institutions led by the Institute for Development Research, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria to conduct a Governance and Corruption Survey study. The report was released in 2003. In the opinion of public officials, the major causes of corruption in the public service were low salary for public officials and lack of transparent political process. Others include lack of effective corruption reporting system, lack of effective judiciary and ineffective mass media among others by Adagba (2017).

The African Development Bank (2016) argues that, corrupt practices become the exemption rather than the norm if the likelihood of being caught is high, if the consequence once caught is predictable and severe, and if it is generally condemned by society. The AfDB (2016) and Gregory (2017) summarizes the dynamics of public sector corruption using a simple model; $C = M + D - A$; when C is corruption, M is monopoly, D is discretion and A is accountability. That is, corruption = monopoly + discretion – accountability. Under this model, a public servant is assumed to have monopoly of power over goods or services which generate economic rent, and has discretion to decide who will acquire it. That is, he determines how rent is distributed, and is not accountable for his action.

Bello Imam (2015) identifies the sources of corruption as; Trade Restrictions; Government Subsidies, Price Control, Low Wages in the Public Service, weak democratic structures, and sociological factors inter-alia. In their contributions Ekumankama (2012) and Adebayo (2016) identifies diminished societal value system; poor leadership and political instability; lack of effective internal control and the problem of prosecution and inadequate sanctions against offenders has been responsible for the high rate of corruption in the Federal Public Service.

In developing countries like Nigeria, virtually every aspect of the citizens activities has to be authorized and regulated by the government. These range from owing a shop, borrowing money, investing, owing and driving a car, building a house obtaining foreign exchange, getting a passport and so on. Government monopoly in the granting of these authorizations gives the bureaucrats a great amount of power and a good opportunity to extract bribes.

Studies by Global Integrity (2014, 2016 and 2017) found no relationship between democracy and corruption in the world. Ribadu's (2016) assertion that, the high rate of corruption in the Federal Public Service is mainly due to the prolonged period of military dictatorship then becomes hollow. However, the conditions that favor corruption as identified by TI (2018) are typical of military regimes. Then, one may argue that, the persistence of corruption in the Federal Public Service can partly be attributed to the prolonged military rule. Others such as Ekumankama (2015) and Adebayo (2016) observes were fading societal value system, ineffective internal control and the problem of prosecution and inadequate sanctions for offenders, and weak democratic structures among others as constituting problems to an effective fight against corruption in the Federal Public Service.

From the views of the scholars and institutions, the causes of corruption are multi-dimensional. They are institutional, societal, political, judicial and economic. Under resourced and weak institutions (courts and anti-corruption institutions) cannot effectively fight corruption. A corrupt society produces corrupt public service. Corrupt political process produces corrupt legislators and executives. A poorly paid public service will be more prone to corruption than a well-paid one.

Excessive secrecy in public service will make the detection and investigation of corruption cases difficult.

Public sector corruption is generally connected with the state powers and especially with its monopoly and discretionary powers. Some of these factors are direct causes of corruption such as political party financing, subsidies, mild punishment for corruption offences and weak institutional controls. The indirect factors are societal such as the tendency to make sudden wealth and waning societal norms such as honesty, and hard work.

2.3.4 Strategies for Combating Corruption in the Federal Public Service

If the anti-corruption institutions are to be effective in fighting corruption in the Federal Public Service thereby ameliorating the adverse consequences of the vice, certain strategies need to be taken. Concerned institutions and scholars such as AfDB (2016) Adebayo (2016), Ali (2017) Braibanti (2016), Ekumankama (2012) and Njoku (2017) identified strategies for fighting corruption in the Federal Public Service. Adebayo (2016) suggests the growth and development of a culture that will inculcate the right sense of values which to him can be achieved through education rather than statutory legislations.

Braibanti (2016) suggests societal value re-orientation; creation of alternative means of employment; sincere political commitment; precision of investigative and sanction devices; and strong judiciary and legislature to restrain bureaucratic excesses. Ali (2017) advocates making public declaration of assets and liabilities by all class of public servant's compulsory to enhance transparency. He also advocates the careful amendment of section 308 of the 1999 constitution to remove the immunity clause to enable anti-corruption institutions timely investigate and prosecute chief executives and their deputies at the federal and state levels. Others are the inclusion of anti-corruption clauses in all public contract agreements and the adoption of the Chinese and Saudi-Arabian models for punishment (execution) of corrupt officials as an antidote. Similarly, the "Eagle Watch" (2018) considers robust demonstration of political will at all levels of government to fight corruption; amendment of section 308 of the 1999 Constitution as it relates to all criminal matters and elimination of all forms of protection for corruption in high places. The "Eagle Watch" (2018), also stressed the need for value orientation in the family and society and the refusal by communities, universities, organizations to reward corrupt enrichment. It also advocates the others include; immediate auditing and scrutiny of all security votes, information funds and all such votes however named and putting in place clear parameters consistent with international best practice to prevent abuses associated with the use of the funds. TI (2013) advocates the reform of political parties, the courts and the police. Njoku (2017) in his contribution stresses the need for structural considerations which include fundamental changes in the perception of public office, restructuring the modus operandi of public administration and strengthening the necessary checks and balances to enable the ordinary citizens exercise sufficient pressures on their public officials.

The AfDB (2016) offers more encompassing strategies for combating corruption. It asserts that, anti-corruption strategies must address the broader governance and institutional *raison de'être* that gives rise to the problem in the first instance. At the individual level, it must address the elements of rational choice which rationalizes corrupt practices as low-risk high-gain endeavors rather than the opposite, thus, the need for enforcement of severe punishment for corruption offences. More broadly, AfDB stressed that an effective anti-corruption crusade must be country specific, but also based on internationally accepted norms and standard. The strategy must incorporate elements of prevention, detection, investigation, enforcement, public awareness and institution building. It is worthy to note that, in the fight against corruption, the optimal level may not be zero but that it should be reduced to manageable level. It also requires consistent, coherent, broad based approach and long-term perspective.

Specifically, the AfDB (2018) advocates for; sustained political will and leadership committed to fighting corruption; strengthening institutions; and reform of the public sector. This includes; Financial Management such as the Fiscal Responsibility Bill, Civil Service Reforms; Tax and Revenue Reforms; Public Procurement; and Independent Anti-Corruption Institutions. Other strategies include; reform of the legal and judicial system; strong legislature, existence of vibrant civil society organizations; and international collaboration since corruption money has wings not wheels. As in other developing countries, looted money easily finds safe heavens abroad (Vittal 2015).

It is in view of this that Doig and Mclvor (2019) advocate that recent anti-corruption strategies should cover a number of areas viz; legal, organizational, financial and civic. These include anti-corruption agencies whose effectiveness would depend on administrative and political autonomy, independence from the police, independent financial resources and recruitment powers. Others are combination of prevention, awareness, investigation and prosecution as well as an extensive legal framework.

From the views of the AfDB (2016), Braibanti (2016) and the Eagle Eye (2018), it is clear that a successful fight against corruption must be multidimensional requiring societal value re-orientation; sustained political will and leadership committed to fighting corruption at all levels of government; strong legislature as well as independent judiciary and anti-corruption institutions. Others are reform of the public service, existence of vibrant civil society organizations and international collaboration.

These need to be consistent and embracing in terms of detection investigation and speedy enforcement. It must be pointed out that, whatever strategy is adopted as an antidote, it should target the root causes of corruption in the country. In addition, the strategies should be comprehensive in terms of legal, organization, financial and civic-ranging from initiatives directly intended to combat corruption to those which minimize the opportunity and incentive for corruption.

2.4 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.4.1 Institutional Theory

In this study, the Institutional theory is adopted as the theoretical framework to guide the discussion.

The theory was promoted by (DiMaggio and Powell, (1983) Meyer and Rowan (1977). The Institutional theory - also known as institutionalism - uses country and government institutional characteristics, such as pre-existing rule of law, well-defined anti-corruption norms, and independent anti-corruption institutions with enforcement powers, to explain corruption in the public sector. Institutional theory "examines the processes and mechanisms by which structures, schema, rules, and routines become established as authoritative guidelines for social behaviour" (Scott, 2014).

In relation to understanding corruption, institutional theory brings in the social context and provides taxonomy for understanding how corruption might become entrenched in organizations, in institutions and in society, despite the existence of an anti-corruption framework (Luo, 2005). Institutional theory considers that corruption is influenced the character, design and transparency of the political system and its institutions. At the same time, it acknowledges that the relationship between corruption, institutions, political systems, culture and gender is highly complex (Debski and others, 2018; Stensöta, Wängnerud and Svensson, 2015). A fair amount of research has focused on the relationship between political institutions on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the prevalence and levels of corruption.

We chose this theory because in this study we are using the generic definition of corruption, in the context of examining corruption in public sector organizations. Moreover, an act of corruption in this study is considered to include theft of assets (asset misappropriation), tax fraud,

accounting fraud, bribery and money laundering etc. The model is derived from Luo model (2015) which incorporates institutional theories as the grand theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 2013; Eisenhardt, 2018; Tolbert and Zucker, 2016; Scott, 2019).

Another important reason I adopted Institutional Theory is because in Nigeria, as it is implied in the model, the concentration of powers in the government and weak regulatory oversight allows government officials to contravene policies and gain access to resources through fraudulent means. These conditions generate the opportunities for the political class and business community to collude with government officials with the motive of perpetrating corruption for achieving individual gains.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

This chapter covers the description and discussion on the various techniques and procedures used in the study to collect and analyze the data as it is deemed appropriate

3.2 Research Design

For this study, the survey research design was adopted. The choice of the design was informed by the objectives of the study as outlined in chapter one. This research design provides a quickly efficient and accurate means of assessing information about a population of interest. It intends to study an assessment of the level of political interference in the implementation of public procurement in public institutions. The study will be conducted Edo state.

3.3 Population of the Study

The populations for this study were workers in Civil Service Commission in Edo state, Nigeria. A total of 134 respondents were selected from the population figure out of which the sample size was determined. The reason for choosing Edo state is because of its proximity to the researcher.

3.4 Sample and Sampling Techniques

The researcher used Taro Yamane's formula to determine the sample size from the population.

Taro Yamane's formula is given as;

$$n = \frac{N}{1+N(e)^2}$$

Where N = Population of study (134)

n = Sample size (?)

e = Level of significance at 5% (0.05)

1 = Constant

$$\therefore n = \frac{134}{1 + 134(0.05)^2} = \frac{134}{1 + 134(0.0025)} = \frac{134}{1 + 0.335}$$
$$n = \frac{134}{1.335} = \underline{100}$$

The sample size therefore is 100 respondents.

3.5 Research Instrument and Instrumentation

Data for this study was collected from primary and secondary sources. The primary source of data collected was mainly the use of a structured questionnaire which was designed to elicit information on an assessment of the level of political interference in the implementation of public procurement in public institutions. The secondary source of data collections were textbooks, journals and scholarly materials.

3.6 Validity of Instrument

The instrument of this study was subjected to face validation. Face validation tests the appropriateness of the questionnaire items. This is because face validation is often used to indicate whether an instrument on the face of it appears to measure what it contains. Face validations therefore aims at determining the extent to which the questionnaire is relevant to the objectives of the study. In subjecting the instrument for face validation, copies of the initial draft of the questionnaire will be validated by supervisor. The supervisor is expected to critically examine the items of the instrument with specific objectives of the study and make useful suggestions to improve the quality of the instrument. Based on his recommendations the instrument will be adjusted and re-adjusted before being administered for the study.

3.7 Reliability of Instrument

The coefficient of 0.81 was considered a reliability coefficient because according to Etuk (1990), a test-retest coefficient of 0.5 will be enough to justify the use of a research instrument.

3.8 Method of Data Collection

This study is based on the two possible sources of data which are the primary and secondary source.

- a. **Primary Source of Data:** The primary data for this study consist of raw data generated from responses to questionnaires and interview by the respondents.
- b. **Secondary Source of Data:** The secondary data includes information obtained through the review of literature that is journals, monographs, textbooks and other periodicals.

3.9 Method of Data Analysis

Data collected will be analyzed using frequency table, percentage and mean score analysis while the nonparametric statistical test (Chi- square) was used to test the formulated hypothesis using SPSS (statistical package for social sciences). Haven gathered the data through the administration of questionnaire; the collected data will be coded, tabulated and analyzed using SPSS statistical software according to the research question and hypothesis. In order to effectively analyze the data collected for easy management and accuracy, the chi square method will be used for test of independence. Chi square is given as

$$X^2 = \frac{\sum (o-e)^2}{e}$$

Where X^2 = chi square

o = observed frequency

e = expected frequency

Level of confidence / degree of freedom

When employing the chi – square test, a certain level of confidence or margin of error has to be assumed. More also, the degree of freedom in the table has to be determined in simple variable, row and column distribution, degree of freedom is: $df = (r-1) (c-1)$

Where; df = degree of freedom

r = number of rows

c = number of columns.

In determining the critical chi _ square value, the value of confidence is assumed to be at 95% or 0.95. a margin of 5% or 0.05 is allowed for judgment error.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION

4.1 Introduction

This chapter deals with the presentation and analysis of the result obtained from questionnaires. The data gathered were presented according to the order in which they were arranged in the research questions and simple percentage were used to analyze the demographic information of the respondents while the chi square test was adopted to test the research hypothesis.

4.2 Analysis of Demographic Data of Respondents

Table 1: Gender of Respondents

| | | Frequency | Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-------|--------|-----------|---------|--------------------|
| Valid | Male | 65 | 65.0 | 65.0 |
| | Female | 35 | 35.0 | 100.0 |
| | Total | 100 | 100.0 | |

Source: Field Survey.

Table 1 above shows the gender distribution of the respondents used for this study. Out of the total number of 100 respondents, 65 respondents which represent 65.0 percent of the population are male. 35 which represent 35.0 percent of the population are female.

Table 2: Age range of Respondents

| | Frequency | Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|------------------|-----------|---------|-----------------------|
| Valid 20-30years | 15 | 15.0 | 15.0 |
| 31-40years | 10 | 10.0 | 25.0 |
| 41-50years | 25 | 25.0 | 50.0 |
| 51-60years | 20 | 20.0 | 70.0 |
| above 60years | 30 | 30.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 100 | 100.0 | |

Source: Field Survey.

Table 2 above shows the age grade of the respondents used for this study. Out of the total number of 100 respondents, 15 respondents which represent 15.0percent of the population are between 20-30years. 10respondents which represent 10.0percent of the population are between 31-40years. 25respondents which represent 25.0percent of the population are between 41-50years. 20respondents which represent 20.0percent of the population are between 51-60years. 30respondents which represent 30.0percent of the population are above 60years.

Table 3: Educational Background of Respondents

| | Frequency | Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|-----------------|-----------|---------|-----------------------|
| Valid FSLC | 20 | 20.0 | 20.0 |
| WASSCE/GCE/NECO | 25 | 25.0 | 45.0 |
| OND/HND/BSC | 35 | 35.0 | 80.0 |
| MSC/PGD/PHD | 15 | 15.0 | 95.0 |
| OTHERS | 5 | 5.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 100 | 100.0 | |

Source: Field Survey.

Table 3 above shows the educational background of the respondents used for this study. Out of the total number of 100 respondents, 20 respondents which represent 20.0percent of the population are FSLC holders. 25 which represent 25.0percent of the population are SSCE/GCE/WASSCE holders. 35 which represent 35.0percent of the population are OND/HND/BSC holders. 15 which represent 15.0percent of the population are MSC/PGD/PHD holders. 5 which represent 5.0percent of the population had other type of educational qualifications.

Table 4: Marital Status

| | Frequency | Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|--------------|-----------|---------|-----------------------|
| Valid Single | 30 | 30.0 | 30.0 |
| Married | 55 | 55.0 | 85.0 |
| Divorced | 5 | 5.0 | 90.0 |
| Widowed | 10 | 10.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 100 | 100.0 | |

Source: Field Survey.

Table 4 above shows the marital status of the respondents used for this study. 30 which represent 30.0percent of the population are single. 55 which represent 55.0percent of the population are married. 5 which represent 5.0percent of the population are divorced. 10 which represent 10.0percent of the population are widowed.

4.3 Analysis of Psychographic Data

Table 5: There is a correlation between political interference and implementation of public procurement process

| | Frequency | Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|----------------------|-----------|---------|--------------------|
| Valid Strongly agree | 30 | 30.0 | 30.0 |
| Agree | 42 | 42.0 | 72.0 |
| Undecided | 10 | 10.0 | 82.0 |
| Disagree | 10 | 10.0 | 92.0 |
| Strongly disagree | 8 | 8.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 100 | 100.0 | |

Source: Field Survey.

Table 5 shows the responses of respondents if there is a correlation between political interference and implementation of public procurement process. 30 respondents representing 30.0percent strongly agreed that there is a correlation between political interference and implementation of public procurement process. 42 respondents representing 42.0percent agreed that there is a correlation between political interference and implementation of public procurement process. 10 respondents representing 10.0 percent were undecided. 10 respondents representing 10.0percent disagreed that there is a correlation between political interference and implementation of public procurement process. 8 respondents representing 8.0percent strongly disagreed that there is a correlation between political interference and implementation of public procurement process.

Table 6: There is a low level of political interference in the implementation of public procurement process

| | Frequency | Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|----------------------|-----------|---------|-----------------------|
| Valid Strongly agree | 10 | 10.0 | 10.0 |
| Agree | 15 | 15.0 | 25.0 |
| Undecided | 5 | 5.0 | 30.0 |
| Disagree | 40 | 40.0 | 70.0 |
| Strongly disagree | 30 | 30.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 100 | 100.0 | |

Source: Field Survey.

Table 6 show the responses of respondents if there is a low level of political interference in the implementation of public procurement process. 10 of the respondents representing 10.0percent strongly agree that there is a low level of political interference in the implementation of public procurement process. 15 of the respondents representing 15.0percent agree that there is a low level of political interference in the implementation of public procurement process. 5 of them representing 5.0percent were undecided. 40 of the respondents representing 40.0percent disagree that there is a low level of political interference in the implementation of public procurement process. 30 of the respondents representing 30.0percent strongly disagree that there is a low level of political interference in the implementation of public procurement process.

Table 7: The financial environment is a factor that affects public procurement implementation in public institutions

| | Frequency | Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|----------------------|-----------|---------|-----------------------|
| Valid Strongly agree | 60 | 60.0 | 60.0 |
| Agree | 25 | 25.0 | 85.0 |
| Undecided | 10 | 10.0 | 95.0 |
| Disagree | 5 | 5.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 100 | 100.0 | |

Source: Field Survey.

Table 7 show the responses of respondents if the financial environment is a factor that affects public procurement implementation in public institutions. 60 of the respondents representing 60.0percent strongly agree that the financial environment is a factor that affects public procurement implementation in public institutions. 25 of the respondents representing 25.0percent agree that the financial environment is a factor that affects public procurement implementation in public institutions. 10 of them representing 10.0percent were undecided. 5 of the respondents representing 5.0percent disagree that the financial environment is a factor that affects public procurement implementation in public institutions.

Table 8: Socio-cultural change and environmental fluctuations influences public procurement implementation in public institutions

| | Frequency | Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|----------------------|-----------|---------|--------------------|
| Valid Strongly agree | 25 | 25.0 | 25.0 |
| Agree | 32 | 32.0 | 57.0 |
| Undecided | 13 | 13.0 | 70.0 |
| Disagree | 15 | 15.0 | 85.0 |
| Strongly disagree | 15 | 15.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 100 | 100.0 | |

Source: Field Survey.

Table 8 shows the responses of respondents if socio-cultural change and environmental fluctuations influences public procurement implementation in public institutions. 25 of the respondents representing 25.0percent strongly agree that socio-cultural change and environmental fluctuations influences public procurement implementation in public institutions. 32 of the respondents representing 32.0percent agree that socio-cultural change and environmental fluctuations influences public procurement implementation in public institutions. 13 of the respondents representing 13.0percent were undecided. 15 of the respondents representing 15.0percent disagree that socio-cultural change and environmental fluctuations influences public procurement implementation in public institutions. 15 of the respondents representing 15.0percent strongly disagree that socio-cultural change and environmental fluctuations influences public procurement implementation in public institutions.

Table 9: There are factors affecting public procurement implementation in public institutions

| | Frequency | Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|----------------------|-----------|---------|--------------------|
| Valid Strongly agree | 65 | 65.0 | 65.0 |
| Agree | 30 | 30.0 | 95.0 |
| Disagree | 3 | 3.0 | 98.0 |
| Strongly disagree | 2 | 2.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 100 | 100.0 | |

Source: Field Survey.

Table 9 show the responses of respondents if there are factors affecting public procurement implementation in public institutions. 65 of the respondents representing 65.0percent strongly agree that there are factors affecting public procurement implementation in public institutions. 30 of the respondents representing 30.0percent agree that there are factors affecting public procurement implementation in public institutions. 3 respondents representing 3.0percent were undecided. 3 of the respondents representing 3.0percent disagree that there are factors affecting public procurement implementation in public institutions. 2 of the respondents representing 2.0percent strongly disagree that there are factors affecting public procurement implementation in public institutions.

Table 10: Political change and technological advances affect public procurement implementation in public institutions

| | Frequency | Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|----------------------|-----------|---------|-----------------------|
| Valid Strongly agree | 30 | 30.0 | 30.0 |
| Agree | 42 | 42.0 | 72.0 |
| Undecided | 10 | 10.0 | 82.0 |
| Disagree | 10 | 10.0 | 92.0 |
| Strongly disagree | 8 | 8.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 100 | 100.0 | |

Source: Field Survey.

Table 10 shows the responses of respondents if political change and technological advances affect public procurement implementation in public institutions. 30 respondents representing 30.0percent strongly agreed that political change and technological advances affect public procurement implementation in public institutions. 42 respondents representing 42.0percent agreed that political change and technological advances affect public procurement implementation in public institutions. 10 respondents representing 10.0 percent were undecided. 10 respondents representing 10.0percent disagreed that political change and technological advances affect public procurement implementation in public institutions. 8 respondents representing 8.0percent strongly disagreed that political change and technological advances affect public procurement implementation in public institutions.

Table 11: Political commitment is a necessary condition for each of these strategies to be successful

| | Frequency | Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|----------------------|-----------|---------|-----------------------|
| Valid Strongly agree | 10 | 10.0 | 10.0 |
| Agree | 15 | 15.0 | 25.0 |
| Undecided | 5 | 5.0 | 30.0 |
| Disagree | 40 | 40.0 | 70.0 |
| Strongly disagree | 30 | 30.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 100 | 100.0 | |

Source: Field Survey.

Table 11 show the responses of respondents if political commitment is a necessary condition for each of these strategies to be successful. 10 of the respondents representing 10.0percent strongly agree that political commitment is a necessary condition for each of these strategies to be successful. 15 of the respondents representing 15.0percent agree that political commitment is a necessary condition for each of these strategies to be successful. 5 of them representing 5.0percent were undecided. 40 of the respondents representing 40.0percent disagree that political commitment is a necessary condition for each of these strategies to be successful. 30 of the respondents representing 30.0percent strongly disagree that political commitment is a necessary condition for each of these strategies to be successful.

Table 12: Greater transparency and addressing the supply side of corruption prevent political interference in public procurement implementation in public institutions

| | Frequency | Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|----------------------|-----------|---------|-----------------------|
| Valid Strongly agree | 60 | 60.0 | 60.0 |
| Agree | 25 | 25.0 | 85.0 |
| Undecided | 10 | 10.0 | 95.0 |
| Disagree | 5 | 5.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 100 | 100.0 | |

Source: Field Survey.

Table 12 show the responses of respondents if greater transparency and addressing the supply side of corruption prevent political interference in public procurement implementation in public institutions. 60 of the respondents representing 60.0percent strongly agree that greater transparency and addressing the supply side of corruption prevent political interference in public procurement implementation in public institutions. 25 of the respondents representing 25.0percent agree that greater transparency and addressing the supply side of corruption prevent political interference in public procurement implementation in public institutions. 10 of them representing 10.0percent were undecided. 5 of the respondents representing 5.0percent disagree that greater transparency and addressing the supply side of corruption prevent political interference in public procurement implementation in public institutions.

Table 13: Changes in the organization of public procurement will preventing political interference

| | Frequency | Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|----------------------|-----------|---------|-----------------------|
| Valid Strongly agree | 25 | 25.0 | 25.0 |
| Agree | 32 | 32.0 | 57.0 |
| Undecided | 13 | 13.0 | 70.0 |
| Disagree | 15 | 15.0 | 85.0 |
| Strongly disagree | 15 | 15.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 100 | 100.0 | |

Source: Field Survey.

Table 13 shows the responses of respondents if changes in the organization of public procurement will prevent political interference. 25 of the respondents representing 25.0percent strongly agree that changes in the organization of public procurement will preventing political interference. 32 of the respondents representing 32.0percent agree that changes in the organization of public procurement will prevent political interference. 13 of the respondents representing 13.0percent were undecided. 15 of the respondents representing 15.0percent disagree that changes in the organization of public procurement will preventing political interference. 15 of the respondents representing 15.0percent strongly disagree that changes in the organization of public procurement will preventing political interference.

Table 14: There are remedies to preventing political interference in public procurement implementation in public institutions

| | Frequency | Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|----------------------|-----------|---------|--------------------|
| Valid Strongly agree | 65 | 65.0 | 65.0 |
| Agree | 30 | 30.0 | 95.0 |
| Disagree | 3 | 3.0 | 98.0 |
| Strongly disagree | 2 | 2.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 100 | 100.0 | |

Source: Field Survey.

Table 14 show the responses of respondents if there are remedies to preventing political interference in public procurement implementation in public institutions. 65 of the respondents representing 65.0percent strongly agree that there are remedies to preventing political interference in public procurement implementation in public institutions. 30 of the respondents representing 30.0percent agree that there are remedies to preventing political interference in public procurement implementation in public institutions. 3 respondents representing 3.0percent were undecided. 3 of the respondents representing 3.0percent disagree that there are remedies to preventing political interference in public procurement implementation in public institutions. 2 of the respondents representing 2.0percent strongly disagree that there are remedies to preventing political interference in public procurement implementation in public institutions.

Table 15: Good regulatory performance may include adopting innovative regulatory approaches, making proactive efforts to reduce the regulatory burden and effective use of risk-based regulation

| | Frequency | Percent | Cumulative Percent |
|----------------------|-----------|---------|-----------------------|
| Valid Strongly agree | 30 | 30.0 | 30.0 |
| Agree | 42 | 42.0 | 72.0 |
| Undecided | 10 | 10.0 | 82.0 |
| Disagree | 10 | 10.0 | 92.0 |
| Strongly disagree | 8 | 8.0 | 100.0 |
| Total | 100 | 100.0 | |

Source: Field Survey.

Table 15 shows the responses of respondents if good regulatory performance may include adopting innovative regulatory approaches, making proactive efforts to reduce the regulatory burden and effective use of risk-based regulation. 30 respondents representing 30.0percent strongly agreed that good regulatory performance may include adopting innovative regulatory approaches, making proactive efforts to reduce the regulatory burden and effective use of risk-based regulation. 42 respondents representing 42.0percent agreed that good regulatory performance may include adopting innovative regulatory approaches, making proactive efforts to reduce the regulatory burden and effective use of risk-based regulation. 10 respondents representing 10.0 percent were undecided. 10 respondents representing 10.0percent disagreed that good regulatory performance may include adopting innovative regulatory approaches, making proactive efforts to reduce the regulatory burden and effective use of risk-based regulation. 8 respondents representing 8.0percent strongly disagreed that good regulatory performance may include adopting innovative regulatory approaches, making proactive efforts to reduce the regulatory burden and effective use of risk-based regulation.

4.4 Test of Hypothesis

Hypothesis I

H₀: There is no significant level of political interference in the implementation of public procurement process.

H_i: There is a significant level of political interference in the implementation of public procurement process.

Level of significance: 0.05

Decision rule: reject the null hypothesis H₀ if the p value is less than the level of significance.

Accept the null hypothesis if otherwise.

Table 16 Test Statistics

| | |
|-------------|--|
| | There is a significant level of political interference in the implementation of public procurement process |
| Chi-Square | 105.520 ^a |
| Df | 3 |
| Asymp. Sig. | .000 |

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 25.0.

Conclusions based on decision rule:

Since the p-value= 0.000 is less than the level of significance (0.05), we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there is a significant level of political interference in the implementation of public procurement process.

Hypothesis II

H₀: There are no other factors affecting public procurement implementation in public institutions.

H_i: There are other factors affecting public procurement implementation in public institutions.

Level of significance: 0.05

Decision rule: reject the null hypothesis H₀ if the p value is less than the level of significance.

Accept the null hypothesis if otherwise.

Table 17 Test Statistics

| | There are other factors affecting public procurement implementation in public institutions |
|--------------------|--|
| Chi-Square | 74.520 ^a |
| Df | 2 |
| Asymp. Sig. | .000 |

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 25.0.

Conclusions based on decision rule:

Since the p-value= 0.000 is less than the level of significance (0.05), we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there are other factors affecting public procurement implementation in public institutions.

Hypothesis III

H₀: There are no significant remedies to preventing political interference in public procurement implementation in public institutions.

H_i: There are significant remedies to preventing political interference in public procurement implementation in public institutions.

Level of significance: 0.05

Decision rule: reject the null hypothesis H₀ if the p value is less than the level of significance.

Accept the null hypothesis if otherwise.

Table 18 Test Statistics

| | There are significant remedies to preventing political interference in public procurement implementation in public institutions |
|--------------------|---|
| Chi-Square | 74.520 ^a |
| Df | 2 |
| Asymp. Sig. | .000 |

a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected frequencies less than 5. The minimum expected cell frequency is 25.0.

Conclusions based on decision rule:

Since the p-value= 0.000 is less than the level of significance (0.05), we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that there are significant remedies to preventing political interference in public procurement implementation in public institutions.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

5.1 Conclusion

Public procurement activities suffer from neglect, lack of direction, poor co-ordination, lack of open competition and transparency, differing levels of corruption and most importantly not having a cadre of trained and qualified procurement specialists, who are competent to conduct and manage such procurements, in a professional, timely and cost-effective manner. Inflexible and bureaucratic systems of procurement contribute to unacceptable contract delays, increased costs, the potential for manipulation of contract awards and lack of fair competition, all of which create the perception in the population at large, that public expenditure is slow, ineffective, expensive and often corrupt.

In improving public procurement in Nigeria as well as reform initiatives have centered on making the acquisition process more efficient, essentially by blocking legal and procedural loopholes believed to be avenues for waste and corruption in the system. Consequently, much effort has been devoted in bringing together existing procurement regulations, including directives, into a single document the Public Procurement Act, 2007 and to making this document clearly understood, easily accessible by and properly enforceable. These efforts remain valid and justified especially considering the general legislative and regulatory weakness that has characterized procurement in Nigeria's public sector over the past decades.

5.2 Recommendation

1. the most important way to improve compliance with the Public Procurement Act, 2007 is to isolate routine procurement decisions from political interference or at least, reduces it to a barest minimum. This requires that political leaders should muster the necessary political will which is currently lacking to implement the Act in full.
2. The National Council on Public Procurement should be set up and the Federal Executive Council (FEC) and other bodies should stop failing the rules. Ministers need not play any role in the procurement process. This will allow proper development of technical competence and reduce the level of political interference with public procurement.

3. The National Council on Public Procurement (NCPP) must set out to perform its functions as provided for in the *Act*. First, it must develop conditions of service and staff regulations for the Bureau. It must develop internal rules for operation of the Bureau. It must review, revise, or simply adopt and approve procurement policies, guidelines, monetary thresholds, and other such documents already issued by the Bureau.

4. The Bureau should develop a clear scope and programs for tackling problems of shortage of technical capacity for public procurement. Procurement planning, development of good requests for proposals and bid evaluation, among others, are very technical, practical and active issues in the procurement process. Routine procurement training and sensitization though a good way to start, but do not suffice to develop such capacity.

5. A program for tackling human factors should be put in place in public procurement. For any reform to succeed there should also be a program of value re-orientation. Public financial management and reforms including public procurements, involving reforms

6. Adequate funding to help minimize the effect of possible political vendetta that may arise following its divorce from political control. One possible approach is to amend the Act to protect its budget to enhance autonomy of the Bureau by guaranteeing its funds just like the National Judicial Council's (NJC).

7. Finally, information on public procurement must be publicly made available. The Bureau should publish more information in the Public Procurement Journal and on its website to include details of outcomes of investigated offences and actions taken. It should also include process of publishing/ prosecuting violators.

FINALLY The study presents empirical analysis of the compliance level of Nigerian Local Governments with the Public Procurement Act. The results reveal that Local Governments' level of compliance with the public procurement act is at its lowest end. The reason for this low level compliance may be due to poor media publicity of local government procurement and poor display of professionalism in the procurement process by the government procurement officers. This was further reinforced by the considerable political interference with procurement process in the Government. This study has advance the literature on compliance with the public procurement act.

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APPENDIX I

QUESTIONNAIRE

INSTRUCTION: Please endeavor to complete the questionnaire by ticking the correct answer (s) from the options or supply the information where necessary.

SECTION A

1. Gender

a. Male

b. Female

2. Age range

a. 20-30 up

b. 31-40

c. 41-50

d. 51-60

e. Above 60

3. Educational qualification

a. FSLC

b. WASSCE/GCE/NECO

c. OND/HND/BSC

d. MSC/PGD/MBA/PHD

e. Others

4. Marital Status

a. Single

b. Married

c. Divorced

d. Widowed

SECTION B

QUESTIONS ON AN ASSESSMENT OF THE LEVEL OF POLITICAL INTERFERENCE IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PUBLIC PROCUREMENT IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS.

SA – Strongly Disagreed

A – Agreed

UD – Undecided

DA – Disagreed

SD – Strongly Disagreed

Objective One: To assess the level of political interference in the implementation of public procurement process

| S/N | QUESTIONS | SA | A | UD | DA | SD |
|-----|--|----|---|----|----|----|
| 5. | There is a correlation between political interference and implementation of public procurement process | | | | | |
| 6. | There is a low level of political interference in the implementation of public procurement process | | | | | |

Objective Two: To identify other factors affecting public procurement implementation in public institutions

| S/N | QUESTIONS | SA | A | UD | DA | SD |
|-----|--|----|---|----|----|----|
| 7. | The financial environment is a factor that affects public procurement implementation in public institutions | | | | | |
| 8. | Socio-cultural change and environmental fluctuations influences public procurement implementation in public institutions | | | | | |
| 9. | There are factors affecting public procurement implementation | | | | | |

in public institutions

10. Political change and technological advances affect public procurement implementation in public institutions

Objective Three: To suggest some possible remedies to preventing political interference in public procurement implementation in public institutions

| S/N | QUESTIONS | SA | A | UD | DA | SD |
|-----|--|----|---|----|----|----|
| 11. | Political commitment is a necessary condition for each of these strategies to be successful | | | | | |
| 12. | Greater transparency and addressing the supply side of corruption prevent political interference in public procurement implementation in public institutions | | | | | |
| 13. | Changes in the organization of public procurement will preventing political interference | | | | | |
| 14. | There are remedies to preventing political interference in public procurement implementation in public institutions | | | | | |
| 15. | Good regulatory performance may include adopting innovative regulatory approaches, making proactive efforts to reduce the regulatory burden and effective use of risk-based regulation | | | | | |

