

**LOCAL-STATE GOVERNMENT RELATIONS AND ISSUES  
OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AUTONOMY IN NIGERIA:  
A CASE STUDY OF EDO STATE**

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BENIN CITY**

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## **CERTIFICATION**

This is to certify that this project was carried out by Evbuomwan Osayande James with Matriculation Number SSC1608311 of the Department of Public Administration in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the award of Bachelor of Science Degree (B.Sc.) in Public Administration, University of Benin.

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**Date**

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**Date**

## **DEDICATION**

This work is dedicated to God almighty for his grace towards my life and my academic pursuit and also to my family for their care, prayers and financial support.

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My profound gratitude goes to God Almighty for his grace towards my life during the period of my study in University of Benin.

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## **Abstract**

This study examines local-state government relations and issues of local government autonomy in Nigeria using Edo State 2010 – 2018. The study adopted the survey design on the foundation to which data were sourced from a sample of 120 respondents. The study adopted the chi-square to analyse the research hypotheses. The result shows that there is no significant relationship between local government and state government in Edo State. Secondly, the findings show that there is significant relationship between State Joint Local Government Account and the financial autonomy of Local Government Councils. The study further shows that there is a slight significant relationship between the administrative structures of Local Government Councils and control and manipulations of the State Government. The study recommends that in order to ensure smooth and cordial relationship between the State and the Local Government in the areas of fiscal relations, there is need for either restructuring or total abolition of the State Joint Local Government Account in the South Western Nigeria States. This is to ensure the efficiency and effectiveness and accountability of the Local Government in rural development. In the case of restructuring, the federal Government should re-examine the section that provide for the creation of the State Joint Local Government Account in order to ensure proper monitoring and punishment from the organ that violate the laid down procedure. This could be achieved by the introduction of machinery assessment and supervision of policies and projects that the allocations send to the State Joint Local Government Account is used for. This will largely reduce the extent at which the state Government tamper with the Local Government in the areas of rural development and to a large extent increase the level of autonomy of Local Government of the region. On the other hand, the State Joint Local Government Account could be abolished to ensure that there is no intermediary between the Local Government and The Federal Government in the distribution of allocation. This will enable the Local Government to be responsible and accountable for all her actions and inaction. This will eradicate unjustifiable coordination of the State Joint Local Government Account by the State Government. Hence, if any of these recommendations is being tested, it will go a long way in reducing the over-dependency of the Local Government on the State Government. This will end up strengthening the Local Government in their autonomy, rural development and accountability, and the efficiency and effectiveness in the policy formulation and implementation.

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **Introduction**

#### **1.1 Background to the Study**

Nigeria struggles to establish and sustain cooperative, interdependent state-local intergovernmental relations (IGR) by providing for the powers and rights of local governments in the federal constitution. Despite the provisions, the practice of state-local IGR has remained inclusive, hierarchical, dependent and competitive (Ikeanyibe, Chukwu & Ibietan, 2019). The extent to which constitutional provisions determine state-local relations as against the macrostructure of intergovernmental relations between the federal government and states is very important. It is difficult to expect a cooperative, interdependent, state-local IGR through constitutional provisions of the powers and rights of local governments, if the federal-state relations, which should be the determining framework of IGR is inclusive, hierarchically dependent (Ikeanyibe, Chukwu & Ibietan, 2019). The implication is that the level of autonomy enjoyed by local governments largely depends on the level of autonomy the states themselves enjoy.

One of the essential ingredients of federalism is the existence of a financial arrangement, which details tax jurisdiction and the functional responsibilities among the various levels of government (Teidi, 2003). The financial relationship among the different tiers of government in a federal structure is often referred to as

intergovernmental fiscal relations (Nchuchuwe & Adejuwon, 2015). A key issue in intergovernmental fiscal relations is the assignment of functions and finances to different levels of government. Nigeria operates a third-tier federal system, which presupposes that the three tiers must relate vertically and horizontally for the good government of the country. In a federal system like Nigeria, local governments are close to the people and hence could efficiently alter grassroots development within their jurisdictions (Ekpo & Ndebbio, 1998). The state-local government relations are among the most contested issues in Nigeria's fourth republic. The contention is made more complicated by the provisions of the 1999 Constitution which make the institution of local government, especially its establishments, structure, composition, finance and functions, a residual matter for state government. The constitutional and legal framework guiding state-local government relations is not only skewed in favour of the state, it completely subjugates the institution of local government to the state government (Chukwuemeka & Uche, 2005).

In spite of the huge resources committed to rural development in Nigeria, rural development still remains a mirage because the local government authorities who are saddled with the responsibilities have not been able to perform up to expectation. The expectation was that the third tier of government would act as a catalyst to rapid and sustained development at the grassroots level. Yet, the hope for rapid and sustained development has been a mirage as successive councils have grossly underperformed in

almost all the areas of their mandate. Apart from the palpable mismanagement and misappropriation of funds currently witnessed in most local governments in the country, the resources available which otherwise should be used for development programmes at the rural level are being used to service bloated elected officials and unproductive bureaucracies (Obasanjo, 2005). To this end, this study fill gap in literature by adding to existing empirical study, sets out to investigate state-local government relations and issue of local government autonomy in Nigeria: A case study of Edo State.

## **1.2 Statement Of The Problem**

In Nigeria, the issue of sharing resources among the three levels of government has remained controversial due to lack of an acceptable formula. It generates tension and poor flow of governance among the three tiers of government. The study therefore focuses on state –local governments relations and local government autonomy in Nigeria. The fiscal relations among the three levels of government in Nigeria are enmeshed with the severe problem most especially state-local government relationship (Fatile, Fajonyomi & Adejuwon, 2018). A number of factors have been attributed to this which includes over-dependence of local government on statutory allocations from the state and federal governments, deliberate tax evasion by the local citizenry, creation of nonviable local government areas, differences in the status of local governments in terms of the rural-urban dimension, inadequate revenue and restricted fiscal jurisdiction to constitutional gaps. Local government has been the root of development in terms of

dealings with the people which democracy is centred upon. Hence, local government is visibly seen as co-agent of rural development and as partners in progress with both states and federal governments in rural developments (Fatile, Fajonyomi & Adejuwon. 2018).

In Federal-State-Local Government relations, there has been what amounts to cold war. Local Governments complain about undue interference from state governments. For example, the Sokoto State government was taken to court by fifteen Local Government Councils, and the court prohibited the deduction of 3% of Council's statutory allocation to fund the Sokoto Emirate Council, as passed by the State House of Assembly (Chukwuemeka & Uche, 2005).

As Ozor (2003) observes, the structure and management of state-local relations has become a dominant issue on the changing nature of federalism in Nigeria, especially in the context of the development of the Nigerian state. In fact, issues of intergovernmental relations, whether federal-state, federal-local, inter-state, state-local or inter-local, have become increasingly controversial since the return to civil rule in May, 1999. Hence, Roberts (1999:57) is of the view that the 'stability of the Fourth Republic could be consolidated or compromised depending on the dynamics of intergovernmental relations'.

Academics, politicians, judges, political analysts, the media, and members of civil social organizations have made various contributions to the resolution of this controversy. This is not surprising given the notion that intergovernmental relations is central to the

success of all federal systems (Oviasuyi, Idada & Isiraojie, 2010). As a matter of fact, Onah (2007:1) sees intergovernmental relations as ‘a necessary process and component of a federal system’, which is germane to the ‘survival of all tiers of government’. Of all the levels of intergovernmental relations that are in operation in Nigeria’s federal practice, state-local relation is the most contentious (Ola & Tonwe, 2005).

Local governments are not sovereign unlike independence nation-State; it is a subordinate government which derives its existence and power from the constitution. Since 1976 Local government reforms were expected to strengthen the local system in Nigeria, Several challenges serves as an impediment to the performance of local government in discharge of their constitutionally assigned responsibility (Osakede, Ijimakinwa & Adesanya, 2016). One of such challenges is lack of financial autonomy. The objective of this study is to examine local government financial autonomy and how local councils can be freed from induce interference by the State, especially in the area of operation and state/local government joint account which gives the State government undue advantage over local government.

### **1.3 Research Questions**

The following research questions are raised in order to direct the course of the main objectives of the study. The questions are stated as follows:

- i. What is the relationship between local government and state government in Edo State?

- ii. What is the implication of State Joint Local Government Account on the financial autonomy of Local Government Councils?
- iii. Does the administrative structures of Local Government Councils subject to or insulated from the control and manipulations of the State Government?

#### **1.4 Objectives of the Study**

The main objectives of this study are to:

- i. examine the relationship between local government and state government in Edo State;
- ii. ascertain the implications of State Joint Local Government Account on the financial autonomy of Local Government Councils; and
- iii. find out if the administrative structures of Local Government Councils are subject to or insulated from the control and manipulations of the State Government.

#### **1.5 Research Hypotheses**

The research hypotheses for this study were formulated in line with the specific research objectives. The hypotheses are stated in the null and alternative form:

- i.  $H_0$ : There is no significant relationship between local government and state government in Edo State.  
 $H_1$ : There is significant relationship between local government and state government in Edo State.

- ii. H<sub>0</sub>: There is no significant relationship between State Joint Local Government Account and the financial autonomy of Local Government Councils.  
H<sub>1</sub>: There is significant relationship between State Joint Local Government Account and the financial autonomy of Local Government Councils
- iii. H<sub>0</sub>: There is no significant relationship between the administrative structures of Local Government Councils and control and manipulations of the State Government.  
H<sub>1</sub>: There is significant relationship between the administrative structures of Local Government Councils and control and manipulations of the State Government.

## **1.6 Scope of the Study**

This study focuses on investigating local - state government relations and issue of local government autonomy in Nigeria: A case study of Edo State. The study covers the period of nine years, that is, 2010-2019. Intergovernmental relations are the underlying theme of this study. There is, therefore, no doubt that the study will help provide the valuable insight into the complex dimensions of state-local government relations to the readers of this study. The study is particularly intended to examine principles and practices that might be useful to Nigeria in its challenging task of exploring how intergovernmental relations in any of its various manifestations may be relevant to the structure of governance in a democracy.

The study area was chosen due to the democratic regime that covers this period of nine years. This period was limited to the government of Comrade Adams A. Oshiomhole and that of Godwin Obaseki.

### **1.7 Significance of the Study**

The study beams light on public administration students on the basis understanding intergovernmental administration as an ‘indispensable tool to quest for grass root development as well as quest for socio-economic and political development. It enlightens students more importantly, on questions of functional allocations as most countries, including Nigeria, have a constitutional framework that determines federal, state and local issues, and make allocation of powers and functions in diverse ways to the different levels of governments. The allocation and the question of who does what and with what resources, will become glaring to students of public administration. The empirical significance of this study is that the subject is necessary at this time in Nigeria’s political history to various institutions of learning, interest groups, civil society organizations and the media are articulating viable options that will make Nigeria’s democratic practice more enduring and people-oriented. The study would certainly be a reference material and of interest to institutions and persons involved in the process of improving Nigeria’s constitutional framework as measures to effective local – state relations.

The study also attempts to present the concept of state-local relations in a context of empirical discussion of its merits, problems, difficulties and strengths as enlightenment to local and state administrators. The essence is to generate ideas on how the institutions of intergovernmental relations can develop and work effectively. Therefore, the thrust of our study has been to move the discussion of state-local relations beyond the general recognition of its complexity towards identifying it as institutional reforms for tackling weaknesses in intergovernmental management. It is hoped that this study will be of value as much to academic knowledge as to political leaders in Nigeria's federal practice.

### **1.8 Definition Of Terms/Concepts**

It is always necessary for the researcher to define terms that are frequently used in the research work. The following are some of the terms used.

**Local Government:** The term "local government" as used in this study means local government as that tier of government closer to the people, expected to serve as the basis of socio-economic development in the locality to the people at grass-root level. It can also be seen as a government that has been perceived as a panacea for the diverse problems of the diverse people with diverse culture. Local government is government in which popularly elected persons are charged with administering and executing duties in matters concerning the inhabitants of a particular district or place.

**State-Local Relations:** This means all administrative, fiscal, political and legal interactions or processes between the State Government and Local Government Councils by which both tiers of government acquires control over the instruments of power and resources for performance of political, constitutional and administrative functions.

**State Government:** It denotes all organs, institutions, authorities, ministries, departments, agencies and commissions of the second tier government recognized in the 1999 Constitution with its powers spelt out in the Concurrent Legislative List. It also has jurisdiction over matters or items not mentioned in either the Exclusive or Concurrent Legislative Lists.

**Tier of Government:** It stands for a separate, distinct and independent level of government with constitutional status, powers and financial autonomy.

**Administrative Structure:** This refers to all elected and appointed officials and career civil servants that operate or run the affairs of a tier of government.

**Financial autonomy:** It is when all funds and revenues legally standing to the credit of a tier of government is accessed and used by the government concerned without any form of interference, deduction or diversion by another tier.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **Literature Review and Theoretical Framework**

#### **2.0 Introduction**

This chapter comprises of subheading such as concept of state – local governments fiscal relations in Nigeria, dominant issues in local government autonomy in Nigeria, state joint local government account and financial autonomy of local government, resources utilization and infrastructural development at the grassroots, interference in the local government political/administrative autonomy, interference in the local government financial autonomy, problems of sustaining local government autonomy, empirical literature, theoretical framework and application of theoretical framework to the study.

#### **2.1 State – Local Governments Fiscal Relations in Nigeria**

The issue of intergovernmental fiscal relations has been a „constant and important fiscal policy consideration in Nigeria since the country’s independence in 1960“ (Alm & Boex 2002). Since independence to date, there a lot of inter-governmental conflicts between the state government and the local government involve the Office of the Governor and some State Ministries, Commissions and Agencies in Nigeria. The Governor tends to act as the Head of the Local Government Chairman. He summons them to meetings at will and gives necessary directives from time to time. The monthly allocations that are expected to be given to local government are diverted and sometimes mismanaged by the State Governors (Togun, 2010; Nwogwugwu & Olusesi, 2015).

Under the 1999 constitution of Nigeria, allocations from federation account are channeled to the local government through the state government. This scenario created a dependency situation than independent one between the local and state governments. In view of this, intergovernmental relations at state – local and local-state are functions of the diversity of the state (Tella, Doho & Bapeto, 2014).

It is important to note the fiscal relationship between State and local governments in Nigeria can be described as “master-servant relationship” rather than partner in governance. Ogbuisi (2007) observe that the funds which the state governments were supposed to share among the local governments were in reality directed to state projects. Ogbuisi state further that the unrepentant attitude of the state governments towards exploiting the funds of local government became obvious when the federal government decided to allocate directly to the various local governments for the purpose of paying teachers in the states” employment. As observed by Ogbuisi (2007) the problem of constant state intervention in the local government funding had a constitutional basis.

For instance, section 162 (5) and 7(1) of the 1999 constitution of the federal republic of Nigeria state that: - Any amount standing to the credit of the local government councils in the federation account shall be allocated to the states for the benefit of their local government councils in such terms and in such manners as may be prescribed by the State House of Assembly... ..the finance, composition, functions, and structure of the local government in the federation is to be determined by the prescriptions of the State

House of Assembly. - The above provisions of the constitution shows that local governments in Nigeria have no power on their own to determine how their affairs are run. The fiscal arrangement has been used to gauge the stake a particular segment of the population has in the federal structure and what powers, real and statutory, a tier wields (Onah, 2007).

**Constitutional relationship** There is no local government that is totally autonomous. Each is part of the interdependent and inter-related political and administrative structures of a country (Enemuo, 1999). In spite of the autonomous powers granted to the local government, section 7(1) provides that the state government shall ensure their existence under a law which provides for the establishment, structure, composition, finance and functions of such councils. Section 4(5) of the constitution also provides that if any law enacted by the House of Assembly of the state is inconsistent with any law validly made by the National Assembly, the law made by the National Assembly shall prevail, and that other law shall, to the extent of inconsistency, be void.

**Political Relationship** The central government reserves the right to establish new local government units, change the boundaries of the existing ones, amalgamate them or terminate them (Enemuo, 1999). Section 8 provides that the government of every state shall ensure their existence under a law which provides for the establishment, structure, composition, finance and function of such council (FRN, 1999).

**Financial Relationship** The fiscal and monetary powers of each tier of government have been delineated by Decree No. 21 of 1998, which has become the Act of National Assembly. The constitution expects local government councils to generate their revenues (Eliagwu, 2011). Section 162(1) provides that all revenues from the federation shall go into the federation account and that Revenue Mobilization, Allocation and Fiscal Commission (RMAFC) shall present a revenue formula to the President to be placed before the National Assembly for the purpose of distribution. The distribution is both vertical (in terms of federal-state-local) and horizontal (in terms of allocation among states). Also, the maintenance of special account called Joint-State-Local Government Account by the state, through which local government funds are paid, allows for interaction between the two levels of government.

**Administrative Relationship** The ministries and agencies of the central government usually have the power to regulate, supervise and mentor local councils in their respective fields of concern. For example, both the federal and state Ministries of Health in Nigeria work closely with the local councils to ensure that they provide primary health services in accordance with the national standards and policies (Enemuo, 1999). Other administrative relations occur among officials at all levels of government during meetings and conferences. Such conferences as noted by Adamoleku in Awofeso (2004) include the Biannual Conference of Commissioners of Local Government, Meetings of Secretaries of Government of the Federation, the National Conference of Minister and

Commissioners for Works etc. At the local government level, Awofeso (2004:20) concludes, apart from the three major areas of transactional interactions among levels of government there also exist intergovernmental social service delivery which may cut across issues such as the protection of life and property to be provided by the police, community and rural development efforts and health services delivery all of which have greater implication of federal-state-local government collaboration. There is also the need for development project which in our past experience has made federal agencies such as the DFRRRI, Better Life for Rural Dwellers most relevant in Federal-State-Local collaboration.

**Judicial Relationship** Through its power of judicial review, the judiciary can declare as null and void, ultra-verse, unconstitutional and with no affect any law made by the federal or state government which is contrary to constitutional provision. Also, local government as a legal entity can sue and be sued by other levels of government.

### **2.1.1 Dominant Issues in Local Government Autonomy in Nigeria**

The important issues in LG autonomy in Nigeria started to emerge with the 1976 far reaching LG reforms. Before 1976, local administration, rather than LG, could be said to have existed in Nigeria. This is because from the colonial era up to 1975, administration at the local level was an appendage of the Regional and later State governments. This was in spite of some reforms by the Regional governments at the local

level in the 1950s and in post independence era by the State governments up to 1975 (Ola & Tonwe, 2005; Ikelegbe, 2005).

It was from the 1976 LG reforms that some dominant issues in LG autonomy could be easily appreciated. These include the setting up of representative councils, determination of population size of LGs, direct allocation of funds to LGs and review of personnel administration. Representative LGs. – The guidelines on the 1976 LG reforms started the autonomy of LGCs when they stated that ‘membership of Local Government Councils should be predominantly elected either by direct or indirect elections from local communities E’ (Nigeria, 1976; para. 25). The fledging autonomy of LGs was driven into the 1979, 1989 and 1999 Nigerian Constitutions. In section 7 of each of the constitutions, there is a clause that ‘the system of local government by democratically elected local government is under this constitution guaranteed’.

The constitution extended this guarantee in section 8 to ‘the establishment, structure, composition, finance and functions of such councils; by directing the States to enact a law to the above effects. And the State governments have been doing so through the enactment and amendment of LG laws since year 2000, even though scant respect has been extended to this and other enactments on LGs. The importance of democratically elected LGs could only be under emphasized (Ola, 1996). Our conceptualization of democracy also supports this view. In terms of autonomy of LGs, democratically elected LGCs simply means that the councillors would no longer be the candidates of State

governments as was the case in the past. It further means that councillors would be sure to serve out their terms without fear or favour, except a councillor acted unlawfully. Size of LG -The 1976 LG reform guidelines also contained issues aimed at promoting the autonomy of Nigerian LGs. These included ensuring that LGs can execute 'all types of functions reasonably economically by having population of between 150,000 and 800,000 E limits (which) may be varied in exceptional geographical circumstances (Nigeria, 1976).

This well intentioned policy has not been abrogated since then, although the practice as on, but slow in pace. The rationale for the maximum population size policy derives from the general minimum population figure or strength that can support a viable community. Promotion of viable community spans issues such as dynamic social, economic, political and cultural matters. These are more adequately or satisfactorily handled with minimum population in the community. With little or small population, the dynamic nature of the above issues is greatly reduced. Contrary to the well informed intention of the Nigerian government on minimum population for LGs, out of 774 LGs in the country, following the 2006 census, 105 (13.57%) LGs have less than 100,000 populations each. 242 (31.27%) LGs have less than 150,000 populations each.

This means that 347 (44.84%) LGs have less than the minimum 150,000 populations' size to carry out 'all types of functions seasonally economically E' (Nigeria, 1976: para. 8). 427 (55.16%) LGs have 150,000 or above population each. The 347

(44.84%) LGs that have less than the minimum of 150,000 populations constitute a large and rather disturbing number or percentage. Hence Gboyega (1993) described the situation as fragmentation of LGs. It is interesting to observe that in the less politicized period of the 1970s, when mineral oil had not made Nigeria a rather monolithic economy, a good number of LGs had the minimum 150,000 population. For example, only 35 (11.63%) LGs had below 150,000 population out of 301 LGs in 1976. 252 (83.72%) LGs had a population of between 150,000 and 800,000 each, while three (0.99%) had over 800,000 population (Ola and Tonwe, 2005). There was no information in respect of 11 (3.65%) LGs.

This means that 255 (84.71%) LGs had a population of 150,000 or above each in the 1970s when revenue derivation principle still had a little meaning in the revenue sharing formula of the country. With little population size against what had been considered a reasonably supportive population during the less politicized period of the 1970s, we now tend to have what may be described as cap-in-hand LGs. They can hardly depend on their population but on external funding as we shall observe later. The implication is that LG autonomy in this regard has been greatly whittled down.

LG finances – It is in this issue that the Nigerian government seems to have done quite a lot to promote LG autonomy, no doubt, for the purpose of their greater development impact in the localities. The government has contributed to the promotion of LGs' financial autonomy in two basic ways. First is through direct financial allocations to

them as Table 2 shows. And second is through constitutional provisions for many of their revenue sources as enshrined in, for example, sections 149 and 162 of the 1999 constitution (Aghayere, 2008; Nchuchukwe, 2003).

Nwabueze (1983) defines the autonomy under a federal system to mean that “each government enjoys a separate existence and independence from the control of other governments”. It is an autonomy which requires not just the legal and physical existence of an apparatus of government like a legislative assembly, governor, count etc, but that each government must exist not as an appendage of another government but as autonomous entity in the sense of being able to exercise its own will in the conduct of its affairs free from direction of another government. According to Nwabueze, autonomy is not constitutionally bound to accept dictation or directive from another.

The argument here is that, the local government autonomy we have in mind is the one that is adequate, not absolute, for the local government councils to perform their responsibilities optimally. Two types of autonomy appear to have been canvassed in the literature absolute and adequate/ relative. Chaturvedi (2006) represents the absolutist school as he states that in local autonomy, the local body has financial and management autonomy to decide and determine its own course of action.

Imhanlahimi and Ikeanyibe (2009) assert that local government autonomy in the less developed countries (LDCs), Nigeria inclusive, should obtain to enable them perform their functions optimally in the people’s interests. It is freedom to the local governments

to exercise authority within the countries of the law or constitution. This is to enable them to discharge legally or constitutionally assigned responsibilities satisfactorily, but without undue interference or restraint from within or higher authority. This definition argues for adequate autonomy for local governments within the law for the purpose of performance, which actually guarantees it. Without performance, which actually guarantees it? Without performance, the law or constitution may not be able to guarantee even adequate autonomy for local governments as the people yearn for development. Autonomy operated within a democracy must be limited as indeed democracy limits the use of power.

However, the autonomy of local government in African countries such as Nigeria is more in theory than in practice. As Olowu (1988) succinctly puts it:

Most governments in Africa have opted for the direct control by governments through a battery of legal, financial and administrative units of the central governments or, worse still, exist as parallel institutions to the government's field administration, controlled by both the central and field units. The heavy dependence of local government in Nigeria, for instance, on statutory allocation from the federal government whittles down the autonomy of the form. It puts local government at the mercy of the federal government.

Successive Nigeria governments (both state and federal) have interfered in the actual functioning of the local government. For instance, between 2007 and 2012 local

government councils in Imo state were abolished and the administration of their affairs of the local government was placed entirely on the sole administrators. Ezigbo (2012) recently reported that Governor Rochas Okorocha had in his maiden broadcast in June 2011, announced the sacking of elected council chairmen, and later appointed transitional committee chairmen to run the 27 council areas in the state. But the council chairmen challenged their removal from office in an Owerri High court, arguing that the governor had no constitutional power to sack them. Consequently, the court, presided over by the chief Judge of the state, Justice Benjamin Njemanze, held that the governor lacked the powers to remove the chairmen from office. Also the court, presided over by Justice Uwani Abbaji held that the governor lacked the power to sack elected governments at the third tier of government. The court also nullified the appointment of transition committee chairmen by the governor to replace the sacked council chairmen. This led the National president of ALGON, Ozo Nwabueze Okafor in a communiqué that the chairmen will fight for the financial and administrative autonomy of the local councils.

In a similar development Anyanwu (2012) reports that the government of Imo state recently introduced another tier of government at the autonomous community level. This so-called fourth tier government according to Governor Okorocha, is expected to assist in the performance of government functions at the grassroots rural community levels of the state. It is perhaps for this reason that it is also known as the community government council (CGC). The concept of fourth tier government may be easily

understood, in its simplest form, as a sub-arm of government that brings dividends of democracy of the government in power to the grassroots through the use of a community governing council. Under this arrangement, traditional ruler, town union executives of the autonomous community, other appointed and elected indigenes are to be empowered as the CGC to participate in governance.

As a citizen of this state, it is expedient for me to contribute to discussions on this burning issue of the moment by examining the problems and prospects of application of this policy to the socio-economic and political development of Imo state. The stipulation of a political role for traditional rulers as head of the fourth tier government is worthy of consideration. The obvious implication is the politicization of our traditional institution, thereby reducing our royal fathers to errand fathers of any government in power. Undoubtedly this will conflict with their traditional functions. Generally, they are the custodians of culture, norm and traditions of their people. In fact, they are expected to operate as the standard bearers of their autonomous community's value system. It is therefore counterproductive to not only add political roles to them but also make them political leaders of their communities. Besides, Nigeria is a republic and to that referendum on the role of their royal fathers in a republican political space. It should not be smuggled through the back door. It is doubtful if an appointed autonomous community head of government can be held accountable by the people and possibly be removed for

non-performance through the ballot box. This is the crux of the matter with royal father as appointed head of government.

This master-servant relationship became a recurring issue. According to Nwokedi (2009) by May 29, 2002, however, the various states in the federation had applied different solutions of solving the bottlenecks of replacing the out-going local government officials. Moreover, Nwokedi (2009) further observed that states like Akwa-Ibom, Enugu and Lagos are the only states that have elected chairmen. In Zamfara State, code administrators were appointed to run the councils. Governor Ahmed Sani said that the decision was in consonance with the states local government Amendment law No. 1 of 2002. He said that the law empowered the state government to provide interim administration for the local government areas in the state. The above few examples indicate that local government has not advanced appreciably towards becoming an autonomous third tier of government in Nigeria. Mutolu (2008) opine that it is pertinent to note that no level of government is fully autonomous. There is what is called inter-governmental relations or independent. What is required is no complete independence for local government, but a degree of autonomy as evidenced by fiscal and administrative, independence subject only to requirements of state law and supervision.

### **2.1.2 State Joint Local Government Account and Financial Autonomy of Local Government**

Local governments in Nigeria are established to bring governance closer to the grassroots and enhance development. However inadequate finance has undermined the ability of local governments to achieve these goals. The financial autonomy of the local governments is severely interfered in by the state governments principally through the instrumentality of the State Joint Local Government Account (Ikechukwu, 2014). One of the nagging problems of Nigeria's federalism is the persistent failure to grant fiscal autonomy to local government as the third tier of government. Under a true federal structure, the autonomy of local government is adequately guaranteed. Although decentralization policies have been introduced in some West African States, including Nigeria, much success has not been attained towards granting autonomy to local government. This is due to the inadequacy of legal framework and constitutional provisions to guarantee the autonomy of local governments (Akinboye, 2007). The State Joint Local Government Account (SJLGA) was initially introduced in the Nigerian federation as far back as 1981 during the Second Republic administration of President Shehu Shagari. The Federation Account has been the focal pool from which the three tiers of government in Nigeria derive their monthly allocation which is expected to be judiciously utilized in addressing socio-economic development of their localities (Ahmad, Abubakar & Ahmad, 2013).

Under the 1999 Constitution of federal republic of Nigeria, the State Joint Local Government Account (SJLGA) is a special account maintained by each state government “into which shall be paid allocations to the local government councils of the state from the Federation Account and from the Government of the State” (Section 162(6), 1999 Constitution of Nigeria). The State Joint Local Government Account is meant to be a mechanism that can implement the notion of fiscal federalism at the local government level in Nigeria. It is not doubtful that the intention of those who formulated the joint account system as a financial policy for the local government was good. The joint account system was established to avoid any possible manipulation of the account by the state government. The system would have assisted in no small measure to extenuating the incessant corruption inherent in the local government system aptly perpetuated by the council’s executives. Bringing the supervision of the account under the state government was a plan well made to check and instill fear in mind and mentality of the council executives (Ojugbeli & James, 2014). It is important to note that the state government is not intended to be a beneficiary of the SJLGA, rather, it is a trustee of the Account. It is required to maintain the Account for the benefit of the local governments by ensuring that the amount allocated for this third tier of government is equitably and fairly shared among the councils, adhering strictly to constitutionally stipulated criteria.

However, reports across the country indicate that most state governments are using SJLGA laws contrary to this intention (Okafor, 2010). Most state Governors

through state joint local government account have converted local governments to a gold mine and their interference became abysmal and detrimental to local government productivity most especially in the area of grassroots development. Onah, (2007); Azelama, (2008); and Ezeani, 2012) observes that the interference in the local government statutory allocations by the state governments reasonably accounts for the inability of the local governments to initiate and execute development programs or projects. Also, Oguntuase (2012), Okolie and Eze (2001), also agree that the state governments have turned the State Joint Local Government Account into an instrument to manipulate and control the local governments. However, it is necessary to observe that the pervasive practice by state governments to interfere in the statutory allocations to the local government is antithetical to the spirit of the constitution in the creation of the State Joint Local Government Account. Indeed, the state governments are only expected to act as trustee of the account and to ensure reasonable oversight of the statutory allocations of the local governments.

### **2.1.3 Resources Utilization and Infrastructural Development at the Grassroots**

Nigeria is a federal state where there are three tiers of government namely federal, state, and local governments according to the magnitude of constitutional power, authority and control. The recognition and importance of local government in the development process is prompted by the imperative to tackle local socio-economic problems and to manage grassroots development through provision of basic rural

infrastructure (Lawal, 2014). The basic rationale behind the creation of local government is to meet the peculiar needs of the people at the grassroots (Tella, Doho & Bapeto, 2014). However, it is pathetic to note that the local governments have demonstrated incompetence in regards to its revenue utilisation. As a result, some local governments end up in financial crises and are unable to tackle the challenges of services delivery and mobilisation of both human and material resources required for the functioning and meaningful development of the local government areas (Agba, Stephen & Nnamani, 2014).

#### **2.1.4 Interference in the Local Government Political/Administrative Autonomy**

The political/administrative autonomy which section 7 (1) of the 1999 constitution seeks to confer on the local governments are equally being undermined in several ways by the state governments. One of these ways is the use of Care-taker Committee system for administering local government areas. In this case some state governors refuse to conduct elections for the constitution of the local government council and instead appoint Care-taker Committees to run them. For example, Edo state government under Governor Peter Obi did not conducted local government election throughout his tenure in office. The Governor rather preferred to use care-taker committee to run the local government. In Bayelsa state, under Governor Timpre Silva, local government election was not held for three years (Abutudu, 2011). In Edo, Kogi and Delta states, Care-taker Committee system was equally used at some points in time to

administer local governments (Abutudu, 2011). Indeed, the practice of adopting Care-taker Committee is tending to become an accepted norm instead of an aberration to democratic practice. This is because as at June, 2011, over 2/3 of the 774 local government councils in Nigeria are being run by non-elected Care-taker Committee appointed by state governors (Ezeani, 2012). In some cases, the state governors even terminate the tenure of elected councils or suspend them before the expiration of their mandate for reasons that, most often, border on petty politics. In such cases, Care-taker Committees are appointed to replace them.

#### **2.1.5 Interference in the local government financial autonomy**

The financial autonomy of the local governments is being severely interfered in by the state governments principally through the instrumentality of the State Joint Local Government Account. Andrews, (2012) and Ogban (2011) observe that state governments use the State Joint Local Government Account (SJLGA) mechanism to make local government appendages of the state. Odo (2003), Okolie and Eze (2001), Oguntuase (2012) and ALGON (1999), observe too that the state governments have turned the State Joint Local Government Account into an instrument to manipulate and control the local governments. For instance, in Enugu state under the regime of Governor Chimaroke Nnamani, between 1999 and 2007, the control of the State Joint Local Government Account by the state government was so total that local governments in the state were only “dashed” peanuts from their statutory allocations.

There were equally cases of over deduction in respect of certain expenses made by the state on behalf of the local governments. Such was the case in Enugu state then that the local governments sometimes barely had enough to pay salaries of the staff. A similar situation existed in Bornu State between March, 2002 and March, 2003, where half of the total of N13.3 billion that was available to the local governments in the state was improperly deducted at source by the state governments. Dlakwa, (2010) cited in Okafor (2010). Abada (2007) in respect of state governments interference in the local government financial autonomy generally observes thus; Local governments between 1999 – 2007 witnessed a lot of financial misappropriation and fraud being perpetrated by various state governments that actually eroded the autonomy of local governments. Indeed, the interference in the local government autonomy by the state governments has become so pervasive that in 2010, 31 out of the 36 states governors tampered with local government funds through the instrumentality of the State Joint Local Government Account (Ukiwo, 2010).

#### **2.1.6 Problems of Sustaining Local Government Autonomy**

It has been difficult to practice an enduring autonomy in Nigerian Local Government. Even, though various institutional structures have been put in place since the 1976 Local Government reform, so as to concretize certain degree of autonomy, yet an amalgam of bottlenecks have been put on the ways of an emergent autonomous Local Government. These are constitutional provisions, political instability in the polity,

financial/fiscal problems. It is an irony of fate that the military induced reforms in the Nigerian Local Government has its attendant contradictions, since the military structure is essentially hierarchical thus the operation of Local Government cannot be isolated from such contradictions that characterized military hegemony. Adeyeye (1996) opined that the Nigerian Federalism remains a formidable problem is evident in the various contradictions of military rule and the decrees they have spurned. Similarly, the continuous overbearing role has been exercise by the states posses a tremendous threat to the autonomy of Local Government. These can be seen within the realm of various contradictory rules, instructions, supervisory powers passed down to the local councils, some of which are outside the constitutional jurisdictions of the Local Governments.

The usurpation of Local Government functions and revenue sources by State Government is another serious area of eroding the autonomy of the Local Government. More often than not, parallel revenue boards, through the states unwittingly usurp and erode the revenue yielding areas of the Local Government. It is not uncommon to see such Boards to include market, motor parks, building plan approvals and forest royalty collection fund etc.

Furthermore it is appreciated that finance is the bedrock of any meaningful development. A balance sheet of the comparative performance of Nigerian Local Governments is nothing to write home about. Most of the Local Governments exist only for payment of salaries, as they depended on the federal allocation, which in most cases

are deducted from sources for the payment of Primary School Teachers Salaries. Even the mandatory 10percent Internally Generated Revenue of the State to Local Governments is not forthcoming. All said and done, other contradictions that tend to erode local government autonomy include the inability of the local governments to meet the finances of their constitutional responsibilities. Similarly, the heavy cost of implementing the separation of power poses yet another threat to local government autonomy.

## **2.2 Empirical Literature**

Fatile, Fajonyomi and Adejuwon (2018) examine the effect of State-Local Government fiscal relations on grassroots development in selected local governments in Lagos state, Nigeria. The study adopted a survey research design technique. The main instrument of data collection was questionnaire. The primary data collected were analysed using descriptive statistics, while the relevant hypotheses were tested using Pearson Product Moment Correlational analysis of hypotheses testing with the aid of Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS 20.0). Fatile, Fajonyomi and Adejuwon (2018) findings show that revenue allocation modules between and among the three levels of government have an attendant effect on grassroots development in Nigeria and also that with proper fiscal responsibility exercised by those entrusted with public fund there will be a positive effect on service delivery. The study, therefore, recommends that Local governments should be proactive and more aggressive in their internally generated revenue drives and find new ways of enhancing revenues. The 1999 constitution of the

Federal Republic of Nigeria needs to be amended so as to grant financial autonomy to states. The study concludes that in Lagos State, there are good mechanisms in place for local governments to drive revenue generation because of the industrial and cosmopolitan nature of the state which has made fiscal relations between the two tiers to be more harmonious when compared to what is applicable in other states of the federation.

Nurudeen (2015) examine the impact of state joint local government account on state local relations in South Western Nigeria. The study utilized primary and secondary sources of data. Primary data were sourced through interviews and administration of questionnaires. Using stratified random technique, one hundred and seventy (170) copies of questionnaires were administered on the senior and management staff of relevant ministries in the three selected States of public service and ministries, Lagos, Oyo and Osun State and three selected Local Governments each from the selected States. Out of the One hundred and ninety questionnaire distributed, 90 % (170) of the questionnaires were returned properly filled and analysed using Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) software to generate frequency and percentages. In addition, inferential statistics such as Pearson Correlation, Chi-square Test and Kruskal Wallis (Annova) were used to infer significance and relationship among the variables. Secondary data were collected from textbooks, journals and publication from the library and internet.

Nurudeen (2015) results revealed that State Local Government Joint Account has helped to reduced wasteful spending and corruption in the Local Government in South

Western Nigeria (72.4%). The result also shows that State Joint Local Government Account has resulted in effective monitoring of Local Government expenditure in South Western Nigeria (70.6%). The result also shows that State Joint Local Government Account has led to reduction in mismanagement and corruption at the Local Government in the South Western Nigeria (67%). The result also shows that State Local Government Joint Account has impeded on the autonomy and expenditure responsibilities of the Local Government in South Western Nigeria (82.3%). The result also shows that the State Joint Local Government Account has resulted in continual interference in the activities of Local Government by the State Government in South Western Nigeria (82.4%). The result also shows that the State Joint Local Government Account causes interference in the function of the local government by the state government in the Southwestern Nigeria (80.5%). Nurudeen (2015) furthermore, the result shows that State Joint Local Government Account brings about to lack of transparency and accountability by state government on actual revenue to be released to the local government in Southwestern Nigeria (63%). The study concluded that State-Joint Local Government Account has not enhanced the State-Local relations in Southwestern Nigeria.

### **2.3 Theoretical Framework**

In the practice of federalism government in a federal state the central national government does not hold all power, but shares power with sovereign states. This power to the states was expressly granted by the tenth amendment, the last of the Bill of Rights,

which states that: The federal government shares sovereignty with states, allowing the states the freedom to create their own sovereign laws based on their own needs and wants.

The concept of intergovernmental relations (IGR) can be understood by considering the three dimensions or schools of thought. The first school of thought believes that intergovernmental relations occur in a federal system, the second school of thought believes that it can only exist in both federal and unitary systems of government while the third stresses that it can take place at the international level. The above is an indication that intergovernmental relations exist in both the federal and unitary systems. Therefore, intergovernmental relations are not associated with any system of government. Adamolekun (1983) and Olopade (1984) defined intergovernmental relations as interactions that takes place among the different levels of government within a state. It is federalism in action. Okoli (2005) argues that IGR is dominated by the relationship between the central government and the major sub-national governments with the main features spelt out in the constitution.

Okoli added that IGR involves patterns of cooperative relationship between various levels of government in a federal governmental structure. IGR encourages a focus on the vertical and horizontal governmental and non-governmental policy-making structures at different levels and in different sectors of the overall intergovernmental process. It also places greater emphasis on cooperative as opposed to conflictual aspects of intergovernmental relations. In his opinion Watts (2008) identifies formal interactions

that are conducted exclusively among the governments of constituent units or states. The informal pattern occurs when the same party is dominant in both levels of government for IGR issues to be addressed within the informal structures of that party itself, rather than in more formal IGR channels. Watts (2008) cites Nigeria since 1999 as a notable example of a presidential regime with a strong executive. Nigerian federalism and IGR have gone through many changes over the past five decades. Frequent constitutional reforms or changes have taken place since independence in 1960, 1963, 1975 and 1979 (Ugwu, 1998) and most recently in 1999.

Ogbuishi (2007) gives reasons why IGR is necessary. They include: promoting peace and harmony among the three levels of government, to enhance the emergence of cooperation rather than competition in the federation, to ensure effective and efficient utilization of available human and material resources among the various levels of government, to accelerate the achievement of self reliant economy, to minimize intergovernmental conflict among the various levels of government, to solve problems of rural and urban poverty, to foster greater national integration via the activities of different levels of government.

### **2.3.1 Structural-Functional Theory**

In applying structural-functional analysis, Almond in Das and Choudhury (2000) hold that political system can be compared and ranked in terms of the manner in which the functions are performed. In fact, Varma (1996) maintains that Gabriel Almond would

always like to approach an understanding of the structures within the political system through their functions. Each political system, according to Almond, has to perform certain functions, and it is on the basis of the efficiency with which a political system performs the functions assigned to it that its stature in the scale of political development is determined. Almond therefore identifies two types of functions of a political system. They are input functions and output functions. The input functions are activities associated with the formation and transmission of demands and supports. They are political recruitment and socialization, interest articulation, interest aggregation, and political communication.

The 'specialized structures' for interest articulation, interest aggregation and political communication are interest groups, political parties and the mass media respectively (Varma, 1996). These input functions, according to Ntete-Nna (2004) are not performed by government or governmental agencies. Output functions, on the other hand, are a threefold governmental function associated with policy-making and implementation. They are rule making, rule application and rule adjudication. The summary of structural-functional approach is articulated by Anikpo (2006) in the remarks that 'the contemporary notion of structuralism is not tied to functionalist assumptions of order and equilibrium in society'. Accordingly, structural-functional approach not only recognizes the inter-dependence of the units of a society but also notes that the relationship between the sub-units does not lead to equilibrium neither is it a balancing factor. On the contrary,

the relationship between the sub-units is only a tool in the hands of the dominant sub-units of a system to sustain what Fidelis (2002) refers to as ‘a state of equilibrium of the disequilibria’. The result is affluence in the dominant parts and poverty, misery, chaos and other indices of underdevelopment in the dominated sub-units. Our interest and focus in the adoption of Structural-Functional theory is driven by its concern with interrelationship in a political system and the effects of structures and institutions on actors at the state and local governments. This explains our application of Structural-Functional Approach to the issue of state-local government relations.

### **2.3.2 Theory of Federation**

The thrust of the Theory of Federalism, which is our second theoretical framework for analysis, is premised upon the idea that existing structure of societal conflict, consensus and resources can be organized into two communities to which citizens belong. In other words, it is assumed that every citizen belongs to at least two political communities. Wheare (1963) is generally regarded as the foremost exponent of the modern theory and concept of federalism. The study of federalism is pre-occupied with the allocation of political power between the levels of government of a society. In a federal system, taking into account the formulation of K.C. Wheare, power is conceived or said to be divided between federal (central) and the state (regional or provincial) government by the constitutional arrangement of society such that certain limitations are placed upon the exercise of power by each level within the total situation. More than that,

it presupposes that not only can political power be allocated but that the concept itself can be explicitly defined and its constituents specified, measured or indicated (Alapiki & Odondiri, 1995).

In applying the theory of federalism, we are guided by the submission of Alapiki & Odondiri (1995) that in the last three decades, both focus and emphasis on federalism have tended to change with non -legal and non-formal institutions giving rise to essential ingredients and focus on analysis of intergovernmental relations. Consequently, scholars have tended to see federalism as ‘essentially a sociological phenomenon, a process or a political bargain’. Therefore, our adoption of the theory of federalism in this study is in recognition of the fact that power in federal system, as Alapiki and Odondiri (1995) averred, ‘reside not only in formal, legal and constitutional instruments, but perhaps more importantly on the dynamics of political, economic and social processes’.

### **2.3.3 Power Theory**

The concept of power is relative. Hickson et al (1971) defined power as the determination of the behaviour of one social unit by another. Following Kaplan (1964) it is seen as having three dimensions: weight or amount, scope, or ranges over behaviour and domain, number of persons or collectivities whose behaviour is determined. The power theory assumes that the responsibility of each unit of government is to promote the interest of its people against the opposition of other units in IGR. The whole question of federalism is related to the question of how power is shared (Fatile & Adejuwon, 2009).

Kelemen (2004) in his *Regulatory Federalism in Fused Power and Fragmented Power Federations* has considered power as an important tool in intergovernmental relations. Kelemen (2004) argues that in parliamentary federations, especially those of the executive-dominant Westminster type, the combination of a fusion of executive-legislative powers at both levels of the federal system and in upper legislative chamber with weak constituent unit representation at the national level tend to produce a decentralized pattern of center-state relations in most IGR policy areas. In Presidential federation like Nigeria where power is sharply divided among competing structures both horizontally and vertically, federation tends to produce a more centralized pattern of IGR policy making and regulation, which he describes as non-discretionary regulatory federalism. Kelemen classifies Canada and Australia as an ideal-type of a fused or concentrated power federation in their IGR policy-making while countries like US and Nigeria are classified as ideal-type of a fragmented power federation because of the numerous veto groups in their governmental decision-making process.

Kelemen's analysis of fragmented power is relevant to Nigeria IGR because a group or level of government tends to use its constitutional power to veto some bills in order to produce desired results. This is apparent between federal government and Lagos state government when the former declared null and void the creation of additional local development councils by the latter during the Obasanjo regime. This view is also

supported by Fatile and Adejuwon (2009) when they argued that the relationship between power theory and intergovernmental relations in Nigeria is apparent.

## **2.4 Application of Theoretical Framework to the Study**

The Structural Functional approach adopted in this study explains the relationships among the various tiers of government in a federal system. Gabriel Almond, a foremost exponent of the theory, emphasizes that the structures of government and how they function go a long way in determining the efficacy or otherwise of a political system. Almond even made a classification scheme of structures that is based, primarily, on the degree of differentiation, the stability of the functions of the various roles and the distribution of power. This will guide us determine systemic maintenance, survival and stability of both the state and local governments. Similarly, we applied the Theory of Federalism to analyze the relationship between the State and Local Governments in terms of the control or appropriation of resources and political power by either of the two units of the federation. This is done on the assumption that the stability of any federal system is often determined by the existence or otherwise of the opportunity for a fair equitable distribution and sharing of political power and revenue.

In this study, we assume the position that Structural-Functional Theory and Theory of Federalism are suitable for analysis, primarily because of the selective aspects of social reality that they seek to describe, explain and predict. This assisted us study state-local government relations, largely in terms of structures, processes, mechanisms,

and functions. These four concepts are of particular importance in the findings and discussions we made.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **Methodology**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

A good research work should be carried out with well defined method and this research work is not an exception. The methodology that will be employed for the research is a function of the research, purpose of the research and other variables. In other words, the method adopted for a particular research depends on the data and material available for accomplishing the research.

#### **3.2 Research Design**

The cross sectional survey research design was employed in this study. The design was adopted because of the relative small sample size needed to effectively carryout this research. It entails studying local - state government relations and issue of local government autonomy in Nigeria: A case study of Edo State with an examination of nine years democratic regime from 2010 – 2019, through the use of structured questionnaires to elicit information from the selected sample.

#### **3.3 The Population**

The population of this study was made up of all local government in Edo State. However, survey research design will be done in Benin City with all the members of the public who are above 18 years of age. The study sampled one hundred and fifty adult

residing in Benin City, Edo State, Nigeria who was chosen at random by the researcher for the administration of questionnaires.

### **3.4 The Sample Size**

The sample size of this study was one hundred and two (120), residents of Edo State based in Benin City.

### **3.5 Sampling Technique**

The sampling technique that was used in this research work is the simple random sampling technique. The researcher adopted simple random sampling technique in obtaining the sample size. This will be done by first constructing a sampling frame.

### **3.6 Sources of Data**

The researcher used both the primary and secondary sources of data.

- a. Primary Data: The primary data were gotten from the use of questionnaires and personal interview were conducted.
- b. Secondary Data: The Secondary data were gotten from the local government journals, annual report and internet.

### **3.7 Method of Data Analysis**

Simple percentage instrument was employed to analyse the questions, while chi-square statistics was used to analyse the hypotheses. The use of chi-square test as the research tool is because of its simplicity, the chi-square ( $X^2$ ) is a statistical tool that enables the researcher to establish if there is any relationship between two variables in the

total population. It does this by testing whether the row classification of the dependent variables is either accepted or rejected. The variable in question must have the structural characteristics of normal and ordinal measures.

### Decision Rule

The calculated value of  $X^2$  is compared with the table (critical value) for  $X^2$  for given degree of freedom at 0.5% in a certain specified level of significance. In other words, where the computed values are greater than the control value, the null hypothesis is rejected while the alternatives hypothesis is accepted if  $X^2$  is less than the value of  $X^2$ , the difference between theory and observation is considered less significant. Therefore, the null hypothesis is accepted while the alternatives hypothesis is rejected.

Chi Square formula:

The Chi Square has two computational formulas

$$1. \chi^2 = \frac{n(ad-bc)}{(a+b)(c+d)(a+c)(b+d)}$$

Where a, b, c, d = Observed frequencies

This formula is strictly restricted to a  $2 \times 2$  table.

$$2. \chi^2 = \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{(f_o - f_e)^2}{f_e}$$

Where  $f_o$  = observed frequencies

$f_e$  = expected frequencies

This test is based strictly on the primary data gotten from the use of questionnaire.

**Decision Rule:** Reject Null Hypothesis if calculated value of  $(X^2)$  is greater than the critical value and accept Null Hypothesis if calculated value of  $(X^2)$  is less than the critical value.

The Degree of freedom =  $(n - 1) (k - 1)$

Where Df = Degree of freedom

n = Number of rows

k = Number of column

## CHAPTER FOUR

### Presentation and Analysis of Data

#### 4.0 Introduction

In any empirical research work the presentation and analysis of data is fundamental. This study is aimed at local state government relation and issue of local government autonomy in Nigeria: A case study of Edo State cover period of ten years. This chapter is concerned with the presentation and analysis of data gathered through the use of questionnaire distributed to the respondents. During the survey, one hundred and fifty questionnaires was administered and one hundred and twenty was return completed

The results of the analysis are tabulated below.

#### 4.1 Analysis of Data

**TABLE 4.1 Gender of Respondents**

<b>Sex</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage (%)</b>
Male	73	60.83
Female	47	39.17
<b>Total</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Source: Field survey, 2021**

Table 4.1 Shows that 60.837%, which translated to 73 respondents', are male, while 39.17%, which translated to 47 respondents are female. This indicates that the male were more represented than females.

**Table 4.2 Age of Respondents**

<b>Age</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage (%)</b>
Under 30 years	34	28.33
31-40 years	25	20.83
41-50 years	41	34.17
50-60 years	15	12.50
Above 60	5	4.17
<b>Total</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source: Field survey, 2021**

Table 4.2 above shows that 34 respondents representing 28.33% were under 30 years, 25 respondents representing 20.83% were 31-40 years, 41 respondents representing 34.17% were 41-50 years, 15 respondents representing 12.50% were 50-60 years, while 5 respondents representing 4.17% were above 60 years. This implies that all the respondents fall within the independent age group.

**Table 4.3: Respondents Educational Qualification**

<b>Educational qualification</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage (%)</b>
Primary/O' Level	20	16.17
B.A/BSC	33	27.50
M.Sc. and Above	22	18.33
Learned Trade	30	25.00
Vocational Studies	15	12.50
<b>Total</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source: Field survey, 2021**

Table 4.3 shows that 20 respondents representing 16.17% had primary/O' Level certificate, 33 respondents representing 27.50% had B.A/BSC, 22 respondents representing 18.33% had Masters and above certificate, 30 respondents representing

25.00% had learned trade, while, 15 respondents representing 12.50% has vocational studies. The implication of this study is that all respondents had one form of training or other, confirming that they have basic idea of the study.

#### 4.2 Presentation and Analysis of Questionnaires

##### Research Question 1: What is the Relationship between Local Government and State Government in Edo State?

**Table4.5: Interference in the functions of the local government by state government?**

Variables	No of respondents	% of respondents
SA	45	37.50
A	35	29.17
SD	25	20.83
D	15	12.50
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>100</b>

*Source: Field Survey, 2021*

From Table 5 above, 45 respondents representing 37.50% strongly agreed that there is interference in the functions of the local government by state government while 35 respondents representing 29.17% agreed, 25 respondents representing 20.83% strongly disagreed, while 15 respondents representing 12.50% disagreed.

##### Table 4.6: The Interference has resulted in transparency and accountability in the activities of state and local government?

<b>Variables</b>	<b>No of respondents</b>	<b>% of respondents</b>
SA	43	35.83
A	38	31.16
SD	24	20.00
D	15	12.50
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>100</b>

*Source: Field Survey, 2021*

From Table 6 above, 43 respondents representing 35.83% strongly agreed that stated control over local government autonomy has resulted in transparency and accountability in the activities of state and local government while 38 respondents representing 31.16% agreed, 24 respondents representing 20.00% strongly disagreed, while 15 respondents representing 12.50% disagreed.

**Table 4.7: The Interference has resulted in coordination and collaboration in execution of project by state and local governments?**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>No of respondents</b>	<b>% of respondents</b>
SA	55	45.83
A	40	33.33
SD	13	10.83
D	12	10.00
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>100</b>

*Source: Field Survey, 221*

Table 7 above revealed that 55 respondents representing 45.83% strongly agreed with the statement, 40 respondents representing 33.33% agreed, 13 respondents representing 10.83% strongly disagreed, while 12 respondents representing 10%

disagreed that local - state has aided the coordination and collaboration in execution of project by state and local governments.

**Table 4.8: The Interference has the operations of the local government in Edo state hence, need for local autonomy?**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>No of respondents</b>	<b>% of respondents</b>
SA	49	40.83
A	33	27.50
SD	20	16.67
D	18	15.00
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>100</b>

*Source: Field Survey, 2021*

The table 8 above shows that 40.83% of the respondents strongly agreed, 27.50% of the respondents agreed, 16.67% of the respondents strongly disagreed, while 15% of the respondents disagreed that local- state relations has led to limit in the operations of the local government in Edo state hence, need for local autonomy.

**Table 4.9: The Interference has resulted to good intergovernmental relationship between local – state financial allocation?**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>No of respondents</b>	<b>% of respondents</b>
SA	50	41.66
A	45	37.50
SD	15	12.50
D	10	8.33
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>100</b>

*Source: Field Survey, 2021*

Table 9 above shows that 50 respondents representing 4166% strongly agreed with the statement, 25 respondents representing 37.50% agreed, 15 respondents

representing 12.50% strongly disagreed, 8.33% disagreed that local – state relations has resulted to good intergovernmental relationship between local – state financial allocation.

**Research Question 2: What is the Implication of State Joint Local Government Account on the Financial Autonomy of Local Government Councils?**

**Table 4.10: The Joint local government has resulted in effective monitoring of local government expenditure?**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>No of respondents</b>	<b>% of respondents</b>
SA	39	43.33
A	26	28.89
SD	11	12.22
D	14	15.56
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>100</b>

*Source: Field Survey, 2021*

From the Table 10 above, 43.33% of the respondents strongly agreed that it has resulted in effective monitoring of local government expenditure, 28.89% agreed, 12.22% strongly disagreed, while 15.56% disagreed respectively.

**Table 4.11: The Joint local government has reduced wasteful spending and corruption in the local government?**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>No of respondents</b>	<b>% of respondents</b>
SA	38	31.16
A	33	27.50
SD	24	20.00
D	25	20.83
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>100</b>

*Source: Field Survey, 2021*

Table 11.above revealed that 31.16% of the respondents strongly agreed, 27.50% agreed, 20% strongly disagreed, while 20.83% disagreed, with the above statement.

**Table 4.12: The Joint local government has led to reduction in mismanagement and corruption at the local government?**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>No of respondents</b>	<b>% of respondents</b>
SA	60	50.00
A	40	33.33
SD	12	10.00
D	8	6.67
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>100</b>

*Source: Field Survey, 2021*

From result in Table 50% strongly agreed, 33.33% agreed, 10% strongly disagree, while 6.67% disagreed that State Joint Local Government Account has led to reduction in mismanagement and corruption at the local government.

**Table 4.13: Disbursement of funds from this State Joint Local Government Account is highly efficient and transparent?**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>No of respondents</b>	<b>% of respondents</b>
SA	45	37.50
A	35	29.17
SD	22	18.33
D	18	15.00
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>100</b>

*Source: Field Survey, 2021*

Table 13 shows that 37.50% strongly agreed, 29.17% agreed, 18.33% strongly disagreed, while 15% disagreed with disbursement of funds from State Joint Local Government Account is highly efficient and transparent.

**Table 4.14: The Joint local government has led to transparency and accountability in the activities of the state and local governments?**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>No of respondents</b>	<b>% of respondents</b>
SA	44	36.67
A	53	44.17
SD	15	12.50
D	8	6.67
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>100</b>

*Source: Field Survey, 2021*

Table 14 shows that 36.67% of the respondents strongly agreed with the statement, 44.17% agreed, 12.50% strongly disagree, while 6.67% disagreed respectively according to the result in the table above.

**Research Question 3: Administrative Structures of Local Government Councils Subject to or Insulated from the Control and Manipulations of the State Government?**

**Table 4.15: It has resulted in continual interference in the activities of local government by the State Government?**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>No of respondents</b>	<b>% of respondents</b>
SA	35	29.17
A	58	48.33
SD	15	12.50
D	12	10.00
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>100</b>

*Source: Field Survey, 2021*

Table 15 above shows that 29.17% of the respondents strongly agreed with the statement, 48.33% agreed, 12.50% of the respondents strongly disagreed, while 10%

disagreed that Control and Manipulations of local government by the State has resulted in continual interference in the activities of local government by the State Government.

**Table 4.16: Administrative Structures of Local Government Councils has constrained the functions of local governments and concentrated power in favour of state government?**

Variables	No of respondents	% of respondents
SA	60	50.00
A	40	33.33
SD	14	11.67
D	6	5.00
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>100</b>

*Source: Field Survey, 2021*

Table 16 above shows that 50% of the respondents strongly agreed with the statement, 33.33% agreed, 11.67% strongly disagreed while 5% disagreed with the statement.

**Table 4.17: Administrative Structures of Local Government Councils has stopped duplication of efforts in project execution by the State and local governments?**

Variables	No of respondents	% of respondents
SA	53	44.17
A	43	35.33
SD	15	12.50
D	9	7.50
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>100</b>

*Source: Field Survey, 2021*

Table 17 above shows that 44.17% of the respondents strongly agreed with state Control and Manipulations of the local government by the state, 35.17% agreed, 12.50% strongly disagreed, while 7.50% disagreed with the statement.

**Table 4.18: Administrative Structures of Local Government Councils has led to suspicion and lack of trust between state and local government?**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>No of respondents</b>	<b>% of respondents</b>
SA	44	36.67
A	52	43.33
SD	12	10.00
D	12	10.00
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>100</b>

*Source: Field Survey, 2021*

Table 18 shows that 36.67% of the respondents strongly agreed with the statement, 43.33% agreed, 10% of respondents strongly disagreed, while 10% disagreed respectively according to the result in the table above.

**Table 4.19 Administrative Structures of Local Government Councils has incapacitated the local government from executing projects for rural development?**

<b>Variables</b>	<b>No of respondents</b>	<b>% of respondents</b>
SA	70	58.33
A	29	24.17
SD	9	7.50
D	0	0.00
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>100</b>

*Source: Field Survey, 2021*

From result in Table 19 shows that 58.33% strongly agreed, 24.17% agreed, 7.50% disagreed that state control and manipulations of the local government has incapacitated the local government from executing projects for rural development.

### 4.3 Hypotheses Testing

#### Hypotheses I

H<sub>0</sub>: There is no significant relationship between local government and state government in Edo State.

H<sub>1</sub>: There is significant relationship between local government and state government in Edo State.

Option/Questions	1	2	3	Total
SA	45	43	55	143
A	35	38	40	113
SD	25	24	13	62
D	15	15	12	42
Total	120	120	120	360

*Source: Field Survey, (2021)*

Expected frequency =  $\frac{(\text{Column total}) \text{ Row total}}{\text{Grand total}}$

$$R_1C_1 = \frac{120 \times 143}{360} = 47.67$$

$$R_2C_1 = \frac{120 \times 113}{360} = 37.67$$

$$R_2C_1 = \frac{120 \times 62}{360} = 20.67$$

$$R_2C_1 = \frac{120 \times 42}{360} = 14.00$$

## Contingency Table

**Table (i) Contingency Table for Hypothesis I**

O	E	(o-e)	(o-e) <sup>2</sup>	(o-e) <sup>2/e</sup>
45	47.67	-2.67	7.13	0.15
35	37.67	-2.67	7.13	0.20
25	20.67	4.33	18.75	0.91
15	14.00	1.00	1.00	0.07
43	47.67	-4.67	21.81	0.46
38	37.67	0.33	0.11	0.002
24	20.67	3.33	11.09	0.54
15	14.00	1.00	1.00	0.07
55	47.67	7.33	53.73	1.13
40	37.67	2.33	5.43	0.14
13	20.67	-7.67	58.83	2.85
12	14.00	2.00	4.00	0.29
X <sup>2</sup>				6.81

Calculated X<sup>2</sup> = 6.81

Degree of freedom = (r-1) (c-1)

= (4-1) (3-1)

= (3) (2)

= 6

& at 0.05 level = 12.592

6.81 < 12.592

**Decision:** Calculated X<sup>2</sup> is less than critical X<sup>2</sup>, therefore accept the H<sub>0</sub> which states that there is no significant relationship between local government and state government in Edo State. and accept the alternative H<sub>1</sub>.

**Decision:** We accept  $H_1$  which states that there is no significant relationship between local government and state government in Edo State.

**Hypothesis Two testing**

$H_0$ : There is no significant relationship between State Joint Local Government Account and the financial autonomy of Local Government Councils.

$H_1$ : There is significant relationship between State Joint Local Government Account and the financial autonomy of Local Government Councils.

<b>Option/Questions</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>Total</b>
<b>SA</b>	39	38	60	137
<b>A</b>	26	33	40	99
<b>SD</b>	11	24	12	47
<b>D</b>	14	25	8	47
Total	120	120	120	360

*Source: Field Survey, (2021)*

Expected frequency =  $\frac{(\text{Column total}) \text{ Row total}}{\text{Grand total}}$

$$R_1C_1 = \frac{120 \times 137}{360} = 45.67$$

$$R_2C_1 = \frac{120 \times 99}{360} = 33.00$$

$$R_2C_1 = \frac{120 \times 47}{360} = 15.67$$

$$R_2C_1 = \frac{120 \times 47}{360} = 15.67$$

Contingency Table

**Table (i) Contingency Table for Hypothesis II**

<b>O</b>	<b>E</b>	<b>(o-e)</b>	<b>(o-e)<sup>2</sup></b>	<b>(o-e)<sup>2/e</sup></b>
39	45.67	-6.67	44.49	0.97
26	33.00	-7.00	49.00	1.49
11	15.67	-4.67	21.81	1.39
14	15.67	1.70	2.89	0.18
38	45.67	-7.67	58.83	1.29
33	33.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
24	15.67	8.33	69.39	4.43
25	15.67	9.33	87.05	5.56
60	45.67	14.33	205.35	4.50
40	33.00	7.00	49.00	1.49
12	15.67	-3.67	13.47	0.86
8	15.67	-7.67	58.83	3.75
<b>X<sup>2</sup></b>				<b>25.91</b>

Calculated  $X^2 = 25.91$

Degree of freedom = (r-1) (c-1)

$$= (4-1) (3-1)$$

$$= (3) (2)$$

$$= 6$$

& at 0.05 level = 12.592

$$25.91 > 12.592$$

**Decision:** Calculated  $X^2$  is greater than critical  $X^2$ , therefore reject  $H_0$  which states that there is no significant relationship between State Joint Local Government Account and the financial autonomy of Local Government Councils and accept the alternative  $H_1$ .

**Decision:** We accept  $H_1$  which states that there is significant relationship between State Joint Local Government Account and the financial autonomy of Local Government Councils.

### Hypothesis Three testing

$H_0$ : There is no significant relationship between the administrative structures of Local Government Councils and control and manipulations of the State Government.

$H_1$ : There is significant relationship between the administrative structures of Local Government Councils and control and manipulations of the State Government.

Option/Questions	11	12	14	Total
SA	35	60	53	148
A	58	40	43	141
SD	15	14	15	44
D	12	6	9	27
Total	120	120	120	360

*Source: Field Survey, (2021)*

Expected frequency =  $\frac{(\text{Column total}) \text{ Row total}}{\text{Grand total}}$

$$R_1C_1 = \frac{120 \times 148}{360} = 49.33$$

$$R_2C_1 = \frac{120 \times 141}{360} = 47.00$$

$$R_2C_1 = \frac{120 \times 44}{360} = 14.67$$

$$R_2C_1 = \frac{120 \times 27}{360} = 9.00$$

### Contingency Table

**Table (i) Contingency Table for Hypothesis III**

O	E	(o-e)	(o-e) <sup>2</sup>	(o-e) <sup>2/e</sup>
35	49.33	-14.33	205.35	4.16
58	47.00	11.00	121.00	2.58
15	14.67	0.33	0.11	0.01
12	9.00	3.00	9.00	1.00
60	49.33	10.67	113.85	2.31
40	47.00	-7.00	49.00	1.04
14	14.67	-0.67	0.45	0.03
6	9.00	-3.00	9.00	1.00
53	49.33	3.67	13.47	0.27
43	47.00	-4.00	16.00	0.34
15	14.67	0.33	0.11	0.01
9	9.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
<b>X<sup>2</sup></b>				<b>12.75</b>

Calculated  $X^2 = 12.75$

Degree of freedom = (r-1) (c-1)

$$= (4-1) (3-1)$$

$$= (3) (2)$$

$$= 6$$

& at 0.05 level = 12.592

12.75 > 12.592

**Decision:** Calculated  $X^2$  is greater than critical  $X^2$ , therefore reject  $H_0$  which states that there is no significant relationship between the administrative structures of Local Government Councils and control and manipulations of the State Government and accept the alternative  $H_1$ .

**Decision:** We accept  $H_1$  which states that there is a slight significant relationship between the administrative structures of Local Government Councils and control and manipulations of the State Government.

#### **4.4 Discussion of Findings**

The findings revealed that the calculated chi-square  $X^2$  6.81 is less than critical  $X^2$  12.592, therefore accept the  $H_0$  which states that there is no significant relationship between local government and state government in Edo State and accept the alternative  $H_1$ . This implies we accept  $H_1$  which states that there is no significant relationship between local government and state government in Edo State. This findings corroborate with extant literature by Angwe (2000) found the relationship between states and local governments in Nigeria as a fragile relationship. He found that financial autonomy, elections, taxation and population as the yardstick to measure a viable and sound local government that would meet the yearnings and aspirations of its members.

The result of the findings show that Calculated  $X^2$  25.91 is greater than critical  $X^2$  12.592, therefore reject  $H_0$  which states that there is no significant relationship between State Joint Local Government Account and the financial autonomy of Local Government

Councils and accept the alternative  $H_1$ . Hence, we accept  $H_1$  which states that there is significant relationship between State Joint Local Government Account and the financial autonomy of Local Government Councils. This findings support extant literatures such as Onah, (2007); Azelama, (2008); and Ezeani, 2012) found that the interference in the local government statutory allocations by the state governments reasonably accounts for the inability of the local governments to initiate and execute development programs or projects. Oguntuase (2012), Okolie and Eze (2001), also agree that the state governments have turned the State Joint Local Government Account into an instrument to manipulate and control the local governments.

The computer chi-square  $X^2$  value of 12.75 is greater than the critical  $X^2$  value of 12.592, therefore we reject  $H_0$  which states that there is no significant relationship between the administrative structures of Local Government Councils and control and manipulations of the State Government and accept the alternative  $H_1$ . This implies that there is a slight significant relationship between the administrative structures of Local Government Councils and control and manipulations of the State Government. This findings corroborate with the extant study by Ikeanyibe, Chukwu and Ibietan (2019), found that the administrative structures of Local Government Councils are control and manipulations by the State Government.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **Summary of Findings, Conclusion and Recommendation**

#### **5.1 Introduction**

This chapter intends to provide the summary of finding, conclusion, recommendations and policy recommendations.

#### **5.2 Summary of Findings**

In the course of this study, the analysis of the responses to the questionnaires shows that a very high percentage of the respondents confirm the “Local State Government Relation and Issue of Local Government Autonomy in Nigeria: A Case Study of Edo State 2010 – 2018”. The following are summary of the findings from this study:

The responses revealed that state interference impedes functions of the local government by state government and it has resulted in transparency and accountability in the activities of state and local government. The findings show that it has resulted in coordination and collaboration in execution of project by state and local governments and local – state relation limit in the operations of the local government in Edo state hence, need for local autonomy. The result indicated that local – state relation has resulted to good intergovernmental relationship between local – state financial allocation.

The findings shows that local implication of state joint local government account on the financial autonomy has resulted in effective monitoring of local government expenditure and that state joint local government account on the financial autonomy has

reduced wasteful spending and corruption in the local government. The result indicated that state joint local government account on the financial autonomy has led to reduction in mismanagement and corruption at the local government and that disbursement of funds from this account is highly efficient and transparent. The result revealed that state joint local government account on the financial autonomy has led to transparency and accountability in the activities of the state and local governments.

The result of the findings indicated that state control and manipulations of the local government has resulted in continual interference, in the activities of local government by the State Government. The result of the response state control and manipulations of the local government has constrain the functions of local governments and concentrated power in favour of state government and state control and manipulations of the local government has stopped duplication of efforts in project execution by the State and local governments. The response indicated that has state control over local government led to suspicion and lack of trust between state and local government and state control and manipulations of the local government has incapacitated the local government from executing projects for rural development.

### **5.3 Conclusion**

Based on the findings of this study on local - state government relations and issue of local government autonomy in Nigeria, the following conclusion was made:

- i. There is no significant relationship between local government and state government in Edo State.

- ii. There is significant relationship between State Joint Local Government Account and the financial autonomy of Local Government Councils.
- iii. There is a slight significant relationship between the administrative structures of Local Government Councils and control and manipulations of the State Government.

#### **5.4 Recommendations**

Based on the empirical findings of this study the recommendations:

1. In order to ensure smooth and cordial relationship between the State and the Local Government in the areas of fiscal relations, there is need for either restructuring or total abolition of the State Joint Local Government Account in the South Western Nigeria States. This is to ensure the efficiency and effectiveness and accountability of the Local Government in rural development.
2. In the case of restructuring, the federal Government should re-examine the section that provide for the creation of the State Joint Local Government Account in order to ensure proper monitoring and punishment from the organ that violate the laid down procedure. This could be achieved by the introduction of machinery assessment and supervision of policies and projects that the allocations send to the State Joint Local Government Account is used for. This will largely reduce the extent at which the state Government tamper with the Local Government in the areas of rural development and to a large extent increase the level of autonomy of Local Government of the region.

3. On the other hand, the State Joint Local Government Account could be abolished to ensure that there is no intermediary between the Local Government and The Federal Government in the distribution of allocation. This will enable the Local Government to be responsible and accountable for all her actions and inaction. This will eradicate unjustifiable coordination of the State Joint Local Government Account by the State Government.

Hence, if any of these recommendations is being tested, it will go a long way in reducing the over-dependency of the Local Government on the State Government. This will end up strengthening the Local Government in their autonomy, rural development and accountability, and the efficiency and effectiveness in the policy formulation and implementation.

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**APPENDIX**  
**RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE**  
Department of Public Administration,  
Faculty of Social Sciences,  
University of Benin,  
Benin City.

19th March, 2020.

Dear Sir/Madam,

**REQUEST FOR COMPLETION OF QUESTIONNAIRE**

I am of the above department student, undergoing a B.Sc. programme in the University of Benin. I am currently on a study: “**Local-State Government Relations and Issues of Local Government Autonomy in Nigeria: A Case Study of Edo State**”.

I wish to appeal to you to assist by kindly sparing a few minutes to complete this questionnaire as honestly as you can. Your opinion or information supplied will be used purely for academic purposes and such information will be treated with utmost confidentiality.

Thanks for your anticipated cooperation.

Yours faithfully,

**EVBUOMWAN OSAYANDE JAMES**

*Researcher*

## SECTION A

Part A: Personal Data Please tick (√) the option that is applicable to you.

1. Gender: a. male ( ) b. female ( ).
2. Age: a. under 30 ( ) b. 31-40 ( ) c. 41-50 ( ) d. 50-60 ( ) e. above 60 ( ).
3. Educational qualification: a. Primary/O' level ( ), b. B.A/BSC ( ) c. M.Sc. and Above ( ), d. Learned Trade ( ).
4. Years in service: a. 1-10 years ( ) b. 11-20 years ( ) c. above 30years ( )

Part B: Local – State Government Relation and Issue of Autonomy

## SECTION B

### SECTION B

<b>Section 1</b>		<b>Responses</b>			
<b>What is the Relationship between Local Government and State Government in Edo State?</b>		<b>SA</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>D</b>	<b>SD</b>
1.	Interference in the functions of the local government by state government				
2.	The interference has resulted in transparency and accountability in the activities of state and local government				
3.	The interference has resulted in coordination and collaboration in execution of project by state and local governments				
4.	The interference has led to limit in the operations of the local government in Edo state hence, need for local autonomy				
5.	The interference has resulted to good intergovernmental relationship between local – state financial allocation				
<b>Section 2</b>					
<b>What is the Implication of State Joint Local Government Account on the Financial Autonomy of Local Government Councils?</b>					
1.	The Joint local government has resulted in effective				

	monitoring of local government expenditure				
2.	It has reduced wasteful spending and corruption in the local government				
3.	The Joint local government has led to reduction in mismanagement and corruption at the local government				
4.	Disbursement of funds from this account is highly efficient and transparent				
5.	The Joint local government has led to transparency and accountability in the activities of the state and local governments				
	<b>Section 3</b>				
	<b>Administrative Structures of Local Government Councils Subject to or Insulated from the Control and Manipulations of the State Government?</b>				
1.	Administrative structures of local government councils has resulted in continual interference in the activities of local government by the State Government				
2.	Administrative structures of local government councils has constrain the functions of local governments and concentrated power in favour of state government				
3.	Administrative structures of local government councils has stopped duplication of efforts in project execution by the State and local governments				
4.	Administrative structures of local government councils has led to suspicion and lack of trust between state and local government				
5.	Administrative structures of local government councils has incapacitated the local government from executing projects for rural development				