

**BOKO HARAM AND THE ISLAMIC STATE OF WEST AFRICA: A STUDY
OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM NETWORK IN NORTH EAST NIGERIA
2013 - 2021**

BY

**Musa Audu OMALE
PG/ART1817061**

**DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
FACULTY OF ARTS
UNIVERSITY OF BENIN
BENIN CITY**

FEBRUARY, 2024

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CERTIFICATION

This is to certify that this thesis was carried out by Mr. Musa Audu OMALE in the Department of History and International Studies, University of Benin, Benin City, Nigeria, under my supervision.

Dr. Frank IKPONMWOSA
(Project Supervisor)

Date _____

Dr. Frank IKPONMWOSA
(Head of Department)

Date _____

External Examiner

Date _____

DEDICATION

To the glory of God, this thesis is dedicated to: my dearest wife, Mrs. Fatima Idris Musa who gave me moral support and unreserved love; my beloved children, Abdulsalam Ojohegbe and Muhammadmukhtar Onema Musa for the joy they brought to the family; my parents, late Mr. Omale Audu Oguche Amony of blessed memory and Mrs Rekiyetu (Amichi) Umoru Omale Audu, who served as my role model.

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ABSTRACT

The study examines the emergence, organization, and operations of Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa and their links with other international terrorist organizations. The objectives of the study were to examine the emergence of Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa in north-east Nigeria; examine the organization and operations of Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa as violent groups opposed to the state; establish the links between Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa and their connections with other international terror groups such as Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabab, Taliban and ISIS; and assess the efforts of the Multinational Joint Task Force in combating them.

The study used data collected from publications of governmental and international governmental organizations and unstructured oral interviews with serving and retired military personnel. The publications were subjected to textual analysis, while the oral interviews were stored and later transcribed and analyzed.

The study found that Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa emerged in the north-east of Nigeria with its main ideology of the establishment of a pure Islamic State (theocratic state) that is based on strict implementation of Sharia law in Nigeria and the neighbouring countries of Chad, Niger and Cameroon. The terrorist groups' attacks on the Nigerian state and the neighbouring countries of Chad, Niger and Cameroon comprising the military, para-military and civilians' targets led to wanton destruction of lives and properties. Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa had links with other international terrorism networks such as Al-Qaeda, Taliban, Islamic State, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb AQIM and Al-Shabaab in aspects of ideology which centered on establishing an Islamic Caliphate that will address problems faced by Muslims worldwide. Other area of collaboration include training, funding, arms supply and logistic supports which facilitated their operations, expansions and attacks; and military and non military approaches adopted by the federal government of Nigeria led to the degrading of Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa fighters. This thesis contends that the functionality of Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa thrived in their collaboration due to the international support they received from other terrorist organizations.

CHAPTER ONE

BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

Introduction

International terrorism has been a great security challenge to global peace and security. In Nigeria, the twin issues of insurgency and terrorism have assumed frightening dimensions of security threat to the corporate existence of the nation. The level it has taken since the return to civil rule in 1999 poses great danger to Nigeria as a sovereign state. The Boko Haram sect which has been in existence since 2002 became popular due to their active participation in sectarian violence. This reality is due to the Boko Haram founding father, Mohammed Yusuf, indoctrinating his followers with his doctrines, which he asserted were founded on purity. The writings of Ibn Tamiyya, a legal expert who promoted Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East in the 14th century, served as an inspiration for Yusuf's conception of purification as well as his doctrines.¹ Yusuf dedicated his mosque in Maiduguri, the headquarters of Borno state, in his honor. The group became dreaded in 2009 after its leader, Mohammed Yusuf, and some of his members were brutally killed by security personnel. This paved the way for the emergence of Abubakar Shekau, one of Yusuf's deputies who was more radical and aggressive. Under him, Boko Haram became increasingly brutal, aggressive, as well as dangerous, while foreclosing open dialogue, and thus, caused wanton destruction of properties and loss of thousands of lives. The sect's terrorist activities came to the limelight with the bombings of churches, mosques, and security formations including police headquarters as well as United Nations building in Abuja which drew international condemnations.

The emergence of Boko Haram is both internal and external. The internal elements that led to the formation of Boko Haram comprised of religion and socio-

economic challenges facing the Nigerian state since independence. However, religious ideology anchored on the enthronement of Islamic government on strict Sharia law is fundamental. The external factors consist of the influence of the Iranian Revolution of 1979, which led to the establishment of the Islamic Republic as well as the overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty, believing that such could be replicated in Nigeria thereby making Northern Nigeria and to a large extent, Nigeria as an Islamic Republic. The victory of the Taliban in Afghanistan over the Soviets in 1989 also influenced the emergence of Boko Haram, aiming at overthrowing the Nigerian government and establishing an Islamic state governed by pure Sharia law.

The influence of the Islamic jihadists such as Ibn Tamiyya, Maududi, Qubt, and Osama bin Laden amongst others played a critical role in the emergence of Boko Haram. Yusuf and its members were influenced by the ideological and theological teachings of the Holy Quran by these learned Islamic jihadists. It was founded on Muslims' need to overthrow and replace apostate rulers as well as governments to aid in the establishment of a genuine Islamic state. According to Maududi, the goal of jihad is to destroy the control of an unIslamic system but also install in its place an Islamic system of state rule. In his opinion, Islam has no alternative but to seize governmental power.² He also encourages war against Muslim leaders who are viewed as being against Islam. It is therefore required that supporters of the Islamic party to carry out a revolutionary act in the government system of the nations toward which they adhere, he stated.³ Consequently, academics agree that both Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa are attempting to construct an Islamic state through jihad. By assaulting other Muslims, including leaders, who are seen as panders, Boko Haram is putting its doctrine as well as philosophy into practice by targeting Christians which they always referred to as infidels. Central amongst the external factors is the religious ideology of

global jihad which is anchored on the enthronement of the Islamic Caliphate on pure and strict adherence to Sharia law. It is the basis of this that the jihadists including the Islamic State of West Africa as well as Boko Haram reject Western cultures.

After the infamous commander Abubakar Shakau swore allegiance to Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi in March 2015, Boko Haram embraced ISIS. As a consequence, Boko Haram changed its name to Islamic State of West Africa (ISWA) in April 2015. Nevertheless, because of the strong personalities of the two leaders, many commentators have questioned if the union of the two organizations would indeed be advantageous to Boko Haram. The uncertainties were quickly dispelled when Al-Baghdadi and Shakau's relationship deteriorated, forcing Shekau to resign, and Abu Musab al-Barnawi, the alleged son of Boko Haram founder Mohammad Yusuf, also named the Wali, or head, of the Islamic State of West Africa, in August 2015.⁴ As was to be predicted, The appointment of Al-Barnawi provoked a fierce leadership struggle, which prompted Shekau to leave ISIS and resurrect his *Jama'atul Ahlus Sunnah Laiddah'awati wal Jihad*, which translates to those dedicated to the prophet's doctrines through Jihad. Shekau and Al-Barnawi fought over their opposing ideologies on jihad. Al-Barnawi advocated lesser bloodshed as well as a restrained strategy that limits jihad to non-Muslims but also Muslims who support a plot against Islam by collaborating with law enforcement to combat them. Shekau, in contrast, persisted in promoting a Jihad theory that made no distinction between Muslims and those who disagreed with him and were not Muslims. He expanded the definition of "infidel" or "apostate" to encompass everyone who does not agree with them, and he called for the execution of such non-believers since, in Shekau's view, they cannot live side by side with adherents.⁵ To completely Islamize Nigeria and the West African sub-region based on Sharia law, Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa, which operates in

northern Nigeria as well as the surrounding nations of Chad, Niger, including Cameroon, intends to eliminate everything with Western viewpoint. In the light of this, this study aims to look into the operations of Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa, as well as any potential connections they may have with the global terrorist network.

Aim and Objectives

The thesis examines the emergence, organization, and operations of Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa and their links with other international terrorist organizations.

The specific objectives are:

- i. To examine the emergence of Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa in the north-east region of Nigeria;
- ii. To examine the organization and operations of Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa as violent groups opposed to the state;
- iii. To establish the links between Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa and their connections with other international terror groups such as Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab, the Taliban, and ISIS; and
- iv. To evaluate the Multinational Joint Task Forces' activities in the northeast of Nigeria as well as the Lake Chad area to confront Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa.

Statement of the Problem

There are plethoras of studies on the emergence of Boko Haram insurgency. Its mode of operations, leadership and organizational structure, its ideology, and Nigeria's military counter-insurgency operations in the north-east region of the country by scholars such as David Cook, H. O. S. Alozieuwa, A. Botha, M. Ewi, U. Salifu, and M.

Abbdile, Loadental Michael, Samuel Osagie Odobo, Israel Nyaburi Nyadera and Mohammed Omar Bincof, Osman Antwi-Boeteng, Theo Brinkel, Soumai Ait-Hida, Stuart Elden, Ayodeji Bayo Ogunrotifa, Abimbola Adesoji, J.O. Abimbola and S. A. Adesote, Nicolas Coutin, Chukwuma Osakwe and Ubong Essien Umoh, Solomon Adebayo Adedire, Modupe Ake and Olakunle Olowojolu, Fonteh Akum, Don John Omale, Hussein Solomon, Freedom Onuoha and Samuel Oyewole, Daniel O. Iweze⁶, and others. Despite their contributions to knowledge, not much has been done on the links between the Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa and their connections to other international terrorist networks. This study argues that the links between Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa and their connection with other international terrorist networks have contributed to the escalation of the insurgency in north-east Nigeria. This is despite Nigeria's military and the Multinational Joint Task Force counter-terrorism operations to end the menace of the terrorist groups.

Justification of the Study

The justification of this study lies in the fact that despite the plethora of studies on Boko Haram insurgency, little has been undertaken by intellectuals on the Boko Haram insurgence and the Islamic State of West Africa and their links with International Terrorism Networks. This study explores this gap to establish the fact of collaboration between the two terror groups and their foreign counterparts which has aided the expansion of Boko Haram's terrorist attacks as well as insurrection activities in the northeast of Nigeria.

The study will be relevant to students and scholars of history, international relations, security and strategic studies, political science, criminology, and related disciplines to stimulate further research in similar areas. It will also be significant to

policymakers and stakeholders in the military and other security agencies. This study will be an addition to current research on the Boko Haram insurgency as well as its links with international terrorism.

Scope and Limitation of the Study

The scope of this thesis covers between 2013 when Boko Haram and Ansaru now Islamic State of West Africa were declared terrorist groups by the Federal Government of Nigeria to 2021 when Abubakar Shekau, the leader of Boko Haram, and Abu Musab Al-Barnawi, the leader of Islamic State of West Africa were respectively killed by the Nigerian military in the northeast region of the country.

The limitation of this study is that data collection on Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa insurgency is challenging because of the precarious security situation in the area under investigation. Oral interviews were collected from the security forces who were members of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF), Operation *Lafia Dole/Zamman Hadi*, who were at the front lines in the north-east region of Nigeria including the vigilante groups. At the onset, some of them refused to grant interviews to the researcher for security reasons. They were afraid of divulging vital information about the military operations because of the faceless nature of members of the Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa terrorists and this constituted a great challenge during data collection.

Methodology and Sources

This study adopted the historical method and employed primary and secondary sources in data collection and analysis

Primary sources involved a substantial reliance on data collected from publications of governmental, international governmental organizations and unstructured oral interviews with core informants who have first-hand information on

Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa. They included both retired and serving military officers and residents in the north-eastern part of Nigeria as well as staff of some multinational companies operating in the region. The interviews were carried out in Maiduguri, Rann, Chibok, Daptchi, Dikwa, Monguno, Gamboru Ngala, Marte, Sambisa, Baga, Damasak and Gubio. The publications were subjected to textual analysis, while the oral interviews were stored, and later transcribed and analyzed

Secondary sources comprised relevant published books, articles in journals, newspapers, and dissertations obtained from the University of Benin, University of Ibadan, University of Lagos, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife. University of Nigeria, Nnsuka, Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Bayero University, Kano, and the University of Maiduguri's libraries. Others included online and media sources. Data collected from these sources complemented the primary sources. The secondary sources were subjected to textual analysis and provided the quantitative and qualitative data for the thesis.

Literature Review

The literature on international terrorism and insurgent movements can be categorized into two- theoretical explanation and empirical studies.

Robert A. Pape and James K. Feldman, in their book entitled *Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How to Stop it*,⁷ explore the U.S. decision-making processes that resulted in the inadequate threat estimates that preceded the invasion of Iraq as well as the essential battle in Afghanistan to destroy al- Qaeda's haven there. This surely leads to rage, fear, and hurry, as well as the emergence of Islamic fundamentalism, a small group of Muslims dispersed over the world who hate American and Western ideals because of their shared religious beliefs. The book explains the phenomenon of transnational terrorism which is traceable in response to

the deployment of Western special operation forces in the Persian Gulf as well as other countries with large Muslim population. The book despite its differential in terms of scope and focus with this thesis is useful in chapter three which deals with the Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa and their links with international terror network. The book is useful as it exposes the ill feelings of the global jihadists towards the US and her allies which the terrorists considered anti-Islam, and hence, the rejection of Western cultures and its attributes.

The book of Charles Townshend, entitled *Terrorism: A Very Short Introduction*,⁸ discusses how attempts by academics and politicians to understand terrorism have frequently been hampered by the difficulty of separating it from other forms of violence or military operations. The author concludes that further definitions were needed since the term "terrorist" is virtually never used by an individual or organization; rather, it is used to describe them by others, most notably by the governments of the nations they target. Hence, rather than being an action, terrorism seems to be a mental attitude. The scope of the book does not extend to Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa and their links with the International Terrorist Organizations but helps in explaining the undertakings of Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa that qualified them to be terrorists.

Walter Riech book entitled *Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, State of Mind*,⁹ examines the origins of terrorism with a focus on the psychology of terrorism concludes that terrorism is a complicated issue with many different causes, and the individuals who commit it are much more so. This immense variability must undoubtedly be taken into consideration in any attempt to comprehend the intentions and behaviors of terrorist individuals and organizations, but no one conceptual model or area of academic research is capable of doing so. The book has

indeed contributed to the success of this thesis, especially chapter two, which deals with the emergence and ideology of Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa. The limitation of the book is that it does not contain the scope and focus of this thesis.

Shmuel Bar, in his book entitled *Warrant For Terror: The Fatwas of Radical Islam and the Duty of Jihad*,¹⁰ examines the influence of Fatwas which have been employed by rebels and insurgents across the Muslim world against westernized regimes' presumed heresy and foreign domination. It is this radical Islamic ideology many terrorist groups including Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa relied on waging war against the infidels to create a new caliphate to be administered based on pure sharia law. Hence, the necessity for this book becomes imperative, as it helps in tracing the emergence and ideology of Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa despite having different scope and focus from this thesis.

The book of Sean Kay, entitled *Global Security in the Twenty-First Century: The Quest for Power and the Search for Peace*,¹¹ examines the dynamic of asymmetric power as applied in the cases of genocide, ethnic cleansing, terrorism, and insurgency movements. On terrorism and insurgent movements, the author explains how some anti-western and pro-Islamic terrorist movements have developed a broader ideological context that also serves as a significant tool to inspire local radical activists to carry out terrorist attacks. This rise towards an ideologically dispersed international terrorist movement stems from the overarching belief that Muslims should take up arms in a holy war against the Judeo-Christian West, a profound sense of indignation at the deaths and perceived oppression of Muslims in Palestinian areas and elsewhere. There exists a growing conviction that moderate secular governments should be replaced by Islamic political movements, this trend complicates terrorist coordination and makes attacks more likely to be regionally based, smaller in scale, and aimed at "soft" (i.e.

easy to kill) civilian targets. While the threat might be small in scale and more diffuse, it is also more difficult to combat. There were, by 2004, more than a dozen, and perhaps as many as forty, regional Islamic groups with growing capabilities and aspirations. These groups had established training camps in Kashmir, the Philippines, and West Africa – and their ambitions were growing beyond the local concerns that initially spawned them. The book is on the Middle East and Asia region, whereas, this thesis covers the north-east region of Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin. It was however useful in chapter three which deals with Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa and their links with international terrorist network.

An immense contribution to this thesis is a book by Haim Malka entitled *Jihadi-Salafi Rebellion and the Crisis of Authority*.¹² He elaborates on the activities of Jihadi-Salafists movement which he tags as social and religious revolutionaries who want a return to the genuine ideals and customs of the first three generations of Muslims. The canonized practices of Mohammed as the sole source of regulation, as well as authority, are upheld by them, and they reject *shirk* (polytheism), hold to a specific understanding of *tawhid* (the unity of God), and are rude and aggressive to transformation, or *bid'a*, which is frequently connected with non-Islamic cultural practices that Muslims have adopted. According to the author, a subset of Salafism has developed through time that encourages violence and views it as a form of jihad, which a variety of organizations, including Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa, ascribe to and which holds as its overarching objective-the violent Jihad of establishing a new Islamic political order and civilization.¹³ The book contributes immensely to the actualisation of chapter two and three of this thesis despite not having same scope and focus.

John Maszkabook entitled *Washington's Dark Secret: The Real Truth About Terrorism and Islamic Extremism*,¹⁴ explores the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq

following the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, World Trade Center in Washington DC and Pentagon and its aftermath that inevitably led to the formation and reformation of Islamist fundamentalism to establish a new caliphate. The writer focuses on the way the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) invaded Syria, asserted control over large oil reserves, and changed its name to the Islamic State of Iraq as well as al-Sham (ISIS). ISIS once more renamed itself to the Islamic State of Iraq as well as the Levant (ISIL), and on June 29, 2014, the organization officially changed its designation to the Islamic State (IS) after declaring the creation of a new caliphate. The group's main objective is to expel the United States from the Muslim World before attempting to overthrow anti-theist Muslim dictatorships. Although the book differs in terms of scope and focus from the thesis, it was useful in tracing the links between Boko haram and the Islamic State of West Africa and their international collaborators in chapter three of this thesis

Bruce Hoffman, in his book entitled *Inside Terrorism*,¹⁵ examines the various religious terrorism across the globe with emphasis on Islamic fundamentalism due to its terrorist network across the globe aiming at establishing a new caliphate based on pure Sharia law, especially in the Middle East and in the North and West African sub-region, and to a large extent, other Islamic countries. The primary distinguishing factor of contemporary terrorism is, in fact, its religious motivation. Even if the book does not discuss Boko Haram or the Islamic State of West Africa, it was however helpful in chapter three in tracing the connections between Boko Haram as well as other terrorist network.

The contribution of Loadenthal Michaelarticle entitled "Othering Terrorism: A Rhetorical Strategy of Strategic Labeling",¹⁶ gives account of the circumstances that warrant a group to be tagged terrorist and accordingly the term terrorism is as value-laden a descriptor as one will encounter in the contemporary period. The author argues

that the decision to label a particular act, individual, or movement as terroristic is more a discursive question of politics than means. In the post 9/11 era, state-level rhetoricians describe their ideological enemies that can be "othered" as terrorists, while others are considered extremists.¹⁷ This explains why members of Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa and their foreign allies see themselves as fighting for Islam but not terrorists. The article does not address the Boko Haram and the Islamic West Africa and their international collaborators but was useful for this thesis.

The article by Osman Antwi-Boateng entitled "Boko Haram and Islamic State: A Tale of Two Terrors",¹⁸ examines the differences and similarities between the Islamic State and Boko Haram. The author argues that both groups are similar in ideology which they use to mobilize political, economic, and socially aggrieved communities towards violence in the north-east region and the Lake Chad Basin. However, they differ in their strategic goal, membership, financing, capabilities, and organizational structures. While Boko Haram majorly situates its attention within the geographical area of Nigeria, and its immediate environment, the Islamic State has an ambitious global agenda broadening to an Islamic caliphate. Although this article differs from this thesis in terms of scope and focus, it was relevant in tracing the emergence, organizational structures, and mode of operations of Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa.

Theo Brinkel and Soumia Ait-Hida in their article entitled "Boko Haram and Jihad in Nigeria",¹⁹ focus on Boko Haram's origin, ideology and mode of operations. They argue that Boko Haram uses Islamic religion as the basis of its ideology and instrument of recruitment, legitimization of its extreme violence and a criterion for the selection of probable targets. The writers conclude that Boko Haram is a terrorist group with religious motivations and that its members are psychologically motivated by the

jihadist interpretation of Islam, which sees them as the only genuine followers and interpreters of the Islamic faith. The formation of an Islamic state based on Sharia in Nigeria, is the only goal of Boko Haram. This thesis, which looks at Boko Haram's connections with the Islamic State of West Africa as well as other international jihadists, is different from the article in that it focuses primarily on the development of the Boko Haram insurgency. The article was helpful in chapter two of this thesis, which discusses the origins of Boko Haram as well as its philosophy and method of operation.

In addition, the article of Stuart Elden entitled "The geo-politics of Boko Haram and Nigeria's War on Terror",²⁰ analyses the emergence of Boko Haram as a terrorist organization and its militancy in the area of bombing, kidnapping, and abduction of school children and foreigners. In the broader framework of Nigerian politics, he places the terrorist organization, their operations and Nigeria's counter-insurgency operations. The scope and focus of this article differ from this thesis, but was relevant in tracing the emergence of Boko Haram and the political struggle for power in Nigeria.

Furthermore, Israel Nyaburi Nyadera and Mohammed Omar Bincof's article entitled "Human Security, Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: Boko Haram and the Taliban",²¹ examines a comparative study of the threats to human security by Boko Haram in Nigeria and Taliban in Afghanistan. The authors assess the ways human security is undermined by terrorism and counter-terrorism activities and argue that the threat of terrorism is aggravated by state counter-terrorism measures. The article differs from this thesis as it focuses on a comparative study of the impact of terrorism on human security in Nigeria and Afghanistan but was useful in Chapter Four of this thesis which examines the Nigerian government actions to Boko Haram as well as the Islamic State of West Africa.

Moreover, the article of Samuel Osagie Odobo entitled "Boko Haram Internationalism and its sub-regional Security Implication",²² examines the activities of Boko Haram and its connections with international terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab, and the Islamic State (IS). The article is a valuable source of data that has contributed greatly to the discussion of Boko Haram's expansionism but also its effects on national, sub-regional, as well as global security. However, it differs from this thesis which focuses basically on the connections between Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa (ISWA) and their collaboration with other global jihadists.

Benson Osadolor article entitled: "Regional Security and Integration: A Study of ECOWAS Initiatives in Military Cooperation",²³ discusses the issues of military cooperation in West Africa against the background of changes in the international arena. He contends that given the reality of global interdependence, the challenges of regional integration are only a regional defense framework that could safeguard and guarantee peace, stability, and security in the West African sub-region. This article differs from this study in terms of scope and focus but was useful in the examination of the operation of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) in north-east region of Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin. The article though differs in the scope and focus of this thesis but was useful in the actualization of chapter four which deals with the Nigerian government's response to Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa.

Similarly, Benson Osadolor article entitled "The Evolution of Policy on Security and Defence in ECOWAS 1978-2008",²⁴ explores the key challenges confronting security and defense in West Africa which culminated in the adoption of policy by the Economic Community of West African States for conflict management. He posits that the success of ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, and Cote d'Ivoire could be replicated in the north-east

region of Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin in ending the menace of Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa. This article does not have same focus and scope with this thesis but was useful in our examination of Nigeria's counter-insurgency operations of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) in our area of study which is in chapter four.

Asep Chaerudin article entitled "Countering Transnational Terrorism in South-East Asia concerning Terrorism in Indonesia and the Philippines",²⁵ reveals the challenges faced by Indonesia and the Philippines in combating the activities of Jamaah Islamiah which has caused transnational security challenges to the South Asia countries of Indonesia and Philippines. He emphasizes that the success of counter-terrorism mechanisms demands the understanding of the terrorist's psychology, motivation, and goals before such a fight can be won. The author suggests that a transnational threat can only be met with a transnational response. This article addresses the activities of transnational terrorist networks in the South Asia of Indonesia and the Philippines through counter-terrorism. The transnational dimension of its focus was useful in the examination of the counter-terrorism operation of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) in combating Boko Haram and Islamic State threats.

The Inaugural lecture of Benson Osadolor entitled "Nations and National Security: The Historical Context of Security Sector Reform in Contemporary West Africa",²⁶ highlights the failure of Nigeria's political leaders to address the issue of security sector reform which would have addressed various conflicts, violence and insecurity in each of the geo-political zones, including the activities of Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa as well as the cattle herdsman. This paper despite having a different scope and focus from the present study, was useful in the examination of military operations against the sects and the need for security reform by

Nigeria's government and its partner, the Multinational Joint Task Force to eliminate the threat posed by Boko Haram and indeed the Islamic State of West Africa within this area.

Another important article by Ayodeji Bayo Ogunrotifa entitled "Class Theory of Terrorism: A Study of Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria",²⁷ analyses the historical materialism founded on a class that Karl Marx proposed as the rationale for the Boko Haram conflict in Nigeria. According to this hypothesis, the adversarial class divisions between both the ruling class as well as the lumpen class translate to individual terrorism that has been prevalent in recent times. This theory contends that terrorist activity is an affirmation of an ongoing class struggle inference in the concealed frameworks of persecution but also structured inconsistencies of the global capitalist system. Even though this article's scope and focus are different from this thesis, it was helpful in chapter two, which discusses the rise of Boko Haram as well as the Islamic State of West Africa.

One of the articles that dwell on Boko Haram insurgency in north-east Nigeria is Abimbola, J.O. and Adesote, S.A. article entitled "Domestic Terrorism and Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria: Issues and Trends: A Historical Discourse".²⁸ The authors analyse several violent uprisings from different geopolitical zones in Nigeria since her return to civil rule in 1999 and the terror dimensions such violence have taken, which also has added to the threat to national security that could cause the country to fall apart. The historical development as well as current developments of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria was traced with the aid of this article. Nonetheless, this thesis's scope as well as aim is different.

In his contribution, Abimbola Adesoji article entitled "The Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria",²⁹ investigates the ethnic and religious

tensions that erupted in Northern Nigeria between the Maitatsine revolt in 1980 and the emergence of Boko Haram extremism in 2009. He asserts that the Boko Haram insurrection in 2009 was noteworthy because it sought to impose fundamentalist Islamic ideologies on the democratic state of Nigeria. This article differs in scope and focus from this thesis, but was no doubt important in tracing the historical emergence of Boko Haram which is in chapter two.

The article by Nicolas Courtin entitled "Understanding Boko Haram",³⁰ examines the meaning of Boko Haram, an armed political, socio-religious movement in which the group and its members do not use the term to refer to themselves, rather, they prefer Jama'atul Ahlis - Sunnah Lidda'awati Wal Jihad, persons dedicated to spreading the teachings of the Prophet and Jihad. Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa offered their organizations allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, at least nominally (ISIL). These successive names refer to the group's origins, commonly used names, and variations that reflect shifting alliances and affiliations. This article was helpful not only in tracing the emergence of Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa but also in their connections with international terror groups despite not having similarities in the scope and focus of this thesis.

Chukwuma Osakwe and Ubong Essien Umoh while analyzing military operations in north-east Nigeria in their article entitled "The Military and Counter-insurgency Operations in Nigeria",³¹ analyzes the challenge of Nigeria employing its armed forces to grapple with insurgency. It argues that a pure military means will be counterproductive since insurgency firmly resides within a political and social realm and not strictly a military one, and as such the role of the military in counter-insurgency operations in Nigeria rests on a proper understanding of the nature of insurgency – counter-insurgency in the counter flow of a globalized world with its peculiar features.

The article despite not having commonality with this thesis, no doubt helps in the examination of the operational strategy of the Multinational Joint Task Force in the fight against Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa.

The book by International Crisis Groups entitled *Counter-terrorism Pitfalls: What the U.S. Fight against ISIS and Al-Qaeda Should Avoid*,³² examines the U.S. battle plan against ISIS and Al-Qaeda -linked groups across the Muslim World, but should be careful when fighting jihadists not to play into their hands; to avoid angering local populations whose support is critical; picking untimely or counter-productive fights and neglecting the vital role diplomacy and foreign aid must play in national security policy. Most importantly, aggressive counter-terrorism operations should not inadvertently fuel other conflicts and deepen the disorder that both ISIS and Al-Qaeda exploit. This book was useful in analyzing the success of Multinational Joint Task Force operation in north-east Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin, though it differs in scope and focus to this thesis.

Solomon Adebayo Adedire, Modukpe Ake, and Olakunle Olowojolu in their article entitled "Combating Terrorism and Insurgency in Nigeria: An International Collaboration against Boko-Haram",³³ examines the efforts undertaken by the Nigerian government and other players to reduce the threat of terrorism and insurgency. These domestic steps range from sending soldiers to the affected areas to forming a combined task force with neighbouring nations, proclaiming a state of emergency but also requesting assistance from the public as well as the press in obtaining intelligence. International athletics employ financial sanctions to penalize state-sponsored terrorist organizations, the sending of security personnel overseas, and the observation of the various as well as increasing enablement systems. This article differs in scope and

focus from this thesis but was useful in analyzing the success of Multinational Joint Task Force operation in north-east Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin.

The article by Jason Warner and Ellen Chapin entitled "Targeted Terror: The Suicide Bombers of Al-Shabaab",³⁴ examines the bombing activities of Al-Shabaab, which have wreaked havoc throughout East Africa since the group formation in 2005. They are seen attacking Somali government forces, civilians, and representatives of the international community in their bid to instil a strict interpretation of sharia law in the country, as a contribution to the broader jihadist struggle. This article though having a different scope and focus from this thesis, was useful in tracing the ideology and operational methodology of Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa.

In his contribution, Fonteh Akum article entitled "The Reintegration Enigma: Intervention for Boko Haram Deserters in the Lake Chad Basin",³⁵ analyzes the maximum productivity attained by the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in the Lake Chad Basin, which has deepened competition between Shekau and Al-Barnawi factions of Boko Haram, including rising disenchantment, have attributed to thousands of members leaving the violent extremist organizations. However, this article did not discuss the Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa and their link to the international terror network but it furnishes us with the operational successes of Multinational Joint Task Force.

Don John, Omale article entitled "Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in Nigeria: Theoretical Paradigms and Lessons for Public Policy",³⁶ explores Nigeria's need for a thorough discussion of terrorism as well as counter-terrorism in light of the catastrophic activities of Boko Haram and indeed the Niger Delta Militant. This essay makes the case that comprehending the connection between extremism and crime in the political, socio-economic, as well as religious domain is necessary for combating terrorism in

Nigeria. The author agrees that there has been an increasing understanding on a global scale that criminal structures, whether local as well as international, pose a threat to both democratic gains and also feed violent conflict by criminalizing politics and using disturbance for their ends. To combat terrorism in Nigeria, the author analyses historical facts, puts out some related theoretical interpretations, and offers economic, security, but also socio-psychological solutions. Although this article's coverage, as well as aim, is different from this thesis, it nevertheless adds to the Nigerian government as well as the nations in the Lake Chad Basin's counter-terrorism approach to fight the threat posed by Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa.

The article by Hussein Solomon entitled "Counter Terrorism in Nigeria: Responding to Boko Haram",³⁷ explores the counter-terrorism measures adopted by the Jonathan administration from declaring a state of emergency to the creation of a Military Joint Task Force (JTF). The study makes the case that such counter-terrorism efforts may be ineffective in and of itself and result in the escalation of already present tensions. Although the focus of this article was not on the affiliation between the transnational terrorist structure as well as Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa, it was however useful as it provides us with information on counter-terrorism measures of the Military Joint Task Force.

Freedom Onuoha and Samuel Oyewole in their article entitled "Anatomy of Boko Haram: the Rise and Decline of a Violent Group in Nigeria",³⁸ examines the rise and fall of the Boko Haram insurgency, its ideology, and international dynamics that have shaped its rise and decline. The study makes the case that Boko Haram's existence, metamorphosis, and daring are results of the Nigerian state's insufficient institutional capacity to provide public goods and lack of governance. According to the researchers, the significant lack of development in the northern part of Nigeria as well as the

ensuing conflict between Western influences versus Islamism catalyzed the rebellion.³⁹ The international connection with other terrorist groups also contributes to its rise. The decline according to the authors is due largely to the lingering internal crisis between the leadership of the groups. This article differs in scope and focus from this thesis, but was useful in tracing the emergence and the organizational structure of Boko Haram.

Providing details to the effect of coronavirus disease (COVID-19) on the military operations in the north-east Nigeria, Daniel O. Iweze article entitled "Covid-19 and Nigeria's Counterinsurgency Operations in the Northeast",⁴⁰ investigates how the Covid-19 Pandemic has affected the military operations in north-east Nigeria and her neighbouring countries of Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. It emphasizes the effect of COVID-19 on counter-insurgency operations in the affected areas under review due to the deployment of military personnel to enforce lockdown directives, such as isolation and physical distancing declared by the Nigerian government. The article argues that the sending of the military to different regions of the nation to implement shutdown orders not only reduces the manpower needed for the counter-insurgency operations, but it added to the workload of security officers, who were already fighting ISWA and Boko Haram operations while also protecting IDPs living in camps and transporting medical supplies to specific locations. The article claims that Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa took advantage of the government's concentration on shifting from special operations, operational processes to quantitative restrictions as well as public indifference by intensifying the kidnapping of civilians as well as the recruiting and instructing of recruits. This was made possible by the army's pathological obsession with enforcing the shutdown order. The terrorists have increased their strength and also have resumed their onslaught against both military positions as well as civilian populations. The article despite not addressing Boko Haram and the

Islamic State of West Africa's links with international terrorist organizations which this thesis investigates, it was useful in chapter five which examines the efforts of the Multinational Joint Task Force in combating Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa in north-east of Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin.

The article by Anthony A. Ebonyi entitled "Implication of Boko Haram Insurgency on Integration: Evidence from Northern Nigeria",⁴¹ gives an account of the emergence of Boko Haram insurgency in north-east Nigeria. The author argues that the inability of people especially the youths to benefit from the resource allocation was a factor in the emergence of the Boko Haram insurgency. It found that several factors such as poverty and unemployment, etc., precipitated Boko Haram insurgency, resulting in social, economic, and political consequences. The analysis reveals that poverty, unemployment, and frustration of the northerners propelled young people to join Boko Haram and thus, enlarged its membership and gave the group courage to continue to unleash mayhem on helpless people. This article concludes that the sect's mission to institute a strict version of Islam and introduce sharia law across Nigeria, especially in the north, has failed. But it has succeeded in disintegrating the southerners and the northerners who hitherto had lived together in peace and harmony. This article despite its usefulness to chapter two of this thesis which dwells on the emergence of Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa in north-east Nigeria, it however did not address the link between Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa and their connections with other international terrorist organisations which this thesis investigates.

There is the contribution of Olumuyiwa O. Familusi and Titus O. Oshomo, who gives an in-depth account of the effect of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. In their article entitled "Socio-Economic Implication of Boko Haram Insurgency in Northern

Nigeria",⁴² the authors give an account of the effect of Boko Haram insurgency on politics, economy, and corporate existence of Nigeria. The article emphasizes the socio-economic implications of the activities of Boko Haram, the challenges it poses to the social and economic development of Nigeria and the implications of such on communities that are free from its activities. The authors attribute the Boko Haram crisis to bad governance in Nigeria. They posit that Nigerians have been denied good governance for long and the youths that are mostly engaged in acts of violence are the first victims of bad governance and acute corruption.⁴³ The article concludes that the implication of Boko Haram insurgency includes daily loss of lives and properties, the fear and animosities among the Nigerian populace particularly the threat posed to the security, economy, democracy, and integration of the corporate society. This situation has made it difficult for the citizens and residents in some parts of northern Nigeria such as Borno and Yobe to carry out their legitimate businesses. The article though did not address the focus of this thesis which is on Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa and their connections with other international terrorist groups but has contributed meaningfully to its actualisation.

The article by Kingsley O. Ilo, Ikegbunam U. Lilian, Chijoke A. C. Okoye, and Chukwuemeka D Onyejebu entitled "Terrorism in Contemporary Nigerian Society: The Case of Boko Haram",⁴⁴ gives us clear evidence that Boko Haram sect exploits widespread youth unemployment, and a high prevalence of illiteracy in Nigeria to perpetrate their terrorist acts. The reasons ranged from the frustrations of the unemployed youths and some people who dropped out of school. The authors argue that Boko Haram flourishes in their activities due to the absence of an effective security system in the country. Taking advantage of these economic frustrations and the corrupt leadership of the country, they were able to win many converts. The article though did

not address Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa and their connections with other international terrorist organizations but was advantageous to the actualization of chapter two of the thesis which is on the emergence of Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa in north-east Nigeria.

Asiegbu V. Iheanyichukwu, Nwankwo Sabastine Jnr, Briggs A. Captain, and Macs Omieye in their article entitled "An Empirical Analysis of Boko Haram Activities on Educational Development in Northeast Nigeria",⁴⁵ argues that one of the ways through which a nation can experience educational development is through the provision of a peaceful and conducive learning environment where successful teaching and learning can take place as well as increased student's performance. But regrettably, the activities of the Boko Haram sect act as a hitch to achieving this goal in some parts of Nigeria. The authors maintain that to a large extent, the activities of Boko Haram have hindered educational development in north-east Nigeria, with the sect destroying over 882 classrooms and abducting a total of nine hundred and thirty-six (936) students of both secondary and tertiary institutions across the country between December 2012 and June 2021 as well as killing 2,295 teachers and termination of many students education and the denial of the opportunity to further their educational opportunities. The article was useful to chapters two and three of this thesis despite not addressing Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa and their connections with other terrorist organizations which the thesis investigates.

One of the valuable contributions to this thesis is the article by David Cook entitled "The Apocalyptic Rhetoric of Boko Haram".⁴⁶ The author provides details on how Boko Haram insurgency has morphed from being a local quietist Salafi group to a local Salafi jihadi. This transition was followed by its becoming a group capable of striking at will across Nigeria to the establishment of Islamic State, and finally to

joining Islamic State, also known as Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) and Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham (ISIS). The article does not cover Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa and their links with other international terrorist groups but was useful in the actualisation of chapter two of this thesis.

From the above, it is obvious that none of the existing literature actually addresses Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa and their links with other international terrorist organizations. It is the gap of the literature review that this thesis intends to fill.

Characterization

To adequately address this thesis, the chapters are broken up into five as follows:

Chapter One: Background to Study

Chapter one introduces the thesis topic. It gives a quick overview of the historical development of Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa in the north-east of Nigeria. Aim and objectives, explanation of the issues, justification of the investigation, scope and limitations of the study, methodology, literature review, chapterization, as well as endnotes are other chapter components.

Chapter Two: Emergence of Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa in North East Nigeria

The chapter takes into consideration the historical emergence of Boko-Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa in north-east Nigeria. It assesses various accounts of the emergence of the groups. It also examines the leadership and the organizational structure of the groups.

Chapter Three: Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa; The Fundamentalist Dimension of International Terrorist Network

The chapter examines Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa and their links to international terrorist networks. It also examines the various supports by the international terrorist network to the groups.

Chapter Four: Response of the Nigerian State to Boko Haram and ISWA in North East Nigeria

This chapter assesses various efforts by the successive government to stop Boko Haram as well as the Islamic State of West Africa's operations.

Chapter Five: Conclusion

The findings and recommendations of the thesis are summarized in this chapter.

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CHAPTER TWO

EMERGENCE OF BOKO HARAM AND THE ISLAMIC STATE OF WEST AFRICA IN NORTH EAST NIGERIA

Introduction

This chapter examines how Boko Haram came into being, including its ideology, organizational structure and administration. It also evaluates causes that led to it. The chapter examines the conflicts over ideology and leadership that gave rise to Ansaru, a Boko Haram offshoot that subsequently changed its name to the Islamic State of West Africa. Boko Haram was born in 2002 when Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf established it in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno state Nigeria. The name "Boko Haram" is a composite of the Hausa words "Boko," which means "book," and "haram," which means "forbidden." Boko Haram translates as "the book is prohibited." In other words, it implies that public education is prohibited because it is wicked or sacrilegious. This has a broader resonance with Western principles or culture, or with individuals who accept Western money without showing kindness to regular people. The term "Yan Boko" is used to refer to the wealthy class as a result of the British government's indirect control in Nigeria. It means "the individuals who have seen their heads turned away by Allah (God) by cheap cash as well as distorting western ideas."¹ The group therefore views such individuals as spiritually as well as ethically depraved, deficient in religious devotion, as well as culpable of profiting by illegal activity rather than devoting themselves towards the Muslim *umma* (community).²

The organization is not called Boko Haram by itself, but the one that has been given by the local population including local and foreign media. This is on account of its rejection of Western civilization which the group viewed as the cause of bad governance, corruption, unemployment, poverty, marginalization, and economic

exploitation facing Muslim society.³ The group preferred to be called *Jama'atul Ahlissunnah Lida'awati wal Jihad*, meaning, "People Committed to Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad".⁴ Before the first public declaration adopting the name Boko Haram in August 2009, Boko Haram transformed under various names such as the Salafist Method Group and the *Ahl al-Sunnah wal Jama'a 'ala Minhaj as-Salaf*, People of the Prophet's Tradition; The "Community of the People of the Tradition for Preaching and Holy War," also known as *Jama'at Ahl al-Sunnah li Da'wah wal Jihad*⁵; *Al Sunna wal Jamma*, "Followers of the Prophet's Teaching"; *Muhajirun*, "Migrant: because they Performed the *Hijra* from Maiduguri to Kannama"⁶; the Nigerian Taliban, "The sect adopted Taliban ways of life"⁷; the *Yusufiyya* Islamic Movement, "Followers of Yusuf, the sect leader"; and *Ahlu Sunna wal' Jamma'ah Hijra*, which means, Congregation of "Prophet's Followers Involved in Call to Islam and Religious" Conflict.⁸

Before becoming the spiritual leader of Boko Haram, Sheikh Ja'far Adam, a well-known but also dynamic Islamic thinker, was Mohammed Yusuf's teacher, *Izalalatu Bidia Waikamatu Sunnah* popularly called *Izala*, which means to remove innovation and to uphold the *Sunnah* of Prophet Muhammad's movement. The *Izala* ideology, a Salafi/Wahhabi theological concept that first surfaced in Nigeria in the late 1970s and was inspired by the Saudi Arabian model, was held by both Sheikh Ja'far Adam and Mohammed Yusuf. The Salafi/Wahhabi movement has always allows its adherents to be active members in the state sector as well as to send their children to public schools, even though it has proposed the creation of an Islamic society that will be consistent with the values (norms) and practices of the pious ancestors, the Salafs. Due to his skill as a religious leader as well as the revolution's vigorous proselytism (*dawah*), Yusuf rose to prominence as an *Izala* leader in Maiduguri.⁹

Later, Yusuf's worldview evolves into a discourse that was defined by the systematic rejection of all secular facets of Nigerian society, progressively moving away from the *Izala* ideal and becoming more extreme. He grounded his reasons on the Hausa idea of *Boko*, which also relates to modern education from the West but also encompasses the concepts of humiliation, fraud, dishonesty, and lack of authenticity. Yusuf claims that the Nigerian federal government is an example of a "Boko" paradigm wherein Muslims are not allowed to be involved. Yusuf frequently recites in his sermons that *Boko Haram da akin gomenati haram* essentially translates to indicate that it was illegal for Muslims to pursue a secular education and work for the government. Because of this, outsiders gave the organization the moniker Boko Haram.¹⁰

Yusuf's mode of preaching and act of radicalizing, especially his outright condemnation of Western education and attacks on the secular state led to open conflict. Sheikh Ja'far Adam promoted the value of a modern education by the West. According to him, Yusuf left the *Izala* movement because "only the intentional embrace of Western as well as secular *Boko* education will ultimately equip Muslims to successfully battle the Western enemy."¹¹ He was shut out of *Izala* mosques while confined in Maiduguri and then was openly criticized in sermons delivered by his old instructor. This action of the *Izala* group prompted Yusuf to establish his mosque known as Ibn Taymiyya Mosque, which officially marked the formation of his group which is derived from the Mohammed Yusuf-named *Yusufiyya* sect of Islam.¹² The Mosque subsequently transformed numerous impoverished families from northern Nigeria as well as its neighbours, registered their children at Islamic schools, and started wooing the poor with his philanthropy and began to teach inciting sermons. The group started to pursue hidden political objectives, and before long it served as a hub for jihadists looking to join the struggle against the Nigerian government. Members of

the gang were from the Arabic-speaking Chad as well as Niger republics, which are close by. The group was also largely known to have lived at Jadama Mada near the Maiduguri airport where they have their Jumma'at Mosque.¹³

The followers of the organization were brainwashed with Yusuf's ideas, which he says were founded on purity. Iba Taymiyya, a legal expert who propagated Islamic extremism in the Middle East in the 14th century, was the inspiration for Yusuf's idea of purity as well as his preaching. Yusuf dedicates his mosque in Maiduguri in his honour. The organization began the *hijra* in 2002 to cleanse the state, declaring Maiduguri to be unforgivably filthy as well as unredeemable. This action was modeled after the Messenger of God Muhammad's exodus from Mecca to Medina. As a result of his relocation from Maiduguri to Yusuf's Kanamma hamlet in Yunasari Local Government in Yobe State, close to the Niger border, a separatist settlement governed by strict Islamic rules was established. The settlement was facilitated because the area is an ungoverned space with no security and other government establishment. Mohammed Ali, the leader of this organization, has advocated anti-state ideologies and urged other Muslims to accompany him in returning to a life governed by "true" Islamic law to create a more ideal society free from the corrupt bureaucracy.¹⁴ Believers in Boko Haram are inspired by the idea that the Nigerian government is corrupt in all ramifications and that to live a righteous life, the alternative thing is to exempt oneself from such society. The group's movement and convictions are captured in this way:

The greatest course of action for a faithful Muslim was to leave the morally bankrupt civilization for a remote location and create an ideal Islamic community free from political fraud as well as moral degeneration.¹⁵

It was also believed that the choice of Kanamma was for strategic purposes thus,

Strove for self, exclusion of its members from the mainstream corrupt society by living in areas outside or far away from society to

intellectualize and radicalize the revolutionary process that would ultimately lead to the violent overthrow of the Nigerian state.¹⁶

They claimed to have isolated themselves protesting against poor leadership which had caused the citizens immense pain, the breakdown of the economic growth, including high-profile unemployment due to corruption. They went into hiding in the forest and began to console themselves using doctrine. They indoctrinated themselves to the point where they began to see the Nigerian society as evil and unworthy to be associated with. This marks the era of insurgency

Boko Haram's contempt for the Nigerian government was first demonstrated in December 2003, when it used violence towards local villagers in Kanamma and members of other Islamic sects in response to a dispute over who had the right to fish in a nearby pond. The organization stormed local government buildings during the fighting, killed roughly 30 individuals, as well as abducted some locals who refused to join the cult. In reaction, police raided the Boko Haram camp and detained some of its members. Others, however, overwhelmed a squad of officers as well as stole their weapons. This altercation sparked the army's siege of the group's mosque in the new year of 2004 which further resulted in the deaths of the majority of the group's members, including Mohammed Ali. Consequently, the initial attacks against police units were planned to acquire weapons for armed uprisings in the future, as demonstrated after the rebellion in 2009.¹⁷ This action of the sect members marked the beginning of violence.

Ansaru

The emergence of Ansaru, a splinter group of Boko Haram is traceable to January 2012 when *Jama'atul Ansaru Muslimina fi BiladisSudan*, abbreviated as Ansaru, which means "Vanguard for the Protection of Muslims Black African",¹⁸ was

announced. It was born out of a determination to shift techniques from Boko Haram's manner of execution and a response to the deaths of Muslims. It has the same philosophy and beliefs as Boko Haram but employs different tactics. Firstly, unlike Boko Haram, Ansaru pledged to only hurt fellow Muslims when necessary to defend themselves. Second, Ansaru decries the murder of innocent security personnel, a group that Boko Haram has been attacking repeatedly since July 2009. Thirdly, Ansaru declared itself to be the protector of Islamic preferences across West Africa as well as throughout Africa, as opposed to Boko Haram, which is based in the northern part of Nigeria. Ansaru believes that anyone who has acknowledged the *Khalimatush Shahada*, Conviction in one God, as well as the Prophet Mohammed as the Messenger of Allah is a Muslim who ought to not be gunned down, except if the person has carried out an act that is liable to death as spelt out in the Quran. This is in contrast to the Shekau-led Boko Haram that also perceives non-members as *kuffar* or *fasiqum*, helping to make such people or groups prime targets of strike. Ansaru abhors Boko Haram's operational approach, which it considers inhumane against the Muslim *Ummah*. It asserts that Islam condemns the murder of Muslims who are blameless.¹⁹

In actuality, Ansaru believes that the killings of innocent Muslims were a distortion of Islam. Perouse de Montclos says that Abu Usamatal Al-Ansari, the movement's head, clashed with Abubakar Shekau in terms of doctrine since he believes that Westerners were the true enemies of Islam and had instituted novel techniques including the abduction of Westerners.²⁰ Even though Ansaru was founded in 2012, it is clear from its philosophy that it was the same organization that had previously gone by the name of Al-Qaeda in the Lands Beyond the Sahel and had taken credit for the kidnapping of Chris MacManus and Franco Lamolinara in May 2011. The major focus of Ansaru's growth was on expatriates as well as foreign interests. The cult forewarned

France that it would strike its people for its prohibition on the Islamic *burqa* and its "important involvement" in the upcoming invasion in northern Mali beginning in December 2012. The abduction of 7 construction personnel in Jama'are, Bauchi State, was also reported by Ansaru, who also affirmed that it had executed the victims in revenge for the anti-Islamic actions of European countries in Mali but also Afghanistan. When Abubakar Adam Kamar was killed in a gun battle with the security forces in his Kano hideout in August 2012, Khalid Al-Barnawi took over as commander of the organization. He remains in that position until he was slain by the military on October 14, 2021.²¹

Al-Barnawi started receiving money as proceeds of the kidnapping business he partook with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. He received 50 million naira (\$325,000) as his share of the 11 million British pounds paid to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) for the discharge of French hostages he assisted in abducting. He donated 40 million naira (\$265,000) to Shekau to ally with Shekau, the leader of Boko Haram. Because of disagreements among its leaders about how to spend the contribution, Boko Haram almost disintegrated. Shekau along with a few lieutenants intended to use some of the money for operations as well as distribute the remainder to the sect's members, while others felt the money should be given to households of the group representatives who had been killed. The two men's relationship reportedly deteriorated to the point that they were unable to communicate for some time. Following their reunion, Al-Barnawi reportedly made a bargain with Shekau, who possessed the resources to offer security protection, whereupon Al-Barnawi, who has the necessary abilities, would abduct Westerners and use a portion of the ransom money to support Boko Haram activities. Al-Barnawi formally dismantled the Ansaru organization by forging this

partnership, and ever since, the group has operated under the protection of Boko Haram.²²

Islamic State of West Africa

After its commander, Abubakar Shekau, swore allegiance to Abu-Bakr al-Baghdad in March 2015, Boko Haram embraced Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS), otherwise called the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) or Islamic State (IS). This led to *Wilayat al-Islamiyya Gharb Afriqiyya*, also known as the Islamic State of West Africa (ISWA), renaming itself Boko Haram in April 2015, which signified the official formation of the Islamic State of West Africa.²³ The two leaders' strong personalities led many experts to question whether the union of the two factions would be sustainable. Later, when Al-Baghdadi and Shekau's relationship worsened, Shekau was fired, while Abu Musab Al-Barnawi, the alleged son of Boko Haram originator Mohammed Yusuf, was appointed as the *Wali*, head of the Islamic State of West Africa, (ISWA) in August 2016, their misgivings became apparent. Nevertheless, Shekau was forced to leave ISIS and revive his *Jama'atul Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda awati Wal Jihad*, commonly known as Boko Haram, due to a bitter leadership struggle brought on by Al-Barnawi's appointment. Shekau and Al-Barnawi fought over their opposing ideologies' views on jihad. Al-Barnawi favoured less bloodshed and a strict strategy that limited jihad to non-Muslims and Muslims who aided in a plot against Islam by collaborating with law enforcement to combat them. Shekau, on the contrary, was dedicated to evangelizing a Jihad theology that made no distinction between Muslims and those who disagreed with him but were not Muslims. He supported the death of such non-believers because, under Shekau's ideology, they cannot live side by side with believers and well-favoured a broad definition of infidel or apostate to encompass anybody who is not with them.²⁴ In fact, their disagreement is a reflection of what transpired between Shekau-led Boko

Haram and Al-Barnawi's Ansaru, and ever since they separated, the two leaders have been operating independently. The misunderstanding is for mere administrative convenience as the goal of Islamizing the north and to a large extent, Nigeria based on strict adherence to sharia law remains unchanged.

Recall that on June 4, 2013, former President Goodluck Jonathan officially declared Boko Haram as well as Ansaru, subsequently known as the Islamic State of West Africa, as terrorist groups. Following this, on November 13, 2013, the US Department of State formally labeled Boko Haram and Ansaru, later known as Islamic State of West Africa Province, as "Foreign Terrorist Organizations."²⁵ The actions of both governments were necessitated by the uprisings that sprang up in July 2009 after Mohammed Yusuf and some of his members were gruesomely killed on Thursday 30th July 2009 by security operatives. This led to the emergence of the sect's notorious leader, Abubakar Shekau in July 2010 after the group kept a low profile for almost a year after Yusuf's death. The uprisings resulted in indiscriminate killings of innocent civilians and security personnel, kidnappings including school children, robbery, rape, and bombings of places of worship and the Nigeria police headquarters on June 2011, as well as a UN building bombing on August 26 2011 in Abuja, Shekau referred to Abuja in 2011 as the "conference of the entire world Satan".²⁶ As Iweze, observed, Since 2009, Boko Haram has presented a danger to the Nigerian government, causing thousands of deaths and willful property damage.²⁷ Attacks by Boko Haram, whose original geographic concentration was on the four northern states of Bauchi, Kano, Yobe, and Borno, subsequently expanded to all other northern states of Nigeria, including Abuja, the capital of the nation as well as to nearby Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. Nevertheless, because of the security operatives' counter-insurgency operations, the operations of Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa have

been restricted to the states of Borno and Yobe as well as select regions of the neighbouring nations of Chad, Niger, as well as Cameroon.

Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa's Ideology

The establishment of strict Sharia law, specifically in northern Nigeria, is central to the Boko Haram movement's ideology to reverse the system's decline, which the group's supporters say is due to the impact of Western culture or civilization spread through Western education. They view all things Western as wholly incompatible with Islam. In particular, members of Boko Haram reject the universal concept of democracy introduced by the Western world believes to be the cause of corruption, poverty, unemployment, and on the whole, bad governance. Western education and its influences are therefore declared by Boko Haram as infidels which must be avoided and destroyed at all costs for the enthronement of the Islamic State governed by Sharia law.

Boko Haram maintained that Western education or culture is counter-productive to Islamic traditions because it accepts not only things Islam rejects, but also propagates the alternative of all doctrines enunciated by Prophet Mohammed. It is on this basis they oppose the mixing of boys and girls under the same shade, propagation of the theory that men evolved from the family of monkeys, and the sun in the sky being static, all in conflict with the direct words of Allah governing the relationship between opposite sexes and evolution as enshrined in the Quran and Hadith. They also oppose secular government, taxation, jurisprudence, and the banking system due to its interest-charging which they consider forbidden by Islam, and specifically in Western education, something which is considered to lack moral precepts.²⁸ Boko Haram representatives also repudiate constitutional provisions that pertain to, for example, women's rights and privileges, homosexuality and lesbianism as ideas, punitive measures for serious crimes

like narcotics trafficking but also infant rape, multi-party democracy in a predominantly Islamic nation like Nigeria, blue movies, commercial sexual exploitation, having a beer as well as alcohol, and numerous other things that are in opposition to Islamic civilization.²⁹

Its actions are motivated by Takfirism, and its philosophy is based on Salafi jihadism. The goal of Salafism is to restore Islam to its original form, which was founded on the Prophet Mohammed and the early Islamic civilization, and to rid it of any foreign influences. Its commitment is firmly to the Hadith and also the Holy Quran's explanation, to change each Muslim's conduct. It also emphasizes the obligation to inspire other Christians to alter their way of life. Only one particular interpretation of Salafism—often referred to as Salafist Jihadism—focuses on using violence to bring over such drastic transformation. Takfirism, which derives from the Arabic term *takfir*, which means to declare an activity or a person to be un-Islamic, adds to the Salafi Jihadist doctrine. Shazad points out that Takfirism labels all non-practicing Muslims as *Tafirs* (infidels) and urges its followers to leave existing Muslim civilizations, emigrate to remote villages, and wage war on any Muslims they deem to be infidels.³⁰

All non-followers of Boko Haram's rigid conception of Islam are considered to be *kuffar*, also known as nonbelievers; those few who reject the truth are known as *fasiqun*, also known as lawbreakers, rendering them valid targets for assault by the organization's members. To destroy the Nigerian state and impose its version of Islamic Sharia Law on the nation and to reform the system, Boko Haram is murdering and maiming not only Christians but also secular Muslims based on this doctrine. *Tell Magazine* accurately summarized the mindset and worldview of the Boko Haram commander Yusuf Mohammed as follows:

The mission of the sect was to establish an Islamic State where "Orthodox Islam" is practiced. Orthodox Islam according to him frowns at Western education and working in the civil service because it is sinful. Hence, for their aim to be achieved, all institutions represented by the government including security agencies like police, military, and other uniformed personnel should be crushed.³¹

This motivated their *hijra* movement from Maiduguri to Kanamma in 2003 in preparations for the forceful overthrow of the Nigerian state and to establish an Islamic state with a pure Sharia legal system. Security agencies were deployed to checkmate the activities of the sect as Islamic State was never established.

Maududi is the source of the anti-Western rhetoric used by extreme Islamic organizations to which Yusuf and his supporters adhere. According to Jan, Maududi perceived Western ideology as a danger to Islam.³² Demant asserts that the five principles Maududi developed, are anti-westernism.³³ Maududi bemoans the distorting effects of secular Western education on Muslim youngsters in his article from 1934. Unclean secularities Maududi claims that Muslims reinterpret Islam across Christian lines.³⁴ Similar to how Nasr describes Maududi, who welcomes modernity but opposes Westernization, the disdain for Western culture and civilization is a reminder that Maududi sought always to Islamize modernism.³⁵ Cheema agrees that while Islamists oppose Westernization, they welcome modernization.³⁶ This explains why Boko Haram rejects Western culture and civilization but uses Western products such as radio, television, cellphones, AK 47, use of computers/internet, vehicles and other gadgets, and even travel by airplane.

Boko Haram commander and his followers, who took their philosophy directly from the Quran, thought that the only way to address Nigeria's societal inequalities and the accompanying crisis of fraud, unemployment, as well as poverty was to establish an Islamic State based on Sharia law.

Leadership and Organizational Structure

Mohammed Yusuf, the organization's founder, serves as the group's spiritual leader as well as commander-in-chief until his death in July 2009. Under his direction, the organization established an executive including *Shura*, or decision-making, *kwamandoji*, or commanders, to manage its activities. Without the *Shura's* permission, the *amirul-aam* cannot speak on behalf of the group. Each state and municipal government unit within its area of operations has its *amir*, commander in charge, in addition to a commander who supervises and directs armed operations. Yusuf was supported by two deputies, *Na'abi Amir Ul-aam* 1 and 11. The commander could be a member of the *Shura*, relying on his influence. *Na'abi*, the deputy, aids him, and *Mu'askur*, who relays instructions from the commander to the foot troops, also aids them. For operational and managerial reasons, big cities and towns are broken into *yajna*, districts, which are under the supervision of sub-amirs. To manage local operations, the organization selected *amirs* in several locales around the region, along with the Kanuri areas of Chad, Niger, and a portion of Cameroon. They are also divided into other positions, such as military, police, as well as judges. Abubakar Shekau, Mamman Nur, but also Mohammed Lawan were Yusuf's top lieutenants. Nevertheless, Lawan and Yusuf split in December 2007 due to differences in philosophy and how the Quran should be interpreted.³⁷

Abubakar Shekau, one of Yusuf's assistants, was chosen as the new leader after Yusuf's passing because he was more extreme and forceful and changed the group's inherited institutional framework. The group continued to have a flexible command-and-control structure under Shekau's direction, allowing it to function independently. Boko Haram currently has interconnected cells and units, although the cells typically follow orders from a single commander. All organizational cells are represented in the

Shura Council, which is the group's highest decision-making body and top council. Since the sect's uprising in July 2009, Shekau has been the leader of the *Shura* Consultative Council, which has given the go-ahead for increasingly planned and sophisticated operations by numerous cells. Under the *Shura* Council, there are also specific operational divisions in charge of carrying out different tactical operations, including bomb attacks, kidnappings, information collecting, recruiting, and bomb manufacture. Along with a public affairs department in charge of propaganda, Boko Haram also has departments that concentrate on the medical requirements of its militants including their families.³⁸ Under Shekau, Boko Haram grew more brutal, and aggressive, as well as destructive, and forbade free communication, leading to wanton property damage and the loss of thousands of lives. The suicide attacks on the police headquarters and also the UN facility in Abuja in June and August of 2011 may have been the most brazen of them.

Members of Boko Haram came from all segments of society, which include compassionate Islamists, disgruntled youths, employed but also economically inactive graduates— including erstwhile university lecturers, students, bankers, as well as a former commissioner—who tore up their diplomas but also jobs letters to join the organization. Substance abusers, wanderers, *almajirai*, as well as unruly individuals, primarily from northern Nigeria, but also from Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Sudan, among other countries. However, a sizable portion of its foot soldiers are *amajirai*. The gang was established in Borno, Yobe, Katsina, and Bauchi states in its early stages. Borno, however, continues to serve as the group's headquarters. As Boko Haram grows, it added supporters and set up operational cells in practically all of the northern states, which include Abuja, the capital city of the country. Nonetheless, due to the counter-insurgency operations of the Nigerian security forces, Boko Haram's operations are

currently exclusively carried out in the north-eastern states of Borno and Yobe, as well as some areas of Cameroon, Chad, as well as Niger.³⁹

Due to the development of Ansaru, a Boko Haram offshoot organization, the group's leadership split in half in 2012. Whereas Shekau is the leader of Boko Haram, Al-Barnawi is the leader of Ansaru until 2015, when Ansaru collapses its structure to Boko Haram and takes on the name Islamic State of West Africa (ISWA) after striking an alliance with ISIS to pursue a shared objective. However, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) sowed discord inside the organization when it announced the selection of new leaders. Shekau asserts that he is the group's commander, while ISIS leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi declared a shift in command and named Abu Musab Al-Barnawi as the new head. This prompted Shekau to leave ISIS and resurrect his Boko Haram organization, *Jama'atul Ahlus-Sunnah Lidda' await wal Jihad*, and ever since then, the two groups have been operating independently.⁴⁰

The leadership of the groups can be said to be similar to autocracy with an autocratic style of leadership, as the commander-in-chief is considered an authoritarian since his decision is final and unchallenged.

Factors that led to the emergence of Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa

The emergence of Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa is a combination of internal and external factors.

Internal Factors

The internal circumstances that influenced the emergence of Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa include religion, politics, and socio-economic.

Religion is central and a major motivating force for the emergence of Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa. From its inception to date, the founder of

Boko Haram, Yusuf, and its followers had wanted to impose religious ideology aiming at Islamizing the north based on Sharia Law, which they believe was the solution to the decay of the Nigerian system. Inspired by the ideology of Salafism, Yusuf believes in the strict application of Sharia Law, which represented his ideal of justice according to the teachings. In the early 2000s, he participated in formal initiatives to adopt and enact Sharia Law in twelve (12) northern states, which were all followers of the Prophet Muhammad. In reality, some have advocated for the Islamization of the government and society through the rigid implementation of Sharia but also some northern politicians even turned it into an election-winning campaign message. For instance, the former Governor of Zamfara state, Ahmed Sani Yerima was believed to have used the introduction of pure Sharia as a campaign tool in winning the election in 1999, and after his achievement, other politicians established themselves as unyielding warriors for Islam. Yerima, is credited as saying, that whoever manages or rules any society not founded on Sharia is an unbeliever.⁴¹

Nevertheless, scholars like Elaigwu as well as Galadima hold divergent opinions on the role that the enforcement of Sharia had in the rise of Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa. According to them, Sharia has been operated in northern Nigeria; the problem is in the manner that it is practiced.⁴² This supports the theory that those who support the implementation of Sharia may be doing so for political reasons to boost the status of the northern political elite and further their political careers. The twelve (12) northern states' adoption of Sharia shows that both religion and politics are not separate. This is in line with the ideological positions of Maududi and Ibn Tarmiyya, who maintain that separating both religion and government also has no existence in Islam, that terrorizing politics was a religious duty, and that Islamification of politics needed to be done, even by force.⁴³ Taymiyyah highlighted

that both religion and politics are not mutually exclusive but rather intertwined.⁴⁴ Looking at the Sharia implementation and the political dimension to it, it is hard to detach religion from politics and this makes it possible for the northern political elites to use religion, especially Sharia law to advance their political hegemony. The ineffective way that Sharia law was politically applied, particularly its incapacity to successfully combat corruption among political leaders and other crimes, however, aids in explaining why young Muslims are angry with the dishonesty and insincerity of their government. *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal Jihad*, better known as Boko Haram, was established in 2002 to advance rigid compliance to Islamic Sharia Law throughout Nigeria, especially in the northern region of the country.

A further significant factor in the rise of Boko Haram was the political goal to create an Islamic Caliphate founded on strict Sharia Law. This goal mostly stems from Usman Dan Fodio's Jihad, which Boko Haram continues to use as a template for a religious revolution. They hold the view that the caliphate he established was built as a result of Western civilization and represents its resurgence. Therefore, Boko Haram's commanders used this custom when they urged all Muslims to "fight for the reinstatement of Usman Dan Fodio's empire, wherein the white man battled and split."⁴⁵ It is on record that Western education has been opposed by Muslim Hausa, Fulani, and Kanuri during colonialism as it was seen as an attempt to alter the existing system of administration based on the Islamic legal system, Sharia Law, and hence, its rejection. It could be recalled that Northern Nigeria became a British Protectorate in 1900 and colonial control was consolidated between then and 1907.

To avoid offending the Muslim population in the provinces, particularly in the core north which formed part of modern-day north-east and west of Nigeria, British colonial authorities decreed a ban on Christian missionary activities in the Muslim

emirates thereby cutting off the north from the Christian missionary educational enterprises, the major instrument for the spread of Western education in most of Nigeria and Africa. This educational lag also persisted because there was suspicion in the Muslim emirates that the Western educational system was a tool for ideas and practices deemed un-Islamic.⁴⁶ Collaborating with this view, Muhammed argues that the aspiration to the restoration of the Caliphate by Boko Haram is traceable to the colonial era; Western education is viewed with contempt and dread because of its long-standing ties to colonial governments including Christian missionaries.⁴⁷ The goal of colonial education, especially in northern Nigeria, was to maintain the status quo by teaching the aristocratic class literacy at the expense of the lower social groups.

By 1930, colonial education had developed a small cadre of elite Western-educated individuals who were aware of their education and sought to contribute to society. The education that many children of the aristocratic class received differed from the traditional education that was provided in their diverse civilizations, and this distinction alone was sufficient to identify them as a distinct group. With this new knowledge, they were able to rise above their friends who had Quranic education and move up the social and financial ladder. The animosity and mistrust among the historically educated elite in northern Nigeria sprang from this. Their Arabic-educated peers saw the educated leaders as accomplices. As a result, opposition to Western education persists in many areas in northern Nigeria, particularly in the northeast and northwest, which have resisted government efforts to encourage school enrolment up to the present. Boko Haram's founder Muhammed Yusuf merely revived and expanded upon previously established historical context.⁴⁸

As the group expanded, they became very attractive to politicians for their political gains. In response, Yusuf subsequently formed a partnership with Ali Modu

Sheriff, the former governor of Borno state, promising to use his large youth followers to help Sheriff come out on top of the 2003 governorship election in exchange for implementing Sharia and giving the sect some high-ranking government consultation. In return for their support, Ali Modu Sheriff offers the organization strict adherence to Sharia, a 50-million-naira award, 50 motorbikes, and the position of Commissioner for Religious Affairs. Alhaji Buji Foi was then mentioned by the group to the Sheriff as their choice for the role. After becoming governor in 2003, Sheriff established a Ministry of Religious Affairs and named Alhaji Buji Foi, Yusufiyya's national secretary, as its inaugural commissioner. Additionally, Abubakar Adam Kamar, who had been imprisoned for armed robbery, was freed from jail.⁴⁹

Shortly after taking office as governor in 2003, there was a disagreement about the stringent application of the Sharia between Governor Sheriff and Mohammed Yusuf organization. International Crisis Group aptly captures the misunderstanding in this way:

According to Boko Haram member, he reneged on his promises to implement sharia fully in the state, limiting its counts to social matters and refusing to allow traditional criminal punishments such as flogging for theft and fornication, amputation, and stoning to death for adultery.⁵⁰

As a result, Mohammed Yusuf forced Alhaji Buji Foi and the majority of the other employees that Buji Foi had recruited to the Ministry of Religious Affairs to resign from Sheriff's cabinet. In 2007, Buji Foi complied and gave up his position as Religious Affairs Commissioner. As a result, Yusuf started preaching against Sheriff and his administration and eventually labeled him an apostate.

In a related development, Samu observes that, from an interview granted by one of the Boko Haram leaders, Sheikh Aliyu Tishau, as published by *Newswatch*, and *Sahara Reporters*, stated that the organization was a creation of a Nigerian political

class who recruited enlisted members of what was purely an Islamic group interested in sanitizing Islam, for the promotion of their political agenda. Thus, Sharia can be used against the same elites who propagated it, and like Boko Haram, they are simply demanding what politicians promised but failed to deliver.⁵¹ It, therefore, means non-implementation of Sharia-based on its strict adherence by the political class, knowing fully well that it will expose their many sins, and coupled with the issues of corruption, unemployment, bad governance, and other grievances culminated in the emergence of Boko Haram in 2002. Adibe concurs with the view that Boko Haram was a creation of northern politicians for their political gains. He contends that the forfeiture of political authority by northern political elites to the South between 1999 and 2003, when Olusegun Obasanjo took office, and once again between 2003 and 2007 and yet again since May 2010, after the death of President Umaru Yar'Adua as well as the election of Goodluck Jonathan as president, is viewed as a crushing defeat of the north's strength in keeping the authority balance. It is said that this instilled animosity is what Boko Haram then seized upon.⁵² This paper equally concurred with this view because Boko Haram emerged immediately after the North lost political power to the South.

Another internal element that fostered the rise of Boko Haram was the socio-economic condition in the north. Socio-economic indicators that highlight the advent of Boko Haram include poverty, corruption, unemployment, inequality, illiteracy or poor levels of education, and economic underdevelopment.

Poor governance is the root cause of poverty, which has ravaged the Nigerian society to the point that the majority of people cannot afford three square meals each day. As per the National Bureau of Statistics on Poverty in Nigeria (2013), 70 percent of Nigerians live on less than \$1 per day in the north-eastern region of the country, which has historically been a stronghold for Boko Haram, as opposed to 50 and 59 % in

the south-west and south-east, respectively.⁵³ Due to poverty, the youths of the affected states in the north-east saw Boko Haram incentives such as financial benefits, offering of loans, motorbikes donations, and donations of cellphones and airtime free of charge as bait for membership, and to potential recruits.⁵⁴ The youths therefore saw Boko Haram incentives as alternative to the government which had failed to alleviate their poor condition, and had no option but to join Boko Haram whom they saw as a means of earning a living.

Corruption permeates every area of the Nigerian economy, both governmental and private. Due to officials' preoccupation with accumulating fortune at the expense of society, successive governments have neglected their duties, depriving millions of people of chances and making Nigeria among the most corrupt nations in the world regularly. Nigeria was ranked as being among the most corrupt countries on the planet by Transparency International in 2013, coming in at number 144 out of 177. This is due to the extent of corruption in the country.⁵⁵ Dr. Obiageli Ezekwesili, a former vice president of the World Bank for Africa, further claims that since gaining independence in 1960, Nigeria has squandered more than \$400 billion to widespread corruption.⁵⁶ Boko Haram was brought about as a result of corruption. A functioning and corrupt free nation would make it impossible for Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of Boko Haram, to attract many disciples, however, due to the favourable climate, his teachings as well as ideology were readily accepted. As far back as 2004, early followers of Yusuf cited corruption as motivation for their actions. One of Yusuf's followers arrested by the police in 2004, told journalists: "Our group has suffered a setback, but our objective of fighting corruption by institutionalizing Islamic government must be achieved"⁵⁷

Northern Nigeria especially the north-east has the highest number of illiterates as a result of school drop-outs or not enrolling in formal school at all. What is well-known as the *Almajiri* pupils, who are taken to Quranic schools much further from their homes and forced to work as domestic helpers or beg for alms (*Almajirinchi*) to survive. Urbanization and rising poverty have made this technique more vulnerable to misuse, which encourages criminality. *Almajiri* has advanced into *Yandaba* and Ecomog, but also, in the majority of cases, political hooligans in places like Kano and Zaria as well as other cities in the north-west and east. Seven million *Almajiri* children were thought to be living in northern Nigeria in 2005, according to the National Council for the Welfare of the Destitute, and this sizable unsupervised demographic served as an ideal recruiting ground for Boko Haram.⁵⁸

An important factor in the rise of Boko Haram is joblessness. This is linked to deteriorating infrastructure, ongoing electricity outages, and the entry of less expensive imported goods, which resulted in widespread industry closures and deterioration in the labour market. In 2014, the World Bank reported that 80% of those under 24 years old were jobless.⁵⁹ There is no question that the high incidence of unemployment, particularly in the northeast, has led many young people to join Boko Haram as a way of employment as they see Boko Haram as a job or employer of labour to earn a means of livelihood. Collaborating these views, Usman Isaq, a businessman who resides in Maiduguri Metropolis during an interview said that the emergence of Boko Haram was not tied to a specific reason, saying the reasons always given by Mohammed Yusuf during sermons, especially on Friday Juma'a prayers and Ramadan lectures anchored on purification of Nigeria from corrupt leadership. Yusuf, he says, always emphasizes that Nigerian society has been polluted by the leadership influenced by Western cultures which encourage and harbour bad governance, poverty, unemployment,

corruption, and other social vices which Islam and Sharia law forbid, and seek the introduction of Sharia law as its alternative to cleanse the influence of westernization.⁶⁰ The internal emergence of Boko Haram is therefore attributed to political and socio-economic grievances and religion becomes a means to legitimate and mobilize for its actualization.

External Factors

The external sources are mainly ideological. The emergence of Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa on this basis was influenced by the ideological and theological teachings and interpretation of the Holy Quran by Ahmad Ibn Taymiyyah, Maududi, and other jihadist scholars. To help restore a legitimate Islamic state, these thinkers base their views on the need for Muslims to overthrow and replace apostate kings and governments. According to Maududi, jihadis want to "remove the control of a non-Islamic system and install in its place an Islamic system of state rule, and according to him, Islam would have no alternative but to grab state Authority."⁶¹ As a result, the goal of Boko Haram as well as the Islamic State of West Africa to build an Islamic state via jihad has resonance with Maududi. In contrast to Taymiyyah, Maududi calls for war against Muslim leaders who are viewed as anti-Islamic. He claims that members of the Islamic party must carry out a revolution in the political systems of the nations to which they belong.⁶² Consequently, both academics resonate with Boko Haram's and the Islamic State of West Africa's desire to build the Islamic State using jihad, which also uses force. By assaulting other Muslims, leaders who are deemed to have compromised, and to a significant extent, Christians, whom they have long condemned as unbelievers, Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa are putting their doctrine but also worldview into practice.

The propagation of extremist Islamist doctrines in the form of Pakistani *Tablighi* clerics as well as Saudi Arabian *Wahhabist* preachers is closely connected. *Izala* was founded in 1978 by Sheikh Mahmud Abubakar Gumi (1922–1992) and was greatly influenced by the *Wahhabi* philosophy, which was a key factor in the rise and radicalization of Muslims in northern Nigeria. The *Izala* started criticizing traditional leaders for their corruption in the government and the deteriorating moral standards of society, and they insisted that Sharia law be established to eradicate the threat in society. Such fundamentalist views are characterized by the idea that the Nigerian government is *Taagut*, wicked, and undeserving of the loyalty of genuine Muslims. Additionally, this gave the Islamic State of West Africa and Boko Haram a theological justification for their development.⁶³

A further factor in the creation as well as radicalism of Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa was the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which, despite US opposition, destroyed the Pahlavi monarchy and installed an Islamic Republic in its stead. Nigeria had a profusion of Iranian groundbreaking literature in the 1980s, which influenced Ibrahim El-Zakzaky's Islamic movement. The great Jihadi work *Al-Ma'alim fil-Tariq* by Sayed Qutb which had been translated into English as *Milestones* (1964) served as the foundation for the revolutionary principles of the Islamic movement. The core of the group's thinking was shaped by Qutb's contention that Islam and pre-Islamic unbelief, *Jahiliyya*, were incomparably different.⁶⁴ It gave the sense that utilizing Islam as a tool for bringing about political and social change was both possible and doable. Hence, Boko Haram thought such an achievement of the Iranian revolution could be replicated in Nigeria.

Muslims in northern Nigeria have become more radicalized as a result of American foreign policy in the Middle East, particularly its unwavering backing for

Israel and its repression of Palestinians. Muslims in Nigeria are familiar with Islamic literature, which consistently denounces such behavior and occasionally sparks demonstrations in the main towns of Muslim-dominated northern Nigeria. The assaults on US territory on September 11, 2001, and the responses to them, which further fed into an already-existing extremism network, were tightly linked to this. The organizations were all aware of the US military invasion and occupation of Afghanistan as well as the announcement of a "global war on terror" and they were all outraged by these events.⁶⁵ Giving credence to this assertion is the interview granted via telephone by Yahaha Yakub, a staff of one of the nongovernmental organizations said that Mohammed Yusuf and his followers were angered over the invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 by the US and its allies. He stated that Yusuf's preaching against the invasions poisoned many youths' minds and thus facilitated the emergence and radicalization of Boko Haram to retaliate against the invasions.⁶⁶ The perception that these incidents and the war on terror were a fight against Muslims and their faith fueled the radicalization.

The Boko Haram emergence was also influenced by the message of Osama bin Laden, who in two audio messages between 2000 and 2002 exhorted Nigerian Muslims to engage in jihad and create an Islamic state. When Bin Laden was in Sudan from 1992 to 1996, he requested a meeting with Mohammed Ali, a Nigerian student at the Islamic University in Khartoum who later enlisted as his follower but also underwent training in Afghanistan. In 2002, Bin Ladin reportedly directed him to set up a cell in Nigeria with a budget of 300 million naira, or \$3 million its equivalent. Following Ali's return home, he reportedly started sponsoring Salafi organizations' religious activities with Bin Ladin's knowledge. According to reports, Mohammed Yusuf and his crew were the main recipients.⁶⁷ Jordan, Pakistan, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, as well as

Morocco were among the renegade anti-Muslim governments that Bin Laden identified in his address aired on February 11, 2003, in his desperate effort to create an Islamic State via war.⁶⁸ In its 2004 State Department Country Reports on Terrorism, the United States of America Department of State admitted that Osama bin Laden had declared Nigeria to be a promising arena for operations.⁶⁹ The message and contributions of Osama bin Laden, who is seen as the leader and authority of global terrorist organizations no doubt became a booster to the emergence of Boko Haram and Islamic State of West Africa.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the emergence of Boko Haram and its ideology which is contrary to Western civilizations and culture by replacing it with an Islamic system based on pure Sharia law. It looks at the internal and external factors that led to its emergence. The Boko Haram emergence was also inspired by the thought of radical Islamic scholars who subscribe to violent means in achieving political and religious objectives. The internal factors are attributed to the socio-economic problems of urban destitution and rural decay in Nigeria, especially in the northeast region, the epicenter of Boko Haram. The north-east region has a large pool of *Almajirai* and a high rate of urban unemployment owing largely to bad leadership or corruption of the political class at both tiers of government, who intentionally failed to provide basic amenities or public goods to the populace and thus, conducive for the emergence of Boko Haram. Despite the emergence of Ansaru which later metamorphosed into the Islamic State of West Africa due to leadership contestation as well as ideological differences which resulted in the two groups operating independently, their primary goal of Islamizing northern Nigeria and to a large extent, the entire Nigeria on pure Sharia law through jihad remain unchanged.

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CHAPTER THREE

BOKO HARAM AND THE ISLAMIC STATE OF WEST AFRICA: THE FUNDAMENTALIST DIMENSION OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST NETWORK

Introduction

This chapter focuses on the activities of Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa especially their acts of terrorism starting from the uprising of 2009 that eventually brought the groups to the international arena. The chapter dwells on the Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa links with international terrorist networks. Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa are Islamic fundamentalists with the main goal of Islamizing northern Nigeria, and to a large extent Nigeria as a whole based on Sharia law. To achieve this objective, the founder of Boko Haram, Mohammed Yusuf changed his peaceful mode of preaching to radicalizing its members, and opened them to foreign collaboration. Boko Haram's international link was noticed at the early stage in Kanamma when members of the group flew flags inscribed with the word Afghanistan; earning the group nickname Nigerian Taliban. Longman, claims that members of Boko Haram momentarily flew the black Taliban flag as a sign of solidarity with the Taliban following one of their brutal raids on a police station in Kanamma, Yobe State.¹ They started to wage war against the local and the state governments with local weapons until international terrorist and terror organizations noticed the sect and began to develop an interest in their activities and started facilitating the sect. As a result, the membership, activities, and attacks of the Boko Haram and ISWA were alleged to have gone beyond the shores of Nigeria.

A significant problem with Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa is the tactics they use to carry out their actions, which have assumed a variety of aspects since their formation. Numerous academics, stakeholders, and members of the

international community have come to the unambiguous conclusion as a result of this trend that recognized terrorist states throughout the world are supporting Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa in various ways. Some experts have concluded that Boko Haram as well as the Islamic State of West Africa should indeed have already sent militants to Afghanistan but also Algeria for training because of their operational strategies, which are modeled after the Taliban in Afghanistan. Some countered that it's possible that Boko Haram as well as the Islamic State of West Africa just styled themselves like the Taliban to recognize their motivations. Some believe that it was done to win the Taliban's or other affiliated groups' pity and support. Another viewpoint said that it's also possible for the ties to be real. For example, when the armed forces and police arrested Islamic extremists whose actions threatened Nigeria's security during Operation Sawdust, which was conducted in 2005 and spanned the north-east geopolitical zones of Borno, Bauchi and Yobe, deceased Boko Haram founder Yusuf Mohammed was one of them detained. Due to the admissions made by others detained alongside Yusuf Mohammed that they had received terrorist training in Afghanistan, Lebanon, Pakistan and Iraq, this capture offered the first information on the connections between Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda. Maps and schematics of government facilities as well as some instructions to particular state buildings in Abuja were among the items found during the investigation.²

After Yusuf's passing on July 30, 2009, Abubakar Shekau as well as other Boko Haram leaders, who lacked Yusuf's intelligence, charisma, and oratorical skills, took more care to elevate these international prototypes on the pretext that these qualities were "spiritual followers of Al-Qaeda".³ According to Perouse de Montclos, the surviving Boko Haram leaders came closer to the global jihadist narrative against "crusaders" as a result of the extrajudicial assassination of Mohammed Yusuf, the

organization's founder, and several of his followers by the Nigerian police.⁴ Unquestionably, the Boko Haram upheavals that began in 2009 attracted the attention of international jihadist movements as well as rebel groups located in the Sahel. Some experts also claimed that Boko Haram had made contact with Islamist groups in the Sahel to acquire partners. This implies that outside assistance may have been involved given how quickly the gang was able to create powerful, large-scale improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and recruit suicide bombers to deliver them. Nevertheless, security personnel were able to put an end to the rebellion in 2009.

Under the direction of Abukakar Shekau, Boko Haram reemerged in 2010 and strengthened its capacity to confront the Nigerian government. Boko Haram has absorbed the techniques and ideologies of international Salafist groups like Al-Qaeda since its resurgence in 2010. Boko Haram's complaints were local at first while being highly affected by Al-Qaeda's ideology and outside events; nevertheless, there have been moves to connect local complaints to global happenings in Mali and elsewhere. In their investigation of Boko Haram's global reach, Onapajo, Uzodike, and Whetho draw the unconvincing conclusion that the organization's guiding principles, operational strategies, financial resources, and inspiring sources are largely found outside of Nigeria.⁵

Boko Haram in 2010 expressed solidarity with jihadist fighters in northern Mali. To help the French Operation Serval, which drove Ansar Dine and indeed the Movement for Oneness as well as Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) out of Mali's northern towns. Nigerian troops were sent to that country in January 2013. Boko Haram commander Umaru said in a statement that same year that his group is only an offshoot of Al-Qaeda, which we support and revere. We back Osama bin Laden, and we'll follow his orders in Nigeria up until the point at which the whole nation has converted

to Islam. Umaru asserted that he was speaking for Boko Haram. He may have been alluding to Osama bin Laden's prior claim that Nigeria was "ripe for jihad".⁶

In a related development, an Ei-dil Fitr Declaration was published on jihadist internet forums on 2nd October 2010 under the heading of al-Andalus, with the banner of AQIM. In the declaration, Shekau called upon Muslims in Nigeria to take on jihad to defend Islam against its enemies. He further stated that Boko Haram is devoted to implementing the "Programme of the Prophet" and to the installation of the Sharia. He rejected the legitimacy of the Nigerian State, which Shekau considered, was founded by colonialism after murdering Muslims, destroying mosques, and de-sacralising the Quran. He added that any government not committed to Sharia, including Christians and Shite States are to be considered enemies. Shekau gave appreciation to Al-Qaeda, its local affiliates and commanders in Iraq, Yemen, and North Africa, as well as to Al-Shabab in Somalia as well as the holy warriors in Pakistan, Chechnya, and Kashmir. He made special reference to Abdul Wadud, the emir of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb; including Mullah Omar bin Laden (AQIM). In the same period, posters appeared on the streets of Maiduguri presenting Boko Haram, the name of Shekau, and the logo of AQIM. The people were warned not to be of any assistance to the police or to come near soldiers guarding the city at night. Every Muslim who opposed the introduction of the Sharia was threatened with murder.⁷

Abubakar Shekau, the head of Boko Haram, declared the group's allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or Da'esh) in March 2015 and later dubbed it the Islamic State of West Africa (ISWA) as a statement to its worldwide fundamentalist groups. In an audio recording made by Abubakar Shekau and distributed by *Newswatch Times* said:

We announced our allegiance to the Caliph of the Muslims, Ibrahim ibn Awad ibn Ibrahim al-Husseini al-Qurashi. ...and will hear and obey in times of difficulty and prosperity, in hardship and ease, and endured being discriminated against, and not to dispute about those in power, except in case of evident infidelity regarding that which there is a proof from Allah.⁸

The audio script identified the Caliph as Ibrahim ibn Awad Al-Qurashi, who is better known as Abu Bakr al-Baghadadi, the leader of the Islamic State (IS) group and self-proclaimed Caliph of the Muslim world. France 24 terrorism expert, Wassim Nasr said that it was clear Boko Haram had been establishing closer ties with the Islamic State group for some time. He posits that:

It was obvious that Boko Haram were getting better and more efficient in their communication and their combat skills suggesting Boko Haram may have been advised by the IS group. It does not mean IS militants were on the group in Nigeria, they could have been advised through the internet, through messages.⁹

The Islamic State had already accepted pledges of all allegiance from other jihadist groups in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and North Africa. The Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, a group operating in Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, became one of the largest militant organizations to pledge loyalty to the IS group outside of Iraq and Syria in November 2014.¹⁰ Islamic State accepted Boko Haram's pledge of allegiance on 12 March 2015. This signals collaboration for the actualization of the global Caliphate governed by pure Sharia law. Meanwhile, the pledge of allegiance by Shekau could not last longer due to leadership contestation among Boko Haram hierarchy especially in the appointment in August 2016 of Abu Musab al-Barnawi, the alleged son of Boko Haram founder Mohammed Yusuf, as the *Wali*, head of the Islamic State of West Africa (ISWA). This prompted Shekau to leave ISIS and resurrect his Boko Haram organization, *Jama'atul AhlusSunnah Lidda awaits Wal Jihad*. This development did

not however alter the philosophy, ideology, and goal of the two groups as they continue their act of hostilities against the Nigerian State and its neighbours.

The binding linkage among Islamic fundamentalists all over the world includes ideology, mode of operations, funding, recruitment and training, kidnapping/hostage-taking, weapons, and communication.

Religious Ideology of Global Jihad

One of the undeniable links among the Islamic fundamentalists is the religious ideology of global jihad. Jihad based on the enthronement of Islamic rule or Sharia law is central to all Islamic fundamentalists. Boko Haram as well as the Islamic State of West Africa are associated with international terrorist organizations including Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, the Islamic State, Al-Shabaab, and the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) as a component of the global Islamic jihad. The worldwide political Islam practiced by Boko Haram as well as the Islamic State of West Africa calls for the takeover of all existing governments, the establishment of the *kufur* system, and the establishment of an Islamic Theocratic Government.¹¹ They both adhere to the same extremist Islamic ideas, which are spread by Wahhabist missionaries from Saudi Arabia and *Tablighi* clerics from Pakistan. Particularly Wahhabism is conducive to the ideology of Al-Qaeda and other Islamist organizations. They want to turn Nigeria and the rest of West Africa into a rigid Sharia-based Muslim Wahhabist state.¹²

Additionally, it was thought that the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan had a similar orthodox Islamic educational ideology to that of Boko Haram as well as the Islamic State of West Africa. Their relationship is strengthened by the worldwide Salafi Jihadist Islamism's transnational flow of intellectual influence. By nature, Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa are Salafi Jihadist Islamist groups who aim to overthrow the secular Nigerian government. The worldwide Salafist Islamic doctrine,

which seeks to impose its interpretation of Islamic law and has become a refuge for jihadists, is where Boko Haram and ISWA's philosophy and operational strategies were developed. The Salafiyya movement links veering from the straight path outlined in the Holy Scriptures to the issues of the modern world. As a result, Salafis characterize their actions as an uphill battle against modernity and *shirk*.¹³ Al-Qaeda claims that Salafism, which emphasizes a literal reading of the Quran and demands a far stricter outward adherence to Islamic laws, is the genuine path. The Salafist school of thought frequently opposes Western culture but also calls for the rectification of Islam as well as the creation of an Islamic Caliphate.¹⁴ Salafists were indeed religious and social proponents who favour a comeback to the genuine beliefs and customs of the earliest successive generations of Muslims, as per Bernard Haykel: "they adhere to a particular understanding of *tawid* or the unity of God, oppose *shirk*, polytheism, view the Quran and Sunna, the canonized practice of Mohammed, as the only valid source of law and authority, and are hostile to innovation, or *bida* often associated with non-Islamic cultural practices".¹⁵

The majority of Salafists, notably the *Takfir* sect, accepts violence and defines it as an expression of jihad. This stain is adhered to by several organizations in the Middle East and North Africa, particularly Boko Haram as well as the Islamic State of West Africa. Members have the same overarching objective of engaging in violent jihad to erect a new Islamic political order, but they are still sharply opposed to how to go about doing so. This may help to explain the split between the Al-Barnawiled Islamic State of West Africa as well as Shekau's Boko Haram (ISWA). Takfiri organizations like the Islamic State, Al-Shabab, and Boko Haram hold to the idea that an extreme form of Salafism ought to be enforced from above. The groups execute Muslims who disobey their rules. Takfiri organizations think that they would be the

only ones rescued on judgment day. The Hadith that states "My *Ummah* will split into 73 groups; one will join heaven and 72 will enter hell" is the one they use as support for their idea.¹⁶ According to *takfiri* philosophy, apostates have no place in the Caliphate, hence getting rid of them is a goal in and of itself. To put it another way, *Takfiri* organizations murder Muslim apostates to further some other political objective.

Their strategic objective includes the eradication of apostate Muslims in large part. No difference is made between the governed and the government by the *Takfiri* organizations. They believe that idolatry is wrong regardless of who engages in it. The *takfiri* concept, which essentially contends that anybody who disagrees with a certain understanding of the faith should indeed be ostracized and murdered, is used by these organizations to justify their activities. The Umayyad monarchy was challenged by the Kwarajites in the 7th century because they were not authentic Muslims, which is when the theory first emerged. Since then, Ibn Taymiyya, Muhammad al-Wahhab, and Sayyid Qutb have all used this philosophy. It most recently made a comeback in Egypt in the 1960s with a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood called *Takfiri wal-Hijira*, which means Excommunication but also Exodus. The theory was transmitted by the group's adherents to Peshawar in the late 1980s and early 1990s, in which it had an impact on several jihadists, notably Zaraqawi. The most well-known follower of the *takfir* philosophy is Baghdadi's Islamic State, which also has encouraged dozens of other organizations to emulate it. Somewhere at the extremity, *takfiri* organizations have the view that by executing specific renegade Muslims, they are carrying out Allah's or God's will and paving the way again for Mahdi. It is commonly acknowledged that Sayyid Qutb and Hassan Al-Banna are among the founders of contemporary Islamic extremism. The claim that their instruction contributed to stoking the violence is not

wholly without validity. Early in the 20th century, a campaign to reestablish the Caliphate and impose sharia law gave rise to modern Islamic extremism.¹⁷

Since the beginning of European colonialism in the late nineteenth century as well as the fall of the Ottoman Caliphate in the early twentieth century, according to modern Jihadi-Salafists, attacks on Muslims across the world have been ongoing. Therefore, they defend their violent behavior as a defensive act of jihad to save Muslims versus invaders, whether those invaders are Muslim administrators supported by the West or the British, American, or both. This concept of jihad as a defensive obligation is important because it gives people the authority to declare jihad rather than a head of State or Muslim ruler. Two other contemporary scholars and ideologues, Muhammad ibn Abdul-Wahhab in the Arabian Peninsula in the 19th century and Sayyid Qutb in Egypt in the 20th century, are also major influences on jihadi-Salafism. Both were horrified by what they saw as the decline of Islamic civilization and, with the help of two South Asian revivalist academics named Abu-l-A'la Mawdudi and Abu-l-Hassan Al-Nadwi, tried to resuscitate the real Islam that the earlier generations of Muslims had been practicing. Qutb clarified two related ideas that are essential to jihadi-defense Salafism's violence against Muslim governments. The first was the idea of *takfir*, which is when a Muslim is labeled an infidel for engaging in unIslamic behavior or thinking. The second was a comparison of an idealistic political structure founded on Islamic law drawn from the Quran and Sunna that symbolized God's authority on earth, or *hakimiyya*, with the politically corrupt order already in place in both the Muslim world and the West. Qutb concluded that any system that did not uphold *hakimiyya* needed to be opposed.¹⁸

For the dissidents of the Islamic revival, the idea of a unified *Umma* was the focus, and many instinctively insisted that Islam was the only source of worldly

legitimacy. Sayyid Qutb and his followers quite simply believed the nation and the state were vestiges of the corruption that Europeans had brought to the Muslim world. For the fundamentalists, the West had purposely plotted to undermine Islamic potential in many ways, but no more so than in dividing the Islamic communities into nation States. Islamic fundamentalists advocated a war on the West and a war on the West's international system, and the ultimate aim was to make the world fully Islamic.¹⁹ Qutb maintained that:

There is only one place on earth that can be called the house of Islam, and it is that place where an Islamic State is established and the Sharia is the authority and God's laws observed... The rest of the world is the house of war, God has established only one cause for killing when there is no other recourse-and that is jihad. He has defined the aim of the believer and the aim of the disbeliever most clearly and decisively. Those who believe fight for the sake of God. And those who disbelieve fight for the sake of idols. Fight, then, the followers of Satan; surely the guild of Satan is but feeble.²⁰

For Qutb, the only authority recognized by God is Islamic State rule by Sharia and the means to achieve this is jihad. Salafi Jihadism emphasizes using violence to effect such a drastic shift. It alludes to the fusion of a jihadi demand for violence with a Salafi worldview. Denoeux and Carter asserts thus:

Salafi Jihadi groups are motivated by a mix of religious and political objectives: they embrace a strict, literal interpretation" of Islam, and combine it with an emphasis on jihad, understood here as a holy war. They view Jihad as the primary instrument through which their Salafi desire to 'return' to the original message of Islam will become reality. Unlike radical Islamists, they approach jihad as a global struggle that knows no borders, and that focuses on combating the West in general, and the United States, in particular. They form an amorphous, transnational movement, and disseminate an ideology that is fundamentally hostile to modernity, to the secular, democratic nation State, to the logic of globalization, and peaceful coexistence of different cultures and religions.²¹

The Salafi doctrine is a kind of religious fundamentalism that seeks to establish an exclusively Islamic state founded on Sharia, opposing all "man-made" laws as well as

secular governance structures like democracy and democratic parties. Safafi-Jihadists regard democracy as well as "man-made" laws as fraud. In reality, they denounce the whole Westphalian nation-state structure as well as all other global political organizations except the Caliphate, contending that they are nothing more than Western imperialism's outgrowths. To reinstate the Caliphate but also describe the *Ummah*, Islamic fundamentalists therefore justify bloodshed as the only method available.

The Iranian Revolution of 1979 is one of the philosophical scenarios that encouraged the fundamentalists' drive for the establishment of a Caliphate based on pure Islamic law. The revolution brought in a broad rejectionist worldview, altering how Muslims viewed themselves, their place in the world, and how they approached politics as well as everyday living. The eventual rise and retention of Islamists in Iran served as a warning sign for the Muslim world as a whole and sparked a broad Islamic renaissance. As a result, new criteria were established and a new discourse emerged that employed radical militant but also martyr-focused tactics to combat "enemies of Islam." Life flourished quickly, particularly if it impeded the growth of the Islamic mission. Thus, Islam was introduced to be seen as both a means as well as an end for the disgruntled masses. This gave rise to leaders who talked about Islamic communities as well as pushing for the necessity to reinstate Islam towards its erstwhile position of supremacy by eradicating the perverting Western ideas that impede the spread of their millenarian perception.²² The aftermath of the Iranian Revolution in 1979 when, as social theorists and radical Muslims alike proclaimed a new epoch of Shiite revolution and Islamic transnationalism, the regrouped exponent of Islam as an explanatory category of the Muslim mindset came back to sweep all analytic challenges before them. For several years after the Iranian revolution, the Islamic State and "freelance" activities sent agents money and arms abroad to support the Islamic struggles and to

combat the influence of the "Great Satan" of the United States and its agents.²³ The universal revolution was consigned to the distant future, and Islamists made the appropriate rationale. As Sohail Hashemi observed:

The idea of a united Muslim world remains, however, inchoate central aspects of the normative framework of Islamic activism. The question of how the Pan-Islamic vision will be realized does not concern the activists because just as the socialist state was to have withered away, leaving the communist's utopia, so will the triumph of truly Islamic regimes lead to the re-creation of the unified Muslim umma.²⁴

Consequently, the 1979 Iranian Revolution that established the Islamic Republic was essential in bringing about the current emergence of religious terrorism. The goal of spreading the fundamentalist interpretation of Islamic law advocated in Iran to other Muslim nations was situated at the heart of the terrorist campaign supported by Iran. Ayatollah Khomeini stated we must work to promote our revolution across the globe, on the anniversary of the Iranian New Year in March 1980, a little over a year after the Islamic Republic of Iran was founded. He continues that we should renounce any notion of not doing so since Islam not only reject to acknowledge any distinctions between Muslim nations but also stand up for all oppressed minorities. Despite the difficult issues that plague us, we must be clear about our position toward the powers and the superpowers. Our attitude to the world is dedicated to our beliefs.²⁵ Muslims all across the globe have looked to the Iranian revolution as an inspiration, prompting them to express the core principles of the Quran once more and to reject the encroachment of Western influence in Muslim-majority nations. The present extremist or jihadist Islamic movement was created by the late Osama bin Laden and has its roots in the anti-Soviet struggle in Afghanistan, despite its close ties to the Islamist dictatorship in Iran for Islamic enlightenment. There, ties between many national groups and individuals were created. The jihadists' victory in Afghanistan has encouraged jihadists elsewhere, and

as a result, other men and women who were simply too young to have battled in Afghanistan imitated what they perceived as the jihadist paradigm.²⁶ According to Muhammed Arif Mustafa, one of the Taliban commanders, while granting an interview to CNN's Charisa Ward, said, "One-day *Mujahedeen* will have victory and Islamic law will come not just to Afghanistan, but all over the world. We are not in a hurry. We believe it will come one day. Jihad will not end until the last day".²⁷ The fight for the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate based on strict implementation of Sharia law by the global jihadists including Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa gives credence to the statement, but changing the modern independent states to an Islamic Caliphate may not be achievable as states may not collapse its sovereignty to form a Caliphate. It is not even realizable in the Muslim world.

For Boko Haram as well as the Islamic State of West Africa, for example, encouragement from Afghanistan might not only refer to the *Mujahedeen's* win against the Soviet Union but also represent Islam's victory over secularism. It mostly stems from the fact that the win was achieved with makeshift and rudimentary weaponry as opposed to the advanced Soviet armaments. To succeed in Nigeria as the Taliban did in Afghanistan, Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa switched from using relatively crude weaponry to homemade explosive devices (IEDs) during their terror campaign there. Al-Qaeda had risen out of the fundamentalist jihadist that had fought the Soviet forces in Afghanistan in the 1980s, while it drew its support from recruits across the Muslim world and proclaimed a corresponding ideology.²⁸ The Taliban's rise to power in Afghanistan inspired sectarian organizations in other Muslim nations, such as Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa, to apply the same strategy to topple the Nigerian government as well as create an Islamic state governed by Sharia law.

In the meantime, global Al-Qaeda has succeeded in Nigeria and other parts of the Muslim world in its endeavour to channel centralized hostilities into a developing but fragile network of international jihadism. As eloquently stated by Vidino, Pantucci, and Kohlman:

Al-Qaeda and more generally, the global jihadist environment have repeatedly attempted to hijack conflicts that were largely nationalistic (local) in nature and turn them both rhetorically and generationally, into battlefields of what they perceive to be a millenarian and global conflict between the worlds of infidelity. The local actor might maintain some of their parochial agendas, but by putting themselves under the banner of the global jihadist movement they benefit from outside support in terms of funding, recruits propaganda, and military expertise. The global jihadist movement also benefits, as it can expand its influence and add credibility to its narrative that Islam is under attack from non-Muslims.²⁹

Boko Haram claims of allegiance to Al-Qaeda and other Islamic jihadists across the globe give credence to the above statement.

The jihadists also hold a common philosophy of opposing American-led global capitalism, which has shifted the balance of social ties across societal classes. So, by focusing on her and its Western friends, they attempt to subvert US hegemony. Remember that the fall of the Soviet Union signaled the mono-polar capitalist system as well as the "free market's" triumph in the end. One-third of mankind lives in poorer countries, which are continually plagued by conflicts, diseases, starvation, poverty, and illiteracy as a result of the extension as well as the spread of capitalism to every region of the world during the post-colonial epoch. They have seen an extraordinary proliferation of warring factions that want to use the contradictions of capitalism, including destitution, social injustice, unfair treatment, unemployment, and so-on as rationalization for establishing an Islamic State that will end the damaging consequences of capitalist crises, in regions like Africa and the Middle East in which these problems are most acute. Due to capitalism's disastrous impact, sectarian

organizations like Al-Qaeda, Islamic State, AQIM, Boko Haram, and ISWA, among others, have begun to call for its elimination and the creation of the Islamic State to combat its harmful effects. Nigeria's and other parts of Africa and the Middle East's involvement in the corporate capitalism process for many years has resulted in antagonistic class relations throughout time.³⁰

Jalata asserts that as states engage in terrorist activities to promote their economic and political domination, non-state terrorist agencies use similar techniques to oppose and challenge such policies, behavior, and practices.³¹ As Marxism rightly puts it, as "long as the global system relies on exploitative, oppressive and hierarchical relationship, there will likely exist conflict and peace may become impossible to achieve".³² In this case, the global jihadists' seek to challenge the capitalist hegemony and replace it with the Caliphate under strict adherence to Sharia law became inevitable.

Another scenario that influenced the fundamentalists' drive for the establishment of the Caliphate was their perceptions towards democracy, which they believed undermined the Islamic ways of life. The democratic setting which permits control of law, education, family, policy freedom, or the very reaction of the Muslim society against state domination of the economy and its associated corruption gives rise to the jihadist movement in Muslim societies. On democracy and the Muslim society, King Fahd made the situation clear in an interview in late March 1992, to which he pronounced that:

The prevailing democratic setting in the world is not suitable for us in this region: Our people's composition and traits are different from the traits in the world. We cannot import the way other people deal with our affairs to apply it to our people: We have our Muslim faith which is a complete system and a complete religion. Elections do not fall within the sphere of the Muslim religion which believes in the consultative system and the openness between a ruler and his subjects and makes whoever is in charge fully answerable to his people... Free elections are not suitable for our country.³³

For the king, Islam negated the need for a fuller democracy, and this could be the reason Yusuf and his followers rejected democracy and its components.

Former US President, George W. Bush equally acknowledged that Islamic fundamentalists hate them because of their democratic values. He acknowledged this on September 20, 2001, while addressing Congress on the September 11 attacks. He said that:

Al-Qaeda is to terrorism what the mafia is to crime. But its goal is not making money; its goal is remaking the world and imposing its radical beliefs on people everywhere. The terrorists practice a fringe form of Islamic extremism... Why do they hate us? They hate what they see right here in the chamber; a democratically elected government... they hate our freedom; our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other.³⁴

To the Islamic fundamentalists, the democratic setting which is a product of colonization has directly altered their traditional and social relations, and this they considered as alien to Muslim societies. The ill-feeling towards democracy which the fundamentalists see as a threat to their traditional and social relations necessitated actions toward the Westerners. Gurr posits that:

When traditional norms, social patterns, and identities are threatened, people are ripe for conversion to radical ideologies based on religion or nostalgia for a glorious, mythical past or promised future. Ideologies derived from Islam cover all aspects of life and give meaning, counsel, and justification for action.³⁵

Democracy no doubt has attributes of civilizations that the Muslim world sees as a threat to Islamic culture and thus creates tension between Muslims and the West which suggests that Islamic and Western cultures were so different and incompatible that international conflict was inevitable. This tension is what Samuel P. Huntington described as the clash of civilizations. He stated that wars between theories are being supplanted by confrontations between old civilizations, with cultural as well as religious differences serving as the main axis of confrontation. He wrote:

It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this world will not be primarily avidly ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation-states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The class of civilization will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.³⁶

Huntington picked out Islam explicitly, calling it a religion with "bloody boundaries," and he forewarned that extreme Islam would pose grave dangers to Western civilization. Huntington's theories gained support after Osama bin Laden-led Islamic extremist assaults on the Pentagon but also World Trade Center in the United States on September 11, 2001, and the menace of political Islam was once again widely recognized. Both Boko Haram and Islamic State of West Africa, AQIM, Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda, Islamic State and other jihadist organizations have constantly accused the West of destroying Muslim societies through their civilizations, which they tagged as "forbidden", and this often necessitated their attacks against western interests.

Ehud Sprinzak asserts that ideological terrorism is a political phenomenon par excellence and is therefore an extension of opposition politics in democracy, as a special case of an ideological conflict of authority.³⁷ It is on this note that Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa and their jihadist collaborators want the establishment of the Caliphate based on pure Sharia law, against a democratic setting. Gurr on the political context of terrorism maintains that violent activism in democracies requires a climate of acceptance of unconventional means of political action among a support group. The support group is any social segment- a communal group, faction, political tendency, or class whose members seek a particular kind of political change.³⁸ In this aspect, the Islamic fundamentalists want a political change in Muslim societies and want a replacement of democracy with the Caliphate. Ferracuti on his part said that

most terrorist groups attempt at some point to acquire a political identity to strengthen their international ties and enlarge their political base. Their main goals, however, tend to remain the achievement of freedom from a "foreign" or "alien" oppressor, whether perceived or real.³⁹ Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) are clear examples with their international ties in almost all the Muslim world aiming at dislodging the US and its allies from the Muslim world. Crenshaw asserts that since the French Revolution, a strategy of terrorism has gradually evolved as a means of bringing about political change opposed by established governments.⁴⁰ Boko Haram and ISWA, AQIM, IS, Al-Qaeda and other Islamic fundamentalists have carried out terrorist acts against established governments aimed at overthrowing and replacing them with Islamic governments or regimes. Juergensmeyer contended that religious terrorists worked toward an "anti-modern political agenda". In his words:

They have come to hate secular governments with an almost transcendent passion... dreamed of revolutionary changes that would establish a godly social order in the rubble of what the citizens of most secular societies have regarded as modern, egalitarian democracies... The logic of this kind of militant religiosity has therefore been difficult for many people to comprehend. Yet its change has been profound, for it has contained a fundamental critique of the world's Post-Enlightenment secular culture and politics.⁴¹

This argument suggests that the single thing that religious terrorists can achieve is the construction of a caliphate based on Sharia law since their goals are uncompromising, impractical, lacking in political pragmatism, as well as antagonistic to the discussion.

The United States Middle East international policy is another driving force behind Islamic extremists' desire to establish a Caliphate based on the application of Sharia law. The US's unwavering backing of Israel, as well as Israeli repression of Palestinians, coupled with the US unwillingness to support the establishment of a Palestinian State, is important reasons for Islamic fundamentalists to demand the

establishment of a Caliphate governed by the Sharia law. Likewise, the decision by the Saudi government to invite US forces to Saudi Arabia on 2 August 1990 to form a coalition against Iraq was to be the breaking point in relations between Riyadh and the militant Islamists led by Osama bin Laden. This development has necessitated Osama bin Laden to issue Fatwas in 1996 and 1998 respectively, to battle the adversaries worldwide, Muslims. Bin Laden remarked:

My Muslim brothers of the globe,
Your brothers in Palestine and the land of the two Holy Places are calling upon your help and asking you to take part in fighting against the enemy your enemy and their enemy the Americans and the Israelis. They are asking you to do whatever you can, with one ('s) own means and ability, to expel the enemy, humiliated and defeated, out of the sanctities of Islam. Exalted be to Allah (Sic).⁴²

The 2nd fatwa, which was released on February 23, 1998, described how Muslims as well as *ulema*, or "guardians of the faith," have agreed across the whole of Islamic history that jihad is an individual duty if the adversary annihilates Muslim countries, as well as how the atrocities but also transgressions of Americans are a pretty obvious declaration of warfare against God, his messenger, Muslims, and *ulema*. That being the case, the accompanying fatwa was declared to all Muslims by God's command:

The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies-civilians and military an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy Mosque (Mecca) from their grip, and for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is by the words of Almighty God, and fights the pagans all together as they fight you all together, and fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and in God.⁴³

Six months later, the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were simultaneously attacked by suicide bombers, properly carrying out the fatwa. The following day, the "International Islamic Front" issued a statement that reaffirmed and supported the

widespread demands for jihad. Bin Laden equally called on Muslims to fight and liberate Muslims land from the oppressors. He said:

Oh Muslims, Israeli cancer in Palestine, and the American cancer in the land of Hijaz, Saudi Arabia must be uprooted. Islam obliges us to liberate all Muslim's land from occupiers whoever they may be, whether American, Israeli, or other forces...

Oh Muslims, yours is an Ummah (worldwide community of Muslims) for whom jihad is the spearhead of its ideology whose creed is built upon a firm foundation with an unshakeable belief that victory is from Allah and that Allah has promised authority, victory, and domination which will undoubtedly be fulfilled God willing.⁴⁴

Osama bin Laden might be referring to north-east and western Nigeria where the majority of the people are Muslims as well as Sharia law is practiced since Nigeria is a secular state.

Over the years, Bin Laden has claimed that a Christian and Jewish "cabal" is the main impetus behind American policies that aim to subjugate and harm Muslim cultures. On September 11, 2001, Al-Qaeda struck the United State because they believed Americans were "complicit citizens" who supported American foreign policy in the Middle East. To free Muslim nations from the control of non-Muslims as well as create an Islamic state based on Sharia law, Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa have carried out violent assaults. This is by Bin Laden's fatwa to Islamic jihadists.

Mode of Operation

An additional connection between Boko Haram, the Islamic State of West Africa, and other global Islamic fundamentalist organizations is their mode of operation, particularly with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al-Shabaab, the Taliban, and the Islamic State (IS). The Islamic State of West Africa and Boko Haram are both involved in this case and their foreign allies adopt the same mode of operation such as suicide bombings, attacks on military formations or artillery and other security

personnel including para-military, targeted associations, ambushes, raids, drive-by shooting, among others. After a military crackdown in 2009, links between Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa were strengthened. The remaining members of the sect are alleged to have fled through the Chad and Niger Republics to Somalia, Algeria, and Afghanistan, where they joined other Islamist jihadists and received guerrilla training. Since then, Boko Haram and ISWAP have mostly destroyed northern Nigeria and its neighboring nations of Chad, Niger, and Cameroon by targeting civilians and government troops, adding to the larger global Islamist conflict. This is comparable to the devastation wrought by Al-Shabaab in East Africa.

In the course of their violent campaigns, Boko Haram and Islamic State of West Africa and their collaborators use a range of tactics, such as the use of gunmen, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), drive-by shootings, targeted assassinations, ambushes, and raids among others. In addition, the group is known to use stoning, amputations, and beheadings to punish and intimidate those in its area of control who do not abide by its interpretation of Sharia.⁴⁵ Yet perhaps, the most pernicious and little-understood tactic in jihadists' arsenal of violence is its use of suicide bombers. Suicide terrorists are sometimes described as predominantly transnational and are frequently referred to as "extremists" who are "radicalized" by some "scattered" worldwide networks. Suicide terrorists may be seen as the result of economic estrangement, social exclusion, or cult-like indoctrination.⁴⁶ "The new international phenomena of suicide attacks is transitory in nature," Assaf Moghadam said.⁴⁷ Accordingly, Scott Atran asserted that "the challenge is international" and that often these suicidal terrorists nowadays are driven by a worldwide Islamic extremism".⁴⁸ Commitment to a certain Islamic philosophy, Salafism, maybe a better explanation for transnational suicide assaults between Muslims.

A coercive tactic being used by democratic countries is suicide terrorism. The target state in contemporary suicide campaigns has historically been a democracy. Due to the widespread belief that democracies are susceptible to coercive retribution, suicide terrorism is much more likely to be utilized against them. This theory is based on the idea that a democratic government ensures liberties that conservative Muslims are hostile to. Suicide bombers are a new breed of terrorists, according to Fateh Muhammad Burfat of the criminology Department at the University of Karachi in Pakistan, who also noted that suicide attackers are post-9/11 phenomena. Suicide bombers, in Burfat's opinion, are "unemployed, uneducated, and belong to low socioeconomic strata," and they "saw the U.S. military efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan as hostile acts against the Muslim world".⁴⁹ This is correct as most Islamic fundamentalists such as Boko Haram/ISWA, Al-Shabaab, AQIM, and others sprang up after the Afghanistan and Iraq invasions of 2001 and 2003 respectively.

Regarding interconnection between Boko Haram/ISWA and other international jihadist groups, Boko Haram's use of suicide bombings, particularly from 2009 onward and in particular after the 2011 bombings of the Police command headquarters and UN building in Abuja, demonstrates the groups' ties to other Salafi-jihadi groups. This is because no other radical Muslim organization in Africa has employed suicide assaults, except Al-Shabab in Somalia and, to a lesser extent, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. According to Kyari Mohammed, Boko Haram adopted the hostage-taking, breaking away, bombing, and targeted killing strategies of other international Salafi jihadist organizations.⁵⁰ According to David Cook, the similarities in suicide attack techniques and video recording techniques between Boko Haram and other terrorist groups like AQIM and Al-Shabab serve as the basis for their linkages.⁵¹ In his view, Perouse de Montclos contends that operational similarities were initially noted as early as 2003

when the earliest Mujahideen members of Boko Haram referred to themselves as Taliban and others made allusions to other jihadist front-lines like Somalia. The biggest developments, meanwhile, occurred in 2011, when Boko Haram and ISWA began using suicide bombings in imitation of Pakistan, Iraq, Lebanon, as well as Palestine.⁵²

A parallel development between Boko Haram and AQIM can be detected in the selection of targets such as the attacks on the United Nations office in 2007 in Algiers and 2011 in Abuja. The relation with AQIM is confirmed at the beginning of a YouTube video of Boko Haram. On it, there is the logo of two crossed Kalashnikov rifles around a Quran and a black Islamic flag. These attacks seem to have been staged planned and coordinated by both terrorists due to the similar nature of the attack. Boko Haram and AQIM used the UN attack to show Al-Qaeda their dedication to international jihad.⁵³ In a similar occurrence, on June 19, 2013, an Al-Shabaab bombing in Mogadishu resulted in the deaths of 15 persons. The attack on the UN is much more in line with other globalist takfiri organizations and is quiet similar to the attack on the UN in Baghdad in August 2003, which was one of the initial blows of the Iraq uprising.⁵⁴

There were also attacks targeting Western interests especially foreign embassies such as the DHK/C suicide bomber attacks on the US embassy in Ankara, Turkey on February 1, 2013, killing himself and a guard;⁵⁵ September 11, 2012, coordinated attacks on two US diplomatic facilities in Benghazi Libya where Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other Americans were killed, with 4 Americans and 7 Libyans wounded by members of the Islamic militant group Ansar Al-Sharia and AQIM;⁵⁶ September 1, 2011, the Taliban attack on the US embassy and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) headquarters in Kabul, Afghanistan, killing at least 7 and wounding 19 people;⁵⁷ May 20 2011, TTP suicide bomber on motorbike attacks US

consulate vehicle in Peshawar, Pakistan killing one Pakistani, and wounding 10 other;⁵⁸ and April 28, 2011, bomb kills 15 in Marrakech, Morocco's Café frequented by Westerners in first major attack in that country since May 2003, which the government blames AQIM but the group denies responsibility.⁵⁹ These attacks targeting foreign citizens are manifestations of the global jihadist quest to destroy the Westerners and their interests which were considered enemies of Islam. The attack is also seen as an attempt at restoring the Caliphate in place of a democratic system which the jihadists believe has created problems that Muslims are facing today.

The bombing of police headquarters or offices is one of the features of suicide bombers of jihadist groups. Viewing from this, a parallel can be drawn between Boko Haram, the bombing of police headquarters in Abuja on June 26, 2011, which killed six people, and similar attacks by other jihadist groups such as Tehreek-e- Taliban Pakistan (TTP) husband and wife suicide bombers attack police station in Kolachi, Pakistan on June 25, 2011, killing 10 people; February 2011, Al-Shabaab attack on a police station in Mogadishu, killing 12 persons including 6 police officers, 4 Djoubotian soldiers and 2 civilians; January 18, 2011 Al-Qaeda suicide bombers attack on a police applicants in Tikrit, Iraq, killing 50 and wounding, 50 applicants.⁶⁰ The fact that these attacks on police stations happened in 2011 indicates that Boko Haram must have sourced the required knowledge for the successful execution of the Nigerian attack, but it is possible the expertise was developed through external links and training, indicating a commonality of purpose.

Boko Haram/ISWA like their counterparts around the globe also engaged in raid and bomb attacks on military formations. In Nigeria, raids and attacks on military formations have almost become daily routine with the recent attack being a multi-dimensional attack on April 26, 2021, when ISWA fighters ambushed a military

convoy escorting weapons and overran a military base in Mainok, Borno State, fired machine guns and rocket propelled grenades on Nigerian soldiers killing 31 soldiers including one officer.⁶¹ Boko Haram equally attacked and killed 16 soldiers in the Southeastern Diffa region of Niger Republic, in August 2021.⁶² Similar attack was carried out in Northern Cameroon in July 2021 where 14 soldiers were killed with 14 and four civilians wounded.⁶³ 24 soldiers were also killed in Boko Haram attacks on the Chadian army in August 2021. The attacks occurred against the armies in the Tchoukotalia area of Lac Province, Chad in the Lake Chad region. The attack is reportedly the largest suffered by the army since the death last April of then President Idriss Derby Itno, who had ruled the country for 30 years.⁶⁴

Another feature of jihadist suicide bombers is their attacks on places of worship most especially churches and mosques, markets, hotels, and bus stations. Boko Haram like other Islamic jihadists counterparts had carried out attacks on places of worship and other important places. Some notable attacks on places of worship include; the December 25, 2011, Christmas day attacks in Madallala, Jos, Gadalla, and Damaturu, where a total of 41 people were reportedly killed;⁶⁵ June 10, 2012, twin attacks on Jos Churches, killing three and wounding dozens of worshippers;⁶⁶ July 5, 2015, suicide bombing killing at least five people inside Church;⁶⁷ December 25, 2020 Christmas Eve attack that kills 11 people.⁶⁸ There were also attacks on mosques such as the attack on a grand mosque in Kano city on November 28, 2014, which claimed more than 120 lives and wound more than 150 others.⁶⁹ November 2015 Shia Muslim procession attack in Kano that claims 21 lives.⁷⁰ Other major attacks were the January 20, 2011 bomb attack in Kano that claimed more than 186 lives;⁷¹ November 4, 2011, coordinated attacks in Damaturu that claimed more than 100 lives;⁷² and 20 May 2014 bomb attack in Jos that killed at least 118 people and injuring 56 others with the first bomb occurring in a

market place, and the second near a bus station;⁷³ April 29, 2012 suicide bomb attacks at St Stephen Catholic Church, Bayero University Kano, killing 20 including 2 professors and wounding several people,⁷⁴ and July 10, 2015, Boko Haram suicide bombing in N'Djamena, Chad, market, kills 15.⁷⁵

The use of female suicide bombers by Boko Haram is another incident that has proven the group's connections to foreign jihadist organizations. Until June 8, 2014, when the group used their first female suicide bomber to target the Nigerian army barracks in Gombe, no jihadist agitators in Nigeria had seen such action. Since then, the group has used hundreds of female bombers, some of whom are as young as seven years old. Boko Haram had never employed suicide bombers before 2011, had unsuccessfully employed female suicide bombers from 2011 to 2014, and has subsequently emerged as the organization that has employed female suicide bombers more frequently than any other organization in Nigerian history.⁷⁶ Some notable female suicide bombers in Nigeria include; March 31, 2018, three female suicide bombers carried out an attack that killed one woman and wounded 13 people in the Muna Garage area of Maiduguri;⁷⁷ March 17, 2017, four female suicide bombers killed 2 and injured 16 in Maiduguri;⁷⁸ July 17, 2017, a female suicide bomber killed 8 and wounded 18 people in a Mosque attack in Maiduguri;⁷⁹ February 24, 2015, six including the female suicide bomber were killed in the town of Pokistun.⁸⁰

February 15, 2015, a female suicide bomber killed 7 and wounded more than 30 others at a crowded bus station in the city of Damaturu, capital of Yobe state;⁸¹ 24 June 2015, a 12-year-old suicide bomber killed at least 10 and wounded 80 people in an attack in a market in Gujba district, south-east Yobe state;⁸² July 15, 2015, 13 people were killed in Damaturu, Yobe state in the three female suicide attacks carried out as residents prepared for the Eidl Fitir festival at the end of Ramadan;⁸³ July 26, 2015, a

girl aged 10 carried out suicide in Yobe state, killing at least 16 and wounding 50 people;⁸⁴ July 27, 2015, a female suicide bomber tore through a crowded market in Damaturu, Yobe state, killing 19 and wounds 47 people;⁸⁵ August 25, 2015, a female teen girl suicide bomber killed 5 and wounded 41 people on an attack at the crowded entrance to a bus station in Damaturu, Yobe state capital.⁸⁶ The use of female suicide bombers is a strategy used by Boko Haram and ISWA as a weapon of war, The attacks using female suicide bombers are similar to the tactics adopted by other jihadist groups such as Al-Shabab, Al-Qaeda, Hamas, and Fatah among others. In the case of Al-Shabaab for example, women form an important social base for the group. Some help it recruit, generate funds, and carry out operations. Women also appear to play a more active role in the insurgency and are involved in activities critical to its resilience; they help recruit and proselytize; they gather intelligence that enables military operations or extortion, or ferry explosives ahead of attacks taking advantage of the fact that security forces tend to watch women less closely than they do men. In a handful of cases, women carry out strikes themselves, though Al-Shabaab deploys far fewer women suicide bombers than for example, Boko Haram.⁸⁷ The point is that Boko Haram would not have adopted the use of female suicide bombers without its connection with other global terrorist organizations and may be part of strategic training received in foreign lands, and considering the diversity of causes to which terrorists are committed, the uniformity of their rhetoric is striking.

Recruitment and Training

Training is one of the pivotal links between Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa and other terrorist groups. The activities of the Boko Haram and ISWA such as suicide bombing, use of weapons such as rocket launchers, AK 47, and

machine guns, making of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), kidnapping/hostage taking, raids on security formations and barracks, combatant and intelligence gathering may not have been possible without adequate training. Initially, scholars were speculative regarding Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa receiving training abroad due largely to the modus operandi of the Boko Haram especially the adoption of suicide bombing, which was not witnessed since religious uprisings in Northern Nigeria. For instance, Abimbola and Adesote claim that after 2004, the leaders of Boko Haram allegedly forged ties with the Algerian Salafist organization that is now known as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), which provided them with instruction in fighting and the deployment of homemade explosive devices (IEDs). It was learned through training received in AQIM that Boko Haram fighters could demonstrate dexterity when handling weapons and producing what is known as "dirty bombs" through IEDs.⁸⁸ Adesoji thinks that the operational style of Boko Haram and ISWA, which was modeled after the Taliban in Afghanistan, as well as the claim made by Boko Haram/ISWA that it had sent representatives abroad for mentoring in countries like Afghanistan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Iraq, Mauritania, and Algeria, as well as the rumored training of some fundamentalists in Al-Qaeda camps in some foreign nations, provide evidence of Boko Haram's connections to fundamentalist organizations worldwide.⁸⁹ Onuoha claims that one of the primary reasons security professionals believe Boko Haram is obtaining more outside help in the area of coaching as well as the purchase of explosives, presumably from AQIM, is the logistical expertise Boko Haram has gained in building IEDs.⁹⁰ From a strictly tactical standpoint, Perouse de Montclos contends that it is quite plausible that the terrorists collaborates with overseas jihadist organizations to develop militants and get weapons.⁹¹

According to rumors, Boko Haram also collaborated with Al-Shabaab, an organization active in the Horn and East of Africa. Through this alliance, Boko Haram can train its militants in Somalia. Having followed the military attack on Boko Haram in 2009, it was thought that the survivors fled through Chad as well as Niger Republics, arriving in Somalia, Algeria, and even Afghanistan where they joined other Islamists and underwent guerrilla training. There, they learned how to make bombs and how to handle modern ammunition and weaponry, such as shoulder-fired guns and surface-to-air rockets. Members of Boko Haram had also received training from Al-Shabaab in Somalia, in which they learned how to create and distribute improvised explosive devices (IEDs), carry out suicide bombings, and spread propaganda, including using intelligence organizations techniques that are important for maintaining the insurgency. Confirming to have trained its members in Somalia by Al-Shabaab and ready to launch attacks against the Nigerian State, Boko Haram in a Statement confirmed that:

Very soon, we will wage jihad... We want to make it known that our jihadists have arrived in Nigeria from Somalia where they received real training on warfare from brethren who made that country ungovernable... This time around, our attacks will be fiercer and wider than they have been.⁹²

The bombings which started in 2011 upward attest to this claim. Among the members trained included Mohammed Nur, who was suspected of planning the bombing of the UN headquarters in Abuja on August 26, 2011, which left 26 people dead. He allegedly joined Al-Shabaab after running away to Somalia, where it is said he formed a deal with AQIM. A year afterward, he went back to Nigeria as well as continued attacking government establishments based on the expertise training received from the foreign trip. According to reports, an additional sect member from Yola in Adamawa State escaped to Afghanistan and trained with Al-Qaeda to make bombs. A group of kids who were detained by the SSS in 2006 said that Boko Haram had transported them to

an Al-Qaeda training facility in Mauritania. In a related development, a prosecutor in the case of Mohammed Ashafa, a senior Boko Haram member who was arrested and being prosecuted by the Nigerian government, confirmed in the indictment, reported that Ashafa received training in Mauritania and Niger and undertook covert operations in Nigeria on the instructions of Al-Qaeda handler in Pakistan. Similarly, another senior member of Boko Haram, Tishau confirmed during interrogation that their members were trained in Mauritania as guerrilla fighters who subsequently fought and overthrew the legitimate government of Mauritania thereby becoming people in government, and this conferred on them the advantage of links with the Al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan, Yemen, Iran, Somalia Al-Shabaab, etc. According to him, the organization is a sophisticated group trained in most acts of contemporary warfare and sabotage activities across the globe.⁹³

The Nigerian government also claimed that Boko Haram had been trained by groups connected to Al-Qaeda. Those who claimed that Boko Haram got training in Mali, including the former president Goodluck Jonathan and the former chief of army staff, Lt. Gen. Azubuike Ihejirika, have confirmed this. The epiphany was described as follows:

Hundreds of Boko Haram members stayed at training camps with Malian militants for months in Timbuktu, learning to fix Kalashnikovs and launch shoulder fire weapons... The Boko Haram members trained for about ten (10) months at what is now a bombed-out customs-police building on Timbuktu's desert fringe intermingling, with a local al-Qaeda offshoot called Ansar Dine... About 50 Boko Haram militants lived and trained at the customs building and 50 more lived in an annex across a giant sandy lot, while others took up in other abandoned government buildings.⁹⁴

The United Nations Security Council, which claims that Boko Haram militants were trained in a Tuareg insurgent camp in Mali, supports this. Reporters were also informed by Niger's foreign minister that Nigerians had received training in rebel camps

throughout the Sahel. The minister provided more information, stating that Boko Haram militants in Nigeria got explosives coaching in Al-Qaeda facilities in the Sahel region of Northern Africa. The Al-Shabaab rebels in Somalia have also trained Boko Haram. "There is no question that there is verifiable intelligence that reveals a relationship between Boko Haram and AQIM, and it comprises mostly of training supplied to components of Boko Haram," he said. At a meeting on regional security in the capital of Mauritania, Bazoum said this. He said that "one group has been accommodated at AQIM sites here in the Sahel and another group is now undergoing training with Al-Shabaab in Somalia based on the evidence we have gotten."⁹⁵ No evidence was however provided to back his claims.

Former President Goodluck Jonathan explained in 2014 how Boko Haram members are trained outside of Nigeria, citing intelligence reports that claimed the group maintains covert international training facilities in locations like Kidaland Gao in Mali, Maradi, Maina, Soro, and Diffa regions in Niger, Garoua, and Maroua in Cameroon, Ridina and Zango areas of N'Djamena, Chad, Ranky Kotsy area of Sudan, in addition to other.⁹⁶ Thousands of warriors who were later sent to combat zones in Cameroon, Nigeria, and other countries were reportedly successfully recruited and trained at Boko Haram's training facilities in Northern Cameroon.⁹⁷

A security source who pleaded anonymity during an interview confirmed in June 2021 that some members of the Boko Haram arrested confessed to having been sent to insurgent training camps in Burkina Faso. It was there they learned tactical planning and execution of attacks on security formations, places of worship- churches and mosques, kidnapping, bomb-making, detonation of bombs, rocket launchers, and arms handling. Providing details, the arrested Boko Haram members told the security source that their leaders only promised them to advance their Islamic or Arabic

education in foreign countries but turned out to be otherwise.⁹⁸ In a related development, some arrested members of Boko Haram and ISWA confessed to security personnel during interrogation that they were recruited through their Mallams, Islamic teachers, and sent to Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria for training and subsequent deployment to fight as mercenaries against the US and her allies over invasions of the affected states. They further provided details on how some of them were deployed to various regions and states to fight for the actualization of the global Caliphate where Sharia laws will prevail.⁹⁹

It should be noted that Boko Haram successfully targeted the unemployed particularly the *Almajiris* in the northeastern portions of Nigeria, and educated young. Nonetheless, it went beyond Nigerian borders, particularly in terms of radicalizing young Muslims. Not just the underprivileged and ignorant, but even extremely educated youngsters in Nigeria and other West African nations as well as the Lake Chad area, have been effectively brainwashed and mobilized by Boko Haram. Radicalization and indoctrination are done in the Mosque, especially during sermons.

Funding

Funding is another area of collaboration between Boko Haram/Islamic State of West Africa and other global jihadist organizations. While most Boko Haram and ISWA financing came from within the area in which it operates, Following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, it has been claimed that Osama bin Laden despatched an assistant to Nigeria with roughly GBP 1.8 million in local currency to distribute among parties that supported Al-Qaeda's purpose to impose Islamic authority. Boko Haram was said to be one of the organizations that benefited from this cash.¹⁰⁰ The trial of Mohammed Yusuf and Mohammed Bello Ilyas, the proprietor of *Daily Trust Newspapers* at Abuja High Court

in 2007 for terrorism-related offenses, especially, terrorism financing is an attestation that Boko Haram/ISWA received financial support from other jihadist organizations. Mohammed Ilyas Bello was charged with receiving \$300,000 from Al-Qaeda to train as well as recruit Nigerians for terrorism in Mauritania, according to one of the allegations. Mohammed Yusuf was charged with five counts, including collecting funds from Al-Qaeda members in Pakistan to fund the recruitment of terrorists to attack the homes of foreign nationals, particularly Americans, residing in Nigeria. The charges were, however, dropped by the court but later events especially after 2009 indicate that Boko Haram members might have received financial assistance outside the country from their foreign partners. Justifying financial support from foreign partner, Abdul Qada, a self-identified spokesman, claimed that their leader, Mohammed Abubakar Shekau, had met with Al-Qaeda leaders in Saudi Arabia in August 2011 and was able to get from Al-Qaeda whatever technological and financial assistance they required. They told the *Guardian Newspaper* in January 2012 that they were spiritual followers of Al-Qaeda and the deceased Osama bin Laden. The US Homeland Security Department claims that extremist foreign religious leaders and groups are funding and influencing groups like Boko Haram. It is also known that the group received funds from *Musilimiyyaa'ma*, an Algerian-based Islamic organization. During the trial of Umaru Dikko, also known as "Kabiru Sokoto," who planned the 2011 Christmas Day bombing of a church in Madalla, Niger State, a witness for the prosecution at a Federal High Court in Abuja corroborated this. Sokoto revealed information about the financing obtained by the militants from an Islamic organization, MusilimiYaa' Maa, based in Algeria, as well as how the cash caused Boko Haram to disintegrate as a result of disputes over the distribution of the funds.¹⁰¹

Similar to how Boko Haram's connections to AQIM allowed it to receive additional finance from organizations in Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom; it was disclosed in February 2012 by members of the organization who had been imprisoned. The imprisoned members further disclosed that additional funds came from the Islamic World Society and the Al-Muntada Trust Fund. Members of Borno's religious establishment concurred that Yusuf Mohammed, the organization's founder, got financial support from Salafist friends in Saudi Arabia after making two hajj pilgrimages during this period. The former Attorney General of the Federation and Minister of Justice, Abubakar Mallami, has confirmed that some Nigerians have been convicted in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) for funding Boko Haram. This is an affirmation of reports in November 2020 by the *Daily Trust Newspaper* on the conviction of six Nigerians by an appellate court in Abu Dhabi, UAE, for funding the dreaded terrorist group. The court judgment also showed that between 2015 and 2016, the convicts were involved in different cash transfers allegedly in favour of Boko Haram to the tune of USD 872,000. Furthermore, the United Arab Emirates on 14 September 2021 named six Nigerians, namely: Abdurrahman Ado Musa, Salifu Yusuf Adamu, Bashir Ali Yusuf, Muhammed Ibrahim Isa, Ibrahim Ali Alhassan, and Surrajo Abubaka Muhammad, among sponsors of Boko Haram.¹⁰² A security personnel at the theatre of operation in north-east Nigeria who pleaded anonymity confirmed during an interview that some members of Boko Haram and ISWA arrested along the Nigerian and Chadian borders confessed during interrogations that they received money from abroad through a third party or that they called war contractors. According to them, the contractors before giving them money normally take their shares. They revealed that the contractors operate in transit to avoid being held by the security operatives.¹⁰³ The

revelation has added weight to the linkage between Boko Haram and other global jihadist groups.

Another source of funds for the Boko Haram/ISWA and their foreign collaborators is kidnapping for ransom, especially foreign citizens. For instance, in May 2011, Franco Lamolinara and Chris McManus were kidnapped by a group of gunmen from the compound of Italian Construction Company, B Stablini in Birni Kebbi, near the border with Niger. It emerged that €1 million was paid as ransom. Al-Barnawi allegedly received 50 million naira (\$325,000) as part of the € 11 million paid to AQIM for the return of the French prisoners he helped abduct.¹⁰⁴ This has shown that Boko Haram/ISWA and AQIM are connected in the kidnapping of foreigners for ransom to raise funds for the actualization of their desired goal of establishing a Caliphate based on Sharia law.

Similarly, in December 2012, the Islamist group, Ansaru allegedly abducted Francis Columps, a French engineer working for the French company Vergnet, in Katsina, according to Ansaru. Additionally, on February 18, 2013, Ansaru took responsibility for the abduction of seven Europeans who were Setraco construction workers in the Bauchi State town of Jamare. In February 2013, Boko Haram abducted seven members of the Tanguy Moulin-Fournier family from Dabanga, Cameroon; their release required the payment of \$3 million. On July 27, 2014, Boko Haram abducted Francoise Agnes Moukouri, the wife of Cameroon's vice prime minister, as well as Seini Lamine, the Lamido of Kolofata, and several foreign nationals from Kolofata. Boko Haram in collaboration with Ansaru claimed responsibility for kidnapping Father Georges Vandenbeusch, a French Catholic Priest in Nguetchewe, northern Cameroon. The abduction of Kagara school children in Katsina in February 2021 was also blamed on Boko Haram. Despite claims that no ransom was paid, sources claimed that the

administration of Katsina State paid N30 million (about \$760,000) to free the schoolboys.¹⁰⁵ Boko Haram had previously adopted 276 Chibok school girls, and Shekau declared, those girls who had not escaped were his 'slaves' in a video which the Islamic State praised as the revival of 'slavery' in its flagship magazine, *Dabiq* helping to pave the way for Shekau to pledge loyalty to the Islamic State in March 2015. Since then, Shekau's fighters have forcibly abducted hundreds more women. Reports found at least 700 Nigerian women in Boko Haram custody in 2019.

In a related development, women have also been reported to have been used as suicidan bombers in Southeast Niger Republic between March 2019 and April 2020, by the Islamist sect.¹⁰⁶ ISWA equally abducted 110 Dapchi school girls in 2018, though, 107 were released after a negotiation with the Federal and Swiss government, 5 dead and Leah Shaibu was not released for her failure to convert to Islam. There is a slave market in Nigeria and its neighboring nations, and abduction has turned into one of Boko Haram's main financial sources, as reported by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point.¹⁰⁷ According to a security source who pleaded anonymity, some arrested Boko Haram and ISWAP members confessed that kidnapping is what sustains their operation as such money realized is used for their salary and the upkeep of their family and that of slain members' family. They further revealed that those who refused to pay especially women are usually being married or sold off to their foreign partners.¹⁰⁸

Weapons

Supply of weapons is another linkage between Boko Haram/ISWAP and other international jihadist groups, as their operations may not have successfully been executed without weapons. Since Nigeria and other West African countries cannot presently produce their weapons, especially the sophisticated ones used by the jihadist groups, most of the weapons in circulation originated from outside the sub-region.

Warsaw Pact weaponry dominates the markets. These weapons continue to be preferred two decades after the end of the Cold War. Consequently, most of the assault rifles detected are of the Kalashnikov variety. Today, the commonly used ones are mostly of Chinese manufacture Norinco Type 56. Similarly, the light machine guns encountered today are mostly PK- patterns, such as the Norinco Type 80. According to this choice, the majority of the ammunition found is 7.62 x 39 mm for assault rifles of the Kalashnikov type or 7.62 x 54R mm for general-purpose machine guns of the PK type, as well as heavy machine guns and ammo from the Warsaw Pact. A large portion of these ammunitions were made in China, Sudan, or Iran.

Links to Ansar Din, "supporters of the Faith," AQIM, and the MUJAO, an AQIM offshoot organization, and Al-Shabaab in Somalia appear to be the main ones. Many of these organizations' commanders and combatants from Mali, Mauritania, and Algeria have worked with gangs that traffic in human beings, weapons, drugs, and narcotics to make money. Former Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi provided certain fighters with training and weapons so they might topple the governments in their own countries. His downfall gave Islamist organizations access to several arsenals. IEDs and other weaponry supposedly seized from Boko Haram/ISWA have been linked to Libya.

The prevalence of firearms has significantly grown since the Libyan crisis in 2011, enabling the disruptive actions of several armed organizations, notably Boko Haram/ISWAP. The collapse of the Gaddafi regime in 2011 no doubt contributed to a large extent, to the sale of illegal weapons to Boko Haram and its foreign allies. A large number of more common firearms were amassed during Gaddafi's 40 years of rule, including tens of thousands of firearms in recent years. These firearms could be sold albeit for relatively cheap prices per unit to any of the jihadist groups in West Africa. Armed groups of particular concern among others include; the non-State armed groups

in northern Mali, including the various factions of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Movement National la Liberation de l'Azawad (MNLA), Ansar Dine, and the Movement Pour lucite et le jihad en Afrique de la Ouest (MUJAO), the secessionist groups in northern Niger, including Movement des Nigerians pour la Justice (MNJ), the Front for the Liberation of Air and Azaouak (AFLAA), and the Front for the Liberation of Tamoust (FLT), the Movement des forces demo critiques de casamance (MFDC), in Senegal, and Boko Haram/ISWA in Nigeria.¹⁰⁹

It was also reported that Mohammed Yusuf during interrogation by the police, provided information on the flow of weapons to the group from Niger, Cameroon, and Chad. Stephaney Schulze, citing a local source, says that some of the Boko Haram weapons probably entered the country through Chad. In a question and answer session with Al-Jazeera on June 14, 2010, AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droukel, also known as Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud, acknowledged that his organization has been in contact with Boko Haram and intends to provide it with weapons to "defend Muslims in Nigeria as well as stop the progression of minority crusaders".¹¹⁰

The major source of Boko Haram/ISWA weapons and their collaboration with other jihadist groups is in the area of trafficking of weapons or firearms trafficking. For example, the GABA Report on the relationship between small arms and light weapons, money laundering, and terrorism financing in West Africa published in 2014 asserted that organizations like AQIM and Boko Haram benefited financially from the trade in conventional weapons. A significant cargo of weapons, ammo, and cash was found in March 2015 while on a patrol expedition in Niger's northern area. A search warrant was issued for the nine people who were detained because they were all involved in the trafficking of firearms and narcotics and were all members of a recognized terrorist organization operating in the area. Investigations showed that these people were dealing

in narcotics. A nonprofit organization that dealt with fundraising was run by one of the group's members in Libya, it was also learned. Drug sales generated some revenue that was used to buy cars, guns, and ammo. The remaining funds, of around EUR 539 000, were to be used to fund upcoming terrorist acts in Niger and the surrounding areas. All of the defendants were accused of participating in a terrorist organization through criminal association, of owning and transporting weapons and ammunition, and of money laundering and funding terrorism. The case is still open. Similar to this, in February 2015, a police operation in the Nigerian district of Diffa led to the discovery of firearms, ammunition, and a sizeable amount of cash. Investigations revealed that a person who had founded many legal businesses, all of which were registered and paid taxes, was a member of a Boko Haram sleeper cell. It was also discovered that he was funding the organization through his legal enterprises, giving them cash, guns, and ammo. He is now being tried for offenses related to funding terrorism. Additionally, in 2015, Nigerian security authorities detained a significant Boko Haram weapon dealer. The guy admitted during questioning that he had received money to buy 5000 rounds of various firearms, including AK-47s. The second trench had EUR 10,145, or NGN 3.5 million in cash, while the third trench included EUR 23,188, or NGN 8 million in cash. The officials seized the cash that was in euros. In that same year, Nigerian security forces detained the Boko Haram chief in control of weapon trafficking. He admitted under questioning that he provided Boko Haram with firearms and ammo. These came from Sudan and were brought illegally to Nigeria's Sambisa Forest through neighbouring nations. The guns were hidden in the trailers as well as the trucks that carried food across the area.¹¹¹ Unknown to many, some repentant Boko Haram and ISWA affiliates at the rehabilitation facility in Gombe State confessed that the majority of the armaments were delivered to the Central African Republic as well as Equatorial

Guinea for further transfer to the Republic of Cameroon, in which they obtain their supply, according to security officers who were interviewed.¹¹²

Another area of collaboration is in the area of arms diversion which occurs in several forms. Prominent among these include deliberate armed attacks by criminal elements on national stockpiles especially the increased attacks by Boko Haram and ISWA on security bases and installations in Nigeria, the Sahel, and some parts of the Lake Chad Region. Attacks include unscrupulous personnel diverting national stockpiles, particularly in crisis-ridden nations like Mali and Libya, for the sole purpose of smuggling guns across combat zones. To dodge inspections, there are evidence of diversion by arms dealers and other accomplices in West Africa who used forged end-user certificate paperwork including certification. This has in the past resulted in a sizable stockpile of weapons that were ostensibly headed for Nigeria but ended up in Liberia and the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire. Additionally, there have been instances of rogue freight company agents diverting cargo through trans-shipment, particularly across the important Gulf of Guinea trade lanes. Equally of note are violent armed groups who deliberately diverted weapons through the looting of armories and seizures during raids on security bases and clashes with security forces. Boko Haram and ISWA are known to attack military bases with the intent of restocking their weapon holding.¹¹³

At the center of the illicit trafficking in Nigeria and also the countries of the Lake Chad region is the challenge of porous borders and weak border security mechanisms. Over time, the majority of illicit arms in circulation in Nigeria and across the Sahel and Lake Chad region came into the country through weak and illegal border routes. The porous natures of borders have been identified as a major enabler of illegal arms transfer in the sub-region. Specifically, for example, border regions between Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, and Burkina Faso constitute a geographical area for the transport of

goods across the Sahel. This area occupies a strategic position and serves as a conduit between the Gulf of Guinea coastal countries and the remote northern Sahel-Saharan region which represents an empty point for goods destined for its landlocked northern neighbors of Mali and Burkina Faso.

Nonetheless, Nigeria fully recognized that illicit trafficking represents a major source of weaponry for terrorists and other criminal networks active in the Lake Chad and the Sahel region. Further, it is essential to state that these regional arms pipelines remain a major supply route for Boko Haram weapons holding which in most cases are traced from locations such as Chad, Mali, Burkina Faso, Libya including Sudan, and the regional part of Darfur. This is possible as a result of the existence of several illegal routes and large expanses of ungoverned space, which is at the moment dominated by several trans-Saharan criminals along the border regions. This situation is exacerbated by the prevalence of illegal trafficking of arms into the country. For example, although Liberia and its neighbours do not make weapons, more than 170 border crossing locations along the borders of Liberia, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and the Ivory Coast have been identified as the main entrance points for illegal weapons and narcotics. As a consequence of the flood of migrants from conflict-ridden areas and other neighboring nations, small guns and rocket launchers are distributed, suggesting that the unrestricted movement of individuals also aids the circulation of such illicit weapons.¹¹⁴ In particular, it's critical to remember that Nigeria has a long history of illegal weaponry transfers. Since it has been more widely available, violent crimes such as abduction, terrorism, and insurrection have increased.

According to analysts, including current and former U.S. officials, the majority of the weapons used by the Islamic terror organization are either taken from the military supplies of Nigeria or bought on the growing illicit market for armaments in

Central Africa. Apart from benefiting from sympathizers in the Nigerian military, the Islamic terror group can purchase small arms and occasionally some larger weapons in nearby conflict zones, "probably Libya, probably Chad", said the official, who spoke with *NBC News* on condition of anonymity. Michael Leiter, former director of the National Counter Terrorism Center and now an NBC News analyst, says Central Africa is brimming with weapons, a situation made worse when the Libyan arms depots were looted during the 2011 Arab Spring that eventually ended Gaddafi's regime. "The collapse of Libya has further flooded the market", said Leiter. "Whether these came from Chad, Nigeria or Libya is almost irrelevant as such arms are widely available". Arms trade expert, William M. Hartung agrees, "It's one conflict after another," he said. "Because of the nature of the conflict... the concentration of conflicts... the black market in Central Africa is more vibrant than other places". Campbell, the former U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria, says the array of small and automatic weapons, grenades, mortars, mines, and perhaps car bombs" is all Boko Haram's soldiers need to act their brand of terrorism".¹¹⁵

It would be recalled that in 2010, 13 containers loaded with crates of weapons including rocket launchers, shells, and mortars loaded in Iran and shipped into Nigeria by French shipping group CMA CGM, were interrupted by the Nigeria Secret Services at the Tin Can Port in Apapa, Lagos. The weapons were falsely declared as "building materials" thought to have been brought in for Boko Haram but later findings indicated Nigeria was being used as a trans-shipment destination while The Gambia was the final destination for the arms.¹¹⁶ In the same period, a Cargo plane loaded with weapons, from Ukraine was apprehended at Aminu Kano International Airport, Kano. The weapons were also suspected to have been brought in for Boko Haram, but upon investigation, the weapons were also alleged to belong to Equatorial Guinea but were

misrouted to Nigeria. There was also a recent indictment of Turkey supplying arms to Boko Haram. The allegation was revealed by *Daily Trust* Nigeria on how the Egyptian Television Station aired a report wherein the presenter of the program played audio of a purported conversation between Mustafa Varank, Turkey's Minister of Industry and Technology, and Mehmet Karatas, a Manager with Turkish Airlines about supplies of arms to Boko Haram from Turkey. The audio seemed to be the same one first reported in 2014 when Varank was Senior Advisor to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan between 2011 and 2013. But this is not the first time we have had reports of countries aiding and abetting Boko Haram insurgents with supplies of arms and logistics. Similarly, there was the case of a French national who reportedly disclosed that France was behind the Boko Haram insurgents, supplying them with arms, logistical support, and training from bases in neighbouring French-speaking countries.¹¹⁷

According to Anonymous security personnel sources serving in the north-east Nigeria and the Lake Chad Region, confirmed during interviews that, most of the arrested and repented members of the sects confessed to having been supplied with arms and ammunition, medical aid, treatment of their wounded members, supply of foods stuff and other logistics by some non-governmental organizations (NGOs).¹¹⁸

Communication

Communication also plays a critical role in the links between Boko Haram ISWA and other jihadist groups due to its dual functionalities, as the survival of Boko Haram and ISWA rely majorly on communication. This is because it makes coordination of the group's activities such as attacks on military formations, raids on security personnel, kidnappings, bombings, and easier movement of weapons. Radicalization among Nigeria's Muslims and their foreign allies is growing as a result of the internet and jihadist chat forums, and this is because the 21st century has

witnessed faster communication and closer international networks accelerated by the forces of globalization and globalism. This in turn has increased the number of actors engaged in warfare thereby further complicating the dynamics of war. Non-state actors like the Taliban, Boko Haram/ISWA, Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda, AQIM, AQAP, and other insurgents or jihadists now compete with state actors for the battlefield. As a result, the battlefield has greatly expanded beyond space to include the element of time carried out on the digital frontier.

Their connections were made possible by the use of contemporary technology, including radio, satellite, television, mobile phones, and new social media like Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter, among others. The entire process might just take a few seconds with the advent of new media, particularly the Internet. Different terrorist and rebel groups seized upon this opportunity to actively recruit non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as well as other international aid organizations to work on their behalf while also gaining worldwide support and pressure. The Internet also enables their participation in "information laundering," when they feature an intriguing or controversial video clip or sound bite concentrating on it, generating "online buzz" about it, and hoping it would gain mainstream media attention. The Internet also gives previously illegal or clandestine organizations new and vastly improved fund-raising possibilities. In effect, financial donations are now just a click away thanks to the abundance of websites that offer banking information for money transfers. The utilization of the World Wide Web by terrorist organizations in promoting their objective made some knowledgeable observers conclude that the groups have the largest presence on the Internet. One of the observers said:

That Internet usage by Islamists is growing is obvious. What is also obvious is that they will use it to promote their views, advance the strategies of the "global Islamic movement" and organize their activities,

which experience has shown are sometimes inimical to Western security, and in a wider sense might also seek to subvert the security of the state.¹¹⁹

As a result, the Internet has established itself as a vitally important method of communication for terrorists, serving as a crucial tool for both internal command and control and propaganda on the outside.

According to some academics, the primary cause of transnational terrorism is the development of international communication networks that enable "leaderless" interaction among philosophical fanatics dispersed over the globe.

International terrorism is distinguished by its sophisticated use of the internet. In actuality, terrorist groups now primarily use the internet as a weapon in place of print and other tangible media. Hoffman noticed the expanding use of the internet by terrorist organizations and the potentially wide-ranging effects in his work *Inside Terrorism*. He contends that:

Terrorists are now able to bypass traditional print and broadcast media via the internet, through expensive but professionally produced and edited videotapes, and even with their own dedicated 24/7 television and radio news stations. The consequences of these developments are far-reaching as they are still poorly understood, having already transformed the ability of terrorists to communicate without censorship or other hindrance and thereby attract new sources of recruits, funding, and that governments have found difficult, if not impossible to counter.¹²⁰

Terrorist groups may now easily and affordably reach their members all over the world as well as the rest of the world thanks to the internet. They have been able to plan local and international assaults, quickly enlist new members, and effectively elude global monitoring thanks to it. Terrorists may communicate with one another in code thanks to the internet. The establishment of the Caliphate under the rigorous application of Sharia law has thereby increased communication between Boko Haram/ISWA and other terrorist organizations worldwide. Additionally, it has been claimed that Boko Haram

and ISWA have used online media to disseminate brief audio and visual messages that specifically address the Nigerian president, the Nigerian military, the United States, and the world community. In addition, it has made use of the platform to promote its links to foreign terrorist groups, first claiming allegiance to Al-Qaeda and then to ISIS, and to urge its supporters to stick with it and continue to aid in its operations. Boko Haram and ISWA spread misinformation online, something they have effectively done in the past to highlight their accomplishments in the northeastern region of Nigeria. In general, terrorist groups utilize the internet as their main tool for gaining widespread media coverage of their assaults, disseminating their extreme ideologies, and instilling fear in the hearts and minds of the public.

Because it offers a quick, efficient, and anonymous way for the movement to keep in touch with combatants, followers, sympathizers, and supporters throughout the world, the Internet has evolved to resemble a virtual haven for Islamic terrorists.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa's links with international terrorist organizations and concludes that there exists a connection between the sects and other global jihadists in the area of religious ideology of Islamizing Nigeria and other Muslim countries, training, funding, weaponry, as well as communication. The paper therefore asserts that the functionality of the Boko Haram and ISWA could not have been possible without international collaborations and supports.

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CHAPTER FOUR

NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO BOKO HARAM AND ISLAMIC STATE OF WEST AFRICA IN NORTH EAST NIGERIA

Introduction

The Nigerian government has used several tactics to combat the threat posed by Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa since those groups first appeared. This chapter specifically looks at how they have adapted terrorism to their cause. This includes random killings, homicides, executions, kidnappings, robberies, rapes, and suicide bombings, which have likely resulted in the loss of thousands of lives and massive property devastation totaling billions of naira since 2009. To this purpose, the Nigerian government used both military as well as non-military initiatives to counter the assault of the insurgent groups Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa. The difficulties of conducting military counter-terrorism operations will also be covered in this chapter. The Federal Government's initial policy in reaction to rebel attacks was military involvement. The governments of Nigeria and her neighbours, Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and Benin, had embraced a military intervention plan as a counter-terrorism method to oppose or thwart terrorist actions by Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa. In reality, there is a reciprocal relationship between insurgency and counter-insurgency, but also technically, insurrection is a concern that counter-insurgency is intended to tackle. The best strategy for controlling the activities of Boko Haram as well as the Islamic State of West Africa is to use military force. Since the goal of war is to deprive the opponent of the means and will to resist, military action became necessary.¹ National and regional reactions are the two facets of military engagement in reaction to the sect's activity.

National Responses

Since the uprising of 2009, the government's counter-insurgency policy has mostly centered on military confinement, which is necessary in and of itself to guarantee security for the execution of other developmental initiatives. Since the end of the civil war in 1970, there has been an increase in violence defined by all types of crimes, and the government has responded by utilizing military containment. The strategy has consistently been to provide security, peace, as well as order by using the law, the police, the military, and some other security measures. To combat Islamic extremists, the Nigerian military frequently forms Joint Task Forces (JTF) establishing a collaborative task force. Early results were positive when a combined security force raided the Boko Haram hideout in the Dutsen Tanshi region of Bauchi state on July 26, 2009, arresting nine sect members and seizing weapons, explosives, as well as ammunition. Following this intervention by the security personnel, there were violent riots in the four states of Bauchi, Kano, Yobe, and Borno. These riots continued for three days, during which Boko Haram members and indeed the security personnel engaged in combat. As a byproduct, police stations, prisons, government buildings, schools, and churches were devastated, 700 people were killed and thousands more were injured.²

Violence increased throughout Nigeria's northern states as a result of the capture of the Boko Haram leader Mohammed Yusuf and a number of his followers, as well as Yusuf's extrajudicial execution in police custody on July 31, 2009, as well as the deaths of some other members, such as the group's most predominant financial backer, Alhaji Buji Foi. The re-emergence of Boko Haram in 2010 under its notorious leader, Abubakar Shekau with confirmed acts of terrorism on government establishments, private residents, businesses, and places of worship including churches and mosques,

spurred the Federal Government of ex-president Jonathan to establish a Special Military Task Force in Maiduguri on June 20th, 2010, made up of the Nigerian Police Force, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force. One significant aspect of the government's reaction to the Boko Haram threat was the creation on June 12, 2011, of a Joint Military Task Force called Operational Restore Order (JTORO) with headquarters in Maiduguri, Borno State to combat the sect's rising terrorist potential. 3,600 people were sent to Maiduguri and other significant northeastern cities in conjunction with the launch of Operation Restore Order, then on May 11–12, 2013, the government dispatched 2,000 more troops and heavy weaponry, notably fighter planes, to Maiduguri.³ President Jonathan, who was determined to put an end to the threat posed by Boko Haram, had authorized the largest military deployment in Nigeria since the civil war to mobilize an additional 8,000 personnel in the area for a direct military attack against Boko Haram fighters.⁴ The JTF's deployment has had some degree of effectiveness, particularly when using military patrol cars that can find concealed explosives and other weapons within a 50-meter radius. The special security personnel have also had achievements in terms of capturing and assassinating operational strategists and leaders of Boko Haram. Also, the rescue of some towns in Adamawa, Yobe, and Borno states has revealed the success of the military operations. Specifically, the troops recovered Monguno, Marte, Gamboru Ngala, and Dikwa among other towns and several surrounding communities in Borno State from Boko Haram and ISWA. These towns and communities were believed to be strongholds of the Boko Haram and ISWA.⁵ The success by the military does not however stop the Boko Haram and ISWA from its hostilities against the Nigerian state.

The emergence of President Muhammadu Buhari as president in 2015 was welcomed with great enthusiasm with the hope of winning the war against Boko Haram

and ISWA, especially going by his track record of crushing the Maitasine uprisings in the 1980s, as a Military Head of State. In his effort to contain the menace of Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West, President Buhari retained the security operational strategy of his predecessor especially the retention of military intervention using the Joint Task Force, which comprises of Army, Navy, Police, Department of State Services as well as Para-military personnel but initiated new military counter-terrorism strategy. Some of these initiatives include the transfer of the command headquarters to Maiduguri, the ordering of then Chief of Army Staff, Lt Gen. Buratai, and some of his lieutenants to relocate to Maiduguri from Abuja for proper coordination of military operations for optimal results, The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) was partially deployed, the number of troops deployed was raised, military commanders were changed, the defense budget was boosted, air power was enhanced, and the corruption practices that had weakened military morale were addressed.⁶ The then-chief of army staff, Lt. Gen. Tukur Buratai, changed the name of the counter-insurgency operations from *Zaman Lafia*, which means "Living in Peace," to Operation *Lafia Dole*, which in Hausa means "Peace is a Must." This was done in a desperate attempt to quell the activities of Boko Haram and ISWA.⁷ The decision signaled Buratai's determination to attain peace by force in the northeast region. The decision was also to send a strong and final warning to the terrorists that they cannot derail the wheel of peace in the northeast or any part of Nigeria.

The military had carried out several operations against Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa under the direction of Operation *Lafia Dole*. In particular, in the south-central Borno region, where Operation Deep Punch I and ii have witnessed a series of intrusions further into the Sambisa Forest area, ground forces have been a crucial component of the military response. A crucial component has also been the

deployment of air power during a series of operations known as *Ruwan Wuta*, Rain of Fire. This region of Borno has been the target of several airstrikes throughout the years.⁸ Despite the hazards involved in this strategy, terrible events like the unintentional bombing of an IDP camp in Rann in January 2017 show that it may work. The fight against Boko Haram has gained increasing public attention while operations against it and the Islamic State of West Africa are still underway. Shekau-related public statements made by Buhari include the clearance of Sambisa Forest in December 2016 and a 40-day deadline for Shekau's capture in July 2017. Not as much attention has been paid to the Islamic State of West Africa. Although such pronouncements only serve to illustrate one aspect of the Nigerian Army's strategy, Shekau has received disproportionate attention due to the very nature of Boko Haram, which has led to a stronger fascination with his group. Nearly every day in the northeastern area, Boko Haram is responsible for more fatal suicide attacks that tend to garner substantial media attention. As opposed to the Islamic State of West Africa's less frequent attacks on security personnel, the frequent targeting of innocent people also calls for a stronger defense. Since he first appeared in the media in 2010, Shekau has also acted as the face of the Islamic insurrection in Nigeria.

Furthermore, Sambisa Forest has become so well-known in Nigeria that when Buhari said in late 2016 that a significant camp in the region had been liberated, many people mistakenly believed that this meant that Boko Haram had been completely defeated. The surviving Chibok schoolgirls, which have emerged as the largest important component of the conflict's worldwide emblem, are held by Boko Haram, according to the group, in contrast to ISWA, which commands a considerably lower level of public visibility.⁹ Therefore, the degrading of Boko Haram fighters is a significant symbolic victory in Nigeria's fight against terrorism and might spur more

attention than the more circumspect ISWA. Although the military first gave Boko Haram greater attention, there has since been a fairer split of efforts. For instance, the Nigerian Army announced Operation Last Hold in late April 2018; it lasted from May through August. Cleansing the Nigerian side of Lake Chad, easing IDPs' return, and restoring regular economic activity were the main objectives. The late Lieutenant General Ibrahim Attahiru, Chief of Army Staff (COAS), authorized the re-branding of the ongoing Counterinsurgency Operation in the north-east from Operation *Lafia Dole* (OPLD) to Operation *Hadin Kai* in light of the victories the Nigerian Army had achieved in the area (OPHK), which in Hausa means "cooperation". As per Army Spokesperson Mohammed Yerima, the organization's rebranding is in keeping with the Chief of Army Staff's goal of a "Nigerian Army that is poised to competently combat all enemies in a joint atmosphere." "This is founded on the reality that the Nigerian Army has made a lot of development over the years but also requires to re-align for improved efficiency," he continued.¹⁰

Despite skeletal attacks by Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa, the Nigerian Government's response using military action can be said to have recorded a huge success, especially with the recapturing of the territories seized by Boko Haram in previous years. The much-publicized restoration of the Maiduguri-Banki road in 2017 is proof that the military has given precedence to the security of transportation networks in March 2018 as well as opening of more routes in recent times thereby facilitating vehicular movement in and around Maiduguri and other states in the north-east and other part of the country. The degrading of Boko Haram and ISWA fighters by the Nigerian military has helped put an end to the activities of the sects, especially suicide bombings. More still, the operation of the Boko Haram and ISWA has been reduced to only Borno and Yobe State, with the sects no longer mounting

"conventional attacks" against security forces and population centers, compared to when Boko Haram spread to almost all parts of Northern Nigeria including Abuja, the nation city capital. This success prompted President Muhammad Buhari to declare that Boko Haram militants is "technically defeated".¹¹

The announcement by the military in 2017 that it had taken over Sambisa forest with the arrest of over 1,240 suspected associates and members of the dreaded Boko Haram and ISWA comprising 413 men, 323 women, 251 male children, and 253 female children is also a major achievement. Military in a video displayed on 21 February 2021 via YouTube, also announced the taking over of Shekau Farm in Sambisa Forest as part of its achievement.¹² The killing of the Boko Haram Leader Abubakar Shekau on 19 May 2021, as confirmed by a top Boko Haram Commander, Bakura Modu, also known as Sahaba on June 18, 2021, is a big victory for the Nigerian military in the fight against the terrorist groups.¹³ The military recorded a major boost when it announced on September 2021, the arrest of Yau Madu, a wanted Boko Haram commander along Damboa-Wajiroko road. The troops also raided an improvised explosive devices (IEDs) material hub in Damboa and Gashua Local Government Areas of Borno and Bauchi states, with 200 bags of Urea fertilizer recently banned by the Federal Government due to its nature recovered. In a sting operation, a total of two hundred and eighty-one (281) 50 kg bags of Urea were recovered from the warehouse in the market, and two notorious Boko Haram distributors were also arrested. Recall that Urea fertilizer has been banned by the government because of its use as a major component for manufacturing IEDs by terrorists. The suspects and materials recovered are currently undergoing preliminary investigation.¹⁴ They were however charged to court after investigation. The Nigerian military recorded a big victory when it announced the Killing of ISWA leader, Abu Musab Al-Barnawi on 14 October 2021.¹⁵

The killing of 50 ISWA commanders and the destruction of MRAP vehicle and 11 Gun Trucks, and the recovery of a large cache of arms and ammunition including five gun trucks, two anti-aircraft Guns, five AK 47 rifles, one HK Machine Gun and one HK Machine Gun Links, 2,560 rounds of 7.62mm special and 29 rounds of 7.62mm North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ammunition abandoned by the terrorists on 15 November 2021 accounts to the military achievement.¹⁶ The Army equally announced the arrest of Haladu Saleh, a notorious terrorist who had been on the security forces' wanted list since 2018, the killing of no fewer than 90 terrorists, the arrest of 21 terrorists, and recovered 98 assorted weapons, including AK 47 rifles and 2589 rounds of ammunition. Within the same period of 15 and 25 November 2021, 996 terrorists and their families, comprising 203 adult males, 302 adult females, and 491 children, surrendered to troops at different locations in Borno state.¹⁷ On December 7, 2021, the Nigerian Army announced the killing of another ISWA commander, Abou Safyan, and scores of his fighters in an airstrike raid at the ISWA armory base in Kusuma and Sigir in the Marte Local Government Area of Borno state.¹⁸ The Nigerian Army recorded more success when it announced on September 9, 2022, the killing of more than 250 Boko Haram and ISWA fighters, the rescuing of 22 hostages including three "Chibok girls" who were kidnapped in 2014, 556 people including 15 adult males, 189 females, and 252 children surrendered, and grenades, A-47 rifles, grenade launchers and many rounds of ammunition recovered.¹⁹

The achievement by the military was at the 75th Session of the United Nations General Assembly held in New York on the 6th of October, 2020, acknowledged by Tijani Muhammad-Bande, Ambassador/ Permanent Representative of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to the United Nations. In his words; "the Nigerian Government has, through its national counter-terrorism strategy and action, curtailed the heinous

atrocities of the Boko Haram insurgency and keeps the terrorist group under continuous surveillance, and most importantly, Nigeria's counter-terrorism efforts have led to improved capability of its troops and repression of territories formerly controlled by Boko Haram as well as the release of victims that were in captivity".²⁰ The military success may be attributed to some measures such as mounting of checkpoints along the major highways to ensure the safety of passengers and goods, and to control Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa's movement in the region, especially on high-risk highways such as the Damaturu- Maiduguri; Bui- Maiduguri, and Maiduguri-Manguno highways.²¹

The successes of the Nigerian military may also be ascribed to cooperative efforts with other nations and international bodies to strengthen Nigeria's ability to counter the danger posed by Boko Haram and ISWA. Collaborations with groups like the United Nations, the European Union, and the International Civil Aviation Organizations, in addition with the United States, France, South Korea, and Israel, are among them. The goal of this is to prevent the establishment of terrorist organizations in Nigeria. For instance, under the auspices of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, Nigeria formed a cooperative framework with the UN known as the "Integrated Assistance on Counter-terrorism" (I-ACT), which includes intelligence sharing, strengthening security forces' capabilities, and equipment support programs.²² To improve Nigeria's knowledge, comprehension, and application of the international human rights framework and rule of law, Nigeria worked with the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT) in 2019 to implement the United Nations project on "Capacity Building and Training of Law Enforcement Officials on Human Rights, the Rule of Law, and the Prevention of Terrorism".²³ Additionally, the Nigerian police and military personnel were sent abroad to get training in bomb detection and

counter-terrorism operations. The partnership also paid off when the Nigerian government declared that it would receive military assistance for the additional training and re-training of military members, the maintenance of military aircraft, and the purchase of new boats, helicopters, as well as technological tools to be used in the fight against Boko Haram and ISWA.²⁴ Even though assaults against security personnel and civilians have decreased to the barest minimum, they have not yet stopped. Nonetheless, the military and other security agencies should not give up on their efforts to bring lasting peace and stability to the northeast region. They should not be carried away with the level of success already recorded, but rather put in their best to ensure that terrorism is completely tackled. This is because, as history has demonstrated, when a belligerent faction is exterminated, its remnants typically reappear under a different name and continue to resist the government as long as the issues persist. Until enduring peace and security are attained, Boko Haram/ISWA's act of terrorism and the government's counter-terrorism reaction will continue.

Regional Responses

The transnational aspect of Boko Haram/ISWA operations that have extended to the neighbouring nations of the Republics of Cameroon, Chad, and Niger was a major factor in the regional reaction to their actions. To combat the threat posed by Boko Haram and ISWA, a regional task force known as the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNTJF) was established. Only a regional security and defense structure can, as Osadolor correctly noted, defend and ensure peace, serenity, as well as security throughout West Africa, particularly in crisis-prone regions, as a prerequisite for prosperity.²⁵ As a result, it is crucial to establish an International Joint Task Force to combat the danger posed by Boko Haram as well as ISWA but was never established. Even before the start of the violent offensive outside of Nigeria's boundaries, Boko

Haram retained cross-border ties in the Lake Chad area. This trend has persisted after the group split into two groups. Regional collaboration to eliminate the threat has not always materialized, though. With its origins and predominant actions in Nigeria, Boko Haram was previously seen as a national issue. Nonetheless, the continuous growth of Boko Haram and ISWA highlighted the region's interdependence beyond its borders, demonstrating how complex conflicts impacting one location are hard to manage. To battle Boko Haram, ISWA, as well as other terrorist organizations active within and around the Lake Chad Basin, the MNJTF was subsequently constituted as an aggressive and stabilizing force.²⁶

Before the establishment of Boko Haram, the Lake Chad Basin Commission established the Multinational Joint Security Force in 1994. The force's primary members were combatants from Nigeria, the dominant country in the geographical area, and its mission was to battle banditry as well as facilitates the freedom of movement of individuals in the Lake Chad region. Even though the activities were restricted to their boundaries, the force was bolstered in 1998 to deal with cross-border challenges, and Chad and Niger joined it. The mission of the force was reviewed in April 2012 to emphasize the danger posed by the Boko Haram militant group. Yet the force wasn't launched again to fight Boko Haram until October 2014, when it was given the new name Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF).²⁷ This occurred following the Paris Summit in May 2014, which also helped bring along the leaders of Benin, Chad, Cameroon, France, Niger, and Nigeria in addition to representatives of the United States, United Kingdom, and indeed the European Union in a bid to enhance regional integration in the fight against Boko Haram and ISWA through collaborative border control and other forms of border surveillance, intelligence-sharing and the exchange of

pertinent information, and joint/coordinated military operations to prevent cross-border infiltration.

By committing soldiers to the MNJTF, the member nations of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, and Benin, committed to increase their collaboration in the fight against Boko Haram as well as the Islamic State of West Africa in October 2014. It was supposed to be operating within the country's boundaries by November 2014. Also, it was determined to request that the African Union (AU) and the UN set up the proper legal framework for international military operations. Following this, the African Union (AU) approved the MNJTF through a resolution made by the African Peace and Security Council (PSC), which met at the level of heads of state and government, on January 29, 2015. The resolution approved the deployment of the MNJTF, which may include up to 7,500 military and civilian personnel, for a 12-month initial deployment that may be extended. The mission's goals are to provide security, reestablish governmental dominance, and permit humanitarian aid in the afflicted areas. This choice was made in conformity with the AU Commission Chairperson's report. The MNJTF's very specific responsibilities include undertaking combat operations, ensuring interstate cooperation, patrolling borders, locating kidnapped individuals, halting the flow of armaments, reintegrating rebels into society, and bringing criminals to justice.²⁸ In addition to sanctioning the military offensive, the PSC requested that the UN Security Council establish a trust fund and enlist international assistance in its decision. The PSC judgment also recognized the necessity to improve residents' standard of living to address the problem's underlying causes. The AU Assembly supported the PSC's stance during the AU's 24 Summit, which took place in Addis Ababa on January 30 and 31, 2015. The Assembly declared its aid for the worldwide actions taken to fight Boko Haram, along with Chad's prompt

intervention in Cameroon, the nations of the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), and Benin's troop commitments. It also endorsed the creation of a military command to coordinate operations against Boko Haram and ISWA.²⁹ The decision by the African Peace and Security Council was in agreement with the ECOWAS "Protocol relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence" that was adopted in 1981 by member states, which made provisions for a multinational ECOWAS defense force, with emphasis on the need to give mutual aid and assistance for defense against any armed threat and aggression. The need for regional security and military cooperation was influenced primarily in terms of maintaining the territorial integrity of the region, which was considered to be of much more importance than matters of internal affairs.³⁰

Soldiers from Benin, Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, as well as Chad made up the MNJTF. In January 2015, the headquarters was relocated to N'Djamena, Chad, although the commanders remained Nigerian. The MNJTF had given the region a venue for military cooperation, and it can be difficult to distinguish between domestic military action and the MNJTF. However, at the proposal of the affected nations, national armies in each country have conducted anti-Boko Haram and ISWA operational processes outside the MNJTF's boundaries. For instance, Chad intervened after 2014 at the request of its Nigerian and Cameroonian neighbours to fight against Boko Haram factions in the Sahel region. The MNJTF has had a measurable influence on the regional conflict involving Boko Haram and ISWA, clearing the path for collaboration surrounding military actions. At the same time, general regional cooperation has significantly strengthened, particularly, cross-border operations.

Before the inauguration of President Muhammad Buhari in early 2015, cooperation between the nations of the Lake Chad area was minimal. Certainly, Buhari's victory marked a clear turning point in the war against Boko Haram and ISWA.

He made it a priority to mend ties with Nigeria's neighbours and made his first visits outside to Niger and Chad to rally support for a coordinated effort to combat the Boko Haram/ISWA threat. Following his inauguration in 2015, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF), a multinational force tasked with weakening Boko Haram/ISWA, went into action and has been instrumental in halting the group's spread across the area.³¹

To combat Boko Haram and ISWA, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) carried out several significant operations. The Multinational Joint Task Force has been impacted by the dynamics surrounding the division of Boko Haram into two groups as one of its greatest operations, *Gama Aiki* (Hausa for Finish the Work), was begun in June 2016 in reaction to the deadly attacks in Bosso, Republic of Niger. Following that encounter, Chadian military units were dispatched to the Republic of Niger, demonstrating the degree of military collaboration in reaction to the shared growing threat by violent extremist groups in the Lake Chad region. This also serves as evidence of the crucial role the Chadian Armed Forces played in launching operational processes against terrorists. *Gama Aiki* remained in operation throughout September 2016 before being superseded later that year by Operation *Rawan Kada* (Crocodile Dancing), also known as *Gama Aiki II*. The same stabilizing was emphasized more in *Rawan Kada*. The MNJTF appears to have primarily dealt with ISWA as opposed to the combined Cameroon-Nigeria initiatives that have focused on fighting Boko Haram farther south, based on the operations' major focus in both the Lake Chad region and along the Niger-Nigeria borderline. This could be due to the serious risks that ISWA near the Nigeria-Nigeria border has been posing. Midway through 2017, *Rawan Kada* said that its goals had been met. Since 2016, the ISWA has refrained from launching an assault in the vicinity akin to the Bosso attack, demonstrating some degree of success for the MNJTF operations. Despite this, smaller-scale conflicts have continued, and

rebels have maintained a foothold in northern Borno and part of Lake Chad, with periodic incursions into the Niger Republic. These episodes serve as a reminder of the region's limitations and the necessity for persistent military control. As a follow-up, the MNJTF declared Operation *Anmi Fakat* in April 2018 to solidify *Rawan Kada's* victories.³²

Collaboration has taken place both inside the MNJTF mechanism and also bilaterally along the Nigeria-Cameroon border that is near the Boko Haram strongholds. For instance, from January 11 to 14, 2016, Cameroonian forces decided to participate in an operation in Ngoshe on Nigerian soil. In addition, in February 2016, 497 Cameroonian soldiers were pre-positioned in Pulka, 12 kilometers from Kerawa, for Operation Deep Punch 2, a sweep operation in Nigeria's Sambisa Forest. Operation Thunder 1, which began in December 2016, was also conducted jointly with the Nigerian and Cameroonian armies near the Mandara Mountains, an infamous militant refugee along the border. Also, recently, Nigeria invited Cameroonian troops to serve on Nigerian soil alongside Operation *Lafia Dole*, its internal military operation against Boko Haram. In early 2018, Cameroonian troops were present in the Gwoza area, while the Nigerian army also credited the support of Cameroonian forces in the re-opening of the Banki road. This cooperation has extended elsewhere, especially about regional troops operating within Nigeria, a dramatic change from just a few years ago. For example, the Nigerian Air Force conducted a bombing raid in northern Borno State that was based on Intel from Nigerian reconnaissance craft in April 2018, while three Chadian soldiers were killed on Nigerian soil in Abadam LGA the same month, demonstrating the burgeoning coordination.³³ The success of MNJTF military operations has helped degrade Boko Haram/ISWA in the Lake Chad Basin area.

The success recorded by the MNJTF may be attributed to the support of the US government and her Western allies, because, in the context of the fight against terrorism, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Benin, and Nigeria benefited in the way of provision of military assistance in the form of military equipment and advisors to the governments of the affected states, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria. Such assistance has enhanced their intelligence-gathering capabilities as well as their ability to move troops quickly to the area attacked by Boko Haram and ISWA. Also, the strategic partnership that the United States has established with members of the MNJTF has assisted them in using the military assistance provided by the US to monitor and manage trans-border crimes among and between nations more effectively.³⁴ These measures have improved regional security as well as decreased the brutality and inhumane treatment of defenseless and innocent persons who were impacted by Boko Haram but also ISWA operations. The MNJTF received \$5 billion in funds from the US to help its military campaign against Boko Haram and the ISWA insurrection.³⁵

The operational successes recorded by the MNJTF in the Lake Chad Basin area have deepened rivalry between Boko Haram and ISWA leadership and thus, have contributed to the waves of members deserting the violent extremist group. The operational success of the MNJTF has also inflicted combat losses on the violent extremist group, and this has resulted in a large number of captured ex-combatants. Boko Haram and ISWA territorial losses have brought both areas and populations under the control of national armies of the affected countries, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria.

Non-Military Responses

Non-military responses are soft measures adopted by the Nigerian government in addressing the menace of Boko Haram and ISWA because a direct militarized

approach may not necessarily solve the threats of the sects. It is on record that military intervention alone has not guaranteed the required peace and security as most of the crisis at times needs socio-political and economic solutions. The persistent use of force to respond to Boko Haram and ISWA challenge and its failure to curtail the menace of the sects has led several political and armed forces figures, including academics and traditional authorities, to doubt the effectiveness of the Federal Government's plan to eliminate the Islamic insurgency primarily by military means. This claim was supported by former Chief of Defense Staff General Martin Luther Agwai (Rtd), who remarked, "You can never address any of these problems with military methods. The armed forces may always be a facilitating factor. They will raise awareness, as well as secure the region, but the problem is political, social, and economic in nature, and as such the army force will never be able to solve it."³⁶ Osadolor in his submission believes that the non-military notion of human security is based on political, economic, social, and environmental imperatives in addition to human rights, hence, military intervention alone cannot resolve the menace of Boko Haram and ISWA.³⁷ Scholars such as Osakwe and Umoh asserts that a significant aspect of Nigeria's counterinsurgency calls for a growing emphasis on non-military force. Instead, the use of military force should be directed at clearing the way for political advancement.³⁸

Given the political nature of the problem of insurgency, David Galula is right when he submitted that counter-insurgency requires an approach that is 80% political and only 20% military. The individuals living in the region where the insurgency is rooted and being carried out must be taken into consideration if a political solution is to be found.³⁹ As forewarned by British Commander Sir Frank Kitson:

The first thing that must be apparent when contemplating the sort of action which a government facing insurgency should take, is that there

can be no such thing as a purely military solution because insurgency is not primarily military.⁴⁰

The non-military approach is not peculiar to Nigeria only, as it is the practice generally adopted all over the world in the fight against insurgents or terrorists aimed at achieving peace. It is on record that despite the United States military engagement in Iraq, the administration of President Bush understood the value of non-military methods and the necessity of building infrastructural facilities. To win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people, it was therefore necessary for the United States to start the rebuilding process as part of the Marshal Plan for Iraq by supplying infrastructure necessities including clean water, communication, sanitation, including power.⁴¹

Likewise, Israel still explored the option of conciliatory counter-terrorism tactics despite employing repressive and deterrent tactics against Palestine. These include the release of Palestinian prisoners, the provision of material aid to Palestinians, the easing of restrictions on Palestinian movement, withdrawal from occupied territory, and engaging in negotiations. Conciliatory tactics were reportedly designed to address the Palestinian grievances that motivate terrorist violence and encourage peaceful diplomacy between the state of Israel and the Palestinian national movement.⁴² The efforts are targeted not only at winning the war but also at winning the peace.

Considering this fact, the Nigerian government adopted the following non-military measures to address the menace of Boko Haram and ISWA. These measures include the promulgation of the Terrorism Prevention Act, Declaration of State of Emergency, Designation of Boko Haram and ISWA as Terrorist Organizations, Use of Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), Border Closure, Telecommunications Shut Down, Establishment of the North East Development Commission (NEDC), Judicial

Prosecution of the arrested members of the Boko Haram and ISWA, and granting Amnesty to the repentant Boko Haram and ISWA's members.

Terrorism Prevention Act

The deadly rampage by Boko Haram following the uprising in July 2009 was a major factor in the adoption of the Terrorism Prevention Act (TPA) 2011, as modified, which was Nigeria's first anti-terrorism law. The Terrorism Prevention Act 2011, as modified, was passed after a protracted legislative procedure. The relative youth of terrorism in Nigeria has been blamed by some academics for the country's tardiness in passing anti-terrorist laws. The 9/11 attacks represented a defining moment in the worldwide perception of what terrorism signifies as well as the necessity of waging a determined battle against it internationally, thus it is necessary to start there when endeavouring to identify the historical precedent for the creation of the anti-terrorist law. The assaults had the direct result of causing the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to adopt resolution 1373, which compelled all member nations to include terrorism, funding for terrorism, and other related offenses as severe crimes in their domestic laws. A Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) was set up by the UNSC to oversee Resolution 1373's implementation and make sure that all UN Member States adhered to it. Regarding this, Nigeria's first reaction to UNSCR 1373 was at best illogical due mostly to political squabbles and ethno-religious animosities. For instance, because there was no counter-terrorism law in place between 2001 and 2004, the Nigerian government did not take any action to implement Resolution 1373. The National Assembly automatically added two parts to the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) Establishment Bill that was then going through the parliamentary process rather than passing a separate anti-terrorism statute as required by the resolution. Sections 15 and 46 of the EFCC Establishment Act 2004 were

created by combining the two provisions. While section 46 attempts to characterize terrorism, section 15 of the Act essentially specifies a few offenses related to terrorism.⁴³

The bill was eventually passed into law in 2011 after ineffective attempts to pass it in 2006 and 2007 because of pressure from the US on the Nigerian government to move quickly forward into embracing complete and accurate anti-terrorism legislation in the wake of the unsuccessful 2009 Christmas Day bombing of a US airliner by a young Nigerian named Umar Abdul Mutallab who had received training in Yemen by Al-Qaeda in Arabia Peninsula. He attempted to detonate an explosive device while aboard Delta/North West Airline Flight 252, which was traveling to Detroit's Metropolitan Airport in the US with 279 passengers and 11 staff members. Abdul Mutallab attempted to blow up the bomb while the jet was in Amsterdam, but he was beaten back by passengers and staff who put out the tiny fire started by the partial explosion of the device. The plane was traveling from Nigeria to Amsterdam.⁴⁴

The US Transportation Security Administration established new security measures in response to this incident, among which was the blacklisting of Nigeria by designating it as a "Country of Interest" on the US Terror Watch List. The US responded by giving Nigeria four requirements to meet before it could be delisted, but the Nigerian administration wasted no time in adopting the appropriate diplomatic measures to avoid a confrontation with the US. These requirements would include widespread criticism of all acts of terrorism anywhere in the globe; enhanced airport security; deployment of air marshals on flights; and laws aimed at countering terrorism in the nation.⁴⁵ In response to these requirements and additional pressure from the US, former President Jonathan wrote the National Assembly three times between January 2010 and February 2011 pleading with it to act quickly on the PTA to regain the

confidence of the global community in the nation's dedication to the global fight against terrorism. The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2011 was approved by the Senate in February 2011 and submitted to the House of Representatives for approval before being forwarded to the President for signature. In February 2011, President Jonathan signed into law the Money Laundering Prohibition Act and the Prevention of Terrorism Act, commonly known collectively as the Terrorism Prevention Act of 2011.⁴⁶ Consequently, on July 24, 2011, the US government delisted Nigeria from the list of countries that harbor or sponsor terrorism thereby effectively bringing to an end, the diplomatic tension between the two countries following the ill-fated Christmas Day Bombing. To better coordinate counter-terrorism efforts in response to the danger presented by Boko Haram and ISWA, the anti-terrorism law was modified and passed in 2013.

However, Section 2 of the TPA as amended defines an "act of terrorism" as a deliberate, premeditated act that: (a) may seriously harm or damage a nation or an international organization; (b) is intended or can reasonably be regarded as having been intended to- (I) unduly compel a government or international organization to perform or refrain from performing any act; (II) seriously intimidate a population, (c) involves, or causes, as the case may be: (I) an attack on a person's life that may cause serious bodily harm or death; (II) kidnapping of a person; (III) destruction to a government or public facility; (IV) otherwise influence such government or international organization by intimidation or coercion; and (V) seriously destabilize or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic, or social structures of a country or an international organization.⁴⁷ The TPA as modified has established the following offenses. The new sections "3-25" that replace sections 3-8 of the Principal Act include 3(a) murder, kidnapping, or other attacks on the person or liberty of an internationally protected person, (b) carrying out a violent attack on an internationally protected person's official

premises, private accommodation, or mode of transportation, or (c) threatening to carry out any such attack, committing an offense. Any individual who: (a) organizes, manages, or helps with the organization or management of a meeting or activity, which he knows to be related to or connected to a terrorist act or group, (b) gathers or provides supplies, articles, or facilities for a gathering or activity that he knows to be related to or connected to a terrorist act or group, or (c) participates in a meeting that he knows is being held to support or further the goals of a prohibited organization, is guilty of the offense. Any person who knowingly solicits or provides assistance, in any way, directly or indirectly, 5(a) for the commission of an act of terrorism or(b) to a terrorist organization, among other things, violates this law and is guilty of an offense punishable by a prison term of at least two decades upon conviction.⁴⁸

The amended Anti-Terrorism Act of 2013, which was first adopted into law in 2011, specifies that the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) is the organization responsible for all security as well as enforcement agencies to provide the necessary legal backing and efficient coordination of the counter-insurgency strategy. The Attorney General of the Federation (AGF) is responsible for maintaining the level of global cooperation necessary for detecting and combating international acts of terrorism as well as ensuring that Nigeria's counter-terrorism laws and policies are by global best practices and standards and United Nations Conventions.⁴⁹ Hence, the Anti-Terrorism Act legalizes military action and creates a legislative structure to reduce the threat posed by Boko Haram/ISWA.

Declaration of State of Emergency

A state of emergency or emergency rule is an extreme measure normally resorted to in a period of national emergency when the security of the state or a part of it is threatened. On December 31, 2011, with effect from January 2012, former

President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency in 15 local government areas of the states of Borno, Plateau, Niger, and Yobe and imposed a curfew in additional states like Adamawa due to the escalating violence activities of Boko Haram that threatened the security of lives and property. To implement the curfew but also a state of emergency, 30, 000 members of the army, police, and state security were sent out.⁵⁰ The action thus gave security officials extra powers without legal encumbrances. This measure, however, did not meet the desired result of bringing the insurgent's attacks to an end. Though, relative peace was restored to Plateau and Niger States. The continued series of deadly attacks by the Boko Haram necessitated President Jonathan to declare, another state of emergency in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa State, on 4 May 2013.⁵¹ This declaration was targeted at curbing the increasingly violent attacks by Boko Haram and Ansaru saying the level of violence called for "extraordinary measures".⁵² The decision came after a spate of attacks on security forces and government targets by Boko Haram in its north-east stronghold. Invoking section 305 (1) of the 1999 Constitution, the President acknowledged that there is an "insurrection" in northeast Nigeria and that the government has lost control of certain geographic areas to "Boko Haram".⁵³ He warned the terrorists that the government will use all resources at its disposal to destroy their activities as they are embarking on a war they cannot win. When invoking his emergency power, the President declares that:

... Already, some northern parts of Borno State have been taken over by groups whose allegiance is to different flags and ideologies. These terrorists and insurgents seemed determined to establish control and authority over parts of our beloved nation and to progressively overwhelm the rest of the country. In many places, they have destroyed the Nigerian Flags and other symbols of state authority and in their place, hoisted strange flags suggesting the exercise of alternative sovereignty. They have attacked government buildings and facilities. They have murdered innocent citizens and state officials. They have set houses ablaze, and taken women and children as hostages. These actions amount to a declaration of war and a deliberate attempt to undermine the

authority of the Nigerian State and threaten her territorial integrity. As a responsible government, we will not tolerate this.⁵⁴

A new military organization, the 7 Division, was established in Maiduguri as a result of the military operation being escalated and given the strategic task of immediately containing and defeating the rebels. Later, more than 1,000 Nigerian soldiers who had been removed from the Mali campaign's theater of operations were added to the campaign in north-eastern Nigeria.⁵⁵ This measure, despite not achieving its targeted objectives, recorded some level of success with some Boko Haram and ISWA members killed and others arrested.

Designations of Boko Haram and Ansaru as Terrorist Groups

After ex-president Goodluck Jonathan signed the Terrorism Prevention Act as amended into law in February 2013, in response to the increased number of terrorist attacks by Boko Haram as well as its offshoot group Ansaru, Jonathan on June 4, 2013, declared Boko Haram and Ansaru (ISWA) terrorist organizations, labeled their operations as terrorism, as well as issued a warning that anyone connected to the two organizations was subject to prosecution.⁵⁶ In a related development, the US Department of State officially designated Boko Haram and Ansaru "Foreign Terrorism Organization" on 13 November 2013.⁵⁷

The declaration of Boko Haram and Ansaru (ISWA) as terrorists is to enable the military to carry out its operation in line with international law, and the groups have been treated as such. It therefore means that for a group(s) to be proscribed as a terrorist organization, its activities must fall within the ambit of the Prevention Terrorism Act as amended. What is understood therefore is that one thing is to have a law and another thing is to have the political will to act on the law. So, until the group(s) is proscribed a terrorist group(s) if not even if such acts are purely acts of terrorism, such group(s)

cannot be considered terrorist group(s). This is what is playing out in the case of Fulani herdsmen that was recently proscribed a terrorist group by the Federal Government after a prolonged call by Nigerians including members of the National Assembly and the international community as a result of their heinous crimes against Nigerians by the Fulani-herdsmen. The political will to proscribe a group(s) a terrorist group is paramount to the fight against terrorism.

Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF)

Borno Youth made up the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), which was established in Maiduguri in May 2013 after a gunman was bravely pursued and apprehended by Baba Lawal Jafar, the erstwhile overall chairman of the Civilian JTF in Borno State, using only a stick. Jafar then turned the man over to the members of Joint Task Force (JTF) Operation Restore Order. Due to this one-of-a-kind and outstanding gesture, Modu Milo and other people-including children, adults, as well as veteran security personnel- joined Jafar in the search for ISWA and Boko Haram militants. As a result, the Civilian Joint Task Force finally began to play a role in putting an end to the continuing insurrection in the north-east of Nigeria. The CJTF's engagement in the counter-insurgency has so far made it more difficult for the insurgents than for security forces, supporting the notion that local self-defense organizations should have a bigger role in counter-insurgency tactics. The massacre of around 200 Boko Haram militants by residents in Borno State's Kala-Balge region serves as a cautionary tale in this regard.⁵⁸

Since their emergence in 2013, they have become part of the security landscape in the area, frequently mounting checkpoints across the territory, and by controlling movement on the one hand, they constitute an initial dissuasive line of defense for the communities. On the other hand, with their knowledge of operational terrain, they are

intelligence-gathering assets for state security institutions in the fight against Boko Haram and Islamic State of West Africa.⁵⁹ They raided the residences of suspected and identified members as part of their activities, manhandling or hacking them to death before turning them over to the military. The CJTF played a crucial role in the anti-insurgent fight while armed with machetes, axes, bows and arrows, clubs, swords, but also daggers. JTF sector commands have control over the vigilantes' neighborhood "sector" organization. They were successful in driving numerous rebels out of Maiduguri and effectively putting an end to Boko Haram and ISWA. The military and others have praised the killings and bombs in the city, with former President Jonathan referring to them as "new national heroes" on July 17, 2013.⁶⁰ They were established in 22 out of the 27 LGAS in Borno State and have more than 26,000 members, which led to their amazing achievement and recognition by the Nigerian government in September 2013.⁶¹ According to the Civilian Joint Task Force's documents, the military's success to date would not have been possible without its assistance (CJTF).

Border Closure

Border closure is another measure adopted by the Nigerian Government in its effort to curb the activities of Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa. Border closure becomes imperative due to its porousness, which heightens the potential spread of terrorist activities into and from neighbouring countries. Their vulnerability to the spread of Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa is compounded by the fact that the Republic of Chad, Niger, and Cameroon have borders with the northern Nigeria States where Boko Haram/ISWA already exerts a strong influence.

The border with Niger for example, stretches along Sokoto, Katsina, Jigawa, and Yobe States, while that of Cameroon Stretches along Taraba and Adamawa States in northern Nigeria, and crosses Rivers and Benue states in the South-South and North

Central regions of Nigeria respectively. Borno State is a neighbour to the Chad Republic. These borders no doubt encourage Boko Haram/ISWA atrocities. The border closure is an effort to strengthen border security and prevent the spread of terrorism especially the movement of Boko Haram/ISWA and other criminal elements across borders.⁶² According to security sources who pleaded anonymity, the closure of the border is a military strategy aimed at preventing the perpetrators of terrorist atrocities from escaping into neighbouring countries. It also represents an effort to stop Boko Haram and ISWA from obtaining reinforcements from international jihadi terrorists in the area by shutting off the flow of weapons, armaments, as well as other logistical support from their overseas allies.⁶³ The successes recorded by the security forces in recent times may be attributed to the closure of Nigerian borders with her neighbours, as the measure has not only caged the Boko Haram/ISWA to a particular location but deprived them of access to weapons and other beneficiaries that may aid their operations.

Telecommunications Shut-Down

Telecommunications shutdown was a measure adopted by the Nigerian military in the hunt for Boko Haram/ISAW. According to a top security official who pleaded anonymity, the networks were put off as part of a strategy to demobilize the insurgents and to slow down the communication among the members of Boko Haram and ISWA who are spread in camps in the forest of Sambisa, Mafa, Wulgo and Kirenowa axis of Borno State as well as the Sahel region.⁶⁴ The telecommunications shut-down also helps in the fight against Boko Haram and ISWA as it enables the military or security forces to cut off the sources of contacts and identify their sources of supply of arms and other essentials to terrorists.⁶⁵ The shutting down could also be a military strategy to avoid the Boko Haram and ISWA members and their informants monitoring or giving

out information about military operations, especially as it concerns the movement of troops and weapons from one location to another. This measure also contributed to the operational success of the military against Boko Haram and ISWA.

Establishment of North East Development Commission

The North East Development Commission (NEDC) was established in 2017, after the bill establishing the commission was passed and signed as an Act on October 25, 2017. Any effective interventions including efforts by the Federal Government or any of its Ministries, Departments, and Agencies (MDAs), States, and other Development Partners were to be evaluated, coordinated, harmonized, and reported on by the organization. The corporation is also tasked with carrying out all projects and activities for the various northeast States of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba, and Yobe. The NEDC "among so many other things, is to obtain but also oversee funds from the Federal Account allotment as well as donor organizations for the settlement, rehabilitative services, as well as reconstruction of roadways, houses, and business premises of insurgency victims as well as tackling the menace of poverty, illiteracy level, ecological problem, and any other environment-related or developmental obstacles in the north-east states".⁶⁶ Since its establishment, the government is rigorously sustaining the rehabilitation and resettlement of victims of terrorism and insurgency in the north-east of Nigeria. This measure is aimed at discouraging the youths of the affected states from joining the dreaded sect, especially when problems with economic hardship, as well as lack of education in the area, are addressed, as both of these factors had a role in the rise of Boko Haram. This action could have encouraged some members of Boko Haram and ISWA to voluntarily surrender. However, the recent attacks by Boko Haram and ISWA indicate that the efforts of NEDC do not prevent some youths and interested citizens from joining Boko Haram

and ISWA, and this is a wakeup call on the Federal Government to urgently and holistically address the socio-economic challenges in the north-east part of Nigeria.

Judicial Prosecutions

Judicial prosecution of arrested members of the sect is another non-military response to address the Boko Haram and ISWA terrorism. The growing number of arrests and detention of Boko Haram and ISWA suspects in various detention centers across the country necessitated the Nigerian Government to commence the prosecution of suspects in 2017. As a result of this, a total number of 1,328 cases were dispensed between the period covering 2017 to 2020. Out of this member, 366 suspects were convicted and sentenced to various terms of imprisonment ranging from 3 to 60 years, while about 882 suspects were released for de-radicalization, rehabilitation, and reintegration programs.⁶⁷ It is recorded that 6 Nigerians were recently convicted in the United Arab Emirates for terrorism-related matters. According to international law, Nigeria is required to look into and punish Boko Haram terrorists who have committed crimes against humanity. This prosecution of Boko Haram and ISWA members is done by that legislation.⁶⁸ Besides, the prosecution of the Boko Haram and ISWA members is under Terrorism Prevention Act 2011 as amended which gave the Attorney General of the Federation the power for the effective prosecution of terrorism matter. It is believed in some quarters that the fear of arrest and prosecution may be part of the reason leading to the surrender of some of the terrorist members in the affected states of the northeast region. More so, the conviction of some of their financiers including six (6) in the United Arab Emirates no doubt affected their financial supply chains and thus weakened their operations. The effect of this also contributed to some victories recorded against Boko Haram and ISWA and their willingness to surrender voluntarily.

Amnesty for Boko Haram and Islamic State of West Africa Members

The offer of an amnesty by President Muhammad Buhari to the repentant Boko Haram and ISWA members came while receiving the released of 107 Dapchi schoolgirls previously abducted on February 19, 2018, at the presidential villa, Abuja on Friday, March 23, 2018. While receiving the girls, President Buhari said the Federal Government was ready to rehabilitate repentant members of the Boko Haram and ISWA and reintegrate them into the society. He said:

While further efforts are being made to secure the release of every abducted citizen in Nigeria, the government is ever ready to accept the unconditional laying down of arms by any member of the Boko Haram group who shows strong commitment in that regard... We are ready to rehabilitate and integrate such repentant members into the larger society This country has suffered enough of hostility. The government is, therefore, appealing to all to embrace peace for the overall development of our people and the country.⁶⁹

Following the president's announcement, the government established Operation Safe Corridor, a 16-week program, under the supervision of the military, as an amnesty program for surrendered but also repentant Boko Haram and ISWA terrorist members. The military also founded a behavior modification camp to revitalize as well as fully integrate this individuals.⁷⁰

Since its inception, many Boko Haram and ISWA members have surrendered and undergone rehabilitation. For example, in 2018 the Borno State Government confirmed that some 1,400 repentant Boko Haram suspects had been released by the military and rehabilitated into the society. Also, Goni Alkali, the Managing Director of the North East Development Commission, after visiting the camp where former fighters were being trained in vocational skills, revealed that over 600 ex-Boko Haram Fighters were being deradicalized under the Operation Safe Corridor (OPSC) project. Earlier Batches Comprised 97 and 243 ex-combatants. In November 2019, the Defence Headquarters (DHD) confirmed that the OPSC handed over 86 Boko Haram Child

fighters, "who voluntarily surrendered to troops", to the Borno State Rehabilitations Centre in Bulumkutu.⁷¹

Similarly, in July 2020, the Federal Government through the Defence Headquarters reintegrated 601 ex-Boko Haram terrorists including 14 foreign nationals from Cameroon, Chad, and Niger into the society through their respective national and state authorities. This was disclosed by the then coordinator of Operation Safe Corridor, Major General Bamidele Shafa, at the DRR Camp in Mallam Sidi, Gombe State.⁷² Also, in September 2021, the Federal Government through the Defence Headquarters, disclosed that close to 6,000 fighters from the Boko Haram and ISWA Islamist insurgents in north-east Nigeria have surrendered in recent weeks.⁷³ On November 6, 2021, the Theatre Commander, Joint Task Force, north-east Operation *Hadin Kai*, Maj. Gen. Christopher Musa has put the number of surrendered Boko Haram/ISWA insurgents at 17,000, attributing the development to the military's counter-insurgency effort.⁷⁴ This achievement is an attestation that the amnesty program is yielding results and is a positive sign that the fight against Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa may not be too far to be won. However, the recent attacks in the northeast by members of Boko Haram and ISWA are an indication that the amnesty program may not be 100 percent relied upon since the socio-economic crises that contributed to the emergence of Boko Haram have not been addressed, paving the way for youths to join the groups. The security forces need to double their effort and re-strategize their counter-terrorism operation, especially on information and intelligence gathering to curtail the menace of the Boko Haram and ISWA. This does not mean the amnesty program be discontinued.

Challenges of Military Counter-Terrorism Operations

Despite some successes recorded against Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa by the military counter-terrorism strategy aimed at putting an end to the menace of Boko Haram and ISWA, the counter-insurgency war is still constrained by some challenges. Some of these challenges include corruption and mismanagement of the counter-terrorism war which is attributed to the hijacking of the crisis by the fifth columnist in the form of "conflict entrepreneurs" or violence profiteers", who are top government officials, as well as high-placed and politically connected contractors and security officers benefiting from the counter-terrorism effort and would prefer that the war continues so that they can benefit from it. Reports of verified corruption, such as the purported redirection of \$2.1 billion intended for arms procurement by a former national security adviser, Col Sambo Dasuki (Rtd) who has been tried for misappropriating military funds and the theft of NGN 3.9 billion by the office of the Chief of Defence Staff, were utilized to support these opinions. The National Intelligence Agency (NIA) uncovered \$ 43 million set aside for clandestine activities in a private Lagos building in 2017, while it was alleged that \$1 billion set up for the army's purchase of weapons went missing in 2018.⁷⁵ If this money was invested in the purchase of arms and ammunition it would have aided the military in recording more success against Boko Haram and Islamic State of West fighters.

Also, the Nigerian military lacks sophisticated weapons to combat the potent terrorist groups of Boko Haram as well as the Islamic State of West Africa. Giving credence to this is the complaints by some military commanders at the front lines of the war about certain shortcomings in the planning of counter-terrorism campaigns, as well as the lack of adequate arms and ammunition. For example, a video recorded by Major General Olusegun Adeniyi, the former field commander of the counter-terrorism of

Operation *Lafia Dole*, was circulated over social media. In the video, the commander recounted the challenges facing his troops that rendered them vulnerable to attacks by the Boko Haram and ISWA terrorists.⁷⁶

Another challenge facing the counter-terrorism operations is intelligence gathering. This contributed majorly to some of the attacks on the security forces by the terrorists, as the movement of the Boko Haram and ISWA members is not properly monitored and tracked to prevent attacks. There is also rivalry among the security agencies giving room to poor coordination, planning, and tactics in executing military operations.⁷⁷

There are also complaints of delays in salary payment and allowances, as well as poor welfare packages for the officers at the front lines of the war thereby demoralizing the morale of the officers and discouraging them from engaging the enemy. However, this may be seen to be a thing of the past as according to the military sources, their payment and other allowances in recent times are paid between on the 10th-15th of every month.⁷⁸

According to top security personnel, lack of adequate manpower is among the major challenges facing counter-terrorism operations in northeast Nigeria. Proving details, he said that the military lacks adequate manpower to effectively curtail the menace of Boko Haram and ISWA since they live in scattered cells and that once there is an attack, the military does not have enough manpower to deploy to the area at the same times.⁷⁹ This is a big challenge as the number of MNJTF troops is not sufficient to cover the ungoverned spaces within the Lake Chad Basin, which Boko Haram/ISWA have infiltrated to launch attacks against the affected states in the region.

The effect of the Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) has also undermined counter-terrorism operations, as it is extremely difficult for military personnel on the

battlefield to practice social distancing. The rising number of people who are affected by the virus has serious implications for the counter-terrorism operations in the northeast region. This has placed additional responsibility on the security personnel, who are tasked with not only combating Boko Haram and ISWA terrorists but also conveying medical equipment and supplies to designated areas, as well as the protection of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in camps. The deployment of the military to various parts of the country to enforce lockdown directives to prevent the spread of Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) hurts the counter-terrorism operations, as engagement of troops in national tasks has reduced the number of those available for deployment to the battlefield.⁸⁰

The fluid border is also a challenge to effectively curtailing the activities of Boko Haram and ISWA as according to military sources who pleaded anonymity during telephone interviews reiterated the challenges to too many unmanned and undetected border routes which pave the way to the inflow of Boko Haram and ISWA members to and fro Nigeria and neighbouring countries of Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Benin Republics.⁸¹

At the regional level, there is a lack of support for the fight against Boko Haram and ISWA among Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) member states. There is also the problem of lack of international solidarity as individual states' interests have tended to impede counter-terrorism strategies. Some state interests border on economic considerations, differences in tactics, and fear of or sympathy with the cause or methods employed by the terrorists Boko Haram and ISWA which invariably led to an escalation of terrorism.⁸²

Lack of adequate cooperation among the MNJTF states is also a big challenge to the counter-terrorism operations. Recall that late Chadian President, Idriss Derby,

had complained of lack of cooperation from Nigerian troops in demolishing the Boko Haram and ISWA fighters on the fringes of Lake Chad Basin. This allegation against the Nigerian military suggests the existence of a crack in the Multinational Joint Task Force (MJ FT) and its operations in the Lake Chad Basin.⁸³ Given these challenges, it has been suggested that the counter-terrorism strategy of the Nigerian military and MNJTF member states should be realistic in the terror war since terrorism is a complex and dynamic phenomenon that must be matched by the same multi-dimensional response.

Conclusion

The military and non-military approaches adopted by the Federal Government are working interwovenly towards putting an end to the menace of Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa. This is attributed to the achievement of the military in degrading Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa fighters, especially with the killing of Abubakar Shekau, the Boko Haram leader, and Abu Musab Al-Barnawi, the ISWA leader which has led the groups in disarray, and the surrendering of thousands of Boko Haram and ISWA fighters through the Amnesty Programme of the federal government is an indication that the two approaches adopted by the federal government of Nigeria are working. As noted, it is a proven truth that neither military nor soft approach can win the war alone. Rather, they depend on each other to get the needed result. We believe that since the two approaches are yielding results it should be sustained until the war is finally won.

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CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

This thesis titled "Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa: A Study of International Terrorism Network in North East Nigeria 2013-2021" has examined the two insurgent groups that have been terrorizing Nigeria's north-east region and neighbouring countries for a decade. Boko Haram emerged in 2002 under the leadership of Mohammed Yusuf in Borno State in the north-east region of Nigeria based on the radical Islamic ideology of establishing a pure Islamic state that is based on the strict implementation of Islamic or Sharia law in the whole country. In the early stage, the activities of the sect were in Borno and Yobe states and later expanded to the north-east states of Bauchi and Adamawa states, north-west cities of states Kano, Kaduna, and north-central states of the plateau, Niger, Kogi including Abuja, the nation's capital city.

The study has revealed that Boko Haram drew its inspiration from both internal and external influences. The external factors include the worldwide resurgence of radical Islam in the Arab region due to the United States of America's global war on terror especially after the September 11 2001 attacks in the United States by the Al-Qada led by Osama bin Laden. Internal influences came from the perennial poor, social, and economic problems of urban destitution and rural decay in north-east Nigeria, with a pool of *almajirai* and urban unemployed youths who are easy recruits by the Boko Haram. At the death of its leader Mohammed Yusuf, Abubakar Shekau became the new leader and it was under his leadership that the sect became more militant using terrorist methods such as suicide bombing, development and use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), kidnapping, use of women and under-aged children for suicide missions. Under Shekau, Boko Haram was localized and became

internationalized having links with other international terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) Al-Shabaab, Taliban, Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL) or Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or simply, Islamic State (IS).

The study has revealed that Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa have links with other international terrorism networks in the area of ideology which centered on establishing a Caliphate that will address problems faced by Muslims worldwide believed to have been caused by Western powers. Other areas of their linkages include training, funding, arms supply, and other logistic supports which facilitated their operations and attacks.

The Boko Haram and ISWA onslaught warranted the Federal Government to adopt counter-terrorism of military and non-military approaches in response to the threats of the sect. The non-military approaches include the declaration of a state of emergency, the promulgation of the Anti-Terrorism Act 2011 as amended 2013 which legalizes military operations, the use of the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), the establishment of the North East Development Commission (NEDC) and granting of Amnesty for the surrendered Boko Haram and Islamic State of West Africa members. However both approaches depend on each other for success since military intervention alone cannot guarantee peace, and from all indications, the approaches are working with the massive surrendering of the Boko Haram and ISWA members to the Amnesty Programme of the Federal Government.

The military approach involved the use of force through the instrument of Joint Task Force (JTF) comprising the Army, Air Force, Navy, Police, Department of State Services (DSS), and Para-Military Personnel such as Nigeria Customs Service, Nigeria Immigration Service, Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps and the Civilian Joint Task Force. This has yielded positive results with the killing and arrest of many Boko

Haram and ISWA commanders and their foot soldiers including the recent killing of ISWA leader, Al-Barnawi. Other successes include the reclaiming of territories and the confinement of the activities of the sect to only rural communities of Borno and Yobe States. This is an indication that Boko Haram and ISWA have been decapitated, degraded, and annihilated despite pockets of attacks on the military and civilians in the rural areas of the northeast region.

Meanwhile, the Federal Government must not relent on its counter-insurgency approaches and not be deceived by the massive surrender of the Boko Haram and ISWA members as they may change their minds and rejoin the group since the socio-economic needs of the people in the affected areas are still not fully met. This is because history has shown that in an instance where a combatant sect is crushed, remnants of the group usually spring up in another nomenclature and challenge the state as long as the problems remain. In this case, the re-emergence and subsequent take over of power by the Taliban in Afghanistan in late 2021 should be an eye opener to the Federal government, and since the ideology that inspired the emergence of Boko Haram and ISWA remains, with the trend of terrorism by the group, the counter-terrorism responses by the government should be sustained until the lasting peace and security are achieved.

Findings of the study had established that Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa emerged in the north-east region of Nigeria and expanded to the Lake Chad Basin with its main ideology of the establishment of a pure Islamic State (theocratic state) that is based on strict implementation of Sharia law in Nigeria and the neighbouring countries of Chad, Niger and Cameroon; the terrorist groups attacks on the Nigerian state and the neighbouring countries of Chad, Niger and Cameroon comprising the military, para-military and civilians targets led to wanton destruction of

lives and properties worth billions of naira; the adaptation of act of terrorism and the dexterity displayed by members of Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa and their expansion from north-east of Nigeria to the neighbouring countries of Chad, Niger and Cameroon was as a result of their linkage with other international terrorist organizations; and Military and non-military approaches adopted by the federal government led to the degrading of Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa fighters. This study contends that the functionality of Boko Haram and the Islamic State of West Africa thrived in their collaboration due to the international support they received from other terrorist organizations.

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The military officers pleaded that their names should not be mentioned

NAME	AGE	OCCUPATION	PLACE OF INTERVIEW	DATE OF INTERVIEW
Isaq Usman	44	Businessman	Maiduguri	10-04-2021
Yahaya Yakub	35	NGO Staff	Maiduguri	11-04- 2021
Anonymous	50	Colonel	Rann	15-04- 2021
Anonymous	35	Captain	Chibok	19-04-2021
Anonymous	22	2 nd Lieutenant	Daptchi	20-04-2021
Anonymous	52	WO2	Dikwa	30-04- 2021
Anonymous	51	WO2	Monguno	1-05-2021
Anonymous	50	WO1	Gamboru Ngala	5-05-2021
Anonymous	48	SSGT	Marte	10-05-2021
Anonymous	45	SGT	Sambisa	14-05-2021
Anonymous	30	CPL	Baga	15-05-2021
Anonymous	32	CPL	Damasak	20-05-2021
Anonymous	27	L/LCP	Gubio	22-05- 2021

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