

**HERDERS/FARMERS CLASHES AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN NIGERIA: THE
CASE OF ENUGU STATE**

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**A PROJECT SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE,
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CERTIFICATION

We the undersigned hereby certify and approve that the study is the original work carried out by **ELU TEMITOPE EMMANUEL** with **Mat No. SSC1708139** and it met the requirement for the award of the Bachelor of Science (B.Sc.) Degree in political science, university of Benin, Benin City, Edo state, Nigeria.

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DEDICATION

This research is dedicated to God the Almighty for His provision and for His steadfast love towards me and also to my parents Mr. Lucky and Mrs. Blessing Elu for their unending love.

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My gratitude goes to the maker of heaven and earth, Jesus Christ, the Author and Finisher of my faith for seeing me through and bringing me thus far.

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ABSTRACT

This research work seeks to explore the herder/farmer conflicts and human security in Enugu State, Nigeria, with a view to situating its nature, causes, dynamics, effects and implications. By way of historical analysis of previous and present studies anchored on the political ecology perspective, the research posits that the conflicts have been informed by the desperate struggle for competitive survival and subsistence in an environment characterized by ecological scarcity and livelihood insecurity. The study had the following specific objectives; determine the socio-economic attributes of the rural crop herders/farmers; identify the sources of herders farmers conflicts in rural farmers on rural development and describe the methods adopted to resolve herders assess the ecological effects of migration but others farmers on rural development and describe the methods adopted to resolve others from us conflicts with rural crops in the area. The research finds that the situation has been exacerbated by the phenomenon of climate change, whose dynamics tend to have been aggravating natural resource conflicts across the world. The research submits that the conflicts situation under review portends negatively for sustainable societal progress especially national security in Nigeria.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Natural resource conflicts are pervasive in Africa and Nigeria is not an exception. It has been asserted that the rise in natural resource conflicts is as a result of human population increase and the globalization of the economy. Resource conflicts can be classified into two; namely point resources including mines, farms and reserves and eco-zonal conflicts including water, grazing and hunting rights (Blench, 1996). Conflicts between herdsman and farmers have been noted as an example of Low Intensity Conflicts (LIC) emanating from environmental degradation, resource scarcity, demographic and climate change. Within the West African sub-region, a large session of the population depends on the production of livestock for their livelihood and survival. More than 12 million people in West Africa depend on a production of livestock as their planning means of supports whereas over 70 million people in the region also depend on livestock and livestock related enterprises for their livelihood.

Farmers and herdsman inter-depend on each other for survival. Herders move their herds to graze and farmlands belonging to crop farmers and also acquired the food stuff between farmers and herdsman therefore makes conflicts inevitable as competing interests arises over the use of natural resources. These conflicts are occasioned by the seasonal weather conditions which forces others to move from the semi-arid areas in search of pastures further south, which results in competition over access to available land for crop cultivation and grazing pastures for the cattle (Monod, 1975). Herders-Farmer's conflict is one of the topical and contending issues, that has been and still bedeviling Nigeria. Herders and farmers have had a mutual and beneficial relationship ranging from agricultural production and inter-marriages. The sustainability of this relationship is, however, threatened due to clashes that have resulted in loss of lives and properties. In recent times, the herder-farmer clashes have taken a new dimension as host communities accuse the herdsman of kidnappings, rape, murder, and all manner of criminal activities.

They are perceived as a severe security threat in many communities in the North Central, Western and Southern parts of the country. Today, the herdsmen's actions might be viewed by many as the greatest threat to Nigeria's corporate existence. The origins of the farmer-herder imbroglio are well known. Farmer-herder crises in Nigeria occur due to resource scarcity; there is a growing scarcity of arable land, impending desertification of the Sahel-Savannah, and scarcity of water essential to sustain crop cultivation and cattle herds. The increasing desertification and the effects of climate change have further increased the herdsmen's drive to move further south in search of grazing land and pasture for their livestock. These southward movements always pitch them against farmers and the host community whose crops are regularly invaded and destroyed by the cattle during this seasonal movement. The result of this is increased conflict, death, displacement, and the destruction of properties. Cattle rustling, the advent of heavily armed criminal herdsmen and the increasing cultural differences among ethnic groups that predominantly farm, or graze cattle further exacerbate the crisis.

The current situation would not have gotten worse if the government did not abandon the grazing reserve system created by the Northern Regional Government in 1965. Then, the government created over 417 grazing reserves in the north. Under the grazing reserve system, the government provided space, water, and vaccinations for the livestock while the herdsmen paid taxes to the government in return. As it is often in Nigeria, this working system was upended by oil discovery in the country. Oil exploration and export made Nigeria an oil economy, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s. Nigeria abandoned the grazing reserve system due to the agricultural sector's neglect as the mainstay of its economy. Consequently, grazing reserves which were under a neglected agricultural sector was not sustained. It received little or no attention from succeeding administrations. As a fallback, herdsmen began to resort back to their traditional and seasonal grazing routes, currently interrupted or interfered with by industrialization, urbanization, demographic, and other natural factors. This leads to clashes and conflict with farmers and host communities.

The herders-farmers conflict continues unabated because the government has not demonstrated the much-needed political will to end the crises. For a conflict that has the capacity of tearing the country apart, it is instructive that political leaders have failed to invoke appropriate legislation and executive actions capable of tackling the issue. Unfortunately, some politicians have sought

to capitalize on the crisis. It is indisputable that some local leaders who have been unable to provide good governance to their people resort to ethnic chauvinism by literally pouring fuel on the farmer-herder conflict to ramp up support amongst the local populace enhancing their popularity. On its part, the federal government might not have shown the right political will to enforce laws that can end the crisis. The government is perceived rightly or wrongly from some quarters as sympathetic to the herdsmen's activities. This perception is likely because the President is Fulani, the same ethnic group that dominates the cattle business. The government must correct this impression and firmly show that it does not link itself to criminality and conflict, regardless of ethnicity.

Many Nigerians are shocked that the federal government does not seem to deal with the herdsmen-farmer conflicts in different parts of the country with the same strength and determination it shows in similar internal security issues in other parts of the country. Impunity reigns supreme as some criminal herdsmen, especially those engaged in kidnapping, apprehended by security agencies are allegedly released shortly afterwards. The government must show Nigerians its scorecard on dealing with the herdsmen-farmers conflict. Nigerians should know where the government stand on the issue and must see the government as enforcing law and order, whether on the side of herdsmen or farmers. The herdsmen crisis is a human security issue. There are four main issues of policy and politics invoked in this problem. The first is the adjusting of the mode of the business of cattle rearing from primordial herding system to the present system of ranching as seen in other climes globally. Roving cattle grazing in the age of industrial ranching and mechanized meat production should be discouraged and the culture modified. Secondly, herdsmen are carrying sophisticated weapons freely and are posing threat to life and property, especially when there are laws forbidden this. This impunity should be immediately discouraged, and appropriate laws enforced.

Thirdly, if any herdsman would veer away from the escort of their cattle into kidnapping, rape, armed robbery, they should be viewed as outright criminals. Law enforcement should deal with herdsmen criminals according to law. Fourthly, the clashes between herdsmen and the various communities where they operate poses a challenge of diversity management for the state and federal governments. The government should not allow sentiments and politics to becloud matters of enterprise regulation and crime control. There is a need to encourage community

policing, taking advantage of the already existing vigilante system in most states of the country. Community policing will help intelligence gathering about criminal herdsmen, and other undesirable elements and mischief-makers in our communities while civil police would respond to such threats. This will help address the challenges of waiting for the federal government to deploy security to states when there is farmer-herder conflict. The federal and state governments should strengthen conflict resolution and peace building mechanisms at state and local government levels and within rural communities, particularly in areas most affected by farmer-herder conflict. The idea that some ethnic nationalities in Nigeria are incompatible is a fallacy. What is lacking is the sense of fairness and equity which brings about suspicions, apprehension, frustration and consequently conflicts.

The government should establish grazing reserves in consenting states and improve livestock production and management to minimize contacts and friction between herders and farmers. The government will be able to do this by revisiting the 1965 Northern Region Government's Grazing Reserve System and remodeling it to deal with contemporary threats. The grazing reserves will be situated in the northern states where governments have already earmarked lands for this purpose. Additional to this, the government should also seek the cooperation and support of all parties involved in the 'herdsmen crisis' – herdsmen, farmers, state, and local governments, to accept the idea of modern ranching as an alternative to traditional migration of herders which causes friction and other associated threats. Conclusively, security is crucial to a nation's sustainable development. The government's seeming failure to solve the people's security needs is what has led to non-state actors such as Sunday Igboho and Nnamdi Kanu/ESN to seize the initiative, which ends up creating more problems than solutions and driving the country to the threshold of disintegration. It is what has led a state governor to engage in ethnic profiling openly. It is what will lead to more mayhem unless something is done to solve the security problem now. The federal government must rise to the challenge of bringing an end to the farmer-herder crisis.

The prevalence of the country's security crises has become a significant concern for the well-meaning Nigerians considering the impact on the nation's peace, security, and economy. Destruction of lives and properties arising from farmer-herder clashes has almost become an everyday affair in different parts of the country. These crises have led to acute instability,

creating a fearful atmosphere that harms the economy as it discourages investors, both domestic and foreign (Dakuku, 2021). Crop damage (63.3%) and indiscriminate bush burning (46.7%) were considered the most common causes of conflict between farmers and pastoralists. The majority (71%) of farmers suffer economic losses from farmer-pastoralist conflicts

1.2 Statement of Problem

The growing and ever increasing cases of conflicts between farmers and Fulani Herdsmen have become serious issues that affected the security of lives and property of people of Nigeria. However despite several efforts adopted by relevant policy makers in the affected areas, a month can hardly pass without security information of attack in either states of Benue, Plateau or Nasarawa, Niger, Edo, Kogi, Ondo, Oyo, etc. In each of these attacks, property worth millions of naira and lives are destroyed on a large scale. The huge human loss is the most worrisome of all. Herder–farmer conflicts in Nigeria are a series of disputes over land resources across Nigeria between mostly Muslim Fulani herders and mostly Christian non-Fulani farmers. They have been especially prominent in the Middle Belt (North Central) since the return of democracy in 1999. Over the years the presence of the herders and their cattle has provoked violent clashes in several communities in Nigeria. Apart from the language and cultural barriers which usually sports the herders as strangers, the audacity with which they shepherd their flocks to graze on every available vegetation on the route has often attracted protests from communities. This scenario has given rise to an unhealthy rivalry between farmers and herdsman leading to violence, loss of lives and properties. In some cases, a whole community is wiped out and those of those fortunate to escape become refugees in other places.

In recent years, this crisis has become one of the most dangerous threats to political, social, cultural, economic and human security of Nigeria most especially the affected states. Herdsman attack is gradually becoming a household word as there is no day or week that the herdsman will not attack villagers or farmers. The attack has negatively affected the economic and human security of Nigeria. The outcomes include human fatalities and morbidities, forced displacements, loss of livelihoods, family and communal dislocations, food crisis/ insecurity, and vicious incidence of rural violence. These clashes have occurred severally in states like Plateau, Benue, Nassarawa, Kogi, Kwara, Edo, Delta, Enugu, Abia, Ebonyi, Ondo, Oyo, Osun, Niger, and many states across the country (Okoli and Atelhe, 2014). Whenever these clashes occur, the ripple

effect wriggle through the immediate flash points down to the very foundation of Nigeria. When herders attacked and kill scores of villagers in the cause of a contest for grazing fields and water, there are usually a pressure attacks (DCID, 2013). There are also claims on counter claims as to who were the aggressors and the underlining motives for the violence.

It's often brings to the fore, the indigene/settler question, land ownership and citizenship rights in Nigeria. This scenario has times without number thrown up ethnic, tribal, regional, religious and political sentiments that threaten the corporate existence of Nigeria. Researches and recent time have shown that by its population and capacity for animal production with 25% of livestock in the sub region, Nigeria is by far the leading lifestyle producer in Central and West Africa the country's cattle herds are estimated at over 16 million head, far ahead of Niger (8.7 million), Mali (8.2 million) and Chad (7 million). The share of Sahel countries is significant, however, representing over 50% of total to herds. Cattle rising in Nigeria is largely supplemented by short-cycle livestock operations, exterminated at 33.8 million head of cattle and 175 million country birds (Tonah, 2002).

Large parts of the livestock sold on these markets come from the Sahel countries. Cross border movement of herds during season of migration also involves a significant number of animals. Demand for beef is largely driven by the Federation of Nigeria as Nigerians make up 50% of the beef consumed in ECOWAS. Nigeria is experiencing historic demographic expansion and spectacular change in food habits. With a population growth nearing 2.8% per year (NPC, 2006), the country's own domestic production is far from being able to meet the demand. Nigeria is therefore forced to import more than 25% of the beef consumed, and is therefore a major outlet for sale or the moving of herds for commercial purposes (Ghana Statistical Services, 2010).

At the federal level, livestock operations contribute only 5% of the GDP whereas agriculture as a whole contributes 35% of the GDP (CBN 2013). Following the foregoing discussion, one can see why it is difficult for both the nomadic and rural communities to coexist without problems. This is because as the nomads are busy trying to protect their herds and make livelihood from their sales, rural farm communities need to protect their farms which these animals upon migration use as grazing lands.

1.3 Research Questions

1. What are the socio-economic impacts of herders-farmers clashes on rural dwellers?
2. What are the sources of herders and farmers conflict in the rural farm fields in Nigeria?
3. What are the socio-economic effects of farmers-herders clashes on national security in Nigeria?
4. What methods are to be adopted to resolve these avoidable clashes in Nigeria?

1.4 Aims and Objectives of the Study

The objectives of the research are to:

1. Determine the socio-economic impact of herders-farmers clashes on rural dwellers.
2. Identify the sources of herders and farmers conflict in the rural farm fields in Nigeria
3. Examine the socio-economic effects farmers-herders clashes on national security in Nigeria
4. Describe the methods to be adopted to resolve others from us conflicts

1.5 Scope and Limitation of the Study.

This study involves a theoretical evaluation of herders and farmers clashes in Nigeria with specific focus on its impact on Nigeria's national security. The study will cover all the aspects of economic life of herders-farmers relations which includes trade. The role of traditional institutions in the herders-farmers conflicts will also be mentioned. This would enable us to understand and evaluate the connection between pastoralists and farmers in the pre-colonial times till this present day. The expected limitation will be the required funds to visit the affected communities and the risk involved in visiting the said communities.

1.6 Methodology

In the course of the research of this work, relevant data information was obtained from one main source. This will be the secondary sources.

Secondary Sources: Secondary resources which were consulted in public and university libraries across the state include journals, textbooks, periodicals, information obtained from the sources helped to guide and supplement their material and facts of change from primary sources. These sources helped to provide data for historical analysis of the relationship between pastoralists and farmers in Nigeria.

1.7 Significance of the Study

The study aims to contribute to the academic debate on the varied forms of resource conflicts particularly in relation to farmers-herders conflict in Nigeria. Attention will be on what triggers these clashes between farmers and herders over the use of fallow and arable land as well as the purported grazing route. It will fill the void left behind by other researchers that have in time past concentrated their studies in the north central and some parts of South West of the country.

1.8 Plan of the Study

The study plan will take the following direction;

Chapter One: INTRODUCTION

It gives a detailed history of the relationship that had existed between farmers and herders (relating to trade, that is, while herders rely on farmers for food crops, farmers depend on herders for livestock), the manner of conflict, factors attracting herders to a particular area as well as the main issues responsible for the unabated avoided clashes.

Chapter Two: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This chapter addresses the history of nomads and states in Africa and its attendant violence occasioned by environmental degradation. It discusses the historical relationship between herders and farmers, analyzed farmers/herders clashes, examined the issue of human and national security, examines state's interest in land allocation including the arrangement under which land are allocated by states. The chapter also discusses the theory of ethnic conflict which explains conflict between two or more contending ethnic groups. While the source of the conflict may be political, social, economic or religious, the individuals in conflict must expressly fight for the ethnic groups position within society this final criterion differentiates ethnic group from other forms of struggle

Chapter Three: FARMERS-HERDERS CONFLICT IN NIGERIA

This chapter takes a cursory look at the historical discourse on farmers-herders conflict among the affected states in Nigeria. The will also include the nature, causes and dynamics of the conflict.

Chapter Four: THE IMPACT OF HERDSMEN ACTIVITIES IN ENUGU STATE

Issues like destruction of farm land and cattle owned by Fulani herders, river body's contamination, spraying of farms with insecticide, raping of women and young girls, cattle rustling and killings, and general Implications of the Conflicts trajectory to National Security, were discussed.

Chapter Five: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The chapter summarizes the findings and concluded that the phenomena of farmer herder's conflicts in Enugu state typifies what is known as resource conflict in contemporary development literature and recommended that in view of the rapid population pressure and declining farmlands, there is the need to adopt improved farming techniques.

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CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Introduction

Existing literatures on farmers' herder conflicts have discussed the origins and development of herder relationship with farmers. Nigeria is known to be the place of people with diverse profession especially in agricultural sector and thus the need for competition which in turn sparks up conflicts.

In the book titled: "*Nomads and the State in Africa*" (2008). Azarya argued that in recent years Nigeria has witnessed series of violence communal clashes arising from the activities of the

herders who move about on a daily basis with their cattle in search of water and greener pastures. They are on the streets in most of our cities and could also be found operating in the remotest villages in various states of the country. These herders who are essentially Fulani tribesmen were originally found in small make-shift communities scattered across the northern fringes of Nigeria and other countries in West Africa. By their culture, tradition and occupation, they have not remained an itinerant race who owned lands nor had any permanent abode. In fact, they cared less about land ownership because they are always on the move.

They simply lived with their cattle wherever there was abundance of fodder and absence of tsetse fly, the blood sucking insect that once threatened the existence of their flocks. The herders used to embark on seasonal migrations from the north to the south but this movement has become an all season's affair. The reason has been that overgrazing in the far north as given way to desertification and a normal alternating wet and dry seasons have metamorphosed into some unusual weather conditions now known as climate change. Initially, a symbiotic relationship existed between the herders and the farmers in every new community they stopped over to take a rest. Azem (2010) in his book titled *Violence through Environmental Discrimination* asserted that communal rights to land is ascribed to all unoccupied and undeveloped land, subject to common right. This land is accessible to all excluding strangers without consideration to reciprocal benefits the derived from the land.

2.2 A Historical Brief of Farmers Herders Relationship in Nigeria

The situation of pastoralists in Nigeria has long been distant from other African countries but that it was still historically rooted in competition for access to land. Conflict was transformed by key changes attendant on the demographic and veterinary revolution of the colonial era and again by the flow of oil revenues from the 1970s onwards which increased the market for pastoral products. However, in recent years, Nigeria has been constantly rocked by civil riff particularly across the religious divide and this has reconfigured herders /farmers conflicts in new and striking ways. The absence of any concerted government to response is a matter for concern in terms of rural development, but also because it is noted by the participants who take it as an opportunity to increase the tension still father.

The cattle base pastoralism of the Fulani has thus be the most significant focus of herder farmer conflict in Nigeria. For a long period the Fulani were confined to the edge of the deserts. During the 20th century, Fulani headers began to migrate through and settle in all zones that we are previously inaccessible to pastoralists bringing them into contact with previously unknown peoples, cultures and production systems. The consequences of this were raft of untested interactions between all parties and considerable space for misunderstanding and conflict. The factors preventing their southern expansion in a previous era remain controversial, but it is likely that a move out of the semi-arid region would have resulted in major losses from the trypanosomes (Blench 1994).

Before the spread of firearms in Nigeria, human population densities were low and wild animals numbers (and thus tsetse vectors) still high. This would have created a high level of tsetse challenge for the non-trypanotolerant zebu owned by the Fulani (Blench 1999). The classic stereotype of Fulani migration in the colonial period was a seasonal movement between semi-arid north and the dry season pastures along the Niger-Benue system. As the rains gathered pace, tsetse population expanded and herders were driven back northwards. Despite this, the gradual exploration of southern pastures led to individuals seeking methods of remaining in these regions all year round. (Fricke's 1979) study of livestock production in Nigeria concluded from an analysis of tax and slaughter house records that they had been a general shift southward of pastoral herders.

The conventional stereotypes of the Fulani has living in northern Nigeria are becoming less and less true year by year. Two major surveys commissioned by the Nigerian government have contributed to a major reformulation of conventional stereotypes of Fulani pastoralism (RIM 1984 and 1992). The movement into the Southwest was markedly earlier than in the center and South East of the country for both ecological religious and cultural reasons. The climate regime of Southwest is such that the derived savannah reaching the coast in beginning and the total is republic this creates relatively open land without the eye immediately associated with forest paper and therefore reduces the disease to zebu cattle.

The second impetus to Southward expansion of the pastoralists was the unaccustomed security of the colonial era. One reason for pastoralists often become militaristic is because they are comparatively vulnerable. Stocks are susceptible both to one-off theft and large scale cattle

rustling. In an economy where land is not a premium, it is difficult to deprive a farmer of his working capital but others can easily be overwhelmed especially as so much of the day is spent virtually alone with the animals. For example, until the colonial era grazing herds avoided the otherwise attractive Jos Plateau because of the threats of armed raids (Awogbade, 1983). The relative peace and security in rural areas encouraged exploratory movements towards new pastures.

This Southward movement has not been without cost of the Fulani. Two features of their present society reflect this; extensive sedentarization and an increase in conflict with the agrarian societies on whom they have traditionally depended on for their supply of cereal staples. The Fulani and the arable farmers are among whom they move have traditionally had an interdependent relationship based both on the local exchange of dairy products for grain, and the periodic sale of animals to provide cash for domestic purposes, such as cloth or marriage payments. Moreover, in many regions Fulani management strategies depend on access to cereal crop residues - something arable farmers may encourage because of the perceived advantages of manure as fertilizer African Union (2019). However, in no case at the goods or services pastoralists is obliged to remain on good terms with farmers if he wishes to continue to exploit the same locale in successive years. If Fulani herders are unable to build up exchange relations with the farming communities, they can only survive either by settling by flexible movement patterns that involve encountering new arable communities every year or by intimidation of the farmers. All of these strategies occur in Nigeria, sometimes practiced simultaneously by different Fulani subgroups. Understanding the structural elements underlying conflict is thus essential to interpreting its recent transformations (Ekong, 2003).

2.3 Farmer Herders Clash: A Historical Analysis

Customary property rights, which are essential for livestock production in Africa, have been eroded by a long history of conflicts. Attempts to apply uniform, centralist state law have weakened both the institutional environment and the contractual arrangements on which communal land tenure is based and has destroyed the management capacity of local institutions (Kirk 1999). This institutional erosion of management efficiency is not only a consequence of the states' incapacity to administer nationalized pastures efficiently but also of its lack of capacity to manage a complex private-property system and to protect still-existing common

property from unhindered “encouragement” of private interests. As a consequence, a variety of conflicts on several levels find their origins in attempts to effect rigid challenges changes in tenure through state policy in pastoral areas: disputes between pastoralists and the states over land rights between competing land users over access to resources, or between pastoral organizations over the differing approaches to halt the loss of land lands (Cousins, 1996). Thus, all conflicts can be said to be embedded in and aggravated by an increasing competition for land as a result of population growth, land scarcity, and a new solvency due to income earned outside agriculture (GTZ 1998 in Kirk 1999, Gefu and Gilles 1999, Fraser, 1997).

The nomadic Fulani herders, according to Farmers and herders, are more frequently involved in conflicts with farmers (64.4%) although the semi-settled (43.1%) and sedentary herders are also involved (37.5%). Unfortunately, the conflicts involving nomads have usually been violent involving the use of arms including guns, which result mostly in loss of human lives and property. Farmers blamed the semi-settled and sedentary herders of inviting nomads to pool up their herds to collectively damage farmers’ crops and harvests in the harvest season. Other pastoral groups also blame nomads of damaging farmers’ crops overnight and fleeing only to leave them to bear the brunt sometimes in the form of fatal clashes with farmers. The way Fulani perceived the Hausa and vice versa is believed to affect relationships between the two ethnic groups. For example, the Fulani were known to see the Hausa as *Kado* (meaning infidels or unbelievers) whose property they can use without an offense to God. The Hausa, on the other hand, perceived the Fulani as intruders, uncivilized and unformed. Historically, the feelings of Hausa and the Fulani have for one another since the jihad times of the Sokoto caliphate have been major reasons why they were at loggerheads. Though the feelings of change seriously, some herders (10.7%) admitted the existence of Fulani who still holds to the above view.

Majority of the herders (78.7%) have, however, put the blame of the predicament of herders and their profession (pastoralism) to biased Nigeria’s public policy that has been neglecting livestock production in favor of crop, urbanization and the like. This, together with the feelings of ill-will described above may be viewed as the underlying causes of conflicts between herders and farmers. Forty percent (40%) of the farmers and 30.7% of the herders have reported village heads as major arbitrators of disputes involving farmers and herders in the study area. Farmers neighbouring crop fields where farmer-herders disputes occur also plays some role in arbitration.

However, involvement of dispute resolution institutions of police and courts of law was found to be very low. This shows that informal traditional mechanisms for conflict resolution are still functional in Zamfara and that both farmers and herders have preference for them over formal authorities when it comes to the issue of conflict arbitration. The desire for sustaining relationships is the major factor that informed farmers and herders preferences. Both have the view that taking disputes of formal authorities like a police and court of law worsen relationships between the disputants. Pair-wise ranking of preference for institutions concerned with grazing reserve control and conflict resolution was also done by separate groups of herders and farmers. In the herders ranking traditional rulers and the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association (MACBAN) a herders union, were ranked first followed by the local government and courts in that order. The police and the traditional Fulani leader *Filani* (the herders' traditional leader) were ranked last. Herders' reasons for the ranking are that the police are corrupt, detain people and delay cases unduly. In the case of the *Filani*, they did not choose him because, according to them, he has no authority over farmers.

The ranking by Farmers, however, involved up to nine institutions. Traditional rulers and courts were ranked first and MACBAN last with a score of zero. Peaceful conflict reconciliation is the farmers' criterion for selecting an institution. For example, the village heads intervention in the dispute though considered a peaceful way of conflict resolution, is sometimes less preferred than village elders mediation. This is because the accused person will always see it that the offender is lenient to him for not taking him to higher authorities. A major non-governmental organization concerned with preventions/resolution of farmers herders conflict is MACBAN. More than half 58% of the herders studied are members of their association. This pastoral association, which has branches all in all states of Nigeria having considerable population of Fulani herders, aims at protecting the interests of herders and grazing facilities in the country. Officials of the association are members of local government committees on farmer-Fulani disputes in Zamfara State. The association, though despised by farmer for the challenges it poses, has been found to have influence on not only semi-sedentary herders but also on the nomadic herders.

In addition, land conflicts are proving more difficult to solve because traditional instruments of conciliation, such as compromised and consensus are failing. On the one hand, local institutions have lastly lost the authority and on the other, few institutional innovations have been developed

(Hasseling and Ba 1994; Kirk and Adoke-Migan 1994 in Kirk 1999) Williams has similarly observed that government interventions in natural resource management is semi-arid. However, the recent attacks by Fulani herdsmen is on the increase, with the most recent attacks in June 2016 occurring in Ossissia community in Ndokwa East local government area, Delta state and three more communities (Ugondo, Turan, Gabo Nemzev) in Logo local government area, Benue states, total killing is involving of fewer than 60 person. The federal government recently ordered an inquiry, military crackdown on the group and affirmed its plans to establish cattle ranches as a solution to the frequent clashes between herders and farmers in Nigeria. This turbulence stands out because of the seeming boldness of the perpetrators and the misery surrounding their real agenda. While many believe that it is simply a farming, grazing land and water dispute, whereby they clash with farmers who accuse them of damaging their crops and failure to control their animals, the Fulanis under the cattle breeders association claims that they are being attacked by gangs from farming communities who try to steal they cattle and they are just defending themselves. But why do these attacks extend to mass killings and butchering? That's the arguments before us now, so fully understand the fundamental purpose of what this militant group demands, the cost of their action and seek a proper way forward to curb the attacks.

According to the 2015 global terrorism index, these Fulani militants are the fourth deadliest militant group in the world with a record killing of 1,229 people in 2014.

However, the federal government has stated that inquiries have established that most of these men who were involved in these clashes in Nigerian communities are not Nigerian citizens and due to the ECOWAS transhumant protocol which has given the rights of free movement to citizens of member countries, it cannot stop non-citizens of Nigeria from grazing their cattle across the country.

2.4 The Concept of Human Security.

Human security is an emerging paradigm for understanding global vulnerabilities whose proponents challenge the traditional notion of national security by arguing that the proper reference for security should be the individual rather than the state. Human security holds that a people-centred multidisciplinary understanding of security involving a number of research field including development studies, international relations, strategic studies and human rights. The United Nations Development Program 1994 Human Development Report of Van der 2013 is

considered a minor publication in the field of human security with its argument that insuring “freedom from want” and “freedom from fear” for all persons is the best path to tackle the problem of global insecurity (Alubo, 2018).

Critics of the concept argued that its vagueness undermines its effectiveness, Annan 1998 that it has become little more than a vehicle for activist mission to promote certain causes and that it does not help the research community understand what security means or help decision-makers to formulate good policies. Alternatively, other scholars have argued that the concept of human security should be broadened to encompass military security in other words if the thing called ‘human security’ has a concept of ‘the human’ embedded at the heart of it, then let us address the question of human condition the rest is understood human security would no longer be the vague amorphous add-on so have the highest areas of security such as military security or state security (Blench, 2004).

2.5 What is Human Security?

Principles and definitions of security are a much-debated institution in international politics. The importance of the concept is particularly evident in the ceremonious of reconstruction after large international wars. The post-war settlements in Vienna in 1815 and at San Francisco in 1945 have all followed by new discourses on international security. The most recent large international conflict, the Cold war, was also followed by significant changes in the political confederation of Europe. The changes after the world war also sparked a renewed political interest in principles of security. Traditionally, theories of security emphasize the predominant role of the state: it is the state that is the centre of security and the state seemed natural in 19th and 20th century where realism occupy the dominant position in international relations. In the recent years the close relationship between human security and the state has been contested and the state as the primary object of security has been challenged by others, among the individual human being (Oluwasola 2007).

The CHS, in its final report on Human Security Now, defines human security as; to protect the vital core of human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment. Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical severe and pervasive widespread threat and situations. It means processes that build on human strength and aspirations. It means creating political, social,

environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give the people the building blocks of survival livelihood and dignity (Haman 2002). The overall, the definition proposed by the (CHS 2004:4) for re-conceptualizing security in a fundamental way by:

- ❖ Moving away from traditional state-centric conceptions of security that focus primarily on the safety of state from military aggression to one that concentrates on the security of the individuals, their protection and empowerment;
- ❖ Drawing attention to a multitude of threats that cut across different aspect of human life and thus highlighting the interface between security development and human rights.

2.6 Why Human Security Now?

As argued by the Commission on Human Security (2004), the need for a new paradigm of security is associated with two sets of dynamics: First, human security is needed in response to the complexity and the interrelatedness of both old and new security threats – from chronic and persistent poverty to ethnic violence, human trafficking, climate change, health pandemics, international terrorism and sudden economic and financial downturns. Such threats tend to acquire transnational dimension and move beyond traditional notions of security that focused on external military aggression alone (Bryant (1998). Second, human security is required as a comprehensive approach that utilizes a wide range of human opportunities to tackle such threats in an integrated manner. Human security threats cannot be tackled through conventional mechanisms alone. Instead, they required a new consensus that acknowledges the linkages and interdependencies between development, human rights and national Security (Fabusoro, 2007).

2.7 Interest of States in Land Allocation

Those who drafted the land use decree act must have thought of these kind of things would happen but not arrogating the power to allocate land absolutely to one person, the state governor. In their wisdom they made provision for the establishment of a Land Use and Allocation Committee (LUAC) whose purpose is to make sure that the process of land allocation to the citizens of each state is subjected to some processes of scrutiny and rational reasoning before allocations of the land are made. Hence, section 2.2 of the Land Use Act provides: “there shall be established in each state a body to be known as the land use and allocation committee” which have responsibility for:-

1. Advising the military governor on any matter connected with the management of land to which paragraph of subsection one above relates;
2. Advising the military governor on any matter connected with the resettlement of persons affected by the revocation of right of occupancy on the ground of overriding public interest under this decree and;
3. Determining dispute as to the amount of compensation payable under this decree for improvements and land.

Now paragraph (a) of subsection (1) states – “as from the commencement of these decree all land in urban areas should be under the control and management of the military governor of each state”. It is clear from these two sections that the control and management of land in each state is still be done by the governor subject to or with the advice of the LUAC.

Section (5) of the decree also made similar provision in respect of land in the rural areas that is “there shall be established a land allocation advisory committee in each local governments to advise the local government on any matter connected with the management of land to which paragraph (b) of subsection (1) above refers”. The subsection referred to states – “all other land shall be subject to this decree, be under the control and management of the local government within the area of jurisdiction of which the land is situated”. It follows therefore that the management and control of land in the rural areas should be subject to the advice of the Land allocation advisory committee to be set up in each local government area.

The question that should come to mind now is, how many state governments have constituted the Land Use and Allocation Committee? In the absence of such a committee the state governors have continued to singularly exercise the right to allocate land in their state to whoever pleases them and at rates and conditions determined by them. That is why it is impossible for some governors to allocate land to their cronies with a waiver statutory payments some even to ridiculous extent, the case of Ogun state may be a child’s play if what is happening or has happened in most other states are exposed. in the same way, if the FCT has a functional land use and allocation committee, most of the abuses of land allocation that have been exposed there may not happened(Gleditch, 2001).

A former minister of the FCT, Mallam Nasir El-Rufai discovered and exposed a lot of irregularities in the allocation of land in the FCT where land meant for public uses, open spaces

and other land over sewers were located to cronies of people in power but he is said to have ended up committing similar offenses during his own tenure. “Absolute power corrupts” in a common saying, perhaps this is what was in the mind of those who drafted the land use decree that made them to insert the clause that provided for the land use and allocation committee (LUAC). Unfortunately, ours is a country where those in power choose which part of the laws they will obey. In more civilized countries, somebody would have gone to court to compare the governors to obey the constitutional requirements of the Land Use Act to constitute the Land Use and Location Committee (LUAC) as provided for in the law.

Section 2.3 made provision for the membership of the Land Use and Location Committee. This is to include the legal practitioner and two estate surveyors and valuers of not less than five years’ experience. The inclusion of these professionals is to bring some professional expertise to the process of control and management of land in the states. The writers of the law must have envisaged that the governors would not necessarily be knowledgeable enough in the management of land a very scarce resource. Hence the provision of two estate surveyors who are trained in the economies of land use and management in the committee. This is to ensure that every action to be taken by the governor would have passed the necessary test during the deliberation of the community. In the same vein, all the legal implications of any exercise to be recommended by the community would have been subjected to legal scrutiny to ensure that all actions of the governors in the process of learning and management including revocation of rights are perfectly within the law.

There is little wonder then why there had been several abuses of land uses where by land use for public, open spaces, schools, hospital, shops, fire and trees etc. have been converted to residential plots and allocated to satisfy the demands of friends and political associates of the governors in power. The Land Use and Location Committee would have prevented these happening if such decisions have passed through them. But even in a few cases where such committees have been constituted, they use professionals are not included as provided by the law. They are being calls for the removal of the Land Use Act from the Constitution to make it amenable to amendments as and when necessary or amend several parts of it which have been found unworkable. 18 years of the National Assemblies have failed to produce single document amendments to this law. Perhaps the ongoing proposal to amend parts of the 1979 Constitution to

which the Land Use Act was made a part of Obaanjo's supreme military council by a fiat will finally direct it search on the parts of the Constitution (Nchi 2013).

If this happens, it will be delighted if an amendment could be made to make it compulsory for all land applications by the governors to be subject to the recommendation of the Land Use and Location Committee. If this is done, it will to some extent, curb or reduce the flagrant abuse of the process of land allocations by the governors.

2.8 Arrangements under Which Lands are Released to others and Farmers

Land although perceived as a free gift of nature is not as free as it seems. There are people with vested interest in its ownership, in addition to rules governing its usage as well as terms of inclusion and exclusion. The rules of inclusion and exclusion are dependent upon ones place of origin, descent group and rules governing are accessibility and usage (Shettimaand Tar 2008). Ownership and control of land especially in Nigeria varies amongst different ethnic groups although the fundamental principle that governs – customary land laws are generally applicable throughout the country (Kasanga, 2002). Among the eastern region for example who practice the patrilineal system of inheritance, chiefs and lineage heads hold the land in trust for their subjects (Berry 2001) whereas in northern region the emirs are the customary trustees who hold the land on behalf of the people (Kasanga 2002 Abdullahi 2002).

Communal rights to land are ascribed to all unoccupied and undeveloped land, subject of common rights. This land is accessible to all including strangers without considerations to reciprocal benefits derived from the land. Such land are available and accessible in southern Nigeria. However, there are exceptions to land use right in some communities in Nigeria. For instance, among the Hausa in the colonial period, there were exceptions to the use of economically variable lands and forest products. Traditional authorities tend to restrict the use of resources such as kola trees and gold deposits from been exploited by strangers where as citizens were free to exploit such resources. In situations where strangers desire to exploit such resources they had to obtain permission from the chief who would normally grant their requests by charging rents for the expectation of such resources. In some cases such request were totally denied by traditional authorities. Where the request is granted, the stranger is expected to give a substantial amount of their earnings to the land owning stool usually one third or two thirds of their earnings (Austin 2005).

Among the Hausa of southern Nigeria Austin (2005) asserts that land elevation was uncommon in the 18th and 19th centuries. Alienation of land may result from the imposition of fines placed on chiefs. According to Austin (2005:100) this took the form of pledging. However the motive behind these arrangement was not to encourage the outright sale of land per say. Chiefs who found themselves in this web of affairs could purchase their land back from the buyer with the exact of money plus interest. However, the 19th century witnessed a different turn of events as families were drawn into the sale of land as a result of the inquisition of court fines placed on them. Families who had access to land resorted to the selling of land to wealthy functionaries and entrepreneurs in a bid to relieve their relations from indebtedness (Austin 2005). Even though chiefs in the past were considered not as having any individual property of their own, by the early 20th century this notion has become outdated. The practice of not distinguishing a chief's personal property from that of the stool created the conducive environment for chiefly aggrandizements (Berry 2001). Even though the practice was abolished by the Ibos confederacy council in 1943, the stage had already been set for the growing interest of chiefs in the allocation of land. Since then chiefs have had varied interest in the location of land coupled with the privileges confide on the chieftaincy institution by the colonial administration. This study therefore examines the interests of chiefs in locating land especially to migrants and the arrangement under which lands are released to migrants or others its impacts on farmers and related conflicts over land. The study also focuses on the moral discourse around migrants and pastoralists.

Conflicts Overland

Conflicts over land are precipitated by a number of factors namely chieftaincy disputes, changing demographic conditions, agricultural and pastoral encroachments, availability of natural resources and land alienation. The reasons why these conflicts emerge are diverse and underpinned by different historical, economic, political and demographic factors. Whereas some of these conflicts occasioned by reforms that seek to transform and integrate traditional farming practices into the market under the capitalist system, others arise as a result of competing livelihood survival strategies and the quest to establish and legitimized one's claim and authority.

Shettimaand Tar (2008) argued that conflict over land occur when autonomous groups feel their rights to land has been denied them in favor of migrants. The opening up of the Cocoa frontiers

in the late 19th century led to the rise in the value and commercialization of land. This development led to the shortage of land which made it difficult for local youth to assess land. As a result, they resented migrants for surging their birthrights (Amanor 2008, Berry 2001). for instance, in Sefwi Wiawso in the Western region in the 1980s, the youth of the area who had difficulty in assessing land accused migrants in the area of occupying large tracks of virgin forest which they have not utilized and had the audacity of subletting such lands to other migrants (Boni, 2005). Pastoral and agricultural encroachment is another factor that endangers conflicts of over lands, the alteration of traditional systems of land management between farmers and pastoralists has occasioned conflicts between the two groups as a result of the increasing mobility of farming groups and pastoral lands (Traore, 2002). The traditional land tenure system which regulated the exploitation of natural resources on a rational basis under - supervised rules of access among various interest groups in the sylvo-pastoral area has undergone significant changes based on modern demands of food sufficiency especially in grain, which has forced many farmers to encroach on former grazing fields. According to him, this has resulted in the recognition of agricultural activities as the only productive use of the land at the expense of pastoral groups making it impossible for pastoralists to assess legal recognition of their pastoral customs and practices in particular those relating to transhumant, resulting in violence and frequent conflicts between pastoralists and farmers in the area. Traore blamed these developments on inappropriate state policies. He argued that the power to allocate land which was confined on the rural council to ensure the development of the land led to the disputation that the disruption of the pastoral land that should be integrated into rural communities whose council exercised control over grades in resources. This intensified the competition for land between pastoralists and farmers leading to a breakdown in the consensus that governed cultural and transhumant circles as a result of the liberty people had been settling wherever they liked (Traore 2002).

In addition, Shettima and Tar (2008) asserted that conflict over many land may arise out of the challenging demographic condition of an area. using the work of Blench(2005) in Nigeria as a reference point they argued that the population of Nigeria which stood at 140 million as a 2006 if projected back to the pre-colonial area would be as slow as 10 million in the 19th century which would not result in competing interest in the land use. However, the increase in the population of Nigeria as 2006 as led to a country in land using limiting the area of land available to both

pastoralists and farmers resorting in conflict between the two groups. Moreover, Davidheiser and Luna (2008) contends that conflict overland especially between farmers and pastoralists have been occasioned by changes in land tenure regime and the deliberate attempt of intervention and legislation that were based on Western models to increase production output and market integration. They argued that farmers and pastoralists have shared complementary roles in their production systems. However, the introduction of land reform schemes based on European models aimed at sedentarizing pastoralists and privileging crop cash crop farming practices above animal husbandry has in the process undermined the symbiotic relationship existing between the two groups and increase the demand for natural resources. These has made land more desirable and scarce and therefore made conflicts between farmers and pastoralists inevitable.

Finally, struggle over the accessibility of natural resources and area also results in conflict over land. although interest in natural resources may involve different actors and groups, for example conflicts over mineral and game resources, competing interest in land between pastoralists and farmers is quite pronounced. Conflicts between farmers and pastoralists occur when pastoralists destroy the crops of farmers. This comes about as both farmers and herders tries to take advantage of the favourable conditions the residual planes along the banks of river offers whereas farmers depend on the residual plains along the banks of the Volta Lake for example, for vegetation farming, herders equally interested in assessing the water points on the Volta Lake to refresh their herds. this inevitably results in conflicts between farmers and others as cattle consumes and destroy the crop seeds of farmers coupled with burning of bushes by herders in order to obtain fresh grass in the dry season. These competing livelihood strategies between farmers and herders endanger just conflict (Toner, 2002).

Migrants and Pastoralists, who are they?

Migrants and pastoralist are viewed with some degree of suspicion and contempt especially in places not considers their home country. Even though they may reside in host communities and engage in some form of socio-economic activity, the erosion of boundaries of inclusion and exclusion limits the extent to which the minds be integrated within these societies. Amanor (2011) contends that West Africa countries have created societies based on notions of first comers and late comers and have integrated migrants into their societies through long distance trade, conquest and slavery. This he explains is made evident in the emergence of migrants

quarters with their respective herdsmen in cosmopolitan cities who have established links based on religious and ethnic affiliations. However he asserted that the most of integration have undergone considerable transformations aided by colonial rule. He argues that colonialism altered the initial process of integration by creating a new category with economic migrants. this development according to him has created boundaries of exclusion in which the status of economic migrant is passed on to their descendants who even though may be integrated into the communities in which they find himself and can never claim to have originated from those communities obtaining distance identity through the use of language and custom.

As economic migrants, Amanor (2011) argue that their presence on the rural moral economy as migrants as investors with capital for accumulation and as laborers are so facilitated investment of others by selling their power. He contended that the presence of migrants open up new opportunities, the introduction of a variety of commodities commercial food production, production of export crops and the accumulation of capital -thus the economic migrant becomes a source of consternation and moral dilemma who results in attempts to incorporate them into precepts of moral economy rooted in good citizenship, or to expel them in times of political and economic crisis. Additionally, the conditions for exclusion becomes more intense when migrants through accumulation of wealth are able to secure natural resources such as land or compete with local populations over access to natural resources. Exclusionary tendencies even become more heightened when local populations perceive chiefs to be in closed association with migrants by allocating natural resources to them as their experience similarly the designation economic migrants on people whose labor is exerted further aggravating stereotypical tendency (Amanor 2011).The activities of pastoralists on the other hand have been perceived as backward and environmentally destructive. These notions have been entrenched through the narratives of received wisdom. receive wisdom according to Leach and Mearn (1996:8) is an idea or set of ideas sustained through labeling, commonly represented in the form of a narrative and granted in a specific cultural policy paradigm.

Scoones (1996) contends that the policy gear towards ranged land management discussed indigenous early practices regarding them as destructive and unproductive and in its place purposes carrying capacity, destocking and rotational grazing as alternative measures that would show early transition practice. He contended that the policy of trying to modernize indigenous

for pastoral practices was economically and politically motivated citing a case of Zimbabwe, Scoones (1996) asserts that the importance of graded bulls in Rhodesia coupled with effort to import pasture through fertilization of natural pasture well management and rotational grazing in 1903 was aimed among other things to contribute to beef exports to supply domestic requirements competes with Argentina beef or supply Britain and South Africa through preferential trade or lose out industry. The interest based on land as a natural resource is a complex subject that has attracted a lot of scholarly attention. Over the years, for traditional authorities allocating land to migrate populations gives them an opportunity to accumulate with and incentive that would be denied them if the transaction is conducted with indigenes. This is because indigenes have a degree of entitlement to land on the other part of individuals; the emergence of diverse ethnic group introduces indigenous populations to the world economy through the cultivation of commercial cash groups and food crops. This leads to the opening of new frontiers to the capitalist economy and the introduction of new commodities. Migrant also introduces indigenous populations to new occupations which is alien to them and would never have been willing to render themselves for such services had it not be for intense competition with migrants.

However intense competition between the two groups indigenes and migrants create the condition for resentments and ethnic stereotyping of migrant groups living them at the mercy of the state or local authorities to be expelled in times of economic downturn besides the narratives of perceived wisdom also creates the condition for blame and intervention by groups with both economic and political interests backed by strong agencies and governments.

2.9 Theoretical Framework

Ethnic Conflicts

Ethnic conflicts within a state belong to identity conflicts that are a type of internal conflicts. Besides identity conflict, there are other types of internal conflicts such as ideological conflict, governance configuration conflicts and environmental conflicts. Sometimes the term ethnic conflict is used to describe a wide range of internal conflicts. It dominant aspects of identity conflict is ethnic, religious, tribal or linguistic differences. The conflicts often involve a mixture of identity and the search for security where the prime contention concerns the devolution of power. Identity conflicts are subdivided into; territorial conflict ethnic or minority conflicts

religious assertions and struggles for self-determination. Before talking about ethnic conflict, it is necessary to make definition “what is ethnicity”? There is little consensus in the literature regarding the terminology and basic concept about ethnicity. “Ethnic group” “ethnic community” “ethnic minority” or sometimes “identity groups” are used by different authors in different ways. Ethnic groups are historically given collectivities or psychological communities .whose members share a persistent sense of common interest and identity that is based on some combination of shared historical experiences and valued cultural truth beliefs culture and religion language ways of life common homeland such groups exist over time even as the image and may well change and disappear.

The more the religious factor is interwoven with other elements of social life the more important religion become as a data manufacturer of ethnicity. For example, in Lebanon being Christian more than reference not only to a private expression of religious faith but to .community and to collective behavior and belonging this is a common phenomenon in Nigeria giving rise to intertribal wars as the case of Fulani herdsmen and farmer. Theory of ethnic conflicts as provided by Cliff Garrett is a conflict between two or more contending ethnic groups. While the source of the conflict may be political, social, economic or religious, the individuals in conflict must expressly fight for the ethnic groups position within society this final criterion differentiates ethnic group from other forms of struggle.

Ethnic conflict does not necessarily have to be violent in the ethnic society. We have freedom of speech is protected ethnic conflicts can be everyday fixture of plural democracy. For example at the conflict might be a non-violent struggle for resources divided among ethnic groups. However, the subject of the confrontation must be either directly or symbiotically linked with ethnic group. In healthy multi ethnic democracies, these conflicts that usually institute through parliament’s assembly’s bureaucracies or through non-violent demonstrations and strikes. While democratic countries cannot always prevents ethnic conflicts flaring up into violence, institutionalized ethnic conflict does not ensure that ethnic groups can articulate their demands in a peaceful manner which reduces the likelihood of violence on the other end. In alternating systems, ethnic minorities are often unable to express their grievances. Grievances are instead allowed to fester with which might lead to long phases of ethnic silence followed by violence outburst (Ajene, 2006). Therefore ethnic peace is an absence of violence not an absence of conflict. Another

consequence is that violence ethnic rebellions often result in political rights for previously marginalized groups. It is this ethnic diversity that has led to the sparkling and ranging conditions which has made pastoralists and farmers to consistently spoil for war in the country.

CHAPTER THREE

Farmers-Herders Conflict in Nigeria

3.1 Origin of Farmers-Herders Clashes in Nigeria's Fourth Republic

With the advent of the fourth republic on May 29, 1999, Nigeria faced severe security challenges ranging from sharia debacle in the North-West, Oodua's Peoples' Congress (OPC) clashes with Hausas in South-West especially in Lagos state, the Odi massacre in Bayelsa state, Christian-Muslim clashes in Plateau state and so many other security challenges. However, the one that has brought Nigeria almost on its knees, is the farmers-herders clashes that is taking place across states in the South-West, South-South, North-East and North-Central, clashes that has undoubtedly created national security problem for the country. Herder-farmer conflicts in Nigeria are a series of disputes over land resources across Nigeria between mostly Muslim Fulani herders and mostly Christian non-Fulani farmers. They have been especially prominent in the Middle Belt (North Central) since the return of democracy in 1999. More recently, it has deteriorated into attacks on farmers by Fulani herdsmen and also vice versa. Attacks have also

taken place in the northwest Nigeria against farmers who are mainly Hausa. While the conflict has underlying economic and environmental reasons, it has also acquired religious and ethnic dimensions. Thousands of people have died since these attacks began. Sedentary farming in rural communities are often target of attacks because of their vulnerability. There are fears that this conflict will spread to other West African countries but this has often been downplayed by governments in the region. Attacks on herders have also led them to retaliating by attacking other communities (Ilo, et al, 2019).

Since the Fourth Nigerian Republic's founding in 1999, farmer-herder violence has killed more than 19,000 people and displaced hundreds of thousands more. It followed a trend in the increase of farmer-herder conflicts throughout much of the western Sahel, due to an expansion of agriculturist population and cultivated land at the expense of pasturelands; deteriorating environmental conditions, desertification and soil degradation; population growth (Ilo et al, 2019); breakdown in traditional conflict resolution mechanisms of land and water disputes; and proliferation of small arms and crime in rural areas. Insecurity and violence have led many populations to create self-defence forces and ethnic and tribal militias, which have engaged in further violence. The majority of farmer-herder clashes have occurred between Muslim Fulani herdsman and farmers, exacerbating hostilities.

Farmers-Herders Crisis: The Plateau State Horror

According to the authorities, between July 31 and August 2 2021, Herders attacks took place across communities in Bassa and its neighbouring LGA, Riyom. On August 5, Plateau state's commissioner of police, Edward Egbuka, said that 17 people had been killed by unnamed "criminals" and 85 buildings had been burned in the two LGAs. However, locals who spoke to Al Jazeera said that figure is grossly inaccurate. More people were killed and more areas were affected, they have insisted. Residents of Maiyanga and Kishesha, another rural community in Bassa, said no fewer than 20 of their relatives lost their lives on August 2 alone. They said that the attackers, heavily armed and dressed in military camouflage or long black coats, shot their relatives or slit their throats. They also razed several houses. Local media reported that at least 400 homes were set ablaze by the assailants in Kpachudu, Kpetenvie, Nche-Tahu, Tafi gana, DTV, Zahwra and five other villages in Bassa. Like Maiyanga, these areas are dominated by subsistence farmers from the Irigwe ethnic group.

Plateau state is home to about 40 ethnic groups and has been a hotbed of conflict. The clashes, mostly between Muslim Fulani herders and Christian farmers from the Berom and Irigwe ethnic groups, is often painted as ethno religious. But analysts have said climate change and scarcity of pastoral land is pitting the farmers and herders against each other, irrespective of faith. The majority of Irigwe and Berom farmers grow acha (a grain known as “hungry rice”) and millet while the chief cash crops are yams, sorghum, corn, potatoes, cowpeas and rice. The Fulani, meanwhile, are nomadic pastoralists, often of northern extraction, who have travelled to central and southern parts of the country in search of greener pastures for their livestock. In some cases, the pastoralists permanently settle in their host communities. However, across the years, pastoral land scarcity compounded by increasing urbanisation has forced herders onto farmlands and restricted areas, such as national parks and conserved forests. This often results in the destruction of crops and ends up snowballing into a conflict between the herders and local farmers. In retaliation, aggrieved farmers and members of farming communities sometimes attack the herders and their livestock.

The herder-farmer clashes are also fuelled by the dichotomy between those who consider themselves “indigenes” – the Berom and Irigwe people – and the Fulanis, who are regarded by many as settlers. According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), this tension was at the root of the first documented clash – triggered by the appointment of a Muslim politician who was not considered an “indigene” to the post of local coordinator for the federal poverty alleviation programme – in 2001. The move “was seen by some as a provocation and was strongly opposed by Christian groups”, HRW researchers noted. The tensions turned violent on September 7, 2001, when a Christian woman attempted to cross a barricaded street outside a mosque during Friday prayers in Jos, Plateau state’s capital city. “She was asked to wait until prayers had finished or to choose another route, but she refused and an argument developed between her and some members of the congregation. Within minutes, the argument had unleashed a violent battle between groups of Christians who appeared at the scene and Muslims who had been praying at the mosque or who happened to be in the neighborhood,” HRW reported. This conflict later spread to other parts of the state, like the farming communities nearly 50km (31 miles) away in Riyom. HRW said groups of primarily young men on both sides of the religious and ethnic divide retaliated and sought to avenge real or rumored attacks. In one instance, on September 11,

2001, some Fulani militias invaded the village of Rankum, home to a mainly Christian Berom community.

In the years since 2001, the inter communal conflict in Plateau has become a recurring problem. A Nigerian government investigative committee found that between September 2001 and May 2004, it resulted in the deaths of more than 53,000 people. Between 2001 and 2018, about 60,000 people were killed and more than 300,000 displaced across four Nigerian states due to the farmer-herder conflict, according to a survey conducted by development and policy advocacy firm Zinariya Consult with support from Global Rights and Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA). Joseph Ochogwu, one of the lead researchers on the survey and an associate professor at the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, explained that of the 300,000 people displaced “176,000 [were] in Benue, about 100,000 in Plateau, and 100,000 in Nasarawa and about 19,000 in Taraba”. The growing conflict now constitutes one of Nigeria’s major security threats after the Boko Haram rebellion in the northeast and the banditry ravaging the northwest (Olufemi, 2021).

Harvest of Death: Assessing Farmers/Herders Clashes in Benue State

Benue State was created in 1976 by the government of General Murtala Mohammed. It is located in the middle belt zone (north central Nigeria). Benue State is bordered by Nassarawa to the north; Taraba to the east; Cross River to the south; Enugu and Ebonyi to the south-east and Kogi to the south-west. The state also shares a common boundary with the Republic of Cameroon on the south-east. Benue state lays between latitude 60 1/2 north and longitude 7 1/20 - 100 east. The state has a total population of 4,219,244 spread across the 23 local government areas which include: Ado, Agatu, Apa, Buruku, Gboko, Guma, Gwer, Gwer West, Katsina-Ala, Konshisha, Kwande, Logo, Makurdi, Obi, Ogbadibo, Ohimini, Oju, Okpokwu, Otukpo, Tarka, Ukum, Ushongo and Vandeikya with Makurdi as the state capital. the state has a multi ethnic configuration which comprise the Tiv, IdomaIgede, Etulo, Abakpa (Abakwariga), Jukun, Hausa, Akweya and Nyifon, with the Tiv being the foremost ethnic group accounting for over half of the entire population (Lyam, 2005; NPC, 2006; Shaminja, &Orkar, 2016)

Benue State is regarded as the ‘food basket of the nation’. It is an agrarian state because of its fertile soil and this makes agriculture very important for their livelihood and survival, even

though they also engage in fishing as secondary occupation especially for the population who reside in the riverine areas. Although the state produces many crops such as; yam, cassava, rice, fish, sugar cane, maize, beans, potatoes, soybeans, sorghum, millet and cocoyam, but yam is the main food they produce and is available for consumption and market, especially during the harvesting season. Yam plays a crucial role in the social-cultural and economic wellbeing of thousands of the people not just in Benue alone, but all over Nigeria and elsewhere in the world (Verter and Becvarova, 2014). Suffice it to say that the yam farmers in Benue state have suffered most human rights violations – loss of life and livelihood. The fertility of Benue State inevitably attracted Fulani herdsmen to the state; and due to the peculiarity of the activities of these herdsmen, they move from one place to another in search of pasture. In this process, they frequently trespass farmlands owned by locals in their host communities, destroying crops and valuables. Most times, the farmers are overpowered, injured and killed, while others are evicted from their homes. Sometimes, the herdsmen are accused of taking advantage of the opportunities to steal, rape, burn houses and kill innocent people of the communities they pass through (Akinkuolie, 2018; Blench, 1984; World Bank, 1989). The herdsmen were perhaps more security conscious than the farmers. More than the farmers, herdsmen ‘prepared for the worst’, ‘tightened security’, and ‘used charms’ (Adisa, 2012). This view is also corroborated by Adeoye (2017) when he asserted that a combination of charms, spears, swords and guns are mostly used during the confrontations. So, the farmers lament about the wanton ravaging of their lands as it destroys of their source of livelihood. In February 2018, as a result of a clash between herdsmen and farmers in Benue State, 40 people were killed, about 2,000 displaced and not less than 100 were seriously injured. Over the last 2 years, more than 92 Nigerians were massacred by suspected Fulani Herdsmen in Benue and Niger states. Before this time, there have been reported attacks by the Fulani Herdsmen in southern states of Nigeria, including Enugu, Ekiti and Ondo States. Unfortunately, between September 2017 and June 2018 the Nigerian herders and farmers conflict have resulted in the death of over 1500 people, and the displacement of over 300,000 people who are now living as internally displaced persons (IDPs) in various camps, settlements and communities. These Internally Displaced Persons camps are in deplorable conditions, with women and children suffering severely from a lack of basic necessities for survival – adequate shelter, food, water, healthcare and human rights abuse. In April 2018 at least seven children were said to have died from an outbreak of measles at the Abagena camp, Markudi, and some

others have been reported to have died of malaria and diarrhea. According to the International Crisis Group, in 2018 the conflict between herders and farmers was six times deadlier than Boko Haram, with a death toll of 1,949, almost double than what it was the year before (ICG, 2018).

Farmers and Herders Conflict: The Bloodbath in Enugu State

Though Enugu State had witnessed two herdsmen attacks since the setting up of the security committees, it is also on record that the security committees quick resolution of several potential crisis prevented Enugu State from joining the league of Zamfara, Taraba, Benue, Adamawa and Plateau states, where the herdsmen attacks have claimed hundreds of lives. It is a common knowledge that the August 25, 2016 attack by the Fulani herdsmen in Ndiagu, Attakwu, Akegbe-Ugwu in Nkanu West LGA, which claimed the lives of Mrs. Amuche Agbo and Seminarian Lazarus Nwafor, and the April 25, 2016 attack on Ukpabi-Nimbo in Uzo Uwani LGA, which claimed nine lives, were avoidable incidents that occurred after security agents ignored Governor Ugwuanyi's report on imminent attacks. Before the Uzo Uwani attacks, Ugwuanyi had held a meeting with security agents where he hinted them on the imminent attacks.

In the meeting, we received assurances from the Commissioner of Police that the Area Commander of SARS was on ground in Nimbo, and that the Anti-Terrorism Unit was at Nimbo. That he was in contact with the Kogi State Commissioner of Police and reported suspected herdsmen grouping at Odolu in Kogi State preparing for an attack on Nimbo and Abbi communities. That Police Mobile Force and conventional police were already drafted to Nimbo and Abbi communities. He claimed he was in touch with the Area Commander, Idah, ACP Ikegwuonwu, who had linked him with the Area Commander, Nsukka, ACP Monday Kuryas. Both men, according to the CP, reported that there were no traces of suspected herdsmen in Nsukka or Idah. He also ordered the Area Commander, Nsukka, to redeploy to Nimbo, Ugwuanyi had explained. Unfortunately, the herdsmen struck as a result of the lapses on the part of the security agencies, despite Ugwuanyi's efforts to forestall the crisis and his unalloyed support to the security agencies. But despite these setbacks, the security committee set up by the governor has ensured that Enugu State enjoys peace, which would have eluded the state, given its proximity to Benue State, the hotbed of the Fulani herdsmen/farmers clashes. The recent bomb blast at the country home of the President of Ohaneze Ndigbo, Chief Nnia Nwodoh in Igbo Etiti LGA was another failed attempt by yet to be identified persons, to derail peace in Enugu

State. Also, by destroying farmlands in Udenu, Isi-Uzo, Igbo-Eze North, Nkanu-West, Uzo-Uwani and many other local government areas, the Fulani herdsmen had attempted several times to shatter the peace in the state but Ugwuanyi has sustained the peace (Alike, 2023).

Pastoralists-Farmers Clashes: The Nasarawa State's Killing Field

Nasarawa State is situated in the Middle Belt region of Nigeria. Otherwise referred to as north-central Nigeria, the Middle Belt consists of Plateau, Nasarawa, Benue, Niger, Kogi, Taraba, Adamawa, Kwara, Abuja (Federal Capital Territory- FCT), and to some extent Southern Kaduna (Ayih, 2003:11). This geographical sphere coincides virtually, but not identically, with what is known as the North-Central zone in the contemporary Nigerian Federation. Nasarawa State was created on October 1st, 1996. It was severed from the old Plateau State. Nasarawa State is composed of thirteen (13) Local Government Areas. Its capital is Lafia, a fast-urbanizing town along the Northern Benue valley. Spread across these Local Government Areas are a number of chiefdoms and emirates. Nasarawa State is a home to an amalgam of ethnic nationalities. Prominent among these are the Eggon, Hausa-Fulani, Tiv, Jukun, Gbagyi, Egbura, Doma, Alago, Milgili, Kambari/Kanuri, and so on. There is also a pronounced presence of settlers (non-natives) from the different parts of the country in the state. Nasarawa State lies within the Savanna grassland region of central Nigeria. The predominant vegetation of the state is undulating grassland with sparse forests along the Tire river valleys (Ayih, 2003:13). The topography of the state is largely low lying but for the high lands around Mada hills and Nasarawa Eggon mountains, which hosts Nasarawa Eggon, Akwanga and Wamba Local Government Areas (Ayih, 2003:13). Agriculture is traditionally the main occupation of the people of Nasarawa State. Important food crops grown in the state include yam, maize, guinea corn, rice, sugarcane, beans, soya beans, groundnuts, and assorted fruits and vegetables. The state is also a harbour of important solid minerals, namely granite, limestone, salt and sundry precious stones. Fishing and herding are also flourishing agricultural activities in the state. Demographically, Nasarawa State is characterized by a mean but 'prodigiously' increasing population (Adogi, 2013).

According to the 2006 census, the state has a total population of 1,863,275 people, making it the smallest in the North-central geopolitical zone. It is, however, estimated that the population of the state has since geometrically increased to the figure of 2.6million people at present (Adogi, 2013). Nasarawa State lies in a geographical or ecological belt characterized by sparse habitation.

In effect, the state's population density is low and dispersed. This characteristic makes the state favourable to grazing and other agricultural activities. The vast arable land and relatively thin population which used to be a dominant attribute of the state, made struggle for farmland virtually unknown in the past (Ayih, 2003). This advantage, however, has been overtaken in the recent years by the trend of massive agrarian migration into the state, which has resulted in stiff competition for the increasingly scarce land resources, leading to confrontations and violent conflicts (Adogi, 2013).

Over the past decade, Nigeria has witnessed bloody attacks between pastoralists and farmers across rural settlements, particularly in the northwestern, middle belt, and recently southern states in the country. Most of the victims have been farmers. According to a report by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), a disaggregated data collection, analysis, and crisis mapping project firm headquartered in the United States, in the first half of 2018 alone, about 1,868 fatalities were attributed to farmer-herder conflicts in Nigeria. Also, it said between 2005 and mid-2021, Nigeria lost no fewer than 8,343 persons due to farmer-herder conflict. The report noted that Benue state witnessed the most violent attacks, closely followed by Plateau, Kaduna, Taraba and Nasarawa respectively. It pegged killings in Benue at 2,539 from 303 attacks, while Plateau, Kaduna, Taraba and Nasarawa states lost 2,138, 1,188, 755, and 521 lives in 279, 160, 111 and 93 attacks respectively (Mojeed, 2022). The herder/farmer conflict in Nasarawa State holds critical implications for the progress of the state in particular and Nigeria in general. Firstly, it implies negatively for inclusive citizenship in Nigeria. The primordial claims by the natives to exclusive land tenure rights is out of keeping with the constitutional guarantees of inclusive citizenship, which require that every Nigeria has the right to settle and make a living in any part of the country he so pleases. Therefore, any attempt to deny any person or group his/her rights to legitimate settlement and livelihood in any party of the country under the guise of indigene/settler calculus, amounts to the violation of Nigeria's citizenship code. Secondly, the conflict situation also portends negatively for sustainable peace and development in Nigeria. Given the extent of crisis and violence that has characterized the conflict, it would be obvious to state that such a situation is an enemy of sustainable development both in the affected communities and Nigeria as a whole. Note that development (which invariably translates into national security) (MacNamara, 1978; Okoli and Orinya, 2013) cannot be attained and sustained under the atmosphere of crisis. Lastly, the implication of the conflict for Nigeria's national

security cannot be over emphasized. The humanitarian, economic, and social consequences of the conflict have been manifold and telling. The attendant security and livelihood crises threaten the collective subsistence and survival of the affected populations. There are also other externalities, such as diminution of agricultural productivity and decline in household capital, all of which do not augur well for societal and national sustainability. It suffices, therefore, to say that the farmer/herder conflict in Nasarawa State is inimical to human security, and by extension, national security in Nigeria.

There have been reports of several coordinated attacks by Fulani militia on farmers and sometimes reprisal from the latter. This situation cut across a plethora of state in the federation. States like Anambra in the South-East, Kaduna in the North-West, Kogi, Kwara and Niger in North Central as well as Edo and Delta in the South-South. The recent kidnapping on Saturday the 7th day of January 2023, of about 32 train travellers waiting at the train station in Igueben, leave so much to desire about the activities of these marauders and the impact it is having on human emotions and existence.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE IMPACT OF HERDSMEN ACTIVITIES IN ENUGU STATE

4.1 Results and Discussions

Farmers-herders raids and counter-raids have been going on seasonally across northern Nigeria for decades but started escalating in 1999. Since 2017 the conflicts have become increasingly deadly as deteriorating environmental conditions have compelled herders to move southward for pasture. The land hunger in the semi-arid zones has caused a major migration of farmers southwards, both seasonally and permanently. Many uncultivated areas in river flood-plains are now farmed by migrants, leading to disputes with their traditional ‘owners’ (Blench, 2004: 6). The shrinking of ecological space and resorts creates an atmosphere of eco-scarcity which raises the stakes and premium on the available resources. What usually results from this is fierce competition and desperate struggle for subsistence. In this context, therefore, conflict does not only become inevitable; it simply becomes a matter of survival. With reference to the herder/farmer conflicts, Blench (2004) observes that the ecological dynamics engendered by

climate change tend to drag various land users into conflictive relations in the context of resource scarcity and want. This situation has been made worse by the claims and contestations over land ownership and/or tenure rights. Hence: As farmers take up more of the river-bank for farms, they come into conflict with the other users, especially the herders and fish-folk. The herders have been coming to the river for many years for the grass and tend to consider they have ownership rights. When they arrive and find their grazing land now covered by tomatoes, they may become angry. The farmers, often desperate to feed their families in a situation where the old rain-fed systems no longer work regard the herders as dangerous and intrusive (Blench, 2004).

4.2 Destruction of Farm Produce by the Cattle of the Fulani Herdsmen

The destruction of farm produce by the cattle of the herdsmen was one of the major rationales for tension between them and farmers. The destruction of farms and food crops is common and becomes normal as herdsmen send their cattle to graze during the day or at night while the animals sometimes stray without the knowledge of the herdsmen, their inability to control the movement of the animals at night coupled with the number of cattle under the care of one or two herdsmen makes the destruction of farms inevitable (Elubo 2008). According to the Farmers, the greater part of the destruction of farms or call during the dry season is because in the dry season, water becomes scarce and because crops such as plantain and watermelon retain water, the Fulani herdsmen depend on these food crops as sources of water for their cattle.

4.3 Contamination of River Bodies by Cattle

The contamination of river bodies by cattle happens to be another source of conflict between Farmers and herdsmen The rivers serve as a source of drinking water for rural communities and

villages and it is within these same Rivers that the herdsmen send their cattle to drink and in the process pollute the water with their faecal matter and secretion from the mouth and as a result, communities are suffering from tropical diseases. For instance, a farmer in Missouri counting the enormity of the situation stated that we share the same water with the cattle when we go to the farm by the time you get to the river the animals would have messed water mess the river with their urine and defecated into the water as well, when you drink the water you can have infections.

4.4 Spreading of Farms with Weedicides and Insecticides

Spraying of farms is an integral part of farming activities and this practice is absorbed by Fulani herdsmen who see this exercise as an attempt to curtail their access to grazing pasture and this indeed was a contributory factor to the tension between Farmers and Fulani herdsmen. As a way of controlling weeds and pests, farmers usually spray their farms with insecticides to enhance crop yield and have a felony expenses as a council moved to deny them of pasture and deliberately killed their cattle through poisonous chemicals which spread on the weeds.

4.5 Raping of Women

Raping of women by Fulani herdsmen was also one of the notable causes of the strained relationship between Farmers and herders across the herders have been accused of raping women at gunpoint in their farms.

4.6 Destruction of Farms

In addition, both Fulani herdsmen and cattle owners conceded to the fact that it was the destruction of farms by their cattle that brought about the tension between the herdsmen and farmers and had on several occasions agreed to the fact that the increase in the number of their herds resort in the destruction of farms. As they send their animals to graze on the field, the herdsmen also accused farmers of deliberately planting crops at the bank of the river where their cows go to drink water, a situation that makes the destruction of farm inevitable (Blench, 2004).

4.7 Cattle Rustling and Killing

Cattle owners and Fulani herdsmen have sometimes agreed that cattle rustling contribute in no small measure to the conflicts in Nigeria. The animals are rustled when they go to graze, and

according to one catalona, the cattle are killed in the forest and the meat is transported to the town markets to sell. In addition, cattle owners claim dissatisfied farmers shoot cattle that strayed into their farms and sites recalled several incidents in which their cattle went to drink water by the riverside and when the animal straight into someone's farm the owner shot the animal and even after, negotiations will be made for them (Herders) to pay the necessary compensation. Conflicts over the years have brought long suffering and hardship on both the nomadic Farmers and the crop farmers in Nigeria.

The demarcation of grazing and cropping land in the grass feed that took place since the colonial period in different parts of Africa is highly contested now because of the rapidly growing population need of more land for agriculture and rural development. Many farmers are not generally satisfied with the manner in which crop and murder cases are handled by some local traditional and government officials. The general belief by the crop farmers is that the nomadic farmers sell their cattle to bribe the government officials, some traditional rulers in order to twist judgment in their favour. The conflict have contributed in the pillaging of the primary access of crop Farmers and the pastoralists since they use their scarce resources to hire the services of solicitors, the same resources which could be used to educate their children who are almost always remaining in a state of poverty and underdevelopment. The herders are even accusing the farmers for the increasing encroachment into grazing land over the years and placement of crop farms along access roads and grazing routes.

4.8 Impacts of the Conflict

The conflict situation under review has resulted in the humanitarian, social and Economic consequences and these effects are drawn systematic exploration of relevant secondary sources.

Social Effects: the conflict has also led to intense and volatile intergroup relations among the various peoples of Nigeria first, in which trust and animosity which often seen the possibility the herders and farmers as enemies of their collective survival and destiny and vice-versa. This creates an imbalance of mutual suspicion and perpetual tension that strengthens peaceful coexistence, security and stability of society.

Economic Effects: the economic impact of the conflict situation under review could be seen in terms of losses associated with destruction of homes, farmlands and community and other

properties. These damages have been well documented in relevant social resources even though they have not been properly quantified and in addition is the diminishing fortunes of agricultural productivity in the state when the conflict occurred, during the crisis, the tendency is that most farmers will not go to farm for fear of being attacked. The implication of this is the possibility of less agricultural productivity in the following season besides the conflict have resulted in actual damage of farmlands and volumes of farm crops and produce on the other and it has also led to killing of cows and all these damages translate into real and quantifiable material losses.

Social-Economic Effects: the social-economic impact of the conflict are evident in the glaring level of rural destruction and destitution in the hinterlands of states and the internal violence associated with the conflict has tended to exacerbate hunger and human insecurity. This does not augur well for sustainable socio-economic, livelihood well-being of the people. The cumulative effects is that the conflict has been endangered the outcome that impede sustainable societal peace and development, destroyed community life and solidarity and destroy local and national economics with negative consequences on general solid, social and economic development.

4.9 General Implications of the Conflicts Trajectory on National Security

One of the greatest security challenges in Nigeria in recent time is the increasing conflicts between crop farmers and herders. Today, the conflict has spread over wide geographical areas on the continents of Africa, Nigeria and in particular. In the same manner, the weapons used in the conflict have moved from small and light arms to use of heavy and complex weapons and ammunitions such as rifles and AK47 among others. The herder-farmer conflict holds critical implications for the progress of Nigeria. It implies negatively for inclusive citizenship in Nigeria because the primordial claims by the natives to have exclusive rights over an area whereas the constitution guarantees inclusive citizenship which requires that every Nigerian has the right to settle and make a living in any part of the country. Any attempt to deny any person or group the right to legitimate settlements and livelihood in any part of the country under the guise of indigenous calculus, amounts to the devaluation of Nigerian citizen ships code. Again, the

conflict situation also portend negatively for sustainable peace and development in Nigeria given the extent of crisis and violence that has characterized the conflict, it also would be obvious to say that such a situation is an enemy of sustainable development both in the affected communities and Nigeria at large. This development invariably translates into national Security challenge. Crop damage (63.3%) and indiscriminate bush burning (46.7%) were considered the most common causes of conflict between farmers and pastoralists. The majority (71%) of farmers suffer **economic losses** from farmer-pastoralist conflicts.

Herder–farmer conflicts in Nigeria are a series of disputes over land resources across Nigeria between mostly Muslim Fulani herders and mostly Christian non-Fulani farmers. They have been especially prominent in the Middle Belt (North Central) since the return of democracy in 1999. More recently, it has deteriorated into attacks on farmers by Fulani herdsmen and also vice versa. Attacks have also taken place in the northwest Nigeria against farmers who are mainly Hausa. While the conflict has underlying economic and environmental reasons, it has also acquired religious and ethnic dimensions. Thousands of people have died since these attacks began. Sedentary farming in rural communities are often target of attacks because of their vulnerability. There are fears that this conflict will spread to other West African countries but this has often been downplayed by governments in the region. Attacks on herders have also led them to retaliating by attacking other communities (Ilo, et al 2019). The conflict has been labeled a genocide of Christians by several Christian and Nigerian sources. Since the Fourth Nigerian Republic’s founding in 1999, farmer-herder violence has killed more than 19,000 people and displaced hundreds of thousands more. It followed a trend in the increase of farmer-herder conflicts throughout much of the western Sahel, due to an expansion of agriculturist population and cultivated land at the expense of pasturelands; deteriorating environmental conditions,

desertification and soil degradation; population growth; breakdown in traditional conflict resolution mechanisms of land and water disputes; and proliferation of small arms and crime in rural areas. Insecurity and violence have led many populations to create self-defence forces and ethnic and tribal militias, which have engaged in further violence. The majority of farmer-herder clashes have occurred between Muslim Fulani herdsmen and farmers, exacerbating hostilities (Baca, 2015).

Herders-farmers conflicts in Nigeria present a very disturbing complex scenario to Nigeria's national security; a scenario that is much more complex than the Boko Haram insurgency or the militancy in the Niger-Delta region of Nigeria essentially because herders-farmers conflicts ramifies into the political, economic, cultural and social spheres. While some schools of thought see herders-farmers conflicts as the continuation of ethno-religious conflicts that predate the Nigerian state, others tend to locate its implications outside the matrix of ethnicity and religion. But no matter how we tend to explain this disturbing phenomenon, the truth is that herders-farmers conflicts have far-reaching implications for Nigeria's unity. Forging national unity from the welter of ethnicities has been a perennial challenge to Nigeria's evolution as a country. Since independence from Britain in 1960, Nigeria has continued to weather severe storms that bear directly at her foundation. Some of these storms include the Nigeria-Biafra civil war, decades of corrupt military dictatorships; perennial inter-ethnic distrust; persistent religious crisis and political instability; ethnic determinism and self-determination; minority and resource control agitations; and a very corrupt political class. These issues make national cohesion very difficult in Nigeria. Presently, the country's geo-political landscape has been overwhelmed by a new dimension of tension and conflict as evidenced by the escalating deadly and fatal conflicts between nomadic Fulani cattle herders and farmers.

Beyond its implications for the unity of the country, it portends serious danger in terms of food production and sufficiency. Admittedly, there have several narratives to this conflict some bothering on accusations of an Islamization agenda; fundamentally the current herders-farmers conflict is a reflection of climate change induced resource scarcity that threatens food and national security. With an estimated 250 ethnic groups, Nigeria is by far Africa's most ethnically diverse country with visible fault lines in its religious divide. The ongoing resource and environmental tension represented by the clash between herders and crop farmers has embedded religious significance. Most itinerant herders are northerners and adherents of the Islamic faith. Their clashes with farmers happen mainly in the central and southern regions, where most people are Christians and animists. From 2013 to 2016, conflicts between the herders and farmers have become very deadly. Many traditional and farming communities in central and southern Nigeria have been overrun by herders who are accused of grazing their cattle on crop fields. The Nigerian and international media have been awash with reports of maiming, killings, rape and other forms of banditry associated with the highly armed Fulani herdsmen. Unofficial figures put the casualty figure from one such incident in Nimbo, Enugu State, in the southeastern region, at about 140. In the absence of state protection, these events have fuelled affected communities' support for ethnic or regional militias as a civic defence strategy.

The clashes between herdsmen and farmers strike at the core of Nigeria's vulnerable ethno-political fault lines. They also have ramifications for climate change and food security. Crop farmers produce more than 80 percent of Nigeria's food. Leaving this critical lifeblood of the country's economic and cultural life at the mercy of herders and their cattle is not an option. Farmers, the majority of whom are women, constitute the bedrock of the country's informal economy. And the unofficial farming sector is the country's highest employer of labour. Now

this key economic sector is under siege. Perennial ethnic and religious suspicion in Nigeria often fuels apprehensions of an ulterior jihadist agenda. This has a significant security dimension that can easily be exploited. There is a perception of state impunity for the herders, given the evident lack of resolve to rein them in. As this paper pointed out earlier, government's response has not been salutary. At best the government's response smacks of abject appeasement and encouragement of violence on the victims of herders' attack. Thus, the government must respond urgently before the current crisis festers like the Boko Haram insurgency. The herders-farmers crisis demonstrates the reality of the synergy between climate change and resource control and its engrained security challenges. The scarcity of water and shrinking of grazing fields in the desert north appear to be pushing herders southwards to the grasslands of the savannas and forests. The conflict over natural resources, like water and grazing fields, could become more pressing as the impact of climate change sets in. That struggle has significant security implications for Nigeria. This volatile situation has further been exacerbated by the influx of additional Fulani herders from neighbouring countries of Niger, Chad, Mali and the Maghreb region, escaping the deteriorating environmental conditions in the Sahel- a semi-arid belt stretching thousands of kilometers. These migrating herders add more pressure on available grazing areas and the determination by the sedentary farmers in the central and southern parts of Nigeria to protect their farmlands from Fulani herders cannot be taken for granted (Asogwa and Okafor, 2016).

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Summary of Findings

Evidently, herders-farmers conflict in Nigeria has a long history. Incidentally, these herders cannot be easily tracked because of their constant movement, which has made them oblivious of territorial boundaries. Experts have predicted that the impact of climate change on the environment will become acute in the coming months and years. The implication of this is that the herders-farmers conflict can only escalate as the herders violate territorial boundaries in search of pastures and grazing fields for their animals. Finding a lasting cure for this conflict, in the light of increasing pressure due to climate change, suggests that the Nigerian government must wake up from slumber. Farmers are not willing to trade off their means of livelihood for the Fulani herdsmen to graze their animals nor are the Fulanis willing to pass-by grazing fields and suffer their cattle to starve to death. This is indeed a very delicate matter requiring urgent and thoughtful intervention. This intervention should include a combination of policy options rooted in technology and innovation, as well as political and sustainability policy responses

It is observed also that the causes of the farmers-herders conflict in Nigeria consist of global climate change, desertification and aridity which is gradually reducing the arable farming and grazing land, migration of the pastoralists towards the southern and Middle-Belt parts of the country and other related factors. Conflicts between farmers and herders is widespread across the

African continent and the reasons for their occurrence varied, stemming from the incompatibility of livelihood patterns, alterations of symbiotic relationship, resentment of pastoralist, destruction of farms by cattle, cattle rustling among others (Shettima and Tar, 2008& Davidheister and Luna, 2008).Even though not all people of Fulani descent are herders, majority of them pursue a lifelong professional cattle-herding as owners of herds hired labourers employed to take care of other peoples cattle. They are predominantly found in the regions of northern Nigeria, the Futa Toro and Futa Djallon regions of Senegal, Guinea and Macina regions of Mali and eastward through Niger and Cameroon. These regions are noted to be places where the Fulani originate from (Davidheiser and Lunar 2008 Opong, 2002).

The presence of the Fulani in Nigeria is a phenomenon which dates back to colonial times. Their influx and permanent settlement with the northern territories dates back to the 20th century. By the 1920s they had settled permanently in the northern territories (northern region) and their population became significantly felt in the 1930s.Their ingenuity in raising cattle coupled with the services they offered as cattle rearing persuaded the colonial authorities who had conceived the idea of establishing native administration found in the north to encourage their settlements. In the Gold Coast (now Ghana), the factors that encourage Fulani quick settlement in the country included the awareness of the pastoral conditions in Nigeria, the seeming expansion of the cattle trade, the establishment of the native administration and the drought of the Sahelian region in the 1960's and 1970's (Toner 2005).

These developments have resulted in conflict between Farmers and Fulani herdsmen that has led to the scuttling and destruction of farms and farmlands, killings, raping of women and kidnappings across the country. The study therefore for argue that conflict between Farmers and herders in Nigeria have been occasioned by the interest of shifts in allocating land on commercial basis which has resulted in the decline of fallow land for local Farmers and lead to conflict between indigenous land users and migrants including conflict between Farmers and others. The study try to examine the interests of indigenes in allocating land and its impact on both orders and farmers and also focused on the arrangement under which lands are released two migrants. Conflicts over land are therefore precipitated by a number of factors namely, land alienation, pastoral and agricultural encroachment, changing demographic conditions and

managerial changes in technology (Shettima and Tar 2008 de Valencia and Luna 2008 Berry 2001).

Equally important is the erection of boundary of exclusion that makes it difficult for migrants to integrate into society in which they find themselves the presence of migrants is a mixed blessing which is expected by government and individuals alike. Migrants are a blessing in periods of economic boom and scapegoats in periods of economic recession. The expulsion of migrants has been used in times of economic difficulties in both Nigeria and some other countries in Africa (Amanor 2011). In addition pastoral activities are always been perceived as backward and land degrading all of which are narratives articulated by the media, government, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and donors agencies. They serve as convenient platform for state intervention in pastoral activities backed by political and economic motives even though the findings of these narratives are biceps with inaccuracies.

5.2 Conclusion

The phenomena of farmer herder's conflicts in Nigeria typify what is known as resource conflict in contemporary development literature. This thrives in an atmosphere of ecological scarcity and competition as well as livelihood crisis. The problem has been accelerated by the global trend of climate change which has led to the shrinking of ecological space and resources leading to intense pressure on and competition for the available resources. The spirally migration of pastoralists from the far north towards the central part of Nigeria has resulted in a sort of dialectical relations between the Fulani herdsmen and the settled native farmers. As this study has observed, the situation has been implicated by the rising incidence of livelihood insecurity among the farming and herding communities as a result of the dwindling ecological fortunes of the country. This scenario has led to desperate violent struggles to access and to control the scarce ecological space and resources, a situation that has endangered their humanitarian, socio-economic and economic consequences. The fierce and often violent natures of this struggle have found expression in a vicious cycle of violence and mutual vendetta.

The farmer/herders debacle in Nigeria has been essentially woeful in terms of its destructive impact. So far it has defied all measures at remedying it in its apparent dynamics of deterioration and viciousness. The situation has given rise to a sort of pervasive Fulani militancy in the hinterlands of the country. This has been the bane of sustainable peace and progress in Nigeria.

Issues of social conflict with respect to the accessibility of natural resources especially land is a hydra-headed development that must be examined against the backdrop of the various actors and interest groups involved in the conflict. The emergence of such conflict is occasioned by number of computing variables and these variables must be examined on a case-by-case basis to ascertain the validity of claims or assertion being made.

5.3 Recommendations

From the discussions on this research, it is obvious that farmer-grazers conflict in any part of Nigeria has centered mainly on cattle owners and crop farmers. The population of both crops and nomadic farmers is rapidly increasing but land remains fixed. The study found that majority of the causes are seen in terms of competition on land, cattle trespass, struggle for leadership, conflict of culture and corruption by some officials. Based on the above premise and the relevant issues raised in this research, it is therefore considered very necessary that to meet with the demand of the society, the government and other interested policy makers may find the following on the list of recommendations useful. In view of the rapid population pressure and declining farmlands, there is the need to adopt improved farming techniques. The Farmers should adopt intensive cultivation by using improved seeds and farm inputs. The pastoralist should adopt a variable and intensive system of grazing in order to cope with the rapid demographic pressure on the grass fields across the country. They should embark on greater fodder production to feed the cattle especially in times of scarcity during the dry seasons. The government at different levels should intervene and carry out periodic sensitization workshops for both crop and nomadic farmers. Lastly, the implication of the conflict for Nigeria's National unity cannot be over emphasized. The humanitarian, economic and social consequences of the conflict have been manifold and telling. The attendant security and livelihoods crisis threatened the collective subsistence and survival of the affected population. There are also other externalities such as demolition of agricultural productivity and decline in asset capital, all of which do not augur well for societal and national sustainability. It suffices, therefore to say that the farmer/herders conflict is inimical to human security and by extension national security in Nigeria. As a panacea to this problem the paper recommends as follows;

1. Effective regulation of grazing and farming activities in Nigeria through efficient land use laws/legislations and administration;

2. Creation of grazing reserves and dedicated grazing routes in order to solve the issue of herders encouragement on farmlands vice versa;
3. Mitigation of the desertification and droughts in the far north by governments, communities and individuals in order to forestall mass movement of pastoralists towards the north central belt;
4. Sensitization of stakeholders farmers and herdsman alike on the need for mutual coexistence and peace as this would help to forestall needless provocations and opportunistic violence;
5. Sedentarization of grazing through ranching in order to regulate practice and for close clashes between herding and farming communities.

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