

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND SECURITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES

BY

**EJIROGHENE OGHALE EMUEDO
(MAT NO: PG/SSC2015701)**

**DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
UNIVERSITY OF BENIN,
BENIN CITY**

OCTOBER. 2023

ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND SECURITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES

BY

EJIROGHENE OGHALE EMUEDO
(MAT NO: PG/SSC2015701)
BSc. (Pol. Sc and Pub. Admin), Western Delta University, Oghara

**A PROJECT UNDERTAKEN IN THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION, SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF POSTGRADUATE STUDIES,
UNIVERSITY OF BENIN, IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
AWARD OF MASTER DEGREE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

SUPERVISOR: DR. E. AKPOMERA

OCTOBER. 2023

Certification

We hereby certify that this Research Work was carried out by **Ejiroghene Oghale Emuedo** in the Department of Political Science, University of Benin, Nigeria.

We certify that it is adequate in scope and quality and therefore in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of Master of Science (MSc) degree in International Relations.

Dr. E Akpomera
(Project Supervisor)

Date

Dr. J.O. Aihie
(Head of Department)

Date

Dedication

This Project is dedicated to my loving parents Dr. and Dr. (Mrs) Crosdel Emuedo, who have always been there for me.

Acknowledgement

I hereby express my sincere gratitude to God Almighty, the giver of life and knowledge who has made this endeavour possible. My gratitude also goes to my project supervisor, Dr. E. Akpomera, for his patience, and genuine guidance and directives to me during the course of this study. I also wish to appreciate all my lecturers in this Masters class; Professor A. Otoghile, Dr C Eghwaree,

Dr I Aghedo and Dr O Idahosa, Dr. J.O. Aihie and Professor S. Ebohon for their love towards me throughout my studies.

Finally, my big thanks to my parents their support to me throughout the Masters Programme.

Ejiroghene O. Emuedo
University of Benin, Nigeria.
October 2023.

Table of Contents

Title	Page
Certification	I
Dedication	ii
Acknowledgement	iii
Abstract	iv
Table of contents	v
Chapter One: Introduction	1
1.2 Background of the Study	3
1.3 Statement of the Problem	5
1.4 Objectives of the Study	6
1.5 Research Questions	6
1.6 Significance of the Study	7
1.7 Definition of Terms and Abbreviations	7
Chapter Two: Literature Review and Theoretical Framework	9
2.1 Concept of Integration	9
2.1.1 Theories of Economic Integration	10
2.1.2 Regional Integration and Insecurity	13
2.2 The Concept of Security	15
2.2.1 Insecurity in West African States	18
2.2.2 Guinea- Bissau	18
2.2.3 Niger Republic	22
2.2.4 The Gambia	23
2.2.5 Mali	25
2.3 Political Economy of Insecurity	27
2.4 The Politics of Insecurity	28
2.5 The Economics of Insecurity	29
2.6 Theoretical Framework	32
2.6.1 Integration in Africa and Developing Countries	32
Chapter Three: Methodology of the Study	35

3.1	Research Methodology	35
3.2	Population of the Study	35
3.3	Source of Data	35
3.4	Limitations of the Study	35
Chapter Four: Challenges of Integration in ECOWAS		37
4.1	Dilemma of Instability	37
4.2	Intra ECOWAS Trade	38
4.3	Economic Performance of ECOWAS States	42
4.4	Foreign Aid as Indicator of Economic Performance	47
Chapter Five: Conclusion and Recommendation		51
5.1	Conclusion	51
5.2	Recommendations	52
	References	56

List of Tables

Table 1:	Number of Check Points on some Highways across ECOWAS	37
Table 2:	Structure of Community Trade	38
Table 3:	Share of Total Trade in \$ Millions (by Country)	39
Table 4:	Intra Community Trade	40
Table 5:	Exports to other REC members-or the World in 2000	41
Table 6:	FDI inflows, by Region and Economy, 1990 – 2013	43
Table 7:	FDI flows to Developing Countries, 1970 – 2013 (%)	44
Table 8:	Trends in Real GDP Growth Rates in ECOWAS Member States (2013 –2017)	44
Table 9:	Inflation in ECOWAS and WAMZ (2015–2017) (%).	45
Table 10:	Budget deficit (excluding grants) as % of GDP in ECOWAS and selected countries	46
Table 11:	Fiscal balance and external current account (including grants) in Africa 2009–2019 (% of GDP).	46
Table 12:	Annual growth rate (AGR) in Foreign Aid (FA) inflows to ECOWAS 2000 - 2017 (in billions of current US\$)	48
Table 13:	Foreign Aid received in ECOWAS 2000 and 2017 (%) of GNI.	49

Abstract

The focus of this study is on the effect of conflicts on economic integration of West African States. This is premised on the fact that almost all the States in the sub-region have been engulfed by one form of conflict at one time or the other, some of which have resulted in State collapse. Empirical data were gathered from relevant sources during the course of this research. For developing countries, regional integration is far more than just market integration. Thus, integration in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has become synonymous with economic development, with enhanced intra-regional trade being only one component of such development. ECOWAS ought to have been the mechanism for galvanising the West African sub-region into the globalisation phenomenon. However, the organisation is making little efforts in its realistic integration efforts after more than two decades. This state of affairs is attributable to the strife-torn inter-state relationships characterising the sub-region. Thus, coups, fratricidal conflicts and insurgency have become implacable words in the political discourse of the sub-region.

The study concludes that the preponderance of conflicts in the sub-region, which are mostly offshoot of regional leaders' fixation on the Clausewitzian concept of security (state-centric conception of security), has negatively affected integration efforts of the sub-region.

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

Regional integration for developing countries goes beyond means of development thus, for them, it is more than just economic (market) integration. As Adepoju, (2016) stated, integration is rational response to difficulties, which confronts regions with small markets. Thus, regional integration is synonymous with economic development, with boosted intra-regional trade being one of the components. According to Abutudu (1988) economic integration in West Africa's is intended to release the sub-region from external dependence. In Abutudu's opinion, political independence of West African states can only be transformed into economic independence, by enhancing their poor economies through merging. The process was defined from viewpoint of co-operation in all areas, including the economy, transportation, communication, agriculture, energy, commerce, mineral resources, finance, social and cultural issues (Osadolor, 1997). Arising from the foregoing, ECOWAS was to be a new era in economic cooperation (Velde, 2011). It is seen as continuum of liberation movements and basis to transform the sub-region into united viable economic and political entity. Though aim of ECOWAS was achievement of economic integration, increasing security challenges have expanded its objectives to include security. This incidentally has become the main pre-occupation of the organisation. For instance, ECOWAS initial intervention internal conflicts, led to the formation of ECOMOG in 1990. Since then, however, the body has intervened in many countries; Guinea Bissau, (1999) Mali (2013), Côte d Ivoire (2019), and Burkina Faso (2012), Niger (2011), Chad (2014) and Benin (2017). Also, there have been coups and counter coups in several countries. As a result, ECOWAS has been mainly preoccupied more with the settlement of conflicts than on fostering measures that would enhance the region's economic viability. Aside all these, many countries while

intervening in other countries are also faced with their own internal problems.. Its membership consists include mainly [Islamic states namely; Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. It GDP is estimated at \\$425.7 billion](#)

Established in 1998, CENSAD (Community of Sahel-Saharan States) was officially recognised as economic community in July 2000 by now defunct OAU, (Organization of African Unity) CENSAD GDP is \$1,350.7 billion.

For instance, ECOWAS initial intervention internal conflicts, led to the formation of ECOMOG in 1990. Since then, however, the body has intervened in many countries; Guinea Bissau, (1999) Mali (2013), Côte d Ivoire (2019), and Burkina Faso (2012), Niger (2011), Chad (2014) and Benin (2017). Also, there have been coups and counter coups in several countries. As a result, ECOWAS has been mainly preoccupied more with the settlement of conflicts than on fostering measures that would enhance the region's economic viability. Aside all these, many countries while intervening in other countries are also faced with their own internal problems.Regional economic integration has several benefits, which according to De Melo and Tsikata,(2014), includes efficient trade, economies of scale and reduction freer borders. Mbekeani, (2013), also, opined that it provides prospects to leverage fair advantage at regional level in ways inaccessible in nation states. As Cara (2015) stated, integration implies [loose and weak centre lacking power to effect decisions on member-states. Thus, regional cooperation is commonly shared desire by states in a region to act with respect to particular issue\(s\) involving implementation of joint schemes that includes; technical cooperation, running of common services and development of natural resources \(Ekpo and Udo, 2017\).](#)

Thus, regional economic integration is agreement among states in a region to reduce tariffs and barriers flow of goods and factors of production among members. This results from

economic and geographical diversity of countries in a region, with varying disparities (Mbekeani, 2013; UNCTAD 2014).

1.2 Background of the Study

ECOWAS was an effort by the region to unite their economies (Chambas, 2007). This is because joining political and economic has been accepted as a right process to create common prosperity in the region (Mkwezalamba, 2011; Engel and Jouanjean, 2013b). In 1945, CFA franc was created to join French-speaking countries in a single monetary union. This started integration efforts that began with adoption of the Lagos Treaty that created ECOWAS in 1975.

ECOWAS was meant to foster cooperation among states in the sub-region. It embarked on economic programs to accelerate economic growth by removing hurdles to movement of goods, capital and people (Dinshak and Damla, 2018).

The process evolves through open trading and removal of barriers to movement, which enhances stability and economic growth. Additionally, benefits from open trade including costs reduction are based removal of trade barriers. As Anadi, (2005), stated, accrued benefits from trade liberalisation are acutely reduced due to non-realisation of complete programme of the region.

The creation of ECOWAS was induced largely by irresistible postulations of traditional theories, of benefits to member states from involvement in regional economic integration programme. However, it seemed the budding regional power structure after independence impacted ability of ECOWAS to implement viable development and self-reliance (Ichim, 2006; Ariyo, 2017). Members of ECOWAS use different official foreign languages which include English, French and Portuguese. This cultural, linguistic and ecological diversity of members seem to create divergent interests for the integration process. This appears to inhibit ability of members to achieve economic integration as envisaged.

Firstly, as epitomised in Article 41 of Revised ECOWAS Treaty; formation of free trade area was based on understanding that duties on imports and exports, quota restrictions and administrative barriers to trade between member states in the region will be removed.

Secondly, ECOWAS envisioned steady march to a customs union that would finally become common market, that involves free mobility of factors of production amongst states and maintain common structure of tariff, trading with non-member countries.

Thirdly, ECOWAS aim as preamble to chapter 9, Article 54 of Treaty, stated, was realising full economic union by coordinating agricultural, industrial, infrastructural development and monetary policies of member states (Obiozor *et al*, 1993; Ariyo, 2017).

As such, formation of ECOWAS was in reaction to growth of regional economic groups in the world and counters dwindling aid from former colonial masters and developed countries.

Its creation also offers states in sub-region, medium for negotiations at international fora and platform for joint actions on international issues. In addition, ECOWAS represented example of Pan-Africanism; emergent events in World politics at the time also influenced regional leaders (Onwuka, 1982; Maiyaiki, 2017). This is because ECOWAS emerged when regional trading blocs were fashionable as strategy for self-reliance and development. This led to world-wide creation of regional trading blocs, which were used often as platform for trade bargain (Mogbitse and Omozue, 2022). In West Africa, Nigeria in particular, regarded economic integration as veritable instrument for regional peace and security only but also its national security. Thus, is not surprising because according to Clapham (1997), security issues become more prominent on ECOWAS agenda, at the expense of economic integration efforts.

ECOWAS' original aim was to achieve economic integration. However, with increasing security challenges, experienced in various countries, it has expanded its objectives to include security. This incidentally has become the main pre-occupation of states in the sub-region (Ekiyor, 2008; Ali, 2009 Afolabi, 2016). As a result, little efforts have been geared towards

implementation of protocols, agreements or to meaningfully seek harmonisation of economic policies across national borders (Francis, 2001; Hameed, 2009; Atuobi and Okyere, 2010). This is because constant insecurity, has transformed ECOWAS's policy agenda to put security issues at the epicenter of regional integration projects (Cilliers, 1999).

1.3 Statement of the Problem

Nigeria has consistently, accorded top priority and support to the objectives of ECOWAS since its creation in May 1975. This steady support for the organisation is due to Nigeria's recognition of the strategic as well as economic importance of the organisation to its national interest in Africa and the world.

Though aim of ECOWAS was achievement of economic integration, increasing security challenges have expanded its objectives to include security. This incidentally has become the main pre-occupation of the organisation. For instance, ECOWAS initial intervention internal conflicts, led to the formation of ECOMOG in 1990. Since then, however, the body has intervened in many countries; Guinea Bissau, (1999) Mali (2013), Côte d Ivoire (2019), and Burkina Faso (2012), Niger (2011), Chad (2014) and Benin (2017). Also, there have been coups and counter coups in several countries. As a result, ECOWAS has been mainly preoccupied more with the settlement of conflicts than on fostering measures that would enhance the region's economic viability. Aside all these, many countries while intervening in other countries are also faced with their own internal problems. The internal conflicts have not only sapped the resources of these countries but have also led to mutual distrust amongst member states, regarding the perceived roles of their neighbours in the conflicts in their states. As a result, little efforts have been geared towards implementation of protocols, agreements or to meaningfully seek harmonisation of economic policies across national borders. Effective regional integration is the one flickers of hope left for West African states to check its little influence in a world now mostly dominated by competing blocs. [The economic](#)

conditions in West Africa are rather parlous. Inhabited by some of the world's poorest, the sub-region have been held down by corruption, drought, debt crisis, and civil wars. These have acted as a brake on the developmental efforts articulated by the sub-region. Thus, economic integration is imperative for the development. European Union (EU) that came into being almost 20 years after the ECOWAS treaty was signed, has since become not only an economic community but a monetary union. However, the reverse seems to be the case for ECOWAS. A major difference between the EU and ECOWAS is that while one has been very peaceful, the other has been bisected by pervasive internal conflicts. Role of insecurity in inability of ECOWAS states to embark on meaningful coordinated and comprehensive promotion of regional economic integration is the study's focus.

1.4 Objectives of Study

This study focuses on effect of insecurity on economic integration. Thus, efforts made in determining: -

1. Insecurity trends of in the sub-region;
2. Explain relationship between international politics, the economy and insecurity in the region;
3. Analyse impact of insecurity on economic integration in the region.

1.5 Research Questions

This project interrogates;

1. Has insecurity in the sub-region any impact on its efforts at integration?
2. Does any a relationship exist between insecurity and the region's economy?
3. How has insecurity impacted the sub-region economy?

1.6 Study Significance

It adds to literature on security and economic integration and how insurgency affects economic development in West Africa. Its findings will help foreign policy makers in their decision making especially in peace and regional integration.

Lastly, it will fire students' imagination and should therefore stimulate interest in further research on this subject matter. It will constitute a basis for further investigation.

1.7 Definition of Terms and Abbreviations

Integration: process where nations forego desired ability to conduct foreign and domestic policies independently, seeking instead to make joint decisions or to delegate decision-making process to a new central organisation.

Insecurity: Rising up or against, rising in revolt or opposition to establish authority.

Third World: Third World countries are split societies economically, geographical, socially and politically. This is evidenced by disconnect between privileged sectors linked to global economy and underprivileged masses. (Chandler, 2007; Mogbitse and Omozue, (2022).

Crisis: Implies a break point along peace-war continuum in a state's relations with internal actors or in its relations with international actors (Krahman, 2003).

AU - African Union; this was formerly known as the Organisation of African Unity.

ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African States, umbrella body for integration in West Africa.

ECOMOG - Economic Community of West African States, Monitoring Group, created initially to mediate crisis in Liberia but has since been deployed to other crisis ridden states in the region

OAU - Organisation of African Unity, it is precursor of AU

UN - United Nations

EEC European Economic Community

UDC - Under Developed Countries, this term is used to refer to countries in Africa, Asia and the Americas that were former colonies and also lack both economic and technological advancement

GNP - Gross National Product

GDP - Gross Domestic Product

CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.1 Concept of Integration

Though central locus in study of integration has for long pre-occupied the thoughts of ancient statesmen and philosophers, increased interests have been given to the study of integration among states since the World War II. This is attributable mainly to inability of modern states system to provide satisfactorily for basic need of its citizens. This, again owing to the increased interdependence among states due to the mechanism of science and technology, leading to the globalisation of issues, which would have otherwise been localised.

Integration, simply defined is way of acting through co-ordinated group efforts it is a process and condition. As a process it emphasises mutuality of willingness to share for common good of members. Integration is a process where political actors in several individual nations shift loyalties to new centre institutions having jurisdiction over pre-existing nation states (Haas, 1958:18). Lindberg (1963), on the other hand defines integration as setting where nations subjugates ability to independently conduct foreign and domestic policies but instead delegates these to new organisation. Lindberg's definition is on four comparative conditions; development of central institutions and assignment to institutions of specific tasks, expansive nature of tasks and continued commitment of member states to such arrangement. As a condition integration is concerned with how political communities become integrated.

Amitai Etzioni (Etzioni, 1965), sharing similar view stated that a political community possession of control over use of violence represents criterion by which levels of integration is measured. A community possessing centre over decision-making, resources allocation and rewards is dominant focus of political association for majority of politically informed citizens (Etzioni, 1965). For Etzioni, therefore, condition to achieve integration is by political unification. Deutsch *et al*, (1957) defined integration as a territory's sense of fulfilment in community's institutions and practices which are strong and widespread to guarantee hope of peace among its population. Sense of community he asserted is belief that common social

problems are resolved through process of peaceful change and ultimately results in creation of two security communities; pluralistic community and amalgamated security community.

2.1.1 Theories of Economic Integration

Thus, from the viewpoint of the Kampala document, to meet these challenges, new institutions, must be put in place, regionally and globally. Suryohadiprojo (1991) also share the opinion that peace and security is of immediate and practical relevance to the process of integration. As he stated, security for individual nations should be enhanced by a regional security structure. Regional security arrangements should be based on the following; 1. Co-operation among nations in certain regions should create awareness and allow accurate intention of each nation's capabilities. This is to prevent misinterpretations and suspicions. If one of the members of the association has intent that could harm the security of the region, the position should be detected and prevented from developing further 2. Close co-operation among nations of a regional security arrangement would deter aggression from outside Powers. Even if an outside Power had superior military and high-tech weapons, the strength of the united regional associations would force it to cancel any offensive actions against the region. 3. The possibility exists for close co-ordination of armament production and purchases from outside the region. Member nations should be free to decide for themselves, but with close co-ordination to achieve the best conditions for every member nation, it is expected that decisions made by government would be compatible with the general interest of the region. Production could even be streamlined to prevent overlap to 7 16 ensure standardisation. This would also benefit the economy of every member nation. The co-ordination of exports would prevent foreign manufacturers from dominance and also prevent excessive buying by member nation that would lead to destabilisation of the region. 4. Concept of regional security presupposes willingness of nations in regions to create security

co-operation. This will not be possible in regions where member states are overtly suspicious of each other thus, unwilling to improve their relationships” (Suryohadiprojo, 1991; Ichim, 2006).

Thus, from the viewpoint of the Kampala document, to meet these challenges, new institutions, must be put in place, regionally and globally. Suryohadiprojo (1991) also share the opinion that peace and security is of immediate and practical relevance to the process of integration. As he stated, security for individual nations should be enhanced by a regional security structure. Regional security arrangements should be based on the following; 1. Co-operation among nations in certain regions should create awareness and allow accurate intention of each nation’s capabilities. This is to prevent misinterpretations and suspicions. If one of the members of the association has intent that could harm the security of the region, the position should be detected and prevented from developing further 2. Close co-operation among nations of a regional security arrangement would deter aggression from outside Powers. Even if an outside Power had superior military and high-tech weapons, the strength of the united regional associations would force it to cancel any offensive actions against the region. 3. The possibility exists for close co-ordination of armament production and purchases from outside the region. Member nations should be free to decide for themselves, but with close co-ordination to achieve the best conditions for every member nation, it is expected that decisions made by government would be compatible with the general interest of the region. Production could even be streamlined to prevent overlap to 7 16 ensure standardisation. This would also benefit the economy of every member nation. The co-ordination of exports would prevent foreign manufacturers from dominance and also prevent excessive buying by member nation that would lead to destabilisation of the region. 4. Concept of regional security presupposes willingness of nations in regions to create security co-operation. This will not be possible in regions where member states are overtly suspicious

of each other thus, unwilling to improve their relationships” (Suryohadiprojo, 1991; Ichim, 2006).

Thus, from the viewpoint of the Kampala document, to meet these challenges, new institutions, must be put in place, regionally and globally. Suryohadiprojo (1991) also share the opinion that peace and security is of immediate and practical relevance to the process of integration. As he stated, security for individual nations should be enhanced by a regional security structure. Regional security arrangements should be based on the following; 1. Co-operation among nations in certain regions should create awareness and allow accurate intention of each nation’s capabilities. This is to prevent misinterpretations and suspicions. If one of the members of the association has intent that could harm the security of the region, the position should be detected and prevented from developing further 2. Close co-operation among nations of a regional security arrangement would deter aggression from outside Powers. Even if an outside Power had superior military and high-tech weapons, the strength of the united regional associations would force it to cancel any offensive actions against the region. 3. The possibility exists for close co-ordination of armament production and purchases from outside the region. Member nations should be free to decide for themselves, but with close co-ordination to achieve the best conditions for every member nation, it is expected that decisions made by government would be compatible with the general interest of the region. Production could even be streamlined to prevent overlap to 7 16 ensure standardisation. This would also benefit the economy of every member nation. The co-ordination of exports would prevent foreign manufacturers from dominance and also prevent excessive buying by member nation that would lead to destabilisation of the region. 4. Concept of regional security presupposes willingness of nations in regions to create security co-operation. This will not be possible in regions where member states are overtly suspicious

of each other thus, unwilling to improve their relationships” (Suryohadiprojo, 1991; Ichim, 2006).

2.1.2 Regional Integration and Insecurity:

ECOWAS was created by treaty signed on May 27 1975. Security was not considered by founders of the union (Ali, 2013; Ariyo, 2017). However, the integration process soon brought to the fore, issue of security as it soon became obvious to leaders that basic prerequisite for regional integration is creation of trust and confidence. Consequently, in 1981, the protocol on Mutual Assistance and Defence was adopted (Suryohadiprojo 1991; Chambas, 2007).

However, political tension within and among member states soon began to increase resulting in the fact that between 1975 and 1991, the internal and international conditions, that prevailed in the region did not provide the stable environment the achieving the goals integration. The security situation almost resulted in collapse of certain states. This forced regional leaders to take cognisance of the role of security in the integrative process. Nigeria former head of state and Chairman Committee of Eminent Persons on Review of ECOWAS treaty, General Gowon (rt.), gave credence to vital role of peace and security for regional integration in July 1992 in Dakar. He stated that attainment and maintenance of peace and stability are pre-requisite for economic progress and development of West Africa” (WAE, 1992). Recognition of role peace and security as condition for development by leaders and decision-makers in ECOWAS is recent occurrence. Also, since 1990, issues about security in Africa have further emerged, as exemplified by the Kampala Forum (ALF, 1991) The Kampala forum of 1990 addressed security and stability in Africa and viewed security as prerequisite for development. Essentially, the document identified erosion of security and stability as one causes of continuing crises and major barrier to creation of sound economies and intra and inter African co-operation (ALF, 1991:1).

Furthermore, the document offers four very practical concepts for tackling the security dilemma;

1. On conflict prevention and containment: it stated that greater attention be placed on prevent measures to contain crisis from escalating into violent confrontation;,
2. Internal and external security: it advocated that states derive common framework for collective security;
3. For individually and collectively: it stated that principles of good neighbourliness and peaceful resolution of conflicts should guide governments;
4. Self-reliance in strategic areas; it stated that military and non-military national defence issues vital for security (ALF, 1991:9-10).

Thus, from the viewpoint of the Kampala document, to meet these challenges, new institutions, must be put in place, regionally and globally. Suryohadiprojo (1991) also share the opinion that peace and security is of immediate and practical relevance to the process of integration. As he stated, security for individual nations should be enhanced by a regional security structure. Regional security arrangements should be based on the following;

1. Co-operation among nations in certain regions should create awareness and allow accurate intention of each nation's capabilities. This is to prevent misinterpretations and suspicions. If one of the members of the association has intent that could harm the security of the region, the position should be detected and prevented from developing further
2. Close co-operation among nations of a regional security arrangement would deter aggression from outside Powers. Even if an outside Power had superior military and high-tech weapons, the strength of the united regional associations would force it to cancel any offensive actions against the region.

3. The possibility exists for close co-ordination of armament production and purchases from outside the region. Member nations should be free to decide for themselves, but with close co-ordination to achieve the best conditions for every member nation, it is expected that decisions made by government would be compatible with the general interest of the region. Production could even be streamlined to prevent overlap to ensure standardisation. This would also benefit the economy of every member nation. The co-ordination of exports would prevent foreign manufacturers from dominance and also prevent excessive buying by member nation that would lead to destabilisation of the region.
4. Concept of regional security presupposes willingness of nations in regions to create security co-operation. This will not be possible in regions where member states are overtly suspicious of each other thus, unwilling to improve their relationships” (Suryohadiprojo, 1991; Ichim, 2006).

2.2 The Concept of Security

Realistically and theoretically, end of the Cold War is mostly regarded as start of diverse political environment. This has been especially obvious in security studies arising from difficulties by scholars to redefine a vital concept that became source worry decades, after the Cold War ended. As a result, several academics reviewed what “is” and what should be, conceptually accepted and whether wider definition paints reality more accurately. This is because states after the Cold War face security challenges that are beyond military threat. United States according to Mathews, (1994), widened definition of national security to include international economics, when it became ‘clear that US economy was no longer autonomous entity as hitherto, but is impacted by vagaries of economic policies in other

countries. However, debate about actual meaning and redefinition of the concept of security began in early 1980s (Tickner, 1995).

This debate was predicated on realist approach to security by 'realists, scholars such as Barry Buzan in his work *People, States and Fear* (Booth, 1994). Buzan argued that concept of security based solely military which dominated discourse during the Cold War was too simple and failed to improve the concept (Buzan, 1991). Thus, he widened concept of security to include other issues; political, economic, social and environmental in addition to military threats (Buzan, 1991). Buzan therefore, examined security from the perspectives of the international system, the state, and the individual but concluded that the state remains most effective provider of security. His analysis provides most extensive examination of human security from state perspective as Clausewitz (1943) originally proposed.

However, though traditional scholars support maintaining Cold War era militarily defined concept of security that stresses importance of the state, modern scholar would rather widen the definition. Modern scholars argue that other issues, such as economy, environment and social threats, poses danger to individuals' lives instead of states.

Originally, security" as defined in international relations, is based on two notions; one, is that threats to state's security are external and two, that threats are mostly, if not entirely, military in nature, thus, always military response is required to preserve state security. Walter Lippmann' summed up these assumptions by stating that state security is protected so long as, ii would forfeit core values, if it wishes to avoid war and is able also, if challenged, to maintain them by victory in a war" (Lippmann, 1943:41). According to Arnold Wolfers, Lippmann definition infers that security rises and falls with ability of a nation to prevent an attack or to defeat it, which is tandem with common usage of the term" (Wolfers, 1962:150). Some scholars also define security as a nation ability to protect its cherished values from external threats (Berkowitz and Bock, 1968:40). Walt Stephen argues that Security Studies

and by implication security itself, could be defined as study of threat and how to control the military. He surveys situations that make utilisation of force inevitable, ways that utilisation of force affects individuals, states and societies, and policies that states adopt in war (Walt, 1991). Walt articulates position centred of the state and restricts purpose of security to military threats. He equates security with peace and conflicts can only be prevented through military means. The postmodernist approach to security, in the work of Ken Booth, advocates widened security that goes beyond mere determination of threats (Booth, 1994:4). However, advocates of postmodernist theory stresses that the state should not be accepted as primary reservoir of security but encompasses instead wide range of non-state actors, such as individuals, ethnic and cultural groups, regional economic blocs, multinational corporations (MNCs) non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and many others. In widening the concept of security, Booth argues that security of individual is of more importance than state security (Booth, 1994:4). Postmodernist theory of security does not equate state security with individual security. In Booth's view, states governments should no longer be chief recipient of security because often, governments that are supposed to protect people have become main source of their insecurity instead of neighbouring countries' military (Booth, 1994:5). This approach rejects idea of the state as provider of security to people. As Booth argues security of the state is regularly, used by 'governments pretending to be their peoples keepers, to cloak reality to hide what essentially is security of their regime and supporters. Thus, according to him, states should be ignored as chief recipient of security (Booth, 1994:4-5). However, it would appear that these definitions either in the traditional or postmodernist approach, seemed to have only a Euro-centric view of security, thus they failed to adequately address security predicament faced by developing countries, especially in period after the Cold War. Mohammed Ayoob, acknowledging intrastate conflicts prevalence in developing countries compared to developed countries after the Cold War, advanced different definition

of security. He defined “security” or “insecurity” in relation to internal and external exposures, to threats that could potentially, lead collapse or significantly weaken structures of state territorially and institutionally (Ayoob, 1997:130). This definition figured underdeveloped political-institutions as prime source of conflicts. This is based on his argument that security of a nation is state’s function, which requires that a state should both own “security hardware” (control of coercive force) and also, “security software” (legitimacy and integration). This definition amply address security dilemma of developing states, which includes all ECOWAS states; the focus of this research and this is the definition of security applied. It is noted however, that from the action of most West African leaders, their concept of security that is rooted in militarism; hence the preponderance conflicts in the sub-region, exacerbated mostly by overt use of military force to remain in power.

2.2.1 Insecurity in West African States

Challenge to economic integration in Africa is political stability. Most countries have failed to enjoy political stability. Political instability is expressed in stresses and strains in the political system, civil disorder and war. Political instability often, is due to poor governance, weak allegiance to the nation and inequitable allocation of resources. As a result, integration has been acutely disrupted in ECOWAS due to internal conflicts experienced by member States. Some of the most destabilising conflicts due to their impacts on neighbouring states and thus, the sub-region in general are briefly discussed below.

2.2.2 Guinea- Bissau

A regime propagating socialism governed Guinea-Bissau following withdrawal of Portuguese colonial forces after independence on September 24, 1973. African Party for Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) unilaterally proclaimed Guinea-Bissau Independence in

Madina de Boé. The party controlled two-thirds of the territory in absence of its founding leader Amílcar Cabral. According to some authors; Monteiro (2019) and Nóbrega, (2003), differences between Guinean and Cape Verdean wing of the party led to Cabral's murder on January 20 1973. National Popular Assembly (ANP), proclaimed the independence; it had two-thirds and one-third of deputies respectively, elected through congresses and the party. João Bernardo "Nino" Vieira led the body. According to Mendy, (1996, p. 28), PAIGC's action was democratized attempt to use power on behalf of the people of Guinea.

Colonial forces departed Guinea after recognizing its independence, following April 25, 1974 revolution that occurred in Portugal and PAIGC assumed power. However, due to poor finances and lack of human resources to replace colonial officials, basics administrative system remained despite the regime's Marxist ideological learning. As a result, years following independence were marked by acute crises in the party. The country faced ethnic disputes between Guinean and Cape Verdean power struggle and economic crises. These crises were by-products of end of the Cold War, and dissolution of the former Soviet Union, which according to Nóbrega (2003) and Monteiro (2019) was then main ally of PAIGC.

Guinea-Bissau independence was won through popular demands for end to colonial rule and free African from colonialism. These demands as Rudebeck (1996, p. 358) observed, were mostly discarded by the new political leaders. Persecution and repression became the norm, which alienated the masses (Lindberg and Clark, 2008, Martins, 2013). Inability of the party to contain dissension, led first coup on November 14, 1980 by powerful Guinean wing led by Nino Vieira. The serious economic crisis faced by the country and deviation from PAIGC ideological principles were used to justify the coup. The new regime also based their action on internal security of the country, when according to Nô Pintcha (1980, p. 4-5), it stated in the state-owned newspaper that five hundred people were killed during the deposed regime's

seven year. According to Mendy, (1996, p. 30), bodies these people who were against the regime were found in two mass graves in 1981.

In the years following the coup, the party encountered difficulties dealing with state issues, while daunting crises manifested in practicing its ideology. According to some authors Nóbrega, (2003, p. 220) and Monteiro (2019, p. 275), unity with Cape Verde ended after the coup as economic crisis worsened. The country witnessed a civil war that ended in sacking of an elected President and three military coups with one ending in assassinations of the President and the Armed Forces Chief of Genera Staff (Jaló, S. (2023). Thus, democracy in Guinea-Bissau is still faced with problems of non-functioning democratic institutions, at the level of governance, the judicial and military (Rudebeck, 1996, p. 358; Jalo', 2023).

2.2.3 Niger Republic

The Republic of Niger a former French colony had been for a long been enveloped by political conflicts that have resulted in many coups since independence, The sources of conflicts in Niger Republic consists of long list of internal actors, that include in no particular order the followings; actions of Niger Government, the defence and security forces and finally, activities of illicit traffickers and terrorist groups (Bonnecas, 2021). They are briefly discussed below.

Illicit Traffickers and Terrorist Groups

According to Soumahoro (2020), traffickers are mostly in communities in northern Niger, They engage in illegal businesses including; drugs smuggling, arms, gold, and migrants trafficking, (Soumahoro, 2020). They have intricate informal relationships with government based on tacit accords. In turn, government has used this relationship to reduce incidences of violence. This scenario is beneficial traffickers it provides suitable environment for business

(ICG, 2020). Traffickers also have reach to the business community. For example, Cherif Ould Abidine, a very prosperous businessman is a notorious trafficker (Grégoire, 2011). According to ICG, (2020), Nigerien security forces are also regularly co-opted to protect convoys for cash. What has not ascertained, is, if, this is part of informal accords with state officials or sign of criminal ties within governmental apparatus. What is certain is that, such collaborations are risks to the state's long-term stability. Traffickers' are often connected to terrorist groups in border areas thus; this phenomenon should be countered urgently to guarantee Niger's stability. In addition, frequent clashes between trafficking groups and increases in drugs and gold convoys have exacerbated rivalries that could lead militarised illicit economy in Niger (ICG, 2020). This situation would, disrupt informal agreements reached between government and traffickers to minimise violence, which would prompt proliferation of criminal groups. Also, traffickers and terrorist groups like, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGIS) having active operations in borders areas with Mali, constitute serious security challenges in Niger.

The Niger Government

As elucidated in Niger Constitution, (2010), the leading body in the state is the Government that consist the President, team of ministers and administrative institutions. The government comprises a 22-party dominated by Nigerien Party for Democracy and Socialism (PNDS) - Tarayya, with 75 seats in parliament. They aligned with two parties: Patriotic Movement for the Republic (MPR-JAMHURIYA), with 13 seats, and National Movement for Social Development (MNSD)- Nassara with 20 seats, giving them absolute parliamentary majority (IPU, 2020). However, the government is often, exposed to risks of collapse. The risks according to [Bonnescase \(2013\)](#) are due to infiltration of criminals into government agencies; deriving from undue reliance of political parties on businesses to fund electoral activities

Also, convoluted relations between traffickers, government and political parties' results in situation that threatens state stability. Furthermore government's inability to satisfy needs of its citizenry has also significantly weakened acceptance of the government and constitutes serious threats. However, the government recently initiated, Renaissance Programme 2011-2035 development plan to radically reduce poverty by 2035. Rate of poverty currently 76.9%, thus, among Nigeriens; it is a context for scarce resources (BTI, 2020). It is not surprising therefore, that government of was ousted in a coup in early August 2023.

Niger Armed Forces (NAF)

The Armed Forces (NAF) has major role defending the country against external threats; it has 25,000 personnel (RFI, 2020). The NAF has shown resilience in combatting existing threats, especially, violent extremism. This led since 2017 to decline in terrorist attacks in the Diffa region, though region has recently witnessed escalated attacks by Boko Haram. In addition, the country territory appears reasonably secured in comparison to its neighbours. However, NAF recently experienced deadly sporadic attacks in Tillabéry region. Notwithstanding, NAF has had peaceful relationships with populations throughout the country. However, subtle intrusion of cartels into state agencies has negatively impacted the army and diverted it to protect illicit activities contrary to their legal missions. The army has increasingly become also, a factor of insecurity due to growing frustrations among troops over lack of equipment and low salaries. Discontent among troops and officers has diverse causes. Troops often, accuse officers of embezzling resources meant for arms procurement (Abdoul-Razak, 2020). Due to records of coups in Niger; 1974, 1996, 1999 and 2010 and comparing cases of coups in the region; especially 2012 coup in Mali and 2002 rebellion in Côte d'Ivoire, it is possible that similar scenario could easily occur in Niger (PM, 2020; Bonnecas, 2021). In December

2015, President Issoufou indeed accused certain members of the army of alleged coup attempt (Larccher, 2015).

It would seem that the army is always looking for excuse to seize power. It is therefore not surprising that Commander of the Presidential Guards ousted President Mohamed Bazoum on August 5, 2023 when he deployed him to another position. This is despite the fact that he has been Presidential Guards Commander for over twelve years.

2.2.4 The Gambia

President Yahya Jammeh after he lost the 2016 presidential election to Adama refusal to step down, setting in a budding constitution crisis in the Gambia. As a result, ECOWAS troops were mobilised to enter The Gambia in January 2017 to curtail the crisis. Barrow's requested ECOWAS troops to enter the country on 19 January after he was inaugurated as President in The Gambian embassy in Senegal. However, Jammeh stepped down and fled the country as ECOWAS troops entered the country's capital, Banjul but 4,000 ECOWAS troops were left behind to maintain law and order pending Barrow's return to his country.

Barrow returned to Monrovia a week after his inauguration and requested that 2,500 troops remain for six months to enable his government consolidate. ECOWAS troops are still in The Gambia as of June 2023. This is because of Barrow's several requests for extension of the troops stay to help train and also assist the domestic security forces (Farge, and Bavier, 2017). Reports of isolated minor clashes emanated during the first few hours of the military incursion but casualties were reported in the initial encounter. In the months following, two civilians were reportedly killed in incidents during protests in some communities over continued ECOWAS troops' presence.

The 2017 19–21 January Intervention

45,000 refugees fled into Senegal after Jammeh's refusal to step down on 18 January. Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) decided to intervene in The Gambian constitutional crisis due to President Yahya Jammeh refusal to accept defeat the presidential election. ECOWAS set 19 January 2017 date to activate invasion, named "Operation Restore Democracy" (Petesch, 2017). ECOWAS forces amassed at The Gambia borders, prompting Marcel Alain de Souza, then Chairman of ECOWAS to say that The Gambia was surrounded land, sea and air. The invasion troops, numbered of over 7,000 (Ewubare, 2017)", which outnumbered The Gambia, armed forces consisting numbering about 2,500 troops almost three times..

Newly elected president who fled The Gambia to Senegal arising from fears over his life was sworn in on 19 January 2017. (Al Jazeera, 2017). Immediately he was sworn as president, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) unanimously approved Resolution 2337; expressing support for ECOWAS transition efforts, advised use of "political means" but kept mum on military action (BBC.2017).

Though UNSC did not endorse military action, Senegalese military along with Ghanaian troops, entered The Gambia the same day, while Nigerian Navy and Air Force provided air and sea support. Clashes occurred near the border village of Kanilai, home town of Yahya Jammeh, between Senegalese and pro-Jammeh MFDC forces, in early hours of the offensive. Senegalese troops reportedly took control of the village. Senegalese troops halted its offensive to provide final chance for mediation with full offensive planned for noon on 20 January, should Jammeh remained adamant and fail to relinquish power.

2.25 Mali

The conflict in Mali, which is still on-going, started January 2012, in northern and southern Mali. On 16 January 2012, insurgent groups opened campaign against Malian government demanding for independence of northern Mali, which they called Azawad. The conflict has since become source of threat to the whole of West Africa due to its spread to neighbouring states (Nisrin, (2023)). In April 2012 National Movement for Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), a group agitating to make this region of Mali independent homeland for the Tuaregs seized control of the region (Nisrin, 2023).

Former French colony Mali, one of World's least developed countries gained independence in 1960; is. Mali has population of about 19 million, most live in the South-west and Central regions. Conflicts in Mali began in 2012 when Tuaregs took control of north and much of central region. This led to ouster of Amadou Toumani Touré then president from power in a coup. However, though the junta's hold on power was short-lived, it attracted international sanctions on Mali that brought further instability and misery already fatigued people (Francis, 2013). In January 2013, French force numbering 2 500 troops pushed the rebels northward. Elections were held in 2013 and in 2015 government and **two rebel groups** signed power-sharing peace agreement (Nyirabikali, 2015). Key provisions of agreement were ignored, while sundry armed groups controlled most of the north. According UN report (2018), 286 million USD was spent on peace efforts but situations in most areas remain volatile (UNSC 2018b, 42). United Nations established Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in 2013 , while EU set up two sector-wide SFA programmes. These efforts including US and French bilateral SFA programmes were to strengthen Mali's security forces. The intention was to stabilise the country, control migration to Europe and prevent drugs and human traffickers. In 2014 French renamed its operation, "regional military initiative" called Opération Barkhane. Another regional initiative was launched in 2017; G5 Sahel Joint Force

numbering 5000 troops army contributed by G5 Sahel countries namely Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. Despite these aids, since 2013, violence has become wide-spread, diverse and conflicts have occurred in central Mali (Matei 2017, 105–106). Islamist groups not included in peace agreement have carried out attacks and expanded their operations. In addition, conflicts among farmers and pastoralists increased, resulting in growing resentment against government. Jihadist networks often infiltrate Fulani communities in central region offering weapons and protection, while government is also allegedly arming militias groups. Government's violent counter-insurgency methods further exacerbate conflicts. As a result, population of north and central Mali experiences overlapping zones of controls between rebels, Islamists, ethnic militias, smugglers and security forces. The peace process itself has even created new rebel groups. This has resulted in insecurity situation; government's presence is restricted to garrison towns and occasional patrol of nearby villages, while armed groups operates unimpeded in other parts (UNSG 2018, 7). Coups of 2020 and 2021 added layer of uncertainty to Mali's future. Widening conflicts have turned what in 2013 were short-termed international efforts to stabilise Mali, into long-term engagement to avoid state collapse in Mali. The result is that Mali is crowded environment with many actors working with local security forces; for example in 2018, 64 countries deployed troops to Mali (IISS2019, 477–479).

Coup d'état

Soldiers unhappy with course of conflicts attacked Sadio Gassama Mali's Defense, Minister on arrival at a military camp on 21 March 2012. The minister's car was pelted with stones, which forced him to flee (Dembele, 2012). Later, soldiers stormed the presidential palace forcing President Touré into hiding. Captain Amadou Sanogo, chairman New National Committee for Restoration of Democracy and State (CNRDR), next morning announced,

suspension of Mali's constitution and military takeover of government. They cited pervasive conflicts and lack of modern weaponry for the army the coup (*BBC. 22 March 2012*). He also stated that until power reverts to new, democratically elected government CNRDR would function as interim government (*Reuters. 22 March 2012*).

The coup was unanimously condemned by the international community (*Le Monde (in English). 24 March 2012*), including United Nations Security Council (*Al Jazeera. 23 March 2012*). The coup was also condemned by Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and African Union (AU). Indeed, ECOWAS on 29 March gave CNRDR 72 hours ultimatum to relinquish power, or its neighbours would closed the country's borders (*BBC News. 29 March 2012*), its assets frozen and travel ban placed on individuals in CNRDR. Mali was also suspended by AU and ECOWAS. In the same vain, the United States, World Bank, and African Development Bank suspended development aid in support of ECOWAS and AU's reactions to the coup (Klapper, 2012). Alassane Quattara then Côte d'Ivoire President, also then ECOWAS rotational chairman placed 2,000 soldiers ECOWAS stand-by force on standby. ECOWAS also appointed then Burkina Faso President Blaise Compaore to mediate the crisis. Agreement which asked both Sanogo and Touré to resign was reached on 6 April and sanctions were lifted. The mutineers were granted amnesty political power reverted to Speaker of Mali's National Assembly, Diocounda Traoré (*The Daily Star. 10 April 2012*). Traoré' on his inauguration, pledged total and relentless war on Tuareg rebels unless they evacuate northern Mali (*The Daily Telegraph, 13 April 2012*).

2.3 Political Economy of Insecurity

End of the Cold war increased prospects for world peace but this was short lived in African states due to horrific violent conflicts that the continent soon faced. Some countries in the continent; Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda/ Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo and

Somalia were ravaged by violent conflicts since 1990s. The Continent was so laden with conflicts, that 14 of 53 Africa countries witnessed armed conflicts in 1996 alone. This accounted for over half of all global war deaths and also created over 8 million refugees (Annan, 1998). Most conflicts now civil wars, which internal (intra-state) conflict fought by one or more identifiable rebel organisations against a government, resulting in at least 1000 battle-related deaths, and with each side suffering at least 5% of the total casualties (Singer and Small, 1982). In addition to loss of life and displacement of people, billions of dollars have been lost through foregone income and destruction of property, increasing already high levels of poverty. Civil wars are also facilitating the spread of AIDS, Africa's deadliest disease. Thus, civil war has can easily be said to reversed the modest progress made since independence in some countries as they are severely stymieing Africa's development.

2.4 The Politics of Insecurity

Myriad of causes has been identified as being responsible for the several conflicts that have continued to plague the African continent. These include ethnic, religious grievances, political repression, colonial legacies external governmental support etc. That some conflicts were the result of legacies of colonialism was emphatically captured by Kofi Annan. He asserted that colonial Powers partitioning of Africa at Berlin Congress in 1885 into territories, kingdoms, states and communities was arbitrarily as unrelated peoples were capriciously bunched together (Annan, 1998). In the 1960s, newly independent States inherited artificial colonial boundaries and challenges posed by colonial legacies to their territories. The challenge according to Kofi Annan was further exacerbated by the fact that laws and institutions, inherited by new States were designed entirely to exploit rather than overcome divisions..." (Annan, 1998)

Political repression is another factor that is also advanced as the motivation for rebellion. Many African countries have had repressive governments that flagrantly violated human rights and alienated the populace. This has sometimes led to rebellion as the means of change. In Liberia, Samuel Doe's brutalisation of political opponents and members of their ethnic group particularly the Gios and Manos partly induced the formation of National Patriotic Front (NPFL) in Liberia and Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone to ostensibly overthrow repressive All People's Congress (Davies, 2000).

Support from external governments has also been responsible for armed conflicts in Africa especially during the period when the Soviet Union actively supported liberation struggles in Africa in its attempt to get a foot hold in Africa to counter the influence of America and her allies in the Continent. Thus, in Angola, the Soviet Union supported the government in power, the MPLA, while the US supported UNITA. Consequently, rivalry between US and then Soviet Union fuelled armed conflicts as each side supported and in some cases created rival factions in African countries, in order to gain strategic advantage over each other. In West Africa, on record, Taylor's insurgency was started with active support of Côte d' Ivoire and Burkina Faso. On his part, Charles Taylor actively supported conflict in Sierra Leone. Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia also, intervened on Kabila's government side, while Rwanda and Uganda took side with rebels in Democratic Republic of Congo.

2.5 Economics Insecurity

Arising from peculiar nature of the African continent, some scholars are of the opinion that the economic factors rather than political factors are responsible for the proliferation of African conflicts. Essentially, these scholars Kuran (1989), Lichbach, (1995) Grossman (1999), Collier and Collier (2002) and Hoeffler (2000) have posited that economic factors such as dependence on lootable primary commodities, poor growth, poverty and large

diasporas, as the principal cause of rebellion. They contended that grievances are often created or exploited by opportunistic leaders to enhance and actuate international support. In addition, the group also posits economic factor as a decider of the duration of conflict hence political factors alone do not cause or sustain conflicts.

The economic exegesis for conflict proposes that risk of rebellion increases with rebel opportunity for finance that Collier and Hoeffler says include; extortion, diasporas donations and subventions from friendly governments (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). Extortion usually involves looting of primary resources, especially primary exports, which are easier to loot as they are usually produced in rural areas, where conflicts often start and which due to distance are usually less well-defended by government troops. In addition, conflicts do not severely disrupt production of primary products and are also easily exported by rebels to earn foreign exchange to finance the conflict resulting from ease of disguise. Thus dependence on primary exports increases vulnerability to civil war. Also it is stated that rebel leaders easily access and purchase weapons and small arms, from black market arms dealers with funds derived from exploiting raw material resources under their sphere of influence. This enables them to operate with minimal international support; hence they are able relatively to resist external pressure (Hutchful, 1999). It therefore, no surprise that conflicts proliferates the African Continent. Most countries in the Continent depend on the export of primary products, which usually constitute more than 90% of their exports.

Consequently, “loot seeking” rebel leaders do not even need to defeat the government for their objective to be realised as they can keep stealing from the local population and exploit mineral resources in areas under their control. For such leaders therefore, rebellion is profitable in the current period” as such are not concerned with collective action, time inconsistency and cohesion. Consequently, French and Ivorian firms took advantage of the Liberian crisis to enter lucrative diamond, rubber, and logging deals with Taylor at Gbarnga

(Hutchful, 1999). Indeed, it has been suggested that one principal objective of warring factions in Liberia was to gain control over resources; diamonds, timber and other raw materials. While in Sierra Leone, plunder natural resources and looting Bank reserves was key motivation for those who seized power in May 1997. Thus, it was control over those resources that gave the various factions the financial means to sustain the conflict (Annan, 1998).

Essentially, the conflicts in Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia and the Congo (former Zaire) have been attributed to Diamond. The problem posed by diamonds in instigation, fierceness and elongation of conflicts in Africa according to an SABC report has led to the UN's adoption of the Kimberley Certification Process. The aim of the Kimberley Certification process according to the US special adviser on commerce, Ambassador Binderagel is to ensure that diamonds from conflict areas (conflict diamonds) do not enter into world trade. He asserted that Angola and Sierra Leone constitute states where diamonds has not only caused but prolonged conflicts to become tragedies to their people (SABC, 2000).

It was also suggested in several quarters that economic motive rather than the quest for peace underpinned Nigeria's foray into Liberia under the aegis of ECOMOG as Nigeria has serious economic interests in the country. These interests include; exploitation of ore mine to feed Ajaokuta iron mill from Bong iron mine in Liberia; Doe's removal endangers the interest. Thus ECOMOG operation was merely facade used to provide collective cover for, Nigeria's sole objective. However, Nigerian leaders justified the ECOMOG adventure on grounds of its consistency with Nigeria's traditions of peacekeeping and humanitarian need to stop carnage in Liberia (Hutchful, 1999).

Another aspect of the cost of rebellion includes its opportunity cost, and co-ordination costs. The opportunity cost refers to what the rebel has to give up to join the rebellion. Faced with such prospect Collier and Hoeffler posit that the lower the opportunity cost, the higher the

likelihood of enlisting, because the smaller the sacrifice the person makes to join the rebellion¹. And the factors that largely determine the opportunity cost are economical for example, poverty tends to reduce the opportunity cost as poor people have little to lose. So also is unemployment as unemployed people have little to lose. Another factor, which is indirectly linked to the economic factors, is educational attainment. It is reasoned that if level of education attained is low, opportunity cost of rebellion is also low. This is because in joining a rebel movement, those uneducated would have less to lose than educated people in terms of foregone current income and loss of future income in the event of death, injury or prosecution by the government. The level of educational attainment is sometimes mostly determined by finance.

2.6 Theoretical Framework

2.6.1 Integration in Africa and Developing Countries

Arising from peculiar nature of the African continent, some scholars are of the opinion that the economic factors rather than political factors are responsible for the proliferation of African conflicts. Essentially, these scholars Kuran (1989), Lichbach, (1995) Grossman (1999), Collier and Collier (2002) and Hoeffler (2000) have posited that economic factors such as dependence on lootable primary commodities, poor growth, poverty and large 87 109 31 diasporas, as the principal cause of rebellion. They contended that grievances are often created or exploited by opportunistic leaders to enhance and actuate international support. In addition, the group also posits economic factor as a decider of the duration of conflict hence political factors alone do not cause or sustain conflicts. The economic exegesis for conflict proposes that risk of rebellion increases with rebel opportunity for finance that Collier and Hoeffler says include; extortion, diasporas donations and subventions from friendly governments (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). Extortion usually involves looting of primary

resources, especially primary exports, which are easier to loot as they are usually produced in rural areas, where conflicts often start and which due to distance are usually less well-defended by government troops. In addition, conflicts do not severely disrupt production of primary products and are also easily exported by rebels to earn foreign exchange to finance the conflict resulting from ease of disguise. Thus dependence on primary exports increases vulnerability to civil war. Also it is stated that rebel leaders easily access light weapons and small arms, procured largely from black market arms sources and are by funds derived from exploiting raw material resources under their control. This enables to operate with minimal international support; hence they are able relatively to resist external pressure (Hutchful, 1999). It therefore, no surprise that conflicts proliferates the African Continent. Most countries in the Continent depend on the export of primary products, which usually constitute more than 90% of their exports. Consequently, “loot seeking” rebel leaders do not even need to defeat the government for their objective to be realised as they can keep stealing from the local population and exploit mineral resources in areas under their control. For such leaders therefore, rebellion is profitable in the current period” as such are not concerned with collective action, time inconsistency and cohesion. Consequently, French and Ivorian firms took advantage of the Liberian crisis to enter lucrative diamond, rubber, and logging deals with Taylor at Gbarnga

Arising from peculiar nature of the African continent, some scholars are of the opinion that the economic factors rather than political factors are responsible for the proliferation of African conflicts. Essentially, these scholars Kuran (1989), Lichbach, (1995) Grossman (1999), Collier and Collier (2002) and Hoeffler (2000) have posited that economic factors such as dependence on lootable primary commodities, poor growth, poverty and large 87 109 31 diasporas, as the principal cause of rebellion. They contended that grievances are often created or exploited by opportunistic leaders to enhance and actuate international support. In

addition, the group also posits economic factor as a decider of the duration of conflict hence political factors alone do not cause or sustain conflicts. The economic exegesis for conflict proposes that risk of rebellion increases with rebel opportunity for finance that Collier and Hoeffler says include; extortion, diasporas donations and subventions from friendly governments (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). Extortion usually involves looting of primary resources, especially primary exports, which are easier to loot as they are usually produced in rural areas, where conflicts often start and which due to distance are usually less well-defended by government troops. In addition, conflicts do not severely disrupt production of primary products and are also easily exported by rebels to earn foreign exchange to finance the conflict resulting from ease of disguise. Thus dependence on primary exports increases vulnerability to civil war. Also it is stated that rebel leaders easily access light weapons and small arms, procured largely from black market arms sources and are by funds derived from exploiting raw material resources under their control. This enables to operate with minimal international support; hence they are able relatively to resist external pressure (Hutchful, 1999). It therefore, no surprise that conflicts proliferates the African Continent. Most countries in the Continent depend on the export of primary products, which usually constitute more than 90% of their exports. Consequently, “loot seeking” rebel leaders do not even need to defeat the government for their objective to be realised as they can keep stealing from the local population and exploit mineral resources in areas under their control. For such leaders therefore, rebellion is profitable in the current period” as such are not concerned with collective action, time inconsistency and cohesion. Consequently, French and Ivorian firms took advantage of the Liberian crisis to enter lucrative diamond, rubber, and logging deals with Taylor at Gbarnga

CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY OF STUDY

3.1 Research Methodology

This study deployed desk top research methodology, thus the relevant data were obtained from secondary sources. Sources of Information include; World Bank reports, trade journals, newspapers and magazine, briefs and memoranda of relevant bodies' such as the ECOWAS secretariat that are connected with the theme of this research. Other sources of data utilised include; journals, the Internet, relevant textbooks and monographs in University of Benin library, Nigeria Institute of International Affairs (NIAA) and previous studies relevant to the topic.

3.2 Population of Study

Population of 14 member countries of ECOWAS, constituting the study population is estimated at 387 million as at 2019 (Haavik et al 2022).

3.3 Source of Data

Due to the nature of study, secondary sources forms the major avenue for data collected. This was considered appropriate for the study because of its nature. All relevant data collected were analysed using simple statistics mostly tables.

3.4 Limitations of the Study

The conflict ridden state is in most cases a state where institutions of governance have almost broken down leading invariably to the privatisation of diplomacy. In such a situation, dealing between these states and the outside world are mostly through informal channels, which makes accurate record keeping impossible or rather unnecessary. Consequently, it is very difficult to get accurate records of transactions amongst member countries and between

Liberia and other countries, particularly during the years of state collapse. Furthermore, owing to sensitive nature of the topic it was not easy to obtain official information from the government especially when such information is classified. The paucity of existing database from which records of transactions amongst these states could be obtained also constituted another limitation due to of period research.

CHAPTER FOUR: CHALLENGES OF INTEGRATION IN ECOWAS

4.1 Dilemma of Instability

The predicament of ECOWAS members is inability to stabilize political environment crucial for sustained national economic development and success of integration agenda. ECOWAS internal socio-economic structures are replete with common problems of national cohesion and economic growth. Most states are embroiled in political and economic crises. **Senegal and Cote d'Ivoire, states previous considered** stable having years of political and economic harmony became anarchic. Internal socio-political situation and fiscal milieu could not provide condition for regional integration programmes (Anadi, 2005:88). Till date ECOWAS, is devoid of region wide policy for community investment. **It lacks** political energy needed to take economic and social decisions to coordinate investments to reduce production costs and distribute gains of development equitably.

For instance, industrial policy of the community is presently at discussions and exchange of ideas as statutes to harmonised investment on region-wide joint growth projects in areas of small and medium scale agricultural industries with direct links to economies in member states are yet to begin. Indeed, the attitude of states towards economic integration is symptomatic of myriads check points along highways, in contrast to provisions of protocol. Table 1 shows official check points in various highways linking states. These man-made obstacles created by the various states have resulted in limited trade unlike in EU, where exists absolute movement amongst states. This as we shall see also has concomitant effects on growth of economies of various states in the region.

Table 1: Number of Check Points on some Highways across ECOWAS

Name of High Ways	Distance (Km)	No of Checkpoints	No of Checkpoints per 100km
Lagos-Abidjan	992	69	7
Cotonou-Niamey	1036	34	3
Lome-Ouagadougou	989	34	4

Accra-Ouagadougou	972	15	2
Abidjan-Ouagadougou	1122	37	3
Niamey-Ouagadougou	529	20	4

Source: Executive Secretary's Annual Report (1998/1999)

4.2 Intra ECOWAS Trade

As earlier stated elsewhere, goals of ECOWAS was to eliminate tariffs and barriers among states, creation of economic group, unification of fiscal policies and harmonized regional policies on infrastructural facilities

However, arising from their former colonial legacies ECOWAS members have over the years developed intensive relations with developed countries. This relationship has been identified as structural imperialism and which has to an extent continued to affect intra community trade very adversely. The facts are, indeed, depressing viewed against ECOWAS intra-group trade and trade with non-regions members (table 2). Between 1985 and 1997, highest intra-regional trade was 12% in 1997 (Yoroms and Aning, 1997). Intra-ECOWAS trade was roughly 11% of inter-regional trade. ECOWAS Handbook of International Trade 1998 stated that intra-community imports were \$1,813m and exports \$2,539m. In contrast, imports and exports from Europe were 7,525m and \$8,114m respectively in 1997. This, shows underdeveloped levels of intra-regional trade, investment and industrial capacity.

Table 2: Structure of Community Trade

Years	Imports			Exports**			Total Trade		
	GT	IT	%	GT	IT	%	GT	IT	%
1985	15,344	984	6.4	18,810	1060	5.6	34,154	2,044	6.0
1986	10,451	1,172	11.2	11,999	945	7.9	22,450	2,117	9.4
1987	11,383	1,078	9.5	14,591	1,580	10.8	25,974	2,658	10.2
1988	11,388	1,120	9.8	13,873	1,490	10.7	25,261	2,610	10.3
1989	11,181	1,092	9.8	15,186	1,473	9.7	26,367	2,557	9.7
1990	13,320	1,454	10.9	20,736	2,113	10.2	34,056	3,567	10.5
1991	14,073	1,334	9.5	19,384	1,661	8.6	33,457	2,843	8.5
1992	18,501	1,808	9.9	19,188	2,180	11.4	37,689	3,988	10.7
1993	17,428	1,572	9.0	15,249	1,600	10.5	32,676	3,172	9.7
1994	13,518	1,301	9.6	12,036	1,424	11.8	25,554	2,725	10.7
1995	13,838	1,552	11.2	16,121	1,715	10.6	29,959	3,267	10.9
1996	15,631	1,882	12.0	20,345	2,316	11.4	35,976	4,198	11.7

1997	16,430	1,813	11.0	20,100	2,539	12.6	36,530	4,352	11.9
------	--------	-------	------	--------	-------	------	--------	-------	------

Source: ECOWAS Secretariat, Abuja.

G T – total trade in \$; I T – intra-trade in m\$;

It seems that main relatively industrial countries in the region like Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana and Nigeria, feel they can secure better deals as individual countries, than a group. This is shown by country’s share of total trade (table 3). Also, many feel better served individually, linked with developed countries; as shown by Nigeria’s volume and direction of trade. Consequently, it has been suggested that to some degree, this created strife in ECOWAS collaboration; landlocked countries; Niger, Burkina Faso, Mali seem frustrated as their impact in global arena is significant.

Table 3: Share of Total Trade in \$ Millions (by Country)

Country	1993 %	1994 %	1995 %	1996 %	1997 %
Benin	N/A	143,119	163,101	261,128	370,184
Burkina Faso	60,039	107,089	161,099	174,086	168,084
Cape Verde	6,004	6,005	5,003	6,003	7,004
Cote D’Ivoire	26,621,746	28,292,350	37,352,317	42,792,103	41,352,057
The Gambia	62,041	38,032	38,024	27,013	28,014
Ghana	974,639	14,201,178	1,302,808	27,811,367	29,041,445
Guinea-Conakry	638,418	598,496	685,425	660,324	653,325
Guinea-Bissau	16,011	13,01	14,009	16,008	18,009
Liberia	211,138	256,213	284,176	258,127	260,129
Mali	325,213	285,237	400,248	415,204	544,271
Mauritania	427,280	411,341	503,312	491,242	411,204
Niger	336,220	257,214	322,199	325,161	304,151
Nigeria	85,595,613	47,023,907	7,399,457	98,393,835	96,204,786
Senegal	624,409	712,592	863,535	531,261	394,196
Sierra Leone	850,556	97,081	39,024	43,021	48,024
Togo	136,089	162,135	20,913	239,117	236,117
Total	116,119,916	92,461,881	49,391,551	172,184,872	169,670,816

Source: ECOWAS Secretariat, Abuja, 2000

An obvious benefit of economic integration is increased trade amongst members. Thus, in order to achieve one of the most obvious benefits of integration for ECOWAS is for mutually beneficial intra-community trade in tandem line with theories of economic integration postulations but incidence of member countries’ trade should be substantial. ECOWAS has used ample time of its spent large part of its life on resolving crises in the region. This accounts for problems of low investments level and trade in ECOWAS (table 4).

Table 4: Intra Community Trade

Country	Imports (Millions \$)					Exports (Millions \$)				
	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
Benin	21	22	55	73	73	9	25	10	13	10
Burkina Faso	127	101	127	132	122	28	31	46	52	33
Cape Verde	6	5	6	5	6	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Côte d'Ivoire	446	335	432	597	478	571	596	685	817	838
Gambia	39	40	24	26	28	14	8	5	7	6
Ghana	273	277	298	312	346	215	234	246	254	268
Guinea-Conakry	112	101	96	121	50	2	1	1	6	12
Guinea – Bissau	14	12	11	12	14	6	5	5	6	7
Liberia	7	10	14	16	18	11	10	12	14	16
Mali	186	138	184	263	268	223	104	100	262	405
Mauritania	3	5	6	7	6	40	28	50	54	37
Niger	87	58	39	34	78	55	46	24	40	55
Nigeria	97	102	75	98	120	304	235	370	618	698
Senegal	115	47	111	112	120	91	81	137	151	13
Sierra Leone	8	9	9	11	10	2	1	2	3	5
Togo	31	39	65	63	76	19	19	22	19	19
Total	1,57 2	1,30 1	1,55 2	1,88 2	1,81 3	1,60 0	1,42 4	1,71 5	2,31 6	2,539

Source: ECOWAS Secretariat, Abuja

Three countries namely; Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal are dominant in the region's trade. Nigeria intra-ECOWAS trade is dominated by crude and refined oil (EHIT, 1998). Important destinations of Nigeria's trade 1985 - 1995 were Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Gabon, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Tanzania. Ghana exported 2.4m metric tonnes of agricultural produce; cocoa, timber, coffee and yam which accounted for 53% of exports in 1999. While imports of 6.3m metric tonnes in 1999, were from United Kingdom and Asia. Imports originating from the continent were 2.6m metric tonnes. Crude oil and petroleum products was 1.3 and 0.9m metric tonnes correspondingly (Aning, 2000). However, with seeming dismantling of tariffs and trade barriers, community trade and indeed African trade have not experienced significant increase (table 5 below). As we can be seen from the table, ECOWAS recorded intra-REC exports and imports of 17%, which was boosted by more traditional and artisan trade. As tariff reduction schedule on industrial commodities, is still facing problems, ECOWAS performance cannot be considered very satisfactory.

Table 5: Exports to other REC members 2000

Regional Groupings	EXPORTS					
	Individual intra-REC exports as share of total intra-REC exports		Share of intra-REC exports in total Africa exports		Individual intra-REC exports as a share of its total exports	
	%	Rank	%	Rank	%	Rank
CEMAC	1.1	10	0.1	10	1.9	11
CENSAD*	12.8	3	1.3	4	3.6	8
CEPGL	0.1	12	0.0	13	0.5	12
COMESA	9.3	4	1.0	5	6.0	6
EAC	4.7	7	0.5	7	18.1	1
ECCAS	1.3	9	0.1	9	1.9	10
ECOWAS	19.9	2	2.1	3	10.2	5
IGAD	4.4	8	0.5	8	13.5	2
IOC	0.7	11	0.1	11	4.0	7
MRU	0.0	13	0.0	12	0.3	13
SACU						
SADC	31.3	1	3.3	2	12.8	3
UEMOA	5.9	6	0.6	6	11.2	4
UMA	8.6	5	8.6	1	3.1	9
Total	100		10.5			

Source: Economic Community for Africa, 2000.

This is results mostly from fact that these countries continue export mostly primary produce to developed countries, while importing finished products. OAU Assistant Secretary-General Lawrence Agubuzu told ADF in March, that in absence of robust proficiency by West Africa countries to manufacture and sell goods to their neighbours, open trade measures will not significantly increase regional trade volume. Such measures can only be achieved in periods of relative peace when long term planning can be carried out and not during periods of conflicts like the region has witnessed in more than a decade (Holman, 1993). The capacities of these states are further eroded by policies of trade liberalisation. Northern industries flooded regional markets with cheap goods as local manufacturers were unable to compete. This led to closure of hundreds of businesses and eroded industrial production, which made regional economies more dependent on production of primary goods. Thus trade liberalisation as Algerian President Bouteflika pointed out, "would not enhance integration. This is because Inequalities in production would create unimagined trade imbalances. To

correct imbalance as Dullah Omar South Africa’s Transport Minister stated at Addis Ababa, African need capable democratic states to partner the private sector. Combining efforts will enhance better **develope roads, market facilities and other essential regional infrastructure** (Hutchful, 2000). Another factor accounting for poor intra-regional trade is illegal trade, usually associated with conflicts and conflicts situations. Most major conflicts have been funded through illegal trade in natural resources, as exemplified by Liberia and Sierra Leone, where diamond, gold mines and even forests are a major prize for any side of the conflict.

4.3 Economic Performance of ECOWAS States

ECOWAS at creation was intended to be West Africa’s most vital vehicle for economic collaboration and growth (Ichim, 2006). Its creation was a bold attempt to integrate the sub-region, achieve self-reliance, promotes development, removes barriers to trade and movement of factors of production across states borders to raise living standards and economic stability. Studies on developing countries shows Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows stimulates national investment, trade, competitiveness, employment and general environment of recipient countries (Ndikumana and Verick, 2007). The quantum of inflow of FDI to the continent is rather small, contrasted with other developing regions. For periods, 1990, 2005 and 2013, FDI inflows were 8%, 10% and 7%, respectively, compared to regions which recorded 26%, 29% and 38% in the same period (Table 6). Asia’s aggregate share in World’s FDI inflow stood remarkably at 65%, 67% and 53% over the same period (UNCTAD, 2014).

Table 6: FDI inflows by Region 1990 – 2013

Year	Latin America	Asia	Africa	*Developing Economies (% Share of World FDI)
1990	26	65	8	17

1991	29	61	9	26
1992	30	62	7	32
1993	20	73	7	34
1994	28	66	6	40
1995	25	69	5	34
1996	31	65	4	38
1997	38	56	6	39
1998	45	49	8	27
1999	45	50	5	21
2000	37	59	4	19
2001	36	55	9	27
2002	34	57	8	27
2003	24	66	9	33
2004	34	60	6	39
2005	25	63	10	34
2006	22	65	14	29
2007	24	63	13	30
2008	24	63	15	38
2009	29	67	10	44
2010	30	62	7	46
2011	32	62	6	43
2012	34	57	7	55
2013	38	53	7	54

Foreign Direct Investment have been more favourable to non-African developing countries than the African developing countries (Table 7). FDI receipt by African countries shows that the regional distribution (share) of FDI is skewed in favour of countries in North Africa. In all regional distribution, most FDI to Africa was to North Africa, Central before Western Africa when Northern African countries began to witness declining economic fortunes that can in part be attributed to instability in the political environment. This regional distribution of FDI in Africa reveals that FDI inflow has not been favourable to West African countries (Ajuwon, and Ogwumike, 2013).

Table 7: FDI flows to Developing Countries, 1970 – 2013 (%)

Region/ Economy	1970-1979	1980 - 1989	1990 - 1999	2000 - 2009	2013
Africa	19	11	6	8	7

Latin America	48	32	35	31	39
Asia and Oceania	33	57	59	61	54
Developing Countries	100	100	100	100	100

Source: UNITAD, FDI/TNC database (www.unitad.org/fdistatistics)

Foreign Direct Investment have been more favourable to non-African developing countries than the African developing countries (Table 7). FDI receipt by African countries shows that the regional distribution (share) of FDI is skewed in favour of countries in North Africa. In all regional distribution, most FDI to Africa was to North Africa, Central before Western Africa when Northern African countries began to witness declining economic fortunes that can in part be attributed to instability in the political environment. This regional distribution of FDI in Africa reveals that FDI inflow has not been favourable to West African countries (Ajuwon, and Ogwumike, 2013)..

Foreign Direct Investment have been more favourable to non-African developing countries than the African developing countries (Table 7). FDI receipt by African countries shows that the regional distribution (share) of FDI is skewed in favour of countries in North Africa. In all regional distribution, most FDI to Africa was to North Africa, Central before Western Africa when Northern African countries began to witness declining economic fortunes that can in part be attributed to instability in the political environment. This regional distribution of FDI in Africa reveals that FDI inflow has not been favourable to West African countries (Ajuwon, and Ogwumike, 2013).

Table 8: Trends in GDP Growth Rates in ECOWAS (2013 –2017).

Zones	Years				
	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
ECOWAS	5.80	6.00	3.20	0.20	2.20
EUMOA	6.00	6.50	6.60	6.80	7.30
Benin	7.20	6.40	2.10	3.90	5.40
Burkina Faso	5.70	4.20	4.00	5.90	7.40
Cote D'Ivoire	9.30	8.80	9.20	8.80	8.50
Guinea Bissau	3.60	1.00	5.10	5.10	5.40
Mali	2.30	7.00	6.00	5.80	5.30

Niger	5.30	7.50	4.00	5.00	5.20
Senegal	3.50	4.10	6.30	6.50	5.30
Togo	6.10	5.90	5.50	5.10	5.30
WAMZ	5.70	6.00	2.60	-0.90	1.40
The Gambia	4.80	0.90	4.30	2.20	3.00
Ghana	3.90	4.00	3.80	3.70	6.30
Guinea	3.90	3.70	3.50	6.60	6.70
Liberia	8.70	0.70	0.00	-1.60	2.50
Nigeria	5.50	6.20	2.70	-1.50	0.80
Sierra Leone	20.70	4.60	-20.50	6.30	5.60
Cape-Verde	0.80	0.60	1.00	3.80	5.70

WAMA/ECOWAS **Projections

Source: Annual Report and Statements of Accounts, West African Monetary Agency (WAMA), Freetown, Sierra Leone

What is concern here is that the 2.2% growth rate in 2017 is lower than the population growth rate that is about 3%. What is of concern here is that the growth rate of the sub-region to reduce poverty, it must average 10% and sustainable for 10–15 years.

Table 9: Inflation rate in ECOWAS and WAMZ (2015–2017) (%).

Zones	Years		
	2015	2016	2017
ECOWAS	8.90	15.50	13.60
UEMOA	1.30	0.30	0.90
WAMZ	10.20	16.50	15.70
The Gambia	6.70	7.10	8.40
Ghana	17.70	15.40	12.10
Guinea	7.30	8.70	8.70
Liberia	8.80	12.50	10.80
Nigeria	9.60	18.60	16.10
Sierra Leone	8.90	9.50	19.10
Cape-Verde	-0.20	-1.80	1.70

Source: WAMZ Report, 2017

Table 10. Budget deficit (excluding grants) as % of GDP in ECOWAS and selected countries.

Zones	Years		
	2015	2016	2017

ECOWAS	8.90	15.50	13.60
UEMOA	1.30	0.30	0.90
WAMZ	10.20	16.50	15.70
The Gambia	6.70	7.10	8.40
Ghana	17.70	15.40	12.10
Guinea	7.30	8.70	8.70
Liberia	8.80	12.50	10.80
Nigeria	9.60	18.60	16.10
Sierra Leone	8.90	9.50	19.10
Cape-Verde	-0.20	-1.80	1.70

Source: Annual Report and Statement of Accounts, West African Monetary Institute (WAMI), Accra (various issues).

Table 11: Fiscal balance and external current account (including grants) in Africa 2009–2019 (% of GDP).

Zones	Years		
	2015	2016	2017
ECOWAS	8.90	15.50	13.60
UEMOA	1.30	0.30	0.90
WAMZ	10.20	16.50	15.70
The Gambia	6.70	7.10	8.40
Ghana	17.70	15.40	12.10
Guinea	7.30	8.70	8.70
Liberia	8.80	12.50	10.80
Nigeria	9.60	18.60	16.10
Sierra Leone	8.90	9.50	19.10
Cape-Verde	-0.20	-1.80	1.70

Source: Derived from Table 3.

Undoubtedly, growing influence of China in West Africa and Africa generally is overwhelming. Chinese aid assistance has increased due to her intent to provide robust development programme estimated at tens of billions of dollars since 2000. Marsh, (2018) stated that from 2000 to 2014, 70% of China's overseas aid was sent to Africa. Some scholars argue that “Chinese aid greatly improves economic growth” (Marsh, 2018) but others avers that its huge assistance is intended to weaken Western efforts to promote “democracy and political reform, as US spending overseas is in decline (Marsh, 2018).

Undoubtedly, growing influence of China in West Africa and Africa generally is overwhelming. Chinese aid assistance has increased due to her intent to provide robust development programme estimated at tens of billions of dollars since 2000. Marsh, (2018) stated that from 2000 to 2014, 70% of China's overseas aid was sent to Africa. Some scholars argue that “Chinese aid greatly improves economic growth” (Marsh, 2018) but others avers that its huge assistance is intended to weaken Western efforts to promote “democracy and political reform, as US spending overseas is in decline (Marsh, 2018).

4.4 Foreign Aid as Indicator of Economic Performance

The external factors in regional integration in Africa have played various roles to either advance the integrative scheme or undermine them. These factors are positive and negative forces. One instrument employed by positive external forces on the integration scheme in Africa is foreign aid. Some African countries depend on foreign assistance infrastructural development. Though, there have been divergent views on the effects of foreign aid by various scholars. In the last two decades, reports have indicated that ECOWAS accounts for the rising share in foreign aid inflow globally (Kurihara, 2014). The rising rate of foreign aid is attributable to factors, which includes decisions by donor agencies and advanced countries to provide means to finance poverty reduction measures, attend to humanitarian needs and close the development gap in less developed regions (OECD, 2014; World Bank, 2014). Adamu (2013, p.1) noted that aids contribution to economic development is twofold. Firstly, aid accelerates potential steady growth rate in a country with limited capital. Secondly, aid improves country’s growth rate by attracting technology transfer, which inspires good governance practices.

Undoubtedly, growing influence of China in West Africa and Africa generally is overwhelming. Chinese aid assistance has increased due to her intent to provide robust development programme estimated at tens of billions of dollars since 2000. Marsh, (2018)

stated that from 2000 to 2014, 70% of China's overseas aid was sent to Africa. Some scholars argue that “Chinese aid greatly improves economic growth” (Marsh, 2018) but others avers that its huge assistance is intended to weaken Western efforts to promote “democracy and political reform, as US spending overseas is in decline (Marsh, 2018).

The impact of technical and financial assistance on the development of ECOWAS from both foreign national governments and nonviolent state actors are unprecedented. Adamu and Ighodaro (2011) noted that ECOWAS countries such as Nigeria’s net aid inflow rose from 0.4% in 2001 to 5.5% and 9,0% in 2005 and 2007 respectively, but dropped to 5.5% in 2008 but The Gambia, Ghana and Sierra Leone recorded 12.8%,12.1% and 46.1% respectively in 2001. The table below shows annual growth rate (AGR) in foreign aid (FA) inflows to the ECOWAS between 2000 and 2017 (in billions US\$).

Table 12: Annual growth rate (AGR) in Foreign Aid (FA) inflows to ECOWAS 2000 - 2017 (in billions of current US\$)

Year	Foreign Aid	Annual Growth Rate(AGR) %
2000	3.17	0
2001	4.321	0.363
2002	4.839	0.12
2003	4.99	0.031
2004	6.613	0.325
2005	11.763	0.779
2006	17.683	0.503
2007	9.134	-0.483
2008	10.247	0.122
2009	9.856	-0.038
2010	12.158	0.234
2011	12.059	-0.008
2012	13.005	0.078
2013	12.151	-0.005
2014	12.366	0.018
2015	9.623	0.136
2016	10.05	0.044
2017	9.64	-0.041

Sources: Izevbigie, Isikhuemen and Ogbeifun (2020) World Bank WDI (2018)

As already shown in Table 12, there was a decline in the annual inflow of foreign aid which adversely impacted growth rates in 2007, 2009, 2011, 2013 and 2017. The decline may be attributed to several factors occasioned by human security challenges in major receiver countries inclusive of Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal. Growth rate was positive within period under review (2000-2017). Considering the composition of the ECOWAS Sub-region, the foreign aid inflow is predicated on the colonial heritage of member states. Table 13, below shows foreign aid received as a percentage (%) of GNI in ECOWAS between 2000 and 2017.

Table 13: Foreign Aid received in ECOWAS 2000 and 2017 (%) of GNI.

Year	Anglophone	Francophone	Luxophone
2000	42.121	62.858	40.503
2001	44.561	75.672	29.988
2002	43.618	80.033	29.844
2003	38.755	71.868	50.7416
2004	43.973	78.575	30.449
2005	38.712	69.171	28.765
2006	34.838	73.931	27.87
2007	30.277	69.152	28.823
2008	19.273	74.544	28.457
2009	24.001	84.279	29.691
2010	23.508	77.195	35.394
2011	19.058	75.376	24.895
2012	17.74	71.768	22.878
2013	13.273	65.557	24.807
2014	24.361	61.992	23.584
2015	30.53	72.79	30.44
2016	29.76	73.46	29.77
2017	30.49	72.84	30.41

Sources: Izevbigie, Isikhuemen and Ogbeifun (2020) World Bank WDI (2018)

Table 13 above indicates diversity and composition of ECOWAS due to colonial heritage. From the table, Francophone countries are highest, followed by the Anglophone and Lusophone countries. Francophone countries average is higher even if Anglophone and

Lusophone countries are combined. Izevbigie, et al (2020,p.110) opined that Francophone countries quest for foreign aid are attributable to the fact that besides sharing common currency with France have potency of easing capital inflows, as francophone countries are more in numbers.” Development and financial assistance to developing economics come in form of foreign aid. Several scholars have divergent views of the impact of foreign aid on the integrative scheme. Iyoha (2004) argue that large aid flows to Africa have barely promoted growth and alleviate poverty. Sachs (2004) sees aid as moral obligation of rich countries to alleviate poverty in developing countries. Easterly and Levine (2001, 2003) averred that foreign aids contributes to bad governance, corruption and heightened poverty in Africa, hence, he advocated end to foreign aid.

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 CONCLUSION:

Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) ought to be mechanism for galvanising West African into globalisation phenomenon. However, ECOWAS has become almost stillborn, making but a feeble advance in its integration efforts after more than two decades. This pitiable state of affairs has been mainly attributed to the strife-torn inter-state relationships characterising the sub-region. Moreover, the region's power configuration intrudes on co-operation process. Most countries run colonial era systems and maintain trading links and relations more with erstwhile colonialists than neighbouring countries. Thus, lack of infrastructure and poor linkages levels among nations tended to worsen intended trade initiatives.

Though, prospects for West Africa do not seem very bright, we can learn from experiences elsewhere. In Europe, political stability, and strong institutions led to effective regional co-operation that energised economic growth. In West Africa, however these factors are either missing or undeveloped. Thus, ECOWAS lacks domestic or international economic environments, required to fine tune economic policies and build confidence to revitalise economic activity.

However, Integration cannot be achieved by strict reliance or focus on narrow economic dynamics. Political and economic imperatives cannot be separated, as, political and economic integration is inextricably interlinked. This involves democratising regional organisations, movement across borders and collectively addresses social issues. However, many countries in the sub-region either at war or experiencing serious political instability, thus, peace must also be crucial element of integration. One way of achieving peace is full and comprehensive application of concept of NAPAD by all governments, which according to ECOWAS secretary general has been adopted for the sub-region.

In dealing with difficulties facing regional integration efforts, promoters of unity identified several factors for achieving success. They include the followings;

1. Involvement of civic societies, commercial and specialists groups, and other segments more keenly in integration efforts
2. Achievement of equilibrium between public and private commercial plans, resolve differing interests of countries in relation to size, resources and economic success
3. Pursue speed off integration that is bold and also credible to remodel regional bodies, to curtail overlap and ineptitude.

5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

Regional integration is recognised generally as dynamic plan to improve economic growth. Inter-regional collaboration curbs drawbacks in regional programmes by emphasising external look, national and regional policy harmonisation and commercial interests. Challenge facing ECOWAS economies is incapacity to provide sustainable rates of economic growth and capacity to export. This requires sustained economic reforms, which are undeveloped. The challenge of globalisation, should give sub-regional governments enough justification for undertaking reforms as co-operation will help states to play effective part in global economy as a group.

Preferential Trade Area, ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation Scheme (ETLS), and Common External Tariff (CET) represent ideals of globalisation because of trade and investment liberalisation in international fora. ETLS seeks to enhance customs duties and relax customs duties on raw materials, handicrafts, relax tariffs on approved industrial machinery. It also involves established Common External Tariff (CET) regime for outside countries. Introducing CET and country standards will enable ECOWAS respond gainfully to globalisation, as burden of economics forces governments to be circumspect in resources management.

In addition, regional leaders should exhibit disposition to execute ratified protocols, treaties and programmes. They must take necessary curative steps towards financial control, currency elasticity and introduction of supervisory plans to keep pace with financial relaxation. Lesson learnt from other integrating states is realisation that exhibition of complementarity even in agricultural sector shows perceived common or competitive spirit among members. Understanding of comparative advantages in each country is a hurdle that member states must cross to implement common agricultural policy.

ECOWAS is faced with challenges, of full integration and progress beyond one-to-one or state-to-state relations. Regional integration process is over 25 years but level of what is achievable is dependent on implementation of appropriate strategies.

Secondly, ECOWAS must establish strong and adequate institutional structures that will enhance its response mechanisms. Though, ECOWAS has existed for 48 years without strong regional institutions, such scenario is certainly inadequate if regional integration is to become an important achievement for ECOWAS; the only way forward if the community is to maintain its relevance in a globalise world. The implication is that member states should make resources (human and financial) available to ECOWAS, so as to make the Abuja secretariat an efficient, effective and truly functional

Thirdly, there is need for active participation of NGOs in ECOWAS' activities. A link should be created between governments and NGOs by periodic ECOWAS briefing activities, where both parties can explain their programmes, ideas and explore ways of promoting effective co-operation.

It is here emphasised that ECOWAS future response to these challenges is critical for its future. There is need to increase number economic interactions among states, because tendency for co-operation increased if members meet on regular basis than if they meet at irregular and long intervals. This should not only be true for meetings involving ECOWAS

Heads of States and Foreign Ministers but also those in other functional areas that have not been involved hitherto.

Finally, interaction among members should be durable and enduring. If current ECOWAS decisions and in future are for any reason considered extraneous to goals of member states, the likelihood of non-co-operation will become higher. Though existence of ECOWAS may be independent of progress in the political area as exemplified by ECOMOG activities, however, considering prevalent political unrest in many states, it is doubtful seriously that without a political guarantee, economic integration would be a success. Successful economic collaboration, solidification of regional peace and security, democracy and bolstering of diversity are essential elements required for ECOWAS survival.

Narrow focus on economic dynamics or strict reliance on political initiatives may not achieve integration as previously assumed. Political and economic imperatives cannot be separated because political and economic integration are intertwined. However, with countries either at war or experiencing serious instability, peace cannot be discountenanced as strategic factor. One way to achieve peace is application of NAPAD concept by all government, which according to ECOWAS Secretary has been adopted.

In light of the foregoing, effective regional economic co-operations and integration-should begin with trade. This will enhance macro convergence among trading partners, to induce investment on roads, railways, power, air services, and telecoms. However, many travellers in West Africa encounter constant problems travelling amongst neighbouring countries. Small-scale manufacturers encounter difficulties processing licenses for import or export, while at customs posts traders are often extorted. Ordinary travellers often pay bribes to pass police checkpoints. Furthermore, businessmen often wait for weeks to get visas to member countries. However, travellers from Europe and America often obtain visa at airports on arrival to most ECOWAS countries. Also, interests of local private sector appears to be ignored in the

regional integration process because according Chad's Chamber of Commerce and Industry director-general, expertise of businessmen is not even sought about taxes on businesses

Furthermore, to encourage unfettered participation of all states in the integration process, ECOWAS should as a matter of priority establish a compensation mechanism. This will assuage the concern of those countries that are likely to lose revenue due to the vagaries of integration, especially, those countries, which may feel elimination of tariffs will deprive them of important source of revenues. This mechanism has enabled grouping of ECOWAS French speaking states to be reduced to zero in January 2000. Loss of tariff revenue could compromise fiscal position of states' with limited sources of revenue. It is thus advised that such mechanism be weighted in favour of impoverished landlocked countries to compensate for losses in revenues.

References

Abdoul-Razak Idrissa (2020, March 3). Scandale au Niger: où sont passés les milliards destinés aux troupes antijihadistes ?VOA. Retrieved from <https://www.voafrique.com/a/scandale-au-sein-de-larm%C3%A9e-au-niger/5312989.html>

- Abutudu, M. M. (1988) Underdevelopment and Collective Self- Reliance in the Economic Community of West African States. Being an unpublished Ph.D thesis submitted to the Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan.
- Adepoju, A. (2016). Patterns in migration in West Africa. In T. Manuh (Ed.) *At home in the World? International migration and development in contemporary Ghana*. Ghana: Sub-Saharan Publishers.
- Afolabi, B. (2016). *The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF): Evolution, Prospects and Challenges*
- Agaa, M. E.I. (1997) . *Economic Integration Worldwide*, (St Martin's Press NY).
- Ahmad, Aly. (1994). *Economic Co-operation in Africa: In Search of Directions*, (Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, CO.)
- ALF, (Africa Leadership Forum) (1991) Africa Leadership Forum, The Kampala Document was adopted by African Leaders at the Kampala Forum, 19 – 22 May, 1991, which deliberated on a proposal to launch a conference on Peace, Security, Stability, Development and Co-operation in Africa (CSSDCA). It marks out a framework for governance and development in Africa in the 1990s and into the 21st century.
- Ali, W.O. (2009). ECOWAS and Development Challenges in West Africa. In Ogwu, U. J. Ali, W. O. (2009). *ECOWAS Milestones in Regional Integration*. The Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, Nigeria.
- Ali, A. D. (2013). Security and economic development in Nigeria since 1960. *Kuwait Chapter of Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review*, 2(6):1-7.
- Anadi, S.K.M (2005), “Regional Integration in Africa: The Case of ECOWAS”, An Unpublished Doctor of Philosophy Theses submitted to the Faculty of Arts, University of Zurich.
- Atuobi, S. and Okyere, F. (2010). *Enhancing the Operationalisation of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework: A Study of the State-Level Awareness of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework in West Africa (Benin, Burkina Faso, Liberia and Ghana)*. Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre International Institutions Programme.
- Ariyo, S. (2017). *Regionalism and Africa's development expectations, reality and challenges*. London: Macmillan Press.
- Ayoob, M. (1997). *Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective*. In Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams, ed., *Critical Security Studies*, (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press).
- Ajuwon, O.S., and Ogwumike, F.O. (2013). Uncertainty and foreign direct investment: A case of agriculture in Nigeria. *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, 4(1), 155-163.

- Atsain, A (1983) *Regional Integration and Foreign Policy*. A Paper presented at the IEA African Regional Conference, Addis-Ababa, Ethiopia
- Balassa, B. (1961). *The Theory of Economic Integration*, (Richard D. Irvin, Homewood, IL).
- Berkowitz, M. and Bock, P.G. (1968). “National Security”, in David L. Sills (ed.), *International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan).
- Booth, Ken. (1994). *A Security Regime in Southern Africa: Theoretical Considerations*. Southern African Perspectives No. 30, CSAS.
- Bertelsmann Stiftung (BTI). (2020). Country Report – Niger. Page 3.
- Bonnecase, Vincent (2013) “Politique des prix, vie chère et contestation sociale à Niamey. Quels répertoires locaux de la colère?”, *Politique africaine*, 130, p.108
- Bonnecas, Vincente (2021) *Democracy and Adjustment in Niger: A Conflict of Rationales*. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis. PP 181-214.
- Buzan, B. 1991. *New Patterns of Global Security in the 21st Century*. *International Affairs* Vol. 67 (3): 431-451.
- Cara, K. (2015). What is trade openness and what is the effect of trade openness on economic financial development? Retrieved from <https://www.enotes.com/homework-help/what-trade-openness-87695>
- Chambas, M.I. (2007) “The Role of ECOWAS in Achieving the Economic Integration of West Africa” being a paper he presented at the National Democratic Institute, United States of America.
- Chandler, D. (2007). The Security-Development Nexus and the Rise of Anti-Foreign Policy. *Journal of International Relations and Development*, 10(4):362–386
- Collier, Paul. (1999), ‘*On the Economic Consequences of Civil War*’. *Report of the World Bank*: in Collaboration with the University of Oxford, *Oxford Economic Papers* 51: 168–183.
- Clapham, Christopher (1997).. *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival*, Cambridge University Press).
- De meto and Tsikata (2014). “Common Investment Market and Attraction of FDI in ECOWAS”, *Journal of West African Integration*, Vol. 1, No. 2, July, 2012.
- Deutsch, Karl. W. Burrell, Sidney. Kann, Robert A. and Lee, Maurice Jr. (1957). *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
- Dinshak, Luka D. and Damla, Kevin M. (2018). ECOWAS, Insecurity in West Africa and the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework. *Jos Journal of Social Issues*, 2(1):161-176.

- Ekiyor, T. (2008). *The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF). A New Approach to an old Challenge* WACSI Op-Ed
- Ekpo, A H. and Udo E. (2016). Policy coordination framework for the proposed monetary union in ECOWAS. In: Seck D, editor. *Regional Economic Integration in West Africa*. New York: Springer.
- Engel J. and M-A. Jouanjean, (2013b), “Barriers to Trade in Food Staples in West Africa: An Analytical Review,”. London: ODI
- Etzioni, Amitai. (1965). *Political Unification*. (New York: Hole, Rinehart and Winston).
- Eugene, O. Eugene and Abdussalam, Aisha A. (2022). Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Sub-Regional Conflict Management and Peacekeeping Missions in West Africa. *KIU Journal of Social Sciences*, 8(1): 205–218.
- Francis, D. J.2013.The Regional Impact of the Armed Conflict and French Intervention in Mali. Oslo:NOREF.<https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/163177/f18726c3338e39049bd4d554d4a22c36.pdf>
- Francis, D. (2001). *The Politics of Economic Intergration: Sierra Leone in ECOWAS*. Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, England.
- Furtak, T.F (2015) “Integration in Regional Organizations? A Comparative of EU, AU, OAS, and ASEAN” in *Journal of Civil and Legal Science*: Berlin, Germany.
- Grégoire, Emmanuel (2011) “Niger. Un état à forte teneur en uranium”, *Hérodote*, 142, p 211.
- Haarlov, J. (1997). *Regional Co-operation and Integration within Industry and Trade in Southern Africa: General Approaches, SADC and the World Bank*, (Avebury, Anldershot).
- Haas, E.B (1958). *The Uniting Europe: Political, Social and Economic Forces, 1950 – 1957* Stanford University Press.
- Haas, E.B. (1964) *Beyond the National State*. Stanford California: Standard University Press.
- Haavik, Viljar Morten Bøås and Alessio Iocchi (2022): *The End of Stability – How Burkina Faso Fell Apart*, *African Security*, DOI: 10.1080/19392206.2022.2128614
- Hameed, A. (2009). *The Development of ECOWAS Administration 1975-2005*. In Ogwu, U. J. Ali, W. O. (2009).*ECOWAS Milestones in Regional Integration*. The Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, Nigeria.
- Ichim, O. (2006) *Governance and Regional Integration (Seminal Paper on ECOWAS)* at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos.

- Inotai, A. (1982) International Competiveness Imports. *Acta Oeconomica*, 39(1-2):45-60
- International crisis group. (2020, January 6). Ibid. Page 12.
- Inter-parliamentary Union (2020). Data retrieved from https://data.ipu.org/node/124/elections?chamber_id=13476
- Izevbigie, Isikhuemen and Ogbeifun (2020) World Bank WDI (2018)
- Johnson, Essuman A. (2009). “Regional conflict resolution mechanisms: A comparative analysis of two African security complexes”, *African Journal of Political Science*, vol. 3 (11): 7
- Jovanovic, M. (1992). *International Economic Integration*, (Rouledge, London).
- Krahman, E. (2003). Conceptualizing security and governance. *Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association*, 38(1), 5-26
- Larccher, L. (2015, December 12). Tentative de coup d’État au Niger. *La Croix*. Retrieved from <https://www.la-croix.com/Actualite/Monde/Afrique/Tentative-de-coup-d-Etat-au-Niger-2015-12-18-1394672>
- Lee, M. (2000). “Development Co-operation and Integration in the SADC Region” in D.W Nabudere (ed.) *Globalisation and the Post-Colonial African State*, (AAPS Books, Hararep).
- Lindberg, Leon. (1963). *The Political Dynamics of European Integration*, (California Stanford University Press 1963)
- Lippmann, Walter. (1943), *US Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic* (Boston: Little, Brown.
- Lipsey, R.G. (1960) “The Theory of Customs Union: A General Survey”. *Economic Journal* Vol. 70:496 – 513.
- Matei, F.2017.“The Case of Mali.”In *Security Forces in African States Cases and Assessment*, edited by P. Shemella and N. Tomb, 103–122. New York: Cambria Press
- Mathews, J. (1994). ‘Re-defining Security’ in Olson W and Lee J (ed), *The Theory and Practice of International Relations* 9th ed. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Maiyaiki, T. B. (2017), The Challenges and Prospects for Regional and Economic Integration in West Africa in *Journals of Asian Social Science*, 13(5):24
- Mbekeani, K. (2013). Understanding the Barriers to Trade in Africa. Background Paper prepared by Staff of the African Development Bank in collaboration with the World Bank for the G 20 Summit in France.
- Mkwezalamba, M. (2011). “Regional and Market Integration”, Paper Presented at the 16th African Partnership forum, OECD headquarters, Paris, France; 21 April.

- Mogbitse Ulisan O. and Omozue, Ogorugba M. (2022). Insurgency in ECOWAS: An Impediment to the Realization of Regional Integration. *Commonwealth Law Review Journal*, 8:292-305.
- Ndikumana, L., and Verick, S. (2007). The linkages between FDI and domestic investments: Unraveling the developmental impact of foreign investment. (Working Paper No. 25). University of Massachusetts-Amherst, Economics Department.
- Nisser Ibadan (1983) Reflection on Africa's Historic and Current Initiatives at for Political and Economic Unity. Nigerian Institute for Social and Economic Research (NISSER), Ibadan. C:\myfiles\afrikanhistoric.
- Nisrin, Salem (2023) ECOWAS and Regional Security: A Study in the Settlement of the Internal Conflict in Mali. *Khenchela University Journal of Law and Political Science*, 10(02): 1151-1164.
- Nyirabikali, G. 2015. Mali Peace Accord: Actors, Issues and Their Representation. Stockholm: SIPRI.
- Obiozor, G.A, Olukoshi, A, and Obi, C.I (1993) "The Challenges of West African Regional Economic Integration: an Introductory Overview", in *Regional and Cooperation in West Africa: A Multidimensional Perspectives*, (ed) by Real Lavergne, International Development Research, Canada.
- Onwuka, R.I (1982) *Development and Integration in West Africa: the Case Study of ECOWAS*, Ife University Press, Ife, Osun State.
- Osadolor, Benson (1997). Regional Security and Integration: A Study of ECOWAS Initiatives in Military Co-operation, *Benin Journal of Historical Studies*, Vol. 1 No.1 Jan..
- Ostegaard, Tom (1993) "Classical Models of Integration, What Relevance for Southern Africa" in B Oden (ed.) *Southern Africa after Apartheid: Regional Integration and External Resources*, (Nordiska Afrikainstitutet Uppsala).
- Perspective Monde. (2020, November 11). Niger. Politique intérieure. Retrieved from <https://perspective.usherbrooke.ca/bilan/servlet/BMHistoriquePays?codePays=NER&langue=fr>
- Radio France Internationale. (2020, November 30) Niger: les effectifs de l'armée vont doubler d'ici cinq ans. Retrieved from <https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20201130-niger-les-effectifs-de-larm%C3%A9e-vont-doubler-d-ici-cinq-ans>
- République du Niger. (2010). Constitution de la VIIème République. Articles 46-82.
- République du Niger. (2010). Constitution de la VIIème République. Articles 46-82.
- République du Niger. (2010). Constitution de la VIIème République. Art 99.

- Robson, P. (1980). *The Economics of International Integration*: (George Allen and Unwin, London).
- Robson, W (1965) Russia Revisited. *The Political Quarterly*, 36(1):67-81
- Sloan, J.W (1971) The Strategy of Developmental Regionalism: Benefits, Distribution, Obstacles and Capabilities; *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 10:2 :142.
- Soderbaum, M (1996). *The New Regionalism and the Quest for Development Co-operation and Integration in Southern Africa*: (Department of Economics University of Lund, Minor Field Study Series No. 73).
- Soumahoro, M. (2020). Community Engagement in Fighting Transnational Organised Crime in the Liptako-Gourma. Institute for Peace and Security Studies. Policy brief. Page 3.
- Suryohadiprojo, Sayidiman (1991). "Security Systems for the Prevention of War", in *Disarmament (A Periodic Review by the UN)* Vol. XIV No. 4:79-80
- Tickner, J. A. (1995). 'Re-visioning Security' in K. Booth & S. Smith (ed), *International Relations Theory Today*. UK: Blackwell.
- UNCTAD (2014).Global Investment Trend Monitor. New Yorkand Geneva: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
- UNCTAD (2014). The political economy of regionalism in Africa: a decade of the economic community of West African States (ECOWAS). New York: Praeger Special Studies.
- United Nations Secretary General (UNSG).2018.Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation inMali. S/2018/1174. New York: United Nations
- Unya, Ikenna U. (2019). Regional Organisations as Strategies for Development: A Comparison of EU, OAS and ASEAN. *Babcock Journal of History and International Relations* 4(1):101-111.
- Velde, D.W. (2011). Regional integration, growth and convergence. *Journal of Economic Integration*, 26(1):1-28.
- Viner, J. (1950) *The Custom Union Issues* New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- WFE (West Africa Editorial) (1992), 10 – 16 August.
- Walt, Stephen M. (1991). The Renaissance of Security Studies, *Mershon International Studies Review* 41: 212-226.
- Wolfers, Arnold. (1962). *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press).

