

**THE EFFECT OF BOKO HARAM TERRORISM ON THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY**

**BY**

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**BENIN CITY**

**JULY, 2021**

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**A PROJECT SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND  
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**BENIN CITY**

**NIGERIA**

**JULY 2021**

## **CERTIFICATION**

This is to certify that this work was carried out by **PROMISE BONAVENTURE OKEI**. In the Department of History And International Studies, University of Benin, Benin City, under my supervisor.

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DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

## **DEDICATION**

This project is dedicated to Almighty God, without whom I am nothing. I also dedicate this project to my lovely parents, Mr. and Mrs Okei, may the good Lord continue to strengthen You, Amen.

## **ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

I wish to express my profound gratitude to the almighty God for his faithfulness in my life. My special thanks goes to my lovely parents, Mr. and Mrs. OKEI for their moral, financial, loving and caring support and also for their continuous prayers for me.

My profound appreciation goes to my project supervisor, Mr Williams Orukpe, for his unflinching support, useful suggestions, constructive criticism and fatherly disposition during the course of this work. May God continue to grant your needs, Amen

I will appreciate all the lecturers in the department of international studies and diplomacy, most especially the Head of department, Ag. Frank Ikponwosa , Prof O.B Osadolor, Prof Eddie Erhagbe my course adviser, Dr Charles Osarumwense, Dr Daniel iweze, dr osiki odion,.

Finally God bless them all amen. My appreciation goes to my uncles, Felix and Charles, and my friend Jessica. And the entire students of International Studies and Diplomacy.

**PROMISE BONAVENTURE OKEI**

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## CHAPTER ONE

### BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

#### Introduction

Boko Haram is a radical Islamist movement shaped by its Nigerian context and reflecting Nigeria's history of poor governance and extreme poverty in the north. The movement is unique in that it combines a sectarian, radical Islamic agenda with violence. Its stated goal is the establishment of a sharia state, but it shows little interest in actually governing or implementing economic development. It is based on the fundamentalist Wahhabi theological system and opposes the Islam of the traditional northern Nigerian establishment, which is broadly tolerant. Boko Haram, as an extension of the Maitatsine uprising in 1970s and 1980s, it is not in doubt that Boko Haram is part of the unaddressed issues on religion which the Maitatsine had attempted to raise in the northern parts of the country, starting from Kano more than three decades ago. An offshoot of Islam called the 'Yan' tatsine' violently rebelled against the authorities and non-members.<sup>1</sup>

These radical Muslims estimated between 3000 and 5000 were inspired by Mohammed Marwa, an Islamic scholar who migrated from the town of Marwa in Northern Cameroun to the city of Kano in 1945. Boko Haram and its more radical splinter, are steadily expanding their area of operations. Kidnapping has become a major source of revenue and is widespread, while attacks have occurred in Lagos and Kano. The government's response has been to treat Boko Haram as a part of the international al-

Qaeda movement. Security service abuses are likely a driver of some popular support for or acquiescence to Boko Haram. The struggle between the government and Boko Haram has dire humanitarian consequences. Many people have been internally displaced in northern Nigeria and many refugees have fled to neighboring countries. The international community may be asked to help provide humanitarian assistance in what is one of the poorest parts of the world. Boko Haram” is the popular moniker for an Islamist movement that calls itself the “Sunni Community for the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teaching and Jihad”. Unlike al-Qaeda and its affiliates, its focus is specifically on Nigeria and adjacent countries rather than international jihad. The Nigerian context has shaped Boko Haram into what it has become. Nigerian political life is based on patronage-clientage networks, and religious and ethnic loyalties supersede those to the nation. There has been remarkable continuity between military and civilian governance, particularly in terms of the isolation of the government from the people it governs. In 1900 it is estimated that the territory that makes up Nigeria was 26% Muslim and 1% Christian.<sup>2</sup>

The rest of the population adhered to traditional religions. However, during the 20th century, and especially after independence, Christianity grew explosively in the south and center of the country. Its adherents may outnumber those of Islam, and due to internal migration there are now Christian minorities in the predominantly Muslim north. A religious ethos saturates all aspects of Nigerian public and private life, whether Christian or Muslim. Moreover, the cooperating and competing elites that run Nigeria

exploit religious sentiments for their own purposes, while individuals and groups protesting against these elites also draw on religion to promote their own vision for Nigeria. In recent times, the question of “security” had assumed prominence in public consciousness and discussion.<sup>3</sup> It has become particularly so after the spate of violence (street riots, bombings, killing, arson and other acts of violence against property) in some parts of Nigeria immediately before, and after, the 2011 Elections. Consequently, attention was diverted from the subsisting general violence relating to ethno-nationalist and religious, confessional conflicts and the more specific directly individual/group criminal acts of armed robberies, kidnappings etc. to electoral/party-political conflicts and the accompanying violence across the country. As for the state of violent acts after the 2011 Elections, I have made the point somewhere else that the crisis was not only predictable, it was predicted because the central issues in the campaigns especially the presidential campaigns were about where the president will come from and which God or Gods he/she worship. Whether Jonathan won or lost, there was going to be violence. Generally then, the overall public apprehension of security crisis and the attendant violence in Nigeria has to do with violence and/or threats of violence on persons and property as the state (governments at different levels) and state agencies (the courts, police and other law-enforcement agencies) and cultural institution (religion, the media, educational institutions etc.) define insecurity and violence. We need also to put this discussion on “Security Crisis” in a global context. It is not just inside particular countries that there is insecurity and violent conflicts. Violent conflicts and the attendant

consequences such as refugee problems, hunger, death, rapes, and various other forms of human tragedy have proliferated across the world especially in the last decade with national and international dimensions. In many of these national and international theatres of conflict the globalisation of economic and political violence has been implicated. However.<sup>4</sup>

Boko Haram activities is responsible for the hike in the food items in the South, particularly, food items cultivated in the Northern states. In the words of Amodemaja “food items like tomatoes, onion, beef, beans, and carrots are at high cost in the market. Many of them hardly go to farm and those who could go find it difficult to transport it down South. While some of us who sometimes travel to the Northern region for business transactions are sceptical and afraid of been attacked by Boko Haram.<sup>5</sup> Since we cannot identify nor differentiate the sect members from the innocent Hausas/Fulanis, we generalize our perception and consequently affect our contacts... Even when the items are brought to the South themselves, we are carefully suspicious not to be attacked because we have been told that Boko Haram proposes to attack the Yoruba (southwest) people and further circulated rumour that some of the food items are been poisoned by the Boko Harams of Boko Haram activities is not limited to the Northern region as some State Governments in the South are already regulating the activities of the Hausa/Fulani in their States. For instance, in Lagos State, commercial activities of Hausa in Magodo and Iseri areas are been restricted and denied in some cases, while some have been suspiciously arrested without legal trial.<sup>6</sup> This no doubt portends threat to national

integration. He opined further “many of the internally displaced persons, IDPs, reluctantly begin a new life and manage to survive. Those who could not earn their living will be desperate and thus becomes threat to their host community. As a result, different forms of social vices and criminality will set in and consequently are treated with suspicion, discrimination and resistance by the host community. By implication, the thirst for national integration is doomed.<sup>7</sup>

### **Aims and Objectives**

This research aims to examine the impact of boko haram terrorism on national integration in Nigeria, from 2002- 2019, while the objective of this work are:

- 1) To examine the origin, impact and nature of boko haram terrorism on national integration in Nigeria
- 2) To examine the impact of of boko haram terrorism on national integration in Nigeria
- 3) To examine the influence of international law on terrorism in Nigeria
- 4) To evaluate the devastating effect of terrorism on Nigeria’s economy
- 5) To demonstrate that the Nigerian 21<sup>st</sup> century economic growth and development is heavily dependent on sustainable peace and security.

## **Scope of study**

The scope of the study covers the of boko haram terrorism on national integration in Nigeria 2000 – 2019 this study begins with the foundation of boko haram terrorism In Nigeria and would examine its impact on national integration in Nigeria. Impact social-economic as well as political impact n Nigeria. The scope of my study covers the cradle of Nigeria's problem of national unity and integration remains the amalgamation of Northern and Southern protectorate in 1914 signaling the birth of Nigeria as a sovereign nation, the truth remains that Boko Haram poses greater challenge to the problem of integration in consideration of the dichotomy between reality and perception. Whereas the reality could mean that Boko Haram is an international terrorist group, its perception by the citizenry could assume various dimensions. For a perceiver, the fact that Boko Haram is an Islamist sect already couches it in an ethnic garb. The spate of attacks of Christian dominated areas in the Northern Nigeria and burning of churches presents an ethnic undertone to the situation.

## **Methodology**

This research work is centered on the impact of book haram terrorism on national integration in Nigeria, The proposed research is applied, descriptive, longitudinal, and developed from qualitative point of view on the bases of which primary and secondary data relevant for this research work was sourced, the primary research method for this study is literature review and conceptual modeling terrorism infliction and classification

through a structure approach, the primary source of this research will also make use of online materials and also oral interviews this study will first review the historical development of Boko haram In Nigeria, which will focus on the emergence of Boko haram terrorism and its manifestations in Nigeria, finally , the tremendous impact of boko haram terrorism in national integration in Nigeria. For the purpose of this research, the writer has decided to use the classic social science research tools, this oral interviews featured seasoned, informed, experienced, persons in the field of history relevant to this field of study.

### **Literary review**

Anugwom edline *The boko haram insurgency in Nigeria*

In recent times, there have been a growing research interest in the boko haram terrorism in nigeia, scholars within and outside Nigeria have carried out academic investigation into the problem and conferences, workshops and seminars have been organized to give insight in the boko haram phenomenon and proffer strategies for dealing with it. Understandably, there is no scarcity of literatures on the boko haram terrorism. This study would therefore examine available literatures with a view to expanding the frontiers of knowledge in boko haram terrorism in Nigeria and its impact on the economy of the nation. this book focuses on the boko haram insurgency in Nigeria, providing deeper information on the origin and growth of the sect, it uses empirical data to offer insights into the thinking of members of the sympathizers of boko haram

underlying ideological roots which connects the group whether global jihadi movements creates a thorough interlinking perspective as a fuller way to explain the action and staying power of Boko haram.

The author spoke extensively, that the cause of these violence perpetuated by this radical group is centered on ideology, which is only secondary to the matter, lives are being lost daily by acts of this group and necessary actions are to be taken to end the acts rather than focusing on the ideological root of the members of the sect.

James Hussein '*understanding Boko Haram Terrorism*

The author of this book speaks on the Boko Haram's goal of an Islamic Caliphate, starting in the Borno State in the North East that will eventually cover the areas of the former Kanem-Borno Empire, is a rejection of the modern state system forced on it by the West. The central theme of this volume examines the relationship between the failure of the state-building project in Nigeria and the outbreak and nature of insurgency. At the heart of the Boko Haram phenomenon is a country racked with cleavages, making it hard for Nigeria to cohere as a modern state and places the Boko Haram insurgency in a historical context. The author however did not state that there are, however, multiple cleavages in Nigeria ethnic, regional, cultural, and religious and examines the different state-society dynamics fuelling the conflict. Political grievances are common to every society; however, what gives Boko Haram the space to express such grievances through violence, importantly, this volume demonstrates that the insurgency is, in fact, a

reflection of the hollowness within Nigeria's overall security. Looks at the responses to Boko Haram by Nigeria, neighboring states, and external actors. For Western actors, Boko Haram is seen as part of the "global war on terror" and the fact that it has pledged allegiance to ISIS encourages this framing. However, as the chapters here discuss, this is an over-simplification of Boko Haram and the West needs to address the multiple dimension of Boko Haram.

Iyi John '*Boko Haram and International law*'

This book focuses in the underlying causes of the boko haram insurgency to help readers understand the group, and also boko haram terrorism in Nigeria, framing the conflict in an international law context. It analyses the nature of political violence and the dominant role a violent nation state in both colonial and post-colonial experiences and the rise of terrorism, The writer based on an international context, but still Boko haram do not exist in every state, a country like Nigeria have been suffering from the plague of terrorism, and this should be put into much consideration.

Evans Maloney '*The History of African terrorism*'

The author speaks extensively on the history of terrorism in Africa, by origin a splinter of Boko Haram, Ansaru's base is in Kano and Kaduna. Its full name in English is "Vanguards for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa" Its leadership is obscure; Abu Usama al Ansari is frequently identified as its leader, but little other than his name is known. Its spokesmen claim the group split from Boko Haram because of the latter's

frequent killing of Muslims. Ansaru avoids Muslim casualties and instead actively attacks Christian churches and government officials. Ansaru has introduced tactics commonly associated with the Sahel and al-Qaeda that were previously unknown in West Africa, such as kidnappings and suicide bombers, including females. The group had links with radical Islamist groups in Algeria and Mali, but it is unlikely that it takes direction from them. However, its fighters include some individuals from outside Nigeria, especially Chad and Niger. There is evidence of tactical cooperation between Ansaru and Boko Haram, and it is possible that they have reunited. The Chibok schoolgirls' kidnapping has the flavour of Ansaru, but Shekau claimed responsibility. Ansaru has issued no public statements for many months, which is another indication that it may have merged back into Boko Haram. As he focuses on the History, its nature should not be totally ignored as well as its imprint in national integration.

## **CHAPTERIZATION**

This study is divided into five chapters

### **CHAPTER ONE: BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY**

This chapter contains the aim and objectives of the study, scope of study, methodology and source, literature review and chapters structure.

## **CHAPTER TWO: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF BOKO HARAM IN NIGERIA.**

This chapter examines the emergence of boko haram, as radical Islamist movement shaped by its Nigerian context and reflecting Nigeria's history of poor governance and extreme poverty in the north. The movement is unique in that it combines a sectarian, radical Islamic agenda with violence. Its stated goal is the establishment of a sharia state, but it shows little interest in actually governing or implementing economic development. It is based on the fundamentalist Wahhabi theological system and opposes the Islam of the traditional northern Nigerian establishment, which is broadly tolerant. Boko Haram and its more radical splinter, are steadily expanding their area of operations. Kidnapping has become a major source of revenue and is widespread, while attacks have occurred in Lagos and Kano.

## **CHAPTER THREE: THE IMPACT OF BOKO HARAM TERRORISM ON NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN NIGERIA**

This study examines the unfortunate security challenges currently faced by the country, with its new ethnic and religious dimension, have once again brought to the fore, the internal contradictions of the Nigerian system. The emergence of the militant sect Boko Haram and all it represents started like any other protest, but it seems to have come to stay. The battle has been taken to the door step of the government to command attention that breaks across borders. Hence, this paper examines the term Boko Haram,

beliefs and philosophy, methods of operation and factors aiding their activities. The study adopts a qualitative approach to data analysis to assess the impact of the sect activities and findings indicate that the activities of the religious sect have intense socio-economic, psycho-cultural, political and ethnic and religious implications for national integration and development in Nigeria.

#### **CHAPTER FOUR: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF BOKO HARAM ON NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN NIGERIA**

This chapter examines the fact that Terrorism is a disincentive to potential indigenous and foreign investors and the Boko Haram problem continues to hurt Nigeria. The evidence and fast changing indices (in form of changing migration patterns, cost of insurance in the North, mass repatriation of funds, dearth in skilled labour etc.) speaks volumes. Historically, each region in Nigeria compliments the other. What the North lacks in access to the sea, the South provides. The north wields 78 percent of Nigeria's land which supports most of Nigeria's agriculture (food, cash crops and livestock). The South-West's terrain supports both domestic and international commerce and provides an import/export rout. While the South-South and some parts of the South-East wield Nigeria's oil wealth. With increased intensity of bombings in the North, the gripping tension, insecurity, and suffering occasioned by the sect members and the military actions, subjecting innocent civilians to humiliation, brutalization, extortion and undue hardship led to the mass exodus of people from the violent zones. On July 2009, for instance, over

3,500 people were internally displaced, more than 1,264 children orphaned, and over 392 women widowed Properties destroyed include buildings, three primary schools, more than 12 churches and a magistrate court.

## **CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION**

This chapter is the conclusion which sums up the issues discussed in the main work. The impact of boko haram terrorism on national integration in Nigeria, from 2002-2019.

## Endnotes

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## CHAPTER TWO

### HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF BOKO HARAM IN NIGERIA

#### Introduction

“Boko Haram” is the popular moniker for an Islamist movement that calls itself the “Sunni Community for the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teaching and Jihad”. Unlike al-Qaeda and its affiliates, its focus is specifically on Nigeria and adjacent countries rather than international jihad. Boko Haram is a radical Islamist movement shaped by its Nigerian context and reflecting Nigeria’s history of poor governance and extreme poverty in the north. The movement is unique in that it combines a sectarian, radical Islamic agenda with violence. Its stated goal is the establishment of a sharia state, but it shows little interest in actually governing or implementing economic development. It is based on the fundamentalist Wahhabi theological system and opposes the Islam of the traditional northern Nigerian establishment, which is broadly tolerant.

Boko Haram and its more radical splinter, Ansaru, are steadily expanding their area of operations. Kidnapping has become a major source of revenue and is widespread, while attacks have occurred in Lagos and Kano. The government’s response has been to treat Boko Haram as a part of the international al-Qaeda movement. Security service abuses are likely a driver of some popular support for or acquiescence to Boko Haram. The struggle between the government and Boko Haram has dire humanitarian consequences. Many people have been internally displaced in northern Nigeria and many

refugees have fled to neighbouring countries. The international community may be asked to help provide humanitarian assistance in what is one of the poorest parts of the world. The Nigerian context has shaped Boko Haram into what it has become. Nigerian political life is based on patronage-clientage networks, and religious and ethnic loyalties supersede those to the nation. There has been remarkable continuity between military and civilian governance, particularly in terms of the isolation of the government from the people it governs, Boko Haram's combination of a sectarian agenda with violence is distinctive. According to the movement's rhetoric, its goal is to create God's kingdom on earth through justice for the poor achieved by the rigid application of Islamic law, or sharia. Anything that gets in the way of this goal must be destroyed. For Boko Haram, violence is not a perversion of Islam; it is a justifiable means to a pure end. The group adheres to the strict Wahhabi understanding of "tawhid" (the oneness of God or monotheism).

Boko Haram's project of creating a new form of order in Nigeria manifests itself in the attempt to establish authority through use of violence but also by offering, though limited, financial means in terms of payment and security to local recruits and by proposing a radical, alternative ideological framework to that of Nigeria's corrupt state. To become an authority Boko Haram constantly has to negotiate the inherent contradiction between their social legitimation and the violence they exert. Boko Haram seems to easily recruit young destitutes as members by offering them money, jobs and networks, and by addressing their profound grievances related to failed governance, corruption, absence of the possibility to have future aspirations and underdevelopment in

some of the world's poorest regions. Furthermore, ideas of masculinity and "how to be a man" play a significant role in their recruitment, as expressed in the following quote from Nagarajan .

According to Boko Haram rhetoric, a secular nation promotes idolatry, i.e. state worship. The pledge of allegiance to the flag and singing of the national anthem are manifestations of such idolatry and hence punishable by death. For Boko Haram the state is a nest of corruption that exploits the poor. The state is formed and sustained by Western values and education, both of which are against the will of Allah.

Boko Haram is a recent manifestation of a decades-long civil war within Islam. Radical reformers in what is now Nigeria have long claimed that Muslim leaders are "infidels" if they are "unjust", even when the rulers themselves claim to be Muslims. This often manifests as a conflict between Salafi fundamentalists and the tolerant Sufis who dominate the traditional Nigerian Muslim elites. Boko Haram is thus a direct threat to the traditional Islamic establishment, which is led by the sultan of Sokoto and the shehu of Borno, both of whom the movement has tried to murder; it also claimed responsibility for killing the shehu's brother and bodyguards of the sultan. An aspect of the broad Islamist revival in northern Nigeria has been a Salafi rejection of the secular state. Charismatic preachers organize communities that withdraw from secular life. Usually, such groups are quietist, even pacifists; however, at times they can turn violent, usually in response to the secular state's heavy handedness.

Boko Haram's trajectory is a classic example of such a response. Mohammed Yusuf, a charismatic preacher, organized his community in the city of Maiduguri around 2003. It sought to establish God's kingdom on earth by isolating itself from wider society. Although the movement was hostile to the Nigerian state and rejected Western education as non-Islamic, it remained generally non-violent until 2009. In that year there were altercations over local issues that were likely manipulated by local politicians, which resulted in Yusuf ordering a direct attack on the state, to which the security forces responded brutally. During the suppression of the uprising the police murdered Yusuf. This crime was captured on video and went viral on social media, while several hundred of Yusuf's followers were extra judicially killed. The movement went underground, re-emerging in 2010 under the dead leader's deputy, Abubakar Shekau.

The reconstituted Boko Haram sought revenge against the security forces and committed itself to the overthrow through violence of the Nigerian state government and the compromised Islamic establishment. The movement has called for the replacement of the sultan of Sokoto with a shura (council) dominated by Boko Haram. The size of Shekau's Boko Haram is unknown. However, it has mounted operations involving at least 500 operatives, implying several thousand members and affiliates. In addition, much larger numbers appear to acquiesce to what Boko Haram is doing.

## **Causes or Motivations of Boko insurgency in Nigeria**

The main pillars in the overlapping ideas in Boko Haram's ideology, as formulated by the former leader Mohammed Yusuf, are:

- 1) The rejection of democracy and politics entailing that the Nigerian state should be replaced with an Islamic state based on Sharia law. This aim may be shared by other Salafist groups, but the difference lies in the way Boko Haram perceive that this aim should be achieved through violent means. Specifically, in a situation where the secular government holds the majority of power, and the excessive use of force may cost the lives of fellow Muslims; an issue that is source of overt contestation within global jihadist groups
- 2) The rejection of Western education has been a defining characteristic of the group (cf. the name Boko Haram). According to Wahhabi scholars, European colonialism introduced modern secular education to Islamic societies as a conscious strategy to maintain hegemony and disrupt Islamic pietistic morale. Consequently, Boko Haram rejects various subjects of modern education they regard as contradicting Salafi doctrines of Islam. This claim resonates with the local historical conditions in northern Nigeria, where education was brought in by the British colonial administration. Although the practice of Islam has historically been a means of resistance to the imposition of indirect colonial rule through

education and state formation in general, the extremely violent expression of this resistance is new

- 3) The rejection of working for the un-Islamic government in general and in particular in areas of judgment and law enforcement. Through this assertion Boko Haram indirectly defies more organized institutionalized groups like the Izala whose members may work for the government and enjoy more developed relationships with local state actors
- 4) Boko Haram is motivated by stark feelings of injustice by the Nigerian state, which they consider to have terrorized them. As such revenge constitutes a leitmotif of Boko Haram's actions in response to the atrocities carried out by the state security forces.

It is also noted that Boko Haram sect have also been inspired by internal and external elements.

### **Internal contestation**

Although Salafism is considered the remedy to the injustices of the Nigerian state by various extremist groups in the Nigerian north, the different factions often have incompatible positions on two central questions; how and whether to collaborate with or fight against the Nigerian state, and secondly whether civilians and fellow Muslims constitute legitimate targets. The first question is crucial for the prospect of brokering peace deals with Boko Haram by offering an amnesty to its members. Such attempts have

been made, but have not been successful, as members of different factions seem to disagree on openness to reconciliation. Secondly, killing of civilians has been a continuous point of discussion among radical groups in northern Nigeria. Shekau legitimises killings of civilians by primarily drawing on the Prophet and an established system within Islam, as well as on the many violent acts carried out by the Nigerian state, among which the killing of Mohammed Yusuf and other Boko Haram members by the security forces are pivotal. In January 2012 the most prominent of Boko Haram's factions, Ansaru announced its existence (though they may have been around but operating under different names for longer). Although sharing Boko Haram's doctrines they resisted the haphazard killing of innocent civilians and apparently specialised in the kidnapping of foreigners, most likely due to their members being trained by AQIM . These members constituted key members of the so-called "yan-Sahara" who built relationships with AQIM leading to new tactics and increased funding but also to clashes, conflicts and rupture within Boko Haram.

A reconciliation process between Boko Haram and Ansaru may have taken place in northern Mali during the time when Shekau apparently fled to Gao . In November 2012 Shekau appeared in a video expressing his solidarity with Al-Qaeda, which was a radical departure from the groups' domestic focus, bringing Boko Haram and Ansaru closer together. The French military intervention in Mali may have further excited the more regional-oriented section of Boko Haram. This "provided them an opportunity to present themselves as regional and global players".

## **External connections to al Qaeda and Islamic state**

In its more recent stages, the Boko Haram seem to be increasingly inspired by global jihadist groups like Al Qaeda and Islamic State. They are also suspected of having had links to a number of radical African Muslim groups like Al Shabaab, Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and AQIM . These ad hoc connections, as International Crisis Group (2014) has argued, make them a dangerous organisation for the regional stability of West Africa but, in particular, for the people living in the areas Boko Haram strive to control. This image was particularly strengthened by Boko Haram's pledging of loyalty to Islamic State in March 2015. It is, however, disputed how significant this statement and the relationship to Islamic State actually is to the tactical development of the group , and it may most of all serve the purpose of propaganda and attracting media attention, which could incentivise some followers In the media and in policy circles Boko Haram is often portrayed as forming part of a so-called "arc of terrorism" reflected in expressions such as "Afghanistan" or "Sahelistan" imagining a terrorist collaboration between African jihadist groups across the Sahel.

However these ties and the extent to which Boko Haram has a broader global goal are highly disputed among scholars. They may well be inspired by them, and certainly draw international media attention from the statements they make, but their goals remain local, in a context that is nevertheless characterised by porous borders. As such Boko Haram has from the outset been regional, as they have used the border regions in

neighbouring countries for recruitment, refuge and training, where the security forces have acted according to a policy of “if you don’t bother us, we don’t bother you”. But since the inauguration of the Multinational Joint Task Force more attacks in these countries have occurred, disrupting the previous tacit non-interference policy of regional security actors.

### **Manifestations**

Boko Haram draws, among other things, upon historical references to the Islamic empire of Dan Fodio’s Sokoto Caliphate in the 19th century that introduced and institutionalised Islam in northern Nigeria. The Sokoto Caliphate consisted of Sharia-based emirates led by local emirs (commanders), which continued to exist after the British colonial powers made it an integrated part of the Nigerian state when they occupied the territory. Today, the sultan of the Sokoto caliphate is the religious leader of Nigeria’s more than 70 million Muslims , most of whom Boko Haram considers infidels that have been co-opted by the corrupt government. As Boko Haram denies the authority of the secular state, they do not acknowledge the present sultan of Sokoto as the ruler of Muslims. The emergence of Boko Haram can be seen in the broader context of the radical Islamic reform movement inspired by Wahhabism and Salafism that flourished in northern Nigeria in the 1980s. These groups included among others the radical, anti-modern and violent Maitatsine movement who were not, however, organizationally linked to Boko Haram.

Another influential, more organized, non-violent movement was the Izala, founded by highly educated and well positioned members who also established a network of modern Islamic schools, the students of which were pursuing academic education in the 1980s in Nigeria and abroad. Several of these students received grants to study in Saudi Arabia. In general, the rise of more radical interpretations of Islam was introduced during the 1970s and 1980s through, amongst others, Saudi Arabia, which invested in mosques; madrassahs, Arabic teaching and community-led projects as well as providing scholarships for university students to study in Saudi Arabia. These developments are believed to have had a large impact on spreading radical Islamist ideas in the region, but are not necessarily linked to the radical political violence, which by contrast has to be considered in the context of the violent militant responses by the Nigerian security forces.

Under the charismatic leadership of Mohammed Yussuf members of the group were actively engaged in a mobilisation to demand the implementation of Sharia law in some of the northern states. Recruitment also involved a system of informal social welfare through micro financing. Yusuf was apparently let down by his political alliances on their promises to implement Sharia fully in Borno state, after which his methods and preaching took a violent and radical turn towards militant Islam, where members became disassociated from the larger society . The sect first took up arms against security forces in 2003, attacking police stations and public buildings in Yobe state. Subsequently soldiers and police killed 18 and arrested dozens of its members and the group dispersed into other northern States where they, among others things, established a base named

“Afghanistan” on the border of the republic of Niger, following which they gained the name the “Nigerian Taliban”, although no formal connections with the Taliban have been established. Nevertheless they continued to attack and rob police stations on a massive scale. In 2004 Mohammed Yussuf escaped to Saudi Arabia, but he eventually returned to Nigeria. In 2008 Boko Haram members were excluded from use of the mosques in Maiduguri by the Izala. Following contestation over ownership of mosques with the Izala, Boko Haram members were arrested by the police .

The security forces set up the first joint military operation code, Operation Flush II, which mismanaged the crisis from the outset by banning driving motorcycles at night, introducing road blocks and obligations to wear helmets, with often violent enforcement. The harsh police response gave Boko Haram some sympathy in the population. The police violence took another turn, notably when 17 Boko Haram members were shot at while attending the funeral of a fellow member In July 2010. After the death of Mohammed Yusuf, Boko Haram went underground and re-emerged under the new leadership of Abukar Shekau, an ethnic Kanuri from Yobe state, who transformed the group from mobilising youth among the public, to a clandestine network well equipped for asymmetrical warfare. Shekau has been described as the most radical of the aspiring leaders, and extremely violent. Some argue that Shekau is a nom de guerre for several leaders of Boko Haram’s extremely decentralised franchise, consisting of at least six semi-autonomous units of which the largest and most deadly is headed by Shekau, who has been declared dead several times . In this phase, Boko Haram fighters developed new

and more violent tactics including targeted assassinations, drive- by shootings and use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). To revenge the arrests of its members during the 2009 revolt, Boko Haram staged an attack on Bauchi prison in 2010 to liberate its members. Subsequently, the violence and death toll increased. Statements were launched of ties to other regional jihadist militants like the Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

Eventually, and partly in response to the increased security measures deployed by the Nigerian state, suicide bombings became part of the repertoire, targeting among other things, the Abuja police station in 2011 and the UN headquarters killing 23 people. In June 2011, 3,600 men were deployed in a special military Joint Task Force (JTF) named Operation Restore Order comprising personnel and officers of the Nigerian army, navy, air force, police and state security service (SSS) stationed in Maiduguri with a mandate to neutralise Boko Haram. The JTF was perceived locally as an occupation army known for their brutal retaliation against the population including mass arrests of people suspected to be Boko Haram and extrajudicial killings of suspects i.e. an increasing intensity of human rights violations further alienated the population. According to Mohammed Boko Haram would consciously provoke the military knowing they would strike back at civilians. After Boko Haram seized territory in remote areas of the region, in 2013, former president Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency in three northern states and allocated another 2,000 troops to join the JTF.

In April 2013, the military had killed at least 185 unarmed civilians and burnt more than 2,000 houses. According to Amnesty International (2012) there are numerous examples of unrecorded atrocities carried out by the JTF, all of which they have nevertheless denied. Alongside the JTF, groups of civilians organised into a Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) to complement the efforts of the Nigerian soldiers. The CJTF consists of local vigilantes who were believed to have local knowledge about the whereabouts of Boko Haram, but the presence of whom has, nevertheless, spurred increasing concerns that such groups could become militias like Boko Haram themselves exacerbating local level violence. The deployment of the CTJF only encouraged Boko Haram to claim more lives of civilians, whom they had formerly spared, but now considered to have betrayed them, as well as increasing attacks on schools, school teachers and pupils. Boko Haram, thus, lost local support and started engaging in forced recruitment while military repression continued. Kidnapping of foreigners also became part of their tactics, generating both media attention and legitimacy among other radical Salafi groups

Boko Haram is concentrated in north-east Nigeria, but it has demonstrated national reach. It has carried out operations in Plateau State, where ethnic and religious conflict has long been fierce. Shekau also claimed responsibility for a suicide bomb attack in the port of Lagos. Elsewhere in the north are other groups about which outsiders including the Nigerian government appear to know little. Their grievances and violence are usually local, although they use the Salafi rhetoric associated with Shekau. Presumably, many of them have a criminal or political dimension. Funding for Boko

Haram and other radical groups comes from bank robberies, kidnapping ransoms, the theft of weapons from government armouries, and especially in the case of criminal groups smuggling. Remittances from overseas appear to play no role.

Terrorism in northern Nigeria is cheap. Explosives and knowledge about them are widespread, not least because of the presence of an indigenous mining industry. Vehicles used for suicide attacks and car bombs are usually stolen. The large number of weapons in radical hands that come from government armouries implies that radical Islamic groups have infiltrated the military and other institutions of government, as senior military officials and None of these groups has attempted to set up an alternative state structure nor to levy taxes on the local people. This may be changing as of August 2014 Boko Haram controls a swath of territory estimated to be slightly larger than Luxembourg, where it has destroyed all vestiges of secular or traditional rule. Shekau has publicly expressed support for the caliphate established by the self-proclaimed Islamic State in parts of Syria and Iraq and has previously called for a caliphate in northern Nigeria. To manage ethnic, regional, and religious divisions, at the end of military rule in 1998 the competing and cooperating elites in the ruling People's Democratic Party established a pattern of alternating the presidency between the predominantly Muslim north and the mostly Christian south. This system was essentially dismantled in 2011 when southern Christian Goodluck Jonathan successfully won the presidential campaign for re-election with the support or acquiescence of some of the northern Islamic establishment, who were probably bribed. Jonathan's failure to replace the system of

alternate Christian and Muslim presidents with a new balancing structure during a period of accelerating political appeals to ethnic and religious identities has been an important driver of northern marginalisation and a catalyst for the current wave of conflicts there. On the streets the traditional Islamic establishment is seen as having sold out to secularism, making room for Boko Haram.

### **The government's response to Boko Haram**

The government's response to Boko Haram is to see it as a terrorist movement in isolation from any environment that may have fostered it, and state security forces have reacted with violent repression. The government's seemingly indiscriminate killing of alleged Boko Haram members and many others who were simply in the wrong place at the wrong time appears to be a driver of popular support for or acquiescence to Boko Haram (Amnesty International, 2014).

The U.S. and British governments designated Boko Haram and Ansaru as terrorist organisations in 2013, while the United Nations designated Boko Haram an al-Qaeda affiliate in 2014. In the aftermath of the Chibok schoolgirls' kidnapping a number of Western countries offered to help Nigeria find and liberate the captives.<sup>7</sup> However, the government has done little to take advantage of these offers. Moreover, credible reports of human rights abuses by the Nigerian security forces create difficulties for outside involvement by democratic states committed to furthering human rights. Boko Haram insurgency is primarily driven by local conflict dynamics that, lately, are increasingly

involving neighbouring countries with porous borders with northern Nigeria. It is unlikely that Boko Haram will develop the aim of and capacity to carry out attacks in the West, and so far there have not been reported foreign Western fighters in Nigeria. But Boko Haram may continue to target Western interests in Nigeria. Nigeria is a major oil producing country in which European and multinational and corporations and businesses have large stakes. Thus the instability in the region is also a concern for the US and other Western countries. Following the abduction of the Chibok schoolchildren in March 2014 the UN declared Boko Haram to be a terrorist organisation.

The international community including the EU has since then paid more attention to Boko Haram, concurrently with the increased number of attacks in the region. Until the election of Buhari in 2015, Nigeria ruled out the need for foreign intervention either by a UN or an AU-backed force (although Goodluck Jonathan did employ private South African mercenaries to assist in finding the Chibok hostages). Moreover, the regional organisation ECOWAS (that is heavily influenced by Nigeria, its currently most powerful member) has not pursued an active role in the fight against Boko Haram . On 14 October 2015 Barack Obama sent 300 American soldiers to Cameroon to set up a drone base to track fighters from Boko Haram through surveillance operations and the gathering of intelligence.

## **International intervention**

### **The European Union**

The EU highlights the Lake Chad Basin region (Niger, Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad) as a particularly volatile one due to the presence of Boko Haram but also due to the fragility of southern Libya. Thus, seen from the perspective of the EU, Boko Haram and northern Nigeria is gateway to the larger Sahel, which is considered a hot spot for organised crime, trafficking and terrorism. Yet Boko Haram is explicitly not part of the EU's strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel formulated in 2012, focusing on four axes of intervention reflecting European interests: development, political and diplomatic action; security and the rule of law; countering violent extremism and radicalisation.

The action plan for 2015 expands the Sahelian countries from Mali, Niger and Mauritania to include Burkina Faso and Chad the so called G5 countries. In April 2015 the European external action service presented the EU's Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA) for the Boko Haram crisis that was welcomed by the Political and Security Committee (PSC) as a basis to guide the EU response to the crisis, and the best way forward for the EU to support the MNJTF. There is a newly-deployed EU security expert in Abuja who is to engage more with the Nigerian army and EU member states to facilitate support. In addition, the EU is considering supporting reconstruction, rehabilitation, resettlement and long-term development processes in areas affected by the

insurgency. Historically, there has been a tense relationship between France and Nigeria. In March 2015 France announced it would step up its logistical support and intelligence to the neighboring countries fighting Boko Haram. Since December 2014 the fight against Boko Haram has become part of the mandate of the French pan-Sahel counter-terrorism operation Barkhane (replacing and expanding operation Serval) composed of 3,000 French soldiers with its headquarters in N'Djamena (Chad) operating in the former French colonies of Burkina Faso (550 troops), Chad (1200 troops), Mali (1000 troops), Mauritania and Niger (300 troops).

“The fight against Boko Haram is part of a region-wide strategy ultimately aimed, in words of the French Defense Minister, at the eradication of jihadist terrorism in the Sahel”. France does not take part in the combat because it is stretched thin with only 3,000 soldiers, EU’s three Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions include the civil missions of EUCAP Sahel in Niger and Mali that work with capacity building of national authorities and internal security forces in order to combat terrorism and organized crime. In virtue of being the former colonial power there are historical and ambiguous ties between Nigeria and the UK. So far UK security concerns have focused on the Niger Delta and anti-piracy, but with the deteriorating situation in the north, counterterrorism has crawled up the agenda (149Comolli 2015b). The British Special Forces participated in a failed mission to rescue British hostages kidnapped, where after the group joined Boko Haram on Britain’s list of terrorist organizations. Britain as target

in one of his videos for the first time, there has been a tendency to overlook allegations of human rights abuses in Britain's military cooperation with Nigeria.

## **USA**

Nigeria is the US' number one trading partner in Sub-Saharan Africa and has various types of cooperation including regional security cooperation such as military training for Nigerian forces since the 1980s and the 2005 Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) aimed at countering terrorism in Mauritania, Mali, Chad, Nigeria, Niger, Senegal and Burkina Faso through local capacity building and increased cooperation with Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia . The TSCTP built on a "Diplomacy, Defence and Development" model led by the US state department to perform activities like the annual Flintlock counter-terrorism exercise sponsored by the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) as well as a range of other conflict management and legal enforcement activities. Nigeria has been reluctant to acknowledge the size of the insurgency except when facing international audiences, then there could be a tendency to exaggerate Boko Haram's international connections with a view to receiving foreign aid, After the Chibok abduction in 2014 the US sent a surveillance drone and 80 soldiers to Chad to assist the finding of the schoolgirls. Up until that point the US had not considered Boko Haram a security concern.

The Obama administration's approach to Boko Haram should be considered in the context of US foreign policy and internal contestations within the White House

between the Obama administration and his neo-conservative critics who focus on previous links between Osama Bin Laden and Boko Haram. The neo-conservatives perceive Boko Haram to be an ideological anti-Western terrorist organization i.e. a continuation of the axis of evil that requires a military response similar to that in Afghanistan and Iraq. In opposition to this, Obama articulates Boko Haram as a local and socioeconomically motivated insurgency, and his military support to #BringBackOurGirls was specifically framed as a rescue operation, not a war against terror. Though the US increased its support to fight Boko Haram after the kidnappings of the Chibok girls, concerns over human rights abuses by the Nigerian military made the US wary of sending helicopters and more military equipment. Nigeria used to supply more oil to the United States than most middle-income countries. In 2010, Nigeria was among America's top five oil suppliers but in 2014, for the first time since 1973, the US stopped the import of Nigerian oil. The halt was possibly due to increased US oil production, but according to some sources it is likely that the sudden termination of oil imports and the refusal of the US government to sell weapons to Nigeria to fight Boko Haram was a way for Barack Obama to demonstrate his lack of support for ex-president Goodluck's government.

## **Denmark**

In terms of security concerns Boko Haram is not perceived as a direct threat to Danish interests in Nigeria as compared to piracy in the Gulf of Guinea. In 2014

Denmark opened up an embassy in Abuja and a trading office in Lagos. Some of the giant shipping companies have been in Nigeria for long, and Denmark has recently invested 16.3 billion DKK to build a new harbor in Lagos. Sectors like agriculture, health and design are increasingly attracting Danish companies to invest in Nigeria, which can create new development potential and partnerships in the future.

## **Conclusion**

Boko Haram emerged in the context of a broader Islamic reform movement in northern Nigeria in the 1990s and subsequently developed from an Islamic insurgency into a full-scale war in 2013. In the course of these events mutual retaliations carried out by Boko Haram and the Nigerian army's counter-insurgency have trapped northern Nigeria in a spiral of violence. With incumbent president, Buhari's strong-willed approach to fighting Boko Haram and new propositions of socio-economic development plans for northern Nigeria, there is a glimmer of hope for containing the violence in northern Nigeria. However, there are signs that the deepening involvement of neighbouring countries may give rise to reactive attacks against the newly established regional coalition, which is profoundly supported by international security actors progressively engaged in the fight against Boko Haram. In the context of regional instability after the fall of the Gaddafi regime in 2011, and particularly in relation to the the security crisis in Mali, the Boko Haram insurgency is increasingly perceived as forming part of and contributing to a larger "arc of terrorism" across the Sahel. Such

perceptions have been strengthened as attacks in the neighboring countries have increased and by Boko Haram pledging loyalty to Islamic State in March 2015.

A main argument in the report is that the framing of the group as part of a larger pan-African terrorist threat informs military operations, such as the French counter-terrorist operation. However, the disadvantages of overestimating the “arc of terrorism” and the perceived threat to the West are that: First they may serve the opposite purpose of assigning the groups more credibility and capacity, which may strengthen their aim, image and potential recruitment. Second, the emphasis on an “arc of terrorism” downplays the root causes, and local and national dimensions of the conflicts such as the human rights violations and abuses of civilians carried out by Nigeria’s security actors, corruption, illegal economic activities, poverty and inequality. It is the tackling of these issues that holds the key to solving the multi-faceted crisis of Boko Haram. Third, such discourses fail to distinguish between ideologically driven core members and followers whose motivations are mainly economic and even survival.

Finally, an emphasis of an “arc of terrorism” may inform the wrong policy responses that could potentially escalate and further regionalize the conflict ignoring the national Nigerian responsibility and local drivers of conflict. Rather than rephrasing de-contextualized discourses of “an arc of terrorism”, global jihad and international connections to Islamic State, it seems more possible that the situation in north-east Nigeria is heading towards a fragmented protracted conflict with very complex social

tensions. The key issue in the approach to Boko Haram is to understand and include the local dynamics of the insurgency. Therefore there is a need to pay attention, in future debates and potential interventions to current military operations by Niger, Chad and Cameroon, in order to avoid that they repeat the same mistakes made by Nigeria in 2013: human rights violations and economic sanctions that might transform a jihadist uprising into a people's revolt. Furthermore, to address the insurgency the report suggests paying more attention to how gender norms influence male and female recruitment. Gender perspectives and the role of women within Boko Haram and as protesters against Boko Haram should also inform future interventions and policy. Finally, Boko Haram insurgency has entailed tremendous humanitarian consequences in its wake. Civilians have been shot, beheaded, amputated, drowned, burned and bombed, and the violence has prompted the forced displacement of more than two million people in Nigeria and across the region. Food shortages and famine are major concerns while the high level of insecurity constrains the conditions for humanitarian workers to alleviate the situation.

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## CHAPTER THREE

### IMPLICATIONS OF BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY ON NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN NIGERIA

#### Introduction

Conflict in Nigeria is as old as the nation itself, but the frequency and the toll on human lives and properties of recent conflicts by the militant sect Boko Haram and all it represents make them more challenging to address. Even though, the activities of the sect Boko Haram began in the North-Eastern part of Nigeria and escalates to the other Northern states. The impact of the crisis for national integration cut across the geopolitical zones in the country , Although the group has come to be popularity known as Boko Haram, it is not clear whether the group actually called itself by this name. Some called them Yusufiyya sect, but some called them Jamaatul Takful Wal Hyra Ahlus Sunna. Some still called them Khawaarji and some called them Jama'atul Ahlisunnah Lidda'awati walJihad, which they approved of means in Arabic "People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad".

In the town of Maiduguri, where the group was formed, the residents dubbed it Boko Haram. The term "Boko Haram" comes from the Hausa word boko meaning "western education" and the Arabic word haram figuratively meaning "sin" (literally, "forbidden) . The name, loosely translated from Hausa, means "western education is forbidden". The group earned this name due to its strong opposition to anything Western,

which it sees as contradicting the shari'ah laws and corrupting Muslims, The literature on integration is replete with different definitions of the term. It is a very broad statement. In anthropological language, integration suggests that various peoples of Nigeria, in pursuing their daily lives, are actually interpenetrating into each other (morphing) in the course of which a new Nigeria is being born. Philip Jacob and Henry Tenue , defines it as “a relationship of community among people within the same political entity state of mind or disposition to be cohesive, to act together, to be committed to mutual programmes National Integration means combing all the people of the nation into a single whole. It is a particular sentiment that binds together all people in one common bond no matter what their religion, language or history is. It is strong cementing force whereby all kinds of people live together peacefully and can identify themselves as a part of a single whole. It reduces socio-cultural and economic differences or inequalities and strengthens national unity and solidarity, which is not imposed by any authority.

People share ideas, values and emotional bonds. It is feeling of unity within diversity. National identity is supreme. However, in the words of Ntalaja, solidarity with one's identity is best mobilized when the group faces a threat, real or imaged, to its interests, security or its very existence as a group. This is why there is an increase in identity based conflicts during periods of economic and political crisis the high incidence of intercommunal violence is due to growing competition over scarce resources and the persistence of poverty. Thus are insecurity and poverty intertwined, and their persistence can only frustrate the Nigerian 'national' integration and development process. Karl

Deutsch et al. offers a better definition as “the attainment, within a territory of a ‘sense of community’ and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a long time dependable expectations of peaceful community”. Put differently, a security community is a group of people who are integrated. A sense of community is a belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to agreement on at least one point that common social problems must and can be resolved on processes of peaceful change. Peaceful change in this context means the resolution of social problems without resort to large scale physical force”. It is clear that individuals are the units of integration, and members of a nation are integrated as they share a common identity. Thus, the term national integration is not applicable to a single nation, but involves two or more nations. A state is a political entity that is in many cases made of more than one nationality group. Thus, for example, Nigeria is made of about 250 ethnic groups.

Nigeria is a political entity made up of various ethnic groups, bound together by common cultural and linguistic affiliates. The spirit of national integration, however, is indispensable in order to form one formidable nation, sharing common goals and interest and doing things together.

## **Implications of boko haram activities for national integration and development**

### **Socio - Economic Implications**

It is disheartening that Nigeria is being lumped together with Somalia, Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and other ill-reputed nations. Terrorism is a disincentive to potential

indigenous and foreign investors and the Boko Haram problem continues to hurt Nigeria. The evidence and fast changing indices (in form of changing migration patterns, cost of insurance in the North, mass repatriation of funds, dearth in skilled labour etc) speaks volumes. Historically, each region in Nigeria compliments the other. What the North lacks in access to the sea, the South provides. The north wields 78 percent of Nigeria's land which supports most of Nigeria's agriculture (food, cash crops and livestock). The South-West's terrain supports both domestic and international commerce and provides an import/export rout. While the South-South and some parts of the South-East wield Nigeria's oil wealth With increased intensity of bombings in the North, the gripping tension, insecurity, and suffering occasioned by the sect members and the military actions, subjecting innocent civilians to humiliation, brutalization, extortion and undue hardship led to the mass exodus of people from the violent zones. On July 2009, for instance, over 3,500 people were internally displaced, more than 1,264 children orphaned, and over 392 women widowed... Properties destroyed include buildings, three primary schools, more than 12 churches and a magistrate court.

The movements were of unprecedented kind since both Southerners and Northerners simultaneously moved from Boko Haram strong holds. The implication is that "there will be significant dearth in professionals, artisans and commercial professionals in the region". For instance, a doctor at the University of Maiduguri teaching hospital says that many professionals in the International Affairs and Global in 2016 5 service sector and doctors have sought for transfer out of affected zones in the

North. Some whose requests are not being honored and feel they cannot continue in the apprehension resign on the back of pressure from relations. Those who remain do so because opportunities are few.

Business activities are gradually fizzling out, with social activities grounded due to frequent hurling of explosives into restaurants by members of Boko Haram. Hotels up North are enjoying a patronage of dissipation and so are markets. Blessing Essen, a hotelier in the city of Maiduguri said “We are no longer opening our restaurants because people don’t come out to socialize for fear of losing their lives. Thousands of local businesses close down and residents are forced to migrate to greener pastures. Rent in major metropolises in Kano, Borno, Bauchi, Kebbi and Yobe reduced significantly as the crisis unabated”. A resident in Kaduna, Kabir Sobowale reveals that the majority of the non-natives, especially Igbo, have resorted to selling their houses and other landed property at ridiculously cheaper rates, saying that they no longer feel safe to carry out their businesses in the violent prone states. However, Boko Haram activities is responsible for the hike in the food items in the South, particularly, food items cultivated in the Northern states. In the words of Amodemaja “food items like tomatoes, onion, beef, beans, and carrots are at high cost in the market. Many of them hardly go to farm and those who could go find it difficult to transport it down South. While some of us who sometimes travel to the Northern region for business transactions are sceptical and afraid of been attacked by Boko Haram. Since we cannot identify nor differentiate the sect

members from the innocent Hausas/Fulanis, we generalize our perception and consequently affect our contacts.

Even when the items are brought to the South themselves, we are carefully suspicious not to be attacked because we have been told that Boko Haram proposes to attack the Yoruba (southwest) people and further circulated rumour that some of the food items are been poisoned by the Boko Haram...”. Dare Dairo argues further that the socio-economic implications of Boko Haram activities is not limited to the Northern region as some State Governments in the South are already regulating the activities of the Hausa/Fulani in their States. For instance, in Lagos State, commercial activities of Hausa in Magodo and Iseri areas are been restricted and denied in some cases, while some have been suspiciously arrested without legal trial. This no doubt portends threat to national integration. He opined further “many of the internally displaced persons, IDPs, reluctantly begin a new life and manage to survive. Those who could not earn their living will be desperate and thus becomes threat to their host community. As a result, different forms of social vices and criminality will set in and consequently are treated with suspicion, discrimination and resistance by the host community.

By implication, the thirst for national integration is doomed” . Such consequences include; social disintegration and disruption (among kinship groups, family systems, trade linkages, formal and informal associations, disruption of education, gender discrimination and abuse especially rape and sexual violence often manifest), increase in

crime, orphans and street begging, joblessness, marginalization, food insecurity, increased mortality (social stress and psychological trauma). It inadvertently affects the economic wellbeing and integration of people in the country”.

### **Psycho-Cultural and Political Implications**

Boko Haram’s indiscriminate violent activities and successes make the security agencies look inept. As a result, there is a growing perception that the police and their allied organizations are weak, corrupt, and poorly trained. Evidently frustrated by the lack of progress made in countering the threat, President Jonathan recently spoke about supporters of the sect saying that “some of them are in the executive arm of government, some of them are in the parliamentary/legislative arm of the government, whilst some of them are in the judiciary. Some are also in the armed forces, the police and other security agencies”. The real trouble lies in the constant anxiety it is causing Nigerians and the discord it is sowing. The panic was not an exhibition of paranoia, but an admission that in the contest between Boko Haram and the state, the sect is leading.

The realization of this grim fact is what is responsible for the change in attitude. Hotels screen guests for bombs and other weapons. Churches and schools do the same. Entertainment and sports stadium concerns, even in places far away from the North, have adopted the same measure. According to Olorode, stop and search policy have unnecessarily becomes routine in many church in the city of Abeokuta. She puts “I go to church for service at least three times a week and we are always subjected to search

before entering, particularly on Sundays, and that is the same experience in many other churches in the city. Our Pastor said that is the only way to ensure our safety during service” . Pastor Karunwi, and Fasasi, further states “the phobia of not been attacked by the Boko Haram has created suspicion among members of their denomination and that is not good for our relationship and integration. This also led to the recent evacuation being conducted by various states, particularly in the south that fear for their indigenes’ lives in the region.the incessant attacks would adversely affect intra and inter-marriage relationship between the South and the North. The Muslim South and the Muslim North would find it difficult to allow International Affairs and Global ,6 contacts of their children on the one hand, and to a large extent within the Muslim fold in the South who does not belong to the same religious denomination on the other hand, more or less Muslim-Christian marrying to one another.

Evidence reveals that Southerners particularly among Yoruba people are members of the Boko Haram.” .Moreover the daily trouncing of the security and intelligence services is likely to have a demoralizing impact. Low ranking members may begin to doubt the ability of their leaders to make the right calls; and the senior ranks too may begin to doubt the vision and the ability of their superiors. These and other factors are likely to have a negative impact on the cohesiveness of the security and intelligence agencies. Thus disintegration set in within the sector. In addition, civilians and even non-civilians are begun to doubt the leadership capability of the government.

A government that can't, or that is unable to secure lives and property, will find it difficult to govern or command respect that could promote integration of the electorate. This may consequently lead to a crisis of leadership and when the center is in turmoil in the face of ethnic and religious bigotry, integration of these groups within the context of national identity and cultural unity is a mirage. Furthermore, Nigeria is now regarded as a terrorist state and another axis of the devil. Prof. the country's image had already been damaged." The implication is that Nigerians will be subjected to inhuman treatment within and outside her boundary and entire Nigerian will be a suspect to one another. No wonder David Cameron, the British prime minister, had to meet with President Jonathan in Lagos (South-West) instead of the Federal capital Abuja. the crises in the North may have psychological implication causing anxiety, suspicion and sowing discord and could affect political relationship between Christians and Muslims on the one hand and Southerners versus Northerners on the other hand in future political dispensation

### **Ethnic and Religious Implications**

Boko Haram's major attacks, aside from unconfirmed rumors of minor incidents in the South, have so far not extended further South than Abuja, which is technically part of the North. But the group seems to pose indirect threat to attack Southern cities like Lagos and Ibadan, or to oil production in the Delta. The threats Boko Haram poses to the South are more indirect: first the potential for an escalation of inter-communal ethnic and religious tensions and second, the continued erosion of Nigeria's faith in the central

government. the security situation in Northern Nigeria has become frightening, especially the dimension which it has taken. The wave of violence in the North has led to an escalation in the rhetoric of some Southern groups who perceive Boko Haram as anti-South and anti-Christian movement and are aimed at provoking its adherents to action, argument could be justified based on the following press release: Following the killings of Mubi, an Igbo group christened Biafran Liberation Council, BLC in a statement signed by Amaechi Nwaofia, the group's spokesman, states;

The callous murder of innocent Biafrans was carried out just a few days after the warning by Boko Haram, that all Christians and Southerners in the North should leave within three days. This call by Boko Haram and the murder of the Biafrans, Southerners and Christians further confirms our long held view that we can no longer co-habit with the Northerners and we should therefore, be allowed to secede as the sovereign state of Biafra” . The Oodua Nationalist Congress, ONAC and Oodua People's Congress, OPC, in a statement: “Yoruba nation was greatly disturbed by the recent killings of two Yoruba professors, Jerome Ayodele and Andrew Leo Ogbonyomi, in Bayero University, Kano. It had run out of patience with the attitude of the government to the attacks on Nigerians by the Boko Haram sect and the Yoruba nationalist groups would soon embark on a reprisal if nothing was done urgently. Ayo Oritsejafor, president of Christian Association of Nigeria, CAN, said “Christians in the North should find ways of defending themselves to prevent further loss of lives. They do it on Sundays and attack only places of worship attended by Christians. In the words of Bishop Emmanuel Chukwuma, South-East CAN

Chairman asserts: “henceforth the Christians will retaliate every action against Christians by Boko Haram anywhere in the country” . Matthew Hassan Kukah, the Catholic Bishop of Sokoto Diocese, during a National Summit on the Freedom of Information Act stressed: “I warned him about the future of Nigeria; I am convinced that Nigeria is running out of International Affairs and Global Strateg, There is an impending war between Muslims and Christians in the country”.

Killings by Boko Haram and the fear of becoming targets of retaliation has also led to the exodus of Muslim northerners from the southern parts of the country since the beginning of 2012, especially Delta and Edo States where mosques were allegedly attacked. Attacks on mosques and a Islamic school in January 2012, in the Southern communities of Sapele and Benin city suggest that some retaliatory violence has already begun in the South. In Sapele, Delta State, a mosque, a Quranic school and several persons have been attacked by unidentified people who claimed to be retaliating attacks on churches in the northeastern parts of the country. In Edo State, soldiers and mobile policemen were reported to have evacuated northerners from their residences to military and police barracks in the state capital for fear of being attacked. Despite the appeal by the Southern state governors, northerners still could not sleep in their homes with any eye closed for fear of the unknown.

## **Conclusion**

Boko Haram has triggered a national crisis in Nigeria, but the manifestations of this crisis differ from region to region. What began as a Northeastern problem has threatens to spread to the rest of the North, to fuel inter communal violence in the Middle Belt, and to touch off retaliatory violence in the South. In this religiously and ethnically divided country, many eyes will remain fixed, fearfully, on the militants in the North. The longer Boko Haram attacks go on, the greater the potential for such vigilante actions, the persistent reminder that crisis is pervasive and threatening national integration. And if the bombing and counter-bombings are prolonged, it will give rise to nationwide political instability deepens disunity and disintegration of Nigerians. Just as is the case in economic loss, the social costs are significant. School enrollment that had been low or non-existent became worse with the abduction of over 250 female students by Boko Haram, in April, 2014, after they attacked their school. The sect has also attacked churches, mosques, hospital, markets, recreational places, thereby jeopardizing people's security and hampering social integration. In the area of integration.

Nigerian graduates from domestic and foreign institutions now decline posting to the northeast in particular and the northern states generally fearing that their lives would be insecure. This means the aims and objectives of the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) scheme which was originally established by the regime of General Yakubu Gowon in the 1970s, to foster unity and peace (through perhaps inter-cultural marriages,

and cultural exchanges) have been defeated. This claim was authenticated by NYSC Directorate, when some time ago it posted 4171 Corps members to Adamawa, but only 3130 accepted the posting, while the rest 1041 abandoned theirs citing as reason the volatile security situation in that region. In a related situation, Boko Haram had succeeded in disintegrating Nigerians by its campaign of terror; instilling fear and hatred among indigenes and settlers in the northeast. Using Adamawa as an example, the State which used to be home to all, Christians and Muslims, and other religious adherents, has since the advent of Boko Haram insurgency created divisions among these people. The situation has degenerated to affect the entire northern states to the point where northern parents now fear to send their wards to schools in the north; instead they send them to the southern states for their education.

The prevalent atmosphere in the country where the south and north trade allegations against each other for the emergence of and the escalating attacks of Boko Haram, threatened the corporate existence of Nigeria's sovereignty. For example, Southerners accused the northern elites and politicians of creating Boko Haram to truncate or frustrate the erstwhile Goodluck Jonathan's government. However, it is the view of this paper that, whatever might be the case, is obvious to everybody today that Boko Haram is out to destabilize not only the northeast and northern Nigeria by extension, but the entire Nigerian Federation. To make our lives abnormal. And they have succeeded".the social challenges caused by Boko Haram insurgency for northern Nigeria

led to the mass movement of people out of the northeastern areas of the country, mostly Damaturu, in Yobe State.

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## CHAPTER FOUR

### **BOKO HARAM TERRORISM AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA**

#### **Introduction**

Since Nigeria's independence in 1960, Nigerians have been faced with a lot of problems emanating from disorderliness, confusion and the latest insecurity development. To be precise, the first problem Nigeria encountered was the military intervention in the Nigeria's polity. The military administrations which were the fall-outs of the coups and counter coups marked the beginning of the country's calamities and misfortunes. These were followed by the claims and agitations for resource control by the Niger-Delta region, which in practical term means demand for larger shares of the oil revenue. The inability of the government to meet up with such demand, led to the militant groups from the region taking arms and waged war against Nigerians. The timely intervention of late President Alhaji Yar'Adua helped to quench the burning flame ignited by the militants. Nigerians got relieved following the introduction of amnesty policy into Nigeria's political and democratic structures by the same Yar'Adua administration. Unexpectedly, there arose in most recent time, a disorder of a serious religious dimension in the country.

The dangerous trend in insecurity came with the emergence of Boko Haram, the Muslim fundamentalist sect, bombing and attacking everything within reach. According to reports, multiple explosions went off one after the other in places like Kano, in the usual manner of attacks by the members of Boko Haram sect in Maiduguri, Damaturu,

Potiskum, Gombe, Abuja and Madalla in Niger State .They attacked government institutions and later expanded to churches thereby inflicting terror and destruction on innocent people. Suicide bombing of the United Nations Secretariat in Abuja on August 26, 2011 did not happen long after a similar attack on the Nigeria Police Force Headquarters on June 16. Boko Haram otherwise called “Western education is sin,” claimed responsibilities for these and other series of bomb blasts and attacks. It is observed that the sect concentrated its attacks in the northern parts of the country

### **Internal economic effect of Boko Haram**

It has been discovered that foreigners aid and abet violence in the North. According to the Kaduna State Police Commissioner, Mohammed Jinjiri Abubakar in Omipidan, foreign countries sharing the same borders with the Northern states of Nigeria sneak into this country to cause disharmony. He did not hesitate to mention the citizens of Niger Republic, Chad and Cameroon among those involved in the terror activities in the north. This is evident on the arrest of many nationals of these countries, who were caught in mass killings and bombings. The Police Commissioner could not condone the activities of these foreigners any longer and therefore warned that the Police would no longer care about the Africa Charter on the free movement of citizens and would treat foreigners arrested with iron hand, adding that the nation’s kind gesture should not be taken for granted. The fear is that the invasion made by the foreign elements may endanger the existing good relationships between Nigeria and her neighboring countries.

When this happens, there is no doubt that the balance of payments of all countries involved will be badly affected. Under this circumstance, the economy of the north would have the greatest impact as the foreign nationals that contribute to a large extent on its development through their various economic activities, would relocate to their mother countries.

It has been observed that the incessant bombings and gun attacks in the Northern parts of this country by the Boko Haram fundamentalists, have seriously affected the economic lives of individuals in the areas. For instance, commercial banks have been forced to review their operational hours to begin from 9.00am to 12.00 noon as against the normal operational period of 8.00am to 4.00pm . According to Mohammed, this is a part of efforts by these financial institutions to safeguard their business premises. Under this new operational arrangement, bank customers especially traders, find it very difficult to deposit their daily proceeds in the banks due to the limited banking operational hours that are no longer in their favor. Alternatively, these helpless traders have to hide their money in their shops. That is why in addition to the frequent suicide bombings, there are rising cases of shop-breakings and burglaries in the affected areas.

The growing insecurity in the north has seriously affected the socioeconomic condition such that many people including businessmen are fleeing to more peaceful environment in the southern parts of the country. More so, the prices of foodstuffs have started increasing astronomically following the drastic fall in the transportation of the

foodstuffs from north to the south where they (foodstuffs) are greatly consumed. This is because the traders from south find it unsafe to travel to north where they are sold. Consequently, these farm products are stockpiled wasting in the hands of farmers who rely on them as the only source of livelihood.

Security is among the core areas of focus in the internal and external development of states' affairs. Thus, at country and international levels, policy makers are putting varying mechanisms in place to address issues of insecurity in order to create a safe environment for all. However, certain developments, as manifested in the threats and attacks from several groups of persons, have also been occurring within states. These events have had excessive influence in creating instability and insecurity in their immediate environments and in neighboring areas. Borno State has not known true peace for more than two decades and as a result of the ongoing restiveness and insecurity, it has not been able to realize its full potential. In Borno and its neighboring Nigerian states, these scenarios have played out in recent years with the uprising and escalation of the activities of Boko Haram in the Northeast region of the country. Boko Haram's activities have included recurrent attacks; killing of persons; and wanton destruction of property, population displacements, and other forms of aggression. These terrorist activities were particularly severe between 2008 and 2015, the years during which Boko Haram operated with impunity in the northeast axis of the country, killing thousands of people and destroying properties worth several millions of dollars., the activities of the sect especially since 2009 have constituted a major security threat to the nation and have

made Northern 2 Nigeria, particularly the Northeast, which is the epicenter of Boko Haram activities, the most dangerous region in the country.

As a result of the Boko Haram insurgency, labeled Nigeria a major global center of violence, crime, and terrorism. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), reported on December 11, 2014, that more than 5,000 people were killed worldwide that November as a result of jihadist violence, Nigeria shared the dubious honor of being one of the four countries, along with Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria, that accounted for 80% of all deaths from terrorists' attacks. Although the report named Iraq as the single deadliest country accounting for a third of all deaths and the highest number of attacks, it rated Nigeria as the second deadliest country with Boko Haram blamed for the killings there.

The environment in which any business operates is a very powerful factor that can determine its success and survival, as well as the overall development of the host nation. Investors want to establish in environments that are peaceful, progressive and such that can enable them carry out their business activities without the risks associated with insecurity, insurgency activities and violence. Today, insurgency activities have bedridden Nigerian economy and general business activities leading to productivity losses, occupation displacement, disorientation and increased poverty (UNDP 2006; World Bank 1995), and has costs Nigeria several billions of Naira due to investment flight, as well as countless losses of thousands of lives and properties. No nation or business organization can progress in the presence of insurgency and insecurity, as issues

bordering on national security are very critical for the material progress of any polity. As a developing country, Nigeria faces her own share of social, political, economic and cultural problems led by current insecurity and insurgency activities in different part of the country, the challenges that have given rise to insurgency and militancy in Nigeria has been aggravated by years of political and economic marginalization, environmental degradation, bad governance and policy inconsistency by the government, and the divide and rule policy of the oil companies in the Niger Delta area. whereas the oil produced in the Niger Delta is the life blood of the Nigerian economy, oil has failed to translate to regional prosperity and development in the Niger Delta”, but has given rise to environment of anger, desperation, violence and formation of various armed groups whose activities include destruction of oil pipelines and facilities, seizing of oil vessels and kidnapping of foreign nationals, among others In the North East region, there can be no real progress made in any economic that is hostage to security.

Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria have led to people abandoning their businesses, closure of banks and government parastatals amongst other issues. Insurgency in the country has resulted to drop in business performance and has also resulted to greater investor apathy for the country and resulting to low inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI). Today, despite the numerous government campaign to attract foreign investors, the level of foreign direct investment in the country has continue to decline in a very fast pace has contended that any nation striving towards development must reduce the frequency of crime to the barest minimum.

## **Effect of Insurgency on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Nigeria**

Foreign direct investment (FDI) is defined by the World Bank (1996) as investment that is made to acquire a lasting management interest in an enterprise and business operating in a country other than that of the investors. It is a company from one country making physical investment into building a factory in another country. Foreign direct investment can also take the form of direct acquisition of a foreign firm, either totally, its controlling stock or some percentage of its stocks. It also involves construction of facilities or investment in a joint venture with a local firm by a foreign firm, State that foreign direct investment is a form of lending or finance in the area of equity participation that involves the transfer of resource including capital, technology and management and marketing expertise.

A foreign direct investor may acquire voting power of an enterprise in an economy through incorporating a wholly owned subsidiary or company in the country, acquisition of shares in an associated enterprise, via merger or acquisition of an unrelated business enterprise and through participation in an equity joint venture with another investor or enterprise. Types of Foreign Direct Investment like, Horizontal FDI which arises when a firm duplicates its home country-based activities at the same value chain stage in a host country through FDI, Platform FDI: this is a foreign direct investment from a source country into a destination country for the purpose of exporting to a third country,

Vertical FDI which arise when a firm through FDI moves up stream or downstream indifferent value.

The importance of FDI in developing countries has been the reasons why developing countries have place great importance in attracting investors to help develop different sectors of their economies. The importance of foreign direct investment include its contribution to the growth and development of the host country as it encourages the inflow of technology and skills and fill the gap between domestically available supplies of saving foreign exchange and government revenue pointed out that foreign direct investment (FDI) provide a firm with new markets and marketing channels, cheaper production facilities, access to new technology, products skills and financing. It also assists in economic growth of countries by providing local economy with the source of foreign skill, technology, management expertise and human resource development through international training and collaboration Every nation especially developing and undeveloped countries need fast national and economic development. One major way of attracting and ensuring economic development is an enabling environment that is investors friendly. A country where terrorists regularly bomb, kidnap, kill innocent people, and destroy villages and social facilities can never be a safe haven for investment. Noted that “there can be no real progress made in any economy that is hostage to security.

The quantum leap in rate of insurgency has brought with it some negative effect to Nigerian economy and business operation and performance in the country. From

billions of dollars in financial losses by manufacturers to large scale decline in foreign direct investment (FDI), some major investors have abandon Nigeria for other countries with peaceful and stable environment, and Nigerian economy is left grasping for breath and survival. Pointed out that in the last eight years of insurgency activities, “Boko Haram insurgency has not only led to closure or abandonment of people's business activities within the affected region but also led to immigration of people from affected region. Boko Haram activities has added to the fear of foreign investors in Nigeria as no investor would like to invest in an atmosphere of fear, insecurity and anarchy.

An honest assessment of insurgency situation in North East Nigeria could well be described as a war zone. Only recently in 2018, the sum of US 1 billion Dollars was approved by the National Assembly for execution of war against Boko Haram and other insurgencies in the North East Nigeria. High rate of insurgency in Nigeria has led to low level of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Nigeria. International investors are now afraid of investing in Nigeria environment that could be describe as a “time bomb” no business will come to Nigeria with the current security challenge. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is getting leaner, and international oil investors are diverting to cheaper/safer environment, analysis of Nigeria's attractiveness for investor before the rise of insurgency activities from 2009 shows the pitiable situation which insurgency and insecurity has pushed Nigeria into. They observed that, “In a survey of the most attractive economies for the location the end of 2006, Insurgency activities in Nigeria has in no measure increase to a very high proportion with violent clashes in the Middle Belt on daily basis

with it attendant killings of innocent people and some security operatives, and closures of business activities. With secession threats in the South East and militant attacks in the South-South, only few investors would be willing to put at risk the lives of their employees and properties in such state of violence and volatility of high magnitude. Insurgency has thus discouraged foreign direct investment in Nigeria, and this has negatively affected Nigeria economy development with high rise of unemployment and capital flight away from the country As the importance of FDI to the global economy increases.

There is need for stable peaceful environment and well-tailored economic policies that promote FDI and national well-being and sustainability. No meaningful social and economic development can take place in an environment of insecurity, violence and terror. Such environment can never appeal to foreign investors as a good place to do business. Insurgencies in Nigeria have ensured a steady national underdevelopment and reduction in inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI). Billions of dollars have also been spent by the government in the fight against the insurgencies in the last nine years. These monies would have been used in meaningful infrastructural development, setting up enabling business environment for investment and industrial growth, and in addressing the challenges of environmental neglects, high level of poverty and unbearable level of unemployment that have given rise to numerous agitation, fighting and insurgencies in the country. To promote foreign direct investment in Nigeria,

every Nigerians must put away religious, ethnic and political sentiments, and tackle insurgencies with committed determination.

**Ignorance of religious teaching opposed to violence makes youth more vulnerable and susceptible to recruitment.**

In all the states surveyed, there is unanimity that initial ignorance of religious teaching is the leading factor influencing the adoption of extreme religious views, especially among youth. The lack of deep knowledge of true religious teaching is partly related to three observable dangerous trends in the recent practice of religion in Nigeria: the proliferation of sects in both Islam and Christianity, the proliferation of independent preachers in both religions, and the increasing reliance on preachers rather than on the holy books themselves. As a result, young people are very vulnerable to recruitment and radicalization by independent and roaming preachers, extremist groups, and religious ideologues, who often distort religious injunctions. In Borno state, 93.2 percent of respondents were of the view that ignorance of the full teaching of their religion influenced young people's adoption of extreme religious views. In Kano and Sokoto, 90 percent and 82 percent of respondents, respectively, believed that ignorance of the full teaching of their religions is a factor that influences the adoption of extreme religious views by young people in the community. Kashim Shettima, the governor of Borno state, also gave credence to this observation when he lamented recently that "distorted translation of the Holy Book by the insurgents landed us in this mess. If we have had

good understanding of Islam, we would have been in a better place. There is no room for extremism in Islam. We need to go back to Islam as practised by Prophet Muhammad, when Islam encouraged Muslims, Jews, and Christians to live in peace with one another.” In some cases, roaming preachers claiming to be Islamic scholars deceive impressionable youths. In others, youth are radicalized in the training camps of terrorist groups through distorted interpretation of the Holy Book.

### **Unemployment and poverty make youth vulnerable to radicalization**

Unemployment and poverty are socioeconomic challenges that are not only intricately interconnected but glaringly evident in northern Nigeria. Figures from Nigeria’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) show that the country’s unemployment rate in 2006 averaged 14.60, percent until 2011, when it reached an all-time high of 23.90 percent. NBS figures released in early 2013 revealed that, despite favorable economic growth and performance, Nigeria’s poverty rate jumped from 54.7 percent in 2004 to 60.9 percent in 2010. In 2011, 100 million Nigerians lived in absolute poverty and 12.6 million more were moderately poor. The worst hit by these afflictions are young people, especially in northern Nigeria.

In Borno and Kaduna states, survey respondents identified the high incidence of unemployment and poverty that prevail in the state as the second most important reason why youth engage in religious-based violence. In Kaduna state, 83 percent of respondents reported that unemployment and poverty are important factors. In Kano, 92 percent cited

them as important. This is not to argue that unemployment and poverty are direct causes of youth radicalization; rather, privation and other frustrating conditions of life render youth highly vulnerable to manipulation by extremist ideologues. As Komolafe has argued, even if unemployment and poverty are not the main factors in radicalization in Nigeria, “the tendency to produce suicide bombers is greater in a community defined by mass misery and joblessness than the one in which basic needs of food, education, health, housing, and sanitation are met for the majority of the people, the shortage or unavailability of basic human needs makes youth more attracted to terrorism, because this group tends to provide for its members what the government fails to provide for the people, because poverty and hunger are immediate causes of boko haram terrorism.

### **High levels of illiteracy linked to youth radicalization and extremism**

Across the six states, study participants identified high levels of illiteracy as one of the major factors influencing young people’s adoption of extreme religious views. In Gombe state, illiteracy was ranked second out of the sixteen factors listed. It was also ranked second in Yobe state. It was slightly lower in Borno state, where it was ranked fourth out of the sixteen factors listed as causes of youth extremism and violence.

In Kano, 75 percent cited it as important. Illiterate people can be more easily manipulated because their state of social deprivation denies them the capacity and knowledge to critically question the narratives and doctrines of extremist groups. While it is evident that illiterates do not manufacture the bombs that Boko Haram uses, arrest

records suggest that the “real armies of suicide bombers and terrorists’ foot soldiers” are drawn from such “disadvantaged, stranded populations,” suggesting how poverty, lack of education, and indoctrination contribute to terrorism. 21 Poverty, illiteracy, and radicalization are interwoven; in the six states examined, they are correlated. The poor are unlikely to send their children to school and likely to be illiterate, unemployed, and thus vulnerable to recruitment and radicalization.

### **Loss of lively hood**

The ongoing insecurity challenges in the communities have called for wider attention in the public discourse and generated a lot of scholarly interest and discussions in recent times, the fear of insecurity in Nigeria is on the increase and this has been compounded by the rising waves of terrorism since the country returned to democratic rule in 1999. Violent crime has a root and history in Nigeria, and could be traced back to the period from 1960 to 1970. At independence in 1960 a federal structure was imposed on Nigeria by the British, independence, the demand for true federalism, fiscal and political restructuring by different ethnic nationalities in Nigeria has not abated. These agitations have contributed to violent rebellious reactions by aggrieved ethnic groups in the country, endangering the security, unity, and corporate existence of Nigeria as one country.

Federalism that undermines the independence and autonomy of its federating units will only bring about conflict, threat to national cohesion and peace, and ultimate

disintegration. Insecurity challenges can be traced to the early years of military rule when large quantities of arms were imported into the country for the use of the military during and after the Nigerian civil war, some of which got into the hand of the civilians. Soon after the civil war these arms were used by some civilians and ex-military men for mischievous purposes such as armed robbery. There was also the army of unemployed youths some of whom lost their job during the civil war.

The level of insecurity assumed dangerous dimensions in the prolonged years of military rule beginning from 1970 during which people procure arms and light weapons for personal defense. Some of these arms and light weapons got into the hands of unemployed youths who used them for deviant purpose. While some researchers attribute youth violence to peer group influence and other psychological factors associated with growing up, others emphasized the impact of political and economic factors such as ethnic agitation, political agitation, unemployment, Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) as triggers of violent reaction among the youth.

### **Agricultural decline and food scarcity**

The northeast of Nigeria is completely suspended as a result of the terrorist activities of the Boko Haram group in that geopolitical zone. The devastation, which the activities of Boko Haram has caused, is not only obvious but also far-reaching in its impact on agriculture. Besides the Boko Haram group, insecurity in Nigeria has been aggravated by the criminal activities of sundry groups. The group with the most

devastating impact is the Fulani herders whose murderous campaigns have targeted farming communities, with no challenge from the state. Since 2013, there has been a steady increase in the number of displaced persons as a result of conflicts across Nigeria. United Nations sources estimated that over 2.4 million people have so far been displaced with new records of displacement from conflicts expanding the number, between January and June 2019, about 142,000 new displacements were recorded with a caveat that the figure could most likely be an underestimate. Out of this figure, 140,000 people were displaced through conflict and 2,000 people were displaced because of disasters.

The displacement of farming communities as a result of attacks by armed groups, criminal violence and banditry is associated with an alarming rise in food and nutrition insecurity due to non-availability of food. The UNHCR's Deputy High Commissioner underscored the gravity of conflict induced food insecurity when he was quoted to have said, "the future of young generations in the region is at stake, as food insecurity not only affects the dignity of families, but has serious consequences on the physical and cognitive development of children" (UNHCR, 2018). The overall implication is reinforcing cyclic interconnections that would create and sustain intractable security crisis. The intractability of insecurity would result from the clash of national insecurity and food insecurity. In other words, with national insecurity making it impossible for farmers to engage in their farm activities, food shortages would result. As food shortages result, it would create disaffection, which in turn spawns a new round of insecurity due to the intensification of food crisis and mass reaction to it. Thus, there would be constant

insecurity caused by the interplay of national insecurity and food insecurity. Of course, this scenario could be averted through massive importation of food to bridge the gap. But it would have implications for national development due to capital flight and the deepening of poverty.

### **The international response**

In the early years of the conflict, most Western governments saw Boko Haram primarily as a problem specific to Nigeria. The group first emerged as an Islamic reform movement in the northeastern town of Maiduguri in the early 2000s. Its members followed the charismatic Salafi preacher Muhammad Yusuf, who condemned Western-style education and corrupt, secular governance while also cultivating strategic ties to the city's elites. In 2009, clashes between Boko Haram members and police forces escalated into several days of armed uprising in Maiduguri. The Nigerian government brutally crushed the insurrection, leaving several hundreds dead including Yusuf himself, who was executed in police custody. The subsequent evolution of the conflict can be roughly divided into three main phases.

The donor community on the ground in Nigeria was late to acknowledge the severity of the crisis, and slow to scale up its response. Several factors explain this pattern. First, in the early years of the crisis, international partners were hesitant to push back against Nigerian authorities' assurances that the conflict response was under their control. In contrast to other conflict-affected states, the Nigerian government wields

significant resources and regional power, resulting in a greater stature vis-a-vis international partners. Donor governments thus prioritized working through Nigerian government structures rather than sidestepping local authority, even as bureaucratic obstruction, a lack of committed interlocutors, and in-fighting between different levels of government slowed down the response. The United Nations (UN) had little political interest in declaring the region a large-scale emergency, which would have required additional commitments of resources in an already crisis-ridden international context. For example, in 2014–2015, UN leadership in the country did little to press for greater international involvement, despite evidence of worsening conditions in the northeast. Western capitals, already preoccupied with crises in Iraq, South Sudan, and Syria, in turn saw Nigeria as a resource-rich country with less need for international aid.

Those donors already present in Nigeria prior to the crisis had mostly specialized in development programs in areas such as health and education, which often relied on close collaboration with Nigerian authorities. Few had a direct presence in the northeast, and those that did worked via partnerships with smaller local groups. However, the scale of these efforts was far below the level of need. These dynamics further delayed the transition to a comprehensive conflict response. Lastly, the deteriorating security situation and lack of communication lines with Boko Haram limited access and made it difficult to obtain accurate assessments of the rapidly evolving crisis. Beginning in 2013, the state of emergency in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa States severely restricted mobility and communication flows in the region. Even as the military began pushing Boko Haram

into retreat in 2015, continued insecurity prevented the return of civilian administration, and access beyond Maiduguri remained tightly controlled by the Nigerian military. Despite this difficult context, several donors launched small-scale peace building and countering violent extremism (CVE) programs in the northeast, generally centered on Maiduguri. Yet persistent security concerns and access restrictions prevented a rapid scale-up.

Only in mid-2016 did reporting on widespread starvation in Bama, a town in northeastern Borno, trigger a radical increase in the overall donor response. International aid organizations thus reached many areas more than a year after they had been retaken by Nigerian military forces. They found people living in devastating conditions, with little access to food or basic supplies. Most initial efforts prioritized delivering emergency humanitarian assistance to the newly accessible areas. For example, USAID ramped up humanitarian assistance in Nigeria “from virtually nothing in 2014 to \$291 million committed for fiscal year.

### **Solutions to Battling Boko Haram Terrorism**

Nigeria, the most populous country in sub-Saharan Africa as well as the biggest economy, is facing a severe crisis in its nation-building process. Virtually every part of Nigeria claims it is “marginalized.” Concomitant groups have been calling for the convocation of a “Sovereign National Conference” a euphemism for a meeting to discuss whether Nigerians want to continue to live together as one country. Something nasty has

happened to the effort to create “true Nigerians” that is, Nigerians who privilege their Nigerian identity over the other identities they bear in the country. Thus, some people still believe that Nigeria is a “mere geographical expression,” a nation only in name and with only very few “true Nigerians.

The struggle in nation building mixes with poverty, inequality and a lack of development in the country, creating an existential crisis for many Nigerians. As I stated in my previous blog, for many young people, a way of resolving this sense of alienation is to retreat from the “Nigeria project” the idea of fashioning a nation out of the disparate nationalities that make up the country and construct meanings in chosen primordial identities, often with the Nigerian state as the enemy. I have elsewhere called this phenomenon the “de-Nigerianization process.” In Nigeria, there is a heavy burden of institutionalized memories of hurt, injustice, distrust and even a disguised longing for vengeance by various individuals, ethnic groups, regions and religious groups. In this sense, actions that ordinary Nigerians rightly see as heinous are seen by some as normal, even heroic.

### **Provision of Basic Human needs**

Creating a Ministry of Northern Affairs just like the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs to help address the numerous challenges in the north, including the problems of poverty, unemployment, illiteracy and radical Islam. This establishment would be one

way of winning the hearts and minds of the locals and cooling local grievances on which Boko Haram feeds.

### **Education**

Instituting a sort of Marshall Plan for the northeast aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the local populace. The plan should aim at providing quality education, building local capacity and providing jobs.

### **Revive the Regional Coalition**

Abuja must revamp its alliance with Benin, Chad, Niger and Cameroon. This coalition, and its Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram, had worked effectively until it was weakened by Chad's withdrawal in October 2017 of hundreds of troops from Niger. Nigeria has a huge opportunity here to show leadership in Africa, which is struggling with extremist violence and identity conflicts from all angles. Reviving the MNJTF is essential to ensure continued hard-hitting military pressure on Boko Haram.

### **Fight a False Ideology**

Boko Haram needs more than a military response; rejuvenating the regional coalition against Boko Haram, as important as it is, can only contain the group's violence. To comprehensively defeat the group, Nigeria must improve its holistic approach to this scourge. It is crucial to address the root causes of this phenomenon, foremost of which is

the poisonous binary ideology that treats ‘others’ as enemies worthy of death. Buhari should leverage his fresh mandate to pursue the idea mooted by his minister of the interior to embark on mass religious education to reduce the group’s appeal. Rather than teach mere religious literacy, this scheme should aim to instil religious intelligence by teaching the fundamental objectives of Islamic law protection of life, religion, property, lineage and intellect and the biography of the Prophet Mohammad, which espoused harmonious co-existence between Muslims, Jews and Christians.

Nigeria’s president should leverage the expertise of such partners as the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change and the Development Initiative of West Africa, which have been training and supporting imams on these aspects for the past five years. Conducting speedy and fair trials, under Islamic laws, of those found to be Boko Haram activists or funders and letting the law have its full course. Having suspects stand for trial for months or even years creates a backlash, and often has a way of mobilizing sympathy for the suspects. It may also be strategic to try the suspects under Islamic laws since the sect members have openly rejected Western civilization, including its jurisprudence. Whatever punishment is meted to them under Islamic jurisprudence will not be seen as part of Western conspiracy against Islam.

### **Boost Support to the Armed Forces**

The Nigerian government should work to help the troops fighting Boko Haram, not only by providing material equipment to address reported complaints of inadequate ammunition, but also by addressing fatigue and low morale among the troops. The president's unscheduled visits to the front line at the start of his administration had a positive impact on the morale of the security forces and the confidence of Nigerians. More such appearances, as well as calls to wounded soldiers and more humane treatment of the families of the fallen, would go a long way to help. To prevent physical and mental exhaustion, soldiers fighting Boko Haram should be regularly rotated. Empowering the state governments in the north to lead the charge and be the faces of the fight against Boko Haram.. It is important to underline that the conspiracy theories have made it more difficult to mobilize collective anger against Boko Haram.

### **Provide Basic Services**

The political grievances and socio-economic circumstances that made young people vulnerable to Boko Haram, should be tackled, this can be done by taking serious steps to combat poverty, unemployment and the impacts of environmental degradation. Alongside improving the provision of basic services such as drinking water, power, healthcare and quality education that inculcates open-mindedness, this would contribute to building communities resilient to poisonous, divisive ideas like Boko Haram's. In addition to fighting extremist ideologies behind the violence that harms prospects for co-existence, our Institute works with governments and leaders of fragile, developing and

emerging states to support them to deliver on their priorities. This is an integral part of dealing with the enormous challenges a group like Boko Haram poses.

## **Conclusion**

There is no quick fix to fighting terrorism anywhere in the world as the experiences in Afghanistan, Somalia, Yemen and other countries have shown. However, with the above recommended short- to-medium term strategies pursued concurrently with the long-term strategy of resolving the crisis in Nigeria's nation-building processes, Boko Haram's and Ansaru's terrorism can be contained, and the groups eventually neutralized. Following the government's crackdown, Nigerian authorities believed they had successfully quashed the movement. Yet Boko Haram re-emerged in 2010 under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau, carrying out sporadic attacks across the northeast. Its clandestine tactics gradually grew more sophisticated, but the Nigerian government was slow to recognize the extent of the crisis.

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## CHAPTER FIVE

### CONCLUSION

This study examines the effect of Boko Haram terrorism on the Nigerian Economy, the research finds that Terrorism is a disincentive to potential indigenous and foreign investors and the Boko Haram problem continues to hurt Nigeria. The evidence and fast changing indices (in form of changing migration patterns, cost of insurance in the North, mass repatriation of funds, dearth in skilled labour etc) speaks volumes. Historically, each region in Nigeria compliments the other. What the North lacks in access to the sea, the South provides. The north wields 78 percent of Nigeria's land which supports most of Nigeria's agriculture (food, cash crops and livestock). The South-West's terrain supports both domestic and international commerce and provides an import/export rout. While the South-South and some parts of the South-East wield Nigeria's oil wealth with increased intensity of bombings in the North, the gripping tension, insecurity, and suffering occasioned by the sect members and the military actions, subjecting innocent civilians to humiliation, brutalization, extortion and undue hardship led to the mass exodus of people from the violent zones.

Further, the research examines the institution of Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria, since historical evolution of Boko Haram is the popular moniker for an Islamist movement that calls itself the "Sunni Community for the Propagation of the Prophet's Teaching and Jihad". Unlike al-Qaeda and its affiliates, its focus is specifically on

Nigeria and adjacent countries rather than international jihad. Boko Haram is a radical Islamist movement shaped by its Nigerian context and reflecting Nigeria's history of poor governance and extreme poverty in the north. The movement is unique in that it combines a sectarian, radical Islamic agenda with violence. Its stated goal is the establishment of a sharia state, but it shows little interest in actually governing or implementing economic development. It is based on the fundamentalist Wahhabi theological system and opposes the Islam of the traditional northern Nigerian establishment, which is broadly tolerant, Boko Haram is a recent manifestation of a decades-long civil war within Islam. Radical reformers in what is now Nigeria have long claimed that Muslim leaders are "infidels" if they are "unjust", even when the rulers themselves claim to be Muslims.

This often manifests as a conflict between Salafi fundamentalists and the tolerant Sufis who dominate the traditional Nigerian Muslim elites. Boko Haram is thus a direct threat to the traditional Islamic establishment, which is led by the sultan of Sokoto and the shehu of Borno, both of whom the movement has tried to murder; it also claimed responsibility for killing the shehu's brother and bodyguards of the sultan. An aspect of the broad Islamist revival in northern Nigeria has been a Salafi rejection of the secular state. Charismatic preachers organize communities that withdraw from secular life. Usually, such groups are quietist, even pacifists; however, at times they can turn violent, usually in response to the secular state's heavy handedness

More so, the study interrogated the implications of boko haram insurgency on national integration in Nigeria, Business activities are gradually fizzling out, with social activities grounded due to frequent hurling of explosives into restaurants by members of Boko Haram. Hotels up North are enjoying a patronage of dissertation and so are markets. Blessing Essien, a hotelier in the city of Maiduguri said “We are no longer opening our restaurants because people don’t come out to socialize for fear of losing their lives. Thousands of local businesses close down and residents are forced to migrate to greener pastures. Rent in major metropolises in Kano, Borno, Bauchi, Kebbi and Yobe reduced significantly as the crisis unabated”. A resident in Kaduna, Kabir Sobowale reveals that the majority of the non-natives, especially Igbo, have resorted to selling their houses and other landed property at ridiculously cheaper rates, saying that they no longer feel safe to carry out their businesses in the violent prone states. However, Boko Haram activities is responsible for the hike in the food items in the South, particularly, food items cultivated in the Northern states.

Even when the items are brought to the South themselves, we are carefully suspicious not to be attacked because we have been told that Boko Haram proposes to attack the Yoruba (southwest) people and further circulated rumor that some of the food items are been poisoned by the Boko Haram. the socio-economic implications of Boko Haram activities is not limited to the Northern region as some State Governments in the South are already regulating the activities of the Hausa/Fulani in their States. For instance, in Lagos State, commercial activities of Hausa in Magodo and Iseri areas are been

restricted and denied in some cases, while some have been suspiciously arrested without legal trial. This no doubt portends threat to national integration. He opined further “many of the internally displaced persons, IDPs, reluctantly begin a new life and manage to survive. Those who could not earn their living will be desperate and thus becomes threat to their host community. As a result, different forms of social vices and criminality will set in and consequently are treated with suspicion, discrimination and resistance by the host community.

Finally, it is stated that the growing insecurity in the north has seriously affected the socioeconomic condition such that many people including businessmen are fleeing to more peaceful environment in the southern parts of the country. More so, the prices of foodstuffs have started increasing astronomically following the drastic fall in the transportation of the foodstuffs from north to the south where they (foodstuffs) are greatly consumed. This is because the traders farm south find it unsafe to travel to north where they are sold. Consequently, these form products are stockpiled wasting in the hands of farmers who rely on them as the only source of livelihood. The fear is that the invasion made by the foreign elements may endanger the existing good relationships between Nigeria and her neighboring countries. When this happens, there is no doubt that the balance of payments of all countries involved will be badly affected. Under this circumstance, the economy of the north would have the greatest impact as the foreign nationals that contribute to a large extent on its development through their various economic activities, would relocate to their mother countries.

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Oyen Ogie	76	Ethnographer	Benin City	
Veronica James	56	Trader	Agbor	

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