

Corrupt Practices and Efficiency of Telecommunication Services in Nigeria

**Christopher Osas EHIZOBA
PG/MGS0508291**

**Department of Accounting
Faculty of Management Sciences
University of Benin
Benin City**

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Christopher Osas EHIZOBA

PG/MGS0508291

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Faculty of Management Science, University of Benin, Benin City, in Partial
Fulfilment of the Requirement for the Award of Masters of Science (M.Sc)
Degree in Accounting**

Professor A. O. Oladipupo
(Supervisor)

June, 2021

DECLARATION

I, **Christopher Osas EHIZOBA** declare that:

1. This thesis is a study carried out by me in the Department of Accounting, Faculty of Management Sciences, University of Benin, Benin City under the supervision of **Professor A. O. Oladipupo** of the Department of Accounting, Faculty of Management Sciences, University of Benin, Benin City, Nigeria.
2. This work has not been submitted for the award of any degree elsewhere.
3. All the ideas and views are the products of my personal research. All references made to the works of others have been duly acknowledged.
4. I shall be solely and completely accountable for any liability that may arise from this study, if any.

Christopher Osas EHIZOBA

PG/MGS1512637

Date

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We the undersigned attest and declare that the thesis of Christopher Osas EHIZOBA titled “Corrupt Practices and Efficiency of Telecommunication Services in Nigeria” has successfully passed the anti-plagiarism test and does not violate any copyright regulations.

Professor A. O. Oladipupo

Supervisor

Date

Professor A. S. Omoye

Head of Department

Date

CERTIFICATION

We certify that this thesis was carried out by Christopher Osas EHIZOBA in the Department of Accounting, Faculty of Management Sciences, University of Benin, Benin City, Nigeria and it is considered adequate in scope and quality in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of Masters of Science (M.Sc.) degree in Accounting.

Professor A. O. Oladipupo

Supervisor

Date

Professor . J. O. Odia
M.Sc. Coordinator

Date

Professor A. S. Omoye
Head of Department

Date

ATTESTATION OF CORRECTED THESIS

We the cosignatories, attest that Christopher Osas EHIZOBA has successfully carried out all the required corrections as suggested by the External and Internal Examiners in his thesis titled “Corrupt Practices and Efficiency of Telecommunication Services in Nigeria”

Professor, A. O. Oladipupo
Supervisor

Date

Professor. J. O. Odia
Internal Examiner

Date

Professor A. S. Omoye
Head of Department

Date

DEDICATION

This thesis is dedicated to God Almighty for His grace, favour and infinite mercies towards me and to my parents for their enduring support.

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ABSTRACT

The study examined the corrupt practices by telecommunication service providers in Nigeria and their impacts on the efficiency of telecom services in the country. Specifically, the focused on identifying the different categories of corrupt practices by the telecom service providers and their collective impact on service availability, quality of service, and their cost of service.

In order to achieve these objectives, the study adopted the cross-sectional survey research design, using primary data. The population consisted of all active telecommunication users (subscribers) in the six (6) South-South States in Nigeria (i.e. Akwa-Ibom = 3,102,760; Bayelsa = 1,102,570; Cross-River = 2,274,165; Delta = 5,328,096; Edo = 5,169,076 and Rivers State = 6,270,011), totalling 23,246,678 subscribers (i.e. GSM and others) as at the second quarter (Q2) of 2018. The Taro Yamani's formula was employed in systematically scaling down the sample to four hundred (400) participants for convenient sake which were chosen randomly among the subscribers of the four (4) major service providers in Nigeria (MTN, Glo, Airtel and 9mobile). Both descriptive statistics and the simple linear regression techniques were used for the analysis.

The results showed an inverse and non-significant relationship between level of corrupt practices, telecom service availability and quality of telecom service. This implies that higher levels of corrupt practice by telecom operators have the tendency of reducing telecom service availability and quality, but not significantly. However, the relationship between level of corrupt practices and cost of service is positive and statistically significant meaning that higher level of corrupt practice by telecom network providers is strongly associated with high cost of telecom services (tariffs). The study concludes that the level of corrupt practices by telecom network providers is not associated with the quality and availability of the telecommunication service in Nigeria. The study recommends, among others, that stiffer sanctions, such as withdrawal of licence, should be meted out to network providers found to be engaging in corrupt practices and/or exploitative services capable of short-changing the subscribing public.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Information and communication are very vital in all spheres of life. In the context of driving speedy growth and development of any nation, telecommunication, as a key component of the communication industry, is considered germane. Telecommunication facilitates accelerated information diffusion which reduces communication and transaction costs, and equally enhances market efficiency and competition (Sutherland, 2018). In this modern world that is fast becoming a global village, innovative communication services are not only essential for socio-economic growth; they are also among the prerequisite for inclusive participation in the increasingly competitive world markets and for attracting new investments (Adeyemi, Jedin, & Subhan, 2017). Thus, for other sectors of the economy to thrive progressively, telecommunication has a significant role it plays. This explains why the Nigerian government placed telecommunication sector under their control, until recently when deregulation and privatisation policies are being introduced in many key sectors, including power.

Chidozie, Lawal and Ajayi (2015) note that prior to the return of democratic rule in Nigeria in 1999, majority of the sectors managed by the government were marred by poor performance and epileptic services as a result of gross mismanagement, ineptitude, and endemic corruption. The telecommunication operations were then under the control of NITEL (i.e. Nigeria Telecommunications Limited). Those periods (that is, prior to 1999) were characterised by the dominant use of land telephone lines as virtually the only means of telecommunication in the country. Ownership of telephone lines were among the indicators of wealth as it was then rigorous and costly to own one as an individual (Hassan, 2011). People usually gather at the houses of telephone line owners to wait and receive phone calls from their relatives. The

inefficiencies of some of the government-controlled enterprises led to series of reforms and deregulation of various economic sectors in order to encourage private sector participation (examples include: telecommunications, power, and downstream petroleum sectors). Among all the deregulated sectors as mentioned above, the telecommunication sector appeared to be the most noticeable beneficiary of the liberalization policy in year 2000 which paved way for the introduction of the general system for mobile telecommunications (GSM) in year 2001 (Adediran, Opadiji, Faruk& Bello, 2016; Odunlami & Awolusi, 2015).

A report by the National Bureau of Statistics (2018) suggested that the liberalization of the telecommunication sector in Nigeria led to a tremendous increase in the number of telephone subscription base in the country from about 508,316 landlines in 1999 to 162,522,772 GSM and fixed wireless lines as at the second quarter (Q2) of 2018 - representing over 30000% growth. The sector has also attracted over \$1 billion a year in investments in the past five years while Nigeria has been rated as one of the countries with the fastest growing tele-density (telephone penetration) in the world rising from 0.45% in 1999 to 114.92% as at August 2018. By virtue of the above figures, it then implies that about 80% of the Nigerian population now own at least one mobile telephone line. This assumption is practically observable as there are no longer series of phone booths along the streets with large umbrella-covered call-centers bearing the names of different multinational telecommunication companies.

From the foregoing, it is pertinent to note that the deregulation policy initiatives in the Nigerian telecommunication sector, as realized via the different service providers that were issued licenses by the Nigerian Communication Commission (NCC), has made noticeable impacts on the Nigerian economy. It is worthy of mention at this stage that there are currently four (4) mobile telecommunication service providers in Nigeria (MTN, Airtel, 9mobile and Glo) including other Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) network operators like Smile, Visafone,

Multilinks and NTEL. In spite of the observable successes of the sector as portrayed in the previous paragraphs, some school of thoughts (such as Chidozie, Lawal, & Ajayi, 2015) still hold the view that the large dominance of foreign (and a few local) bourgeoisies in the telecommunication sector may have increased the bane of corrupt practices in the entire communication sector in Nigeria. It is however instructive to examine the perception of the public users' on the corrupt practices by communication service providers in Nigeria. This forms the background of the study.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Corruption has been an age-long national phenomenon in most developing countries and still subsists as one of the greatest challenges facing Nigeria at the moment. Its existence is rife in virtually all aspects and sectors of the nation's socioeconomic life, including telecommunication (Nwaodu, Adam & Okereke, 2014). As Sutherland (2012) cited in Sutherland (2018, p.2), puts it "that corruption is commonplace in the telecommunications sector is well established, with manufacturers and operators having admitted bribery and nepotism in a range of countries", including the United States. In the 1970s for instance, Nigeria was the location of bribes allegedly paid by Alcatel-Lucent, International Telephone & Telegraph (ITT), and Siemens, which all resulted in corruption-related litigations including one involving a former state governor (Cowell, 1983). Even the fire that razed down the Lagos NET's (Nigerian External Telecommunications Company) 32-storey building in 1983 was touted as being the handiwork of arsonists attempting to destroy strong evidences of extensive corruption in the telecommunication sector (Cowell, 1983).

Traditionally, corruption is usually been seen as a public sector phenomenon, while the private sector is often celebrated as a system 'where things work', but anecdotal evidence

subjectively suggests that corrupt practices in the private sector can be equated with those in the public sector. In recent times, there have been allegations of corrupt practices by the operators of different deregulated sectors in Nigeria; for example, the power and telecommunication sector. On the former, different civil society groups have recently raised concerns of massive extortions of customers via exorbitant estimated billings. On the latter, as the focus of this study, there have been allegations of poor service quality, serial deductions for unsolicited short messages (SMS), perceived exploitation via unsolicited caller tunes and promotional internet subscription packages, among others – including infractions and failure to adhere to certain regulatory injunctions which have led to exorbitant fines by the NCC.

Overall, the magnitude of the allegations of corrupt practices and swindling perpetrated by some telecommunication network providers in Nigerians is quiet *alarming*; however there is little or no survey research in that regards to understand the perception of the telecommunication users who directly patronise their services. Most studies on corrupt practices in Nigeria, such as Acho and Abuh (2016), have focused only on the public sector, leaving the private (service) sectors where such ‘sharp’ practices are equally prevalent. Researchers like Osemeka (2014) posits that while the telecoms sector is increasing the country's integrative capacity, it is also increasing avenues for the perpetration of crime and corrupt practices. To this extent, this study intends to examine the corrupt practices by telecommunication service providers in Nigeria from the perspective of telecommunication users. Arising from the above, the following research questions were raised to guide the study:

- i. How do corrupt practices by telecommunication service providers affect the service availability of telecommunications in Nigeria?
- ii. To what extent do corrupt practices by telecommunication service providers affect the quality of service of telecommunications in Nigeria?

- iii. How do corrupt practices by telecommunication service providers affect the cost of service of telecommunications in Nigeria?

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The broad objective of this study is to examine the public users' perception of corrupt practices by telecommunication service providers in Nigeria. The specific objectives of the study are to:

- i. examine how corrupt practices by telecommunication service providers affect the service availability of telecommunications in Nigeria,
- ii. identify the extent to which corrupt practices by telecommunication service providers affects the quality of service of telecommunications market in Nigeria; and
- iii. ascertain how corrupt practices by telecommunication service providers affect the cost of service of telecommunications in Nigeria.

1.4 Research Hypotheses

In line with the research questions and the specific objectives of the study, three (3) hypotheses are formulated for testing and stated in the null (Ho) form as follows:

- i. Corrupt practices by telecommunication service providers do not significantly affect the service availability of telecommunications in Nigeria.
- ii. Corrupt practices by telecommunication service providers do not significantly affect the quality of service of telecommunications in Nigeria.
- iii. Corrupt practices by telecommunication service providers do not significantly affect the cost of service of telecommunications in Nigeria.

1.5 Scope of the Study

The study is designed to examine the corrupt practices by telecommunication service providers in Nigeria and its effect on service availability, quality of service and cost of service of telecommunications in the country. The scope of the study was limited to all active public telecommunication users' (encompassing individual and institutions) in the six (6) states of the South-South geopolitical region of Nigeria – namely Edo, Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross-River, Delta and Rivers states. Based on the report of the National Bureau of Statistics (2018), there are a total of 23,246,678 active voice telecommunication subscribers (i.e. GSM and others) in the entire six aforementioned south-south States as at second quarter (Q2) of 2018 (i.e. Edo=5,169,076; Akwa-Ibom=3,102,760; Bayelsa=1,102,570; Cross-River=2,274,165; Delta=5,328,096; and Rivers=6,270,011). The south-south region and its States were chosen for the study due to its closeness to the researcher's base for the purpose of questionnaire administration and retrieval.

1.6 Significance of the Study

Studying the incidences of corruption by telecommunication service providers would certainly be of immense benefit to the Nigerian government, especially as the fight against corruption appears to be the dominant policy of the current administration. It will also contribute to the body of research since majority of the previous studies have focused on examining the incidences of corruption in the public sector. Thus, the outcome of this study will open up avenues for further studies in other industries as private sector corruption deserves as much attention as public sector corruption due to its equally debilitating effects on economic activity of the country. For regulatory purposes, this study will also be of utmost significance to the policy makers in the private sector to be able to know and assert the specific areas the services

providers short-change the public with a view to reviewing existing regulations and curbing corrupt practices in the sector. The study will also serve as an eye opener to the general public and the other industries in the private sector on the reality and nature of corrupt practices in the telecommunication sector and its implication on service availability, quality of service and cost of service. This will guide both existing and potential subscribers on the service provider that deserves their patronage. More so, the research will serve as literature material to students who may want to know or carryout research on related topic.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a review of related literature on the study topic. The chapter begins with a conceptual review of corruption from the general perspective in sub-section 2.2.1, to the Nigerian context (sub-section 2.2.2) and as relates to the private sector as reviewed in sub-section 2.2.3. It went further to provide an overview of the evolution of telecommunication in Nigeria in sub-section 2.2.4 which preceded the nature of corrupt practices by telecommunications service providers in section 2.3. Section 2.4 looked at the corrupt practices and efficiency of telecommunications services in Nigeria from the dimensions of service availability, service quality and cost of service. In section 2.5, the study reviewed the outcome of the available related empirical studies related to the study topic. The theoretical framework of the study came in section 2.6 followed by the summary of the review in section 2.7.

2.2 Conceptual Review

This sub-section reviews the concept of corruption and its history in Nigerian private sector. It also covered an overview of telecommunication in Nigeria.

2.2.1 Corruption

Corruption is often described as being more of a human invention than mere societal malaise. It has also been defined from different perspectives based on the context of its conceptualization. For example, the pioneer chairman of the anti-graft agency in Nigeria, Nuhu Ribadu, defined corruption as a deliberate use of one's position to get illegitimate benefit and undue advantage which could be financial or in other forms (Ribadu, 2006). Some others conceptualise corruption from the bribery point of view. For example, Heeks (1998) defined corruption as an inducement to wrong by bribery or other unlawful or improper means. From the

economic point of view, Misangyi, Weaver and Elms (2008) defined corruption as the misuse of a position/title of authority for private/personal and/or group benefit or gain, and this “misuse” typically connotes a breach of legal norms (Misangyi *et al.*, 2008). In business organizations, corruption can be described as the pursuit of individual interests by one or more organizational persons through the intentional misdirection of organizational resources, procedures, authority and power (Lange, 2008). Osuagwu (2012) corroborated the above definition by asserting that corruption represents any action or behaviour in a business organization which is at variance with formally-defined and laid-down obligations for purposes of private/group interests, gains, profits and privileges.

According to sociologists, “corruption is a symptom of a dysfunctional relationship between the state and the public; characterised by bribery, extortion and nepotism” (Altas 1968). It consists of the “subordination of public interests to private aims involving a violation of the norms of duty and welfare, accompanied by secrecy, betrayal, deception, and a callous disregard for any consequence suffered by the public” (Altas 1968). In that context, corruption is seen as a symptom of systematic decay of State institutions. As the UNDP puts it, “corruption is a symptom of something gone wrong in the management of the state” (UNDP 1997). From the above definitions, it is clear that the term ‘corruption’ generally entails the misuse or abuse of positions, power or procedures for personal or group interests. It also encompasses the violation of established rules, practices, and procedures for personal and/or group interests and is largely concerned with actions directed towards securing wealth, power, authority, influence, relevance or advantage through illegal means.

Ndikumana (2013) noted that corruption has overtime been viewed (traditionally) as a public sector phenomenon, involving “vertical transactions” between the state and private agents whereby those who control state institutions and regulations extract rent from producers and

consumers. However, whether conceptualised from the perspective of the public sector or the private sector, it is common knowledge that corruption takes various forms depending on the context. It is most often understood as bribery, a transaction whereby public officials impose or accept informal payments to perform official tasks that are otherwise provided for by law either free of charge or with a legally defined fee (Acemoglu & Johnson 2005). Corruption also takes the form of state capture whereby the bureaucrats are enticed through illegal or semi-illegal forms of lobbying to accept bribes or other favours in exchange for the provision of preferential treatment to private actors (Acemoglu, 2006). Another form of corruption is political patronage, nepotism or cronyism.

Riley (1998) categorised corruption into three (3) main types, namely; incidental, systematic, and systemic corruption. The incidental corruption or petit corruption involves small-scale operations by individuals and small enterprises. While it may be prevalent in scope, the associated volumes of bribery, extortions and theft are relatively small. “Systematic corruption involves a larger number of public officials and an element of organization and conspiracy” (Riley 1998). It involves the corruption at the higher levels of the bureaucracy involving senior decision makers and large volumes of resources. It is usually observed in large public procurements by government departments, state-owned companies, aid programs and projects, and NGO-led programs. Systemic corruption is when corruption has become a system of government. Well known examples in Africa include the former regimes of Mobutu in ex-Zaire and Siaka Stevens’ regime in Sierra Leone, as well as the successive military regimes in Nigeria, Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea, to name a few. These regimes have orchestrated a genuine plunder of national wealth in collusion with external private associates and with the blessing of foreign allied governments that were happy to promote national strategic interests at the detriment of African countries’ development goals. These countries have experienced massive

smuggling of public funds in the form of capital flight. During Mobutu's three-decade reign in Zaire, the country incurred capital flight in excess of its external debt, and at one point, Mobutu's personal wealth exceeded the country's liabilities to the rest of the world (Ndikumana & Boyce 1998).

A corrupt environment is characterised by institutionalized impunity, resulting in an erosion of the norms of integrity and responsibility. Because of institutionalized impunity, corruption tends to be a self-perpetuating phenomenon. On the one hand, bureaucrats manipulate the legal and regulatory systems, and establish laws and regulations that create opportunities for rent-seeking and private wealth accumulation. On the other hand, private actors learn to expect corruption and behave accordingly; that is, they internalize bribery and extortion in their investment and trade decisions. A vicious circle thus ensues where corruption creates expectations of corruption which generate demand and supply for bribes, extortion and nepotism. Therefore, corruption becomes "the natural result of efficient predatory behavior in a lawless world" (Charap & Harm 2002). Corruption may thus be endogenous; an outcome of deliberate decisions by rent-maximizing agents that manipulate and exploit the institutional and regulatory systems to create the "lawless world" that generates and perpetuates corruption.

According to Klitgaard (1988), "corruption typically occurs where three conditions hold: monopoly, discretion, and lack of accountability". Public officials or private actors are able to exploit their monopoly position to extract rents and gain unofficial additional incomes or profits. Discretionary power, coupled with pervasive regulation and expanded public procurements provide opportunities for rent extraction and extortion by the bureaucrats. Lack of accountability, partly due to high centralization of economic and political power, perpetuates corruption. Thus the public sector domain becomes privatized, and the web of patronage and connivance that

develops erodes the foundations of accountability while further expanding opportunities for corruption.

Once corruption is rooted into a society, it also tends to persist because of group reputational dynamics (Tirole, 1996). In a regime with a bad reputation of being corrupt, individual leaders or bureaucrats have little incentive to behave honestly because individual behavior is imperfectly observable while individual reputation is tied to group reputation. It therefore may not seem rational for an individual bureaucrat to attempt to be clean when the system which he/she is associated with is known to be corrupt. Behaving honestly is costly (foregone monetary gains) while it may generate disproportionately low moral rewards in a corrupt environment. All these forces tend to perpetuate corruption. As a result, “once a society becomes corrupt there are powerful forces tending to keep it corrupt” (Collier 2000, p.197).

In addition to undermining overall economic performance and efforts towards poverty reduction (Ndikumana, 2005), corruption has important distributional effects. Corruption somehow has a ‘Robin Hood in reserve’ character (Riley 1998, p.131). The burden of corruption falls disproportionately on the poor and the marginalized segments of the population. In the private sector, evidence shows that corruption disproportionately affects medium-size firms (Francisco & Pontara, 2007). A possible explanation is that while large firms may be well positioned to both internalize the costs of corruption and exploit their connections with influential politicians, small firms (many of them being informal) are able to swim under the radar. In contrast medium sized firms are visible enough to attract the attention of the bureaucrats and regulators but they are not connected enough to avoid corruption. At the same time it is the medium-size firm segment of the private sector that is generally most dynamic and creates jobs especially for the unskilled and semi-skilled labor. Thus corruption hampers private sector development notably by suffocating growth of medium sized firms.

2.2.2 Corruption in Nigeria

According to (Sutherland, 2018), corruption is a culture-bound concept and has remained one of the most complex problems that have impeded speedy economic development in Nigeria. Ribadu (2006) also stated that corruption is one of the most dangerous social ills of any society because corruption, like a deadly virus, attacks the vital structure that makes for society's progressive function, thus putting its very existence into serious perils. Right from independence in 1960, nothing more has ravaged the foundation of the nation than corruption (Ribadu, 2006). In fact, the history of corruption in Nigeria is strongly rooted in the over 29 years of military rule, out of 59th year of Nigeria's statehood since 1960. Between 1960 to date that is, 59 years after independence, military rule has lasted for 25 years, leaving 34 years for civilian rule. Between these periods, various governments have attempted to fight corruption through establishment of agencies, commission of enquiry. However, the role played by some of these agencies still leaves food for thought with respect to corruption.

Corruption has a long history in the Nigerian governance and politics, including the public sector (Pierce, 2016; Frahm, 2017), some of which has been captured by Transparency International (TI) in its Corruption Perceptions Index (see Figure 2.1). Although the scores are largely based on public sector corruption according to experts, business people and country analysts, it gives an insight on the extent to which corruption is being condoned in the country. While the recent loss of about USD 16 billion from its oil fund was outrageous (Turkson, 2016), it was not the first such incident, despite efforts through the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI, 2017). In all economic sectors the FGN determines the 'rules of the game' thus enabling corruption (Sutherland, 2018). Even the corruption fight of the current administration has been marred by criticisms of selective investigations of those opposing the policies of the

government, while allegedly leaving out indicted members and cronies of the government in power.




Figure 2.1: Corruption Perceptions Index – Ranking for Nigeria (2017)

Source: Corruption Perceptions Index (2017) by Transparency International

The most important analytical framework has been prebendalism, in which politicians and government officials believe themselves to have a right to a share of government revenues, to be used for the benefit of their supporters, and members of their ethnic groups and religious cults (Adebanwi & Obadare, 2013). Those ethnic groups devised criminal techniques to secure their share, while military governments behaved like organized crime families (Ebbe, 1997). Men in power—gatekeepers for some opportunity – expected to be rewarded for the performance of functions on behalf of strangers, even when it was their duty. Those running for public office had to be able to offer money and gifts to their electorates, especially to community leaders, who would then support their candidacy. There has been a particular problem of overlapping elites,

with leaders in the army and government, also being traditional or tribal chiefs, causing conflicts of interest.

The British legacy, alongside arbitrary borders, includes a political rhetoric about politicians being corrupt, dating back to town councils created after the Second World War (Tignor, 1993). What began in colonial administration correspondence moved into inquiry reports (Storey, 1953), then into antagonistic electioneering, with parties and politicians accusing one another. Corruption first came to a head in the 1966 *coup d'état*, followed by a sequence of military interventions, all purportedly aimed at stamping out corruption, but proving counter-productive. Corruption that could not be concealed was dismissed by the courts or lost in interminable investigatory commissions.

Its roots go deep, to a materialism and political fragmentation that are the products of a moment in development. Forces that might deter corruption are often weak, with little threat of detection from audit controls or police operations, while the public was often unaware, since politicians controlled the press, compounded by low levels of literacy. Nigerians placed a strong emphasis on materialism, initially in imitation of expatriate Europeans, but also influenced by religious cults. The processes of economic development and urbanisation operated to weaken idealism, which was also undermined by interest group politics, sectional and ethnic allegiances.

An anthropological account of corruption in Nigeria shows it to have permeated nearly all aspects of governmental and commercial life, exemplified by the infamous scams, named after the applicable section of the penal code (Smith, 2007). An archetypal advance fee fraud scam is a mail message apparently from Mariam Abacha, widow of an ex-President, explaining that a very large sum is held in a bank account and that on payment of a smaller sum it can be freed and divided up. It presumes some understanding that powerful figures in Nigeria can obtain large sums by illicit means and suspension of disbelief that the approach is a scam.

Human Rights Watch (2011) described public service in Nigeria as a kind of criminal enterprise. In particular it complained of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), the body supposed to fight corruption, that.

... many of the corruption cases against the political elite have made little progress in the courts: there have been only four convictions to date and those convicted have faced relatively little or no prison time. Other senior political figures who have been widely implicated in corruption have not been prosecuted. At this writing, not a single politician was serving prison time for any of these alleged crimes. Despite its promise, the EFCC has fallen far short of its potential and eight years after its inception is left with a battered reputation and an uncertain record of accomplishment. (Human Rights Watch, 2011, p.11)

In common with many countries, Nigeria had created a body to fight corruption, the EFCC, which had been pressed on the FGN by the international financial institutions (IFIs) and aid donors, but faced a very slow judicial system, very little political support and frequent interference in prosecutions (Tayo, 2013; Albert & Okoli, 2016). For example, the EFCC arrested and questioned the head of the NCC for a day, apparently because he had disagreed with the minister by refusing to conduct a spectrum auction, when the minister was barred by statute from directing the NCC, to ensure its independence (Osuagwu, 2009; Opata, 2013, p.291). There was and remains little interest in convictions, as demonstrated in the case of James Ibori (see below), with the EFCC budget being limited and the FGN failing to strengthen its capacity. A devastating account of the political culture and the lack of support were provided to the US Congress (Ribadu, 2009).

In an interview, ex-President Obasanjo remarked: “You are being euphemistic when you say lack of accountability. Call it corruption...there is no part of the world where corruption is absolutely eliminated” because corruption is not peculiar to any continent, region, ethnic group,

faith, political system, age group, gender, etc. However, the magnitude of corruption may vary from one country to another, person to person, organization to organization, or region to region. Therefore, no business organization, profit or non-profit, is totally free of corruption either at the executive level or the employee level (Osuagwu, 2012).

2.2.3 Corruption in the Private Sector

According to Ndikumana (2013), corruption is not only limited to dealings between public sector agents and private actors, it also occurs in transactions involving only private sector agents, where public officials are not directly involved. In such transactions, private agents engage in transactions that increase their individual or corporate benefits to the detriment of others or society in many ways such as: 1) obstruction of competition rules to keep competitors out of the game and thus secure monopoly profits; 2) breaking labour laws to advance business interests (by minimizing wages and other labour-related obligations) or to promote the interests of business associates (including patronage in the hiring process); and 3) manipulating the pricing system to increase profits through tax evasion and usury charges to customers. This form of private sector corruption is probably the most costly to society.

Most corrupt practices usually take place between profit-oriented business organizations and government officials (Luo, 2004). Some may be perpetrated by the operators of profit-oriented business organisations against the end-users, although may differ in form and context. Corrupt practices in business organizations, generally, include bribery, fraud, extortion and favouritism (Luo, 2004). Bribery, as the primary form of corruption, involves payment (in money or kind) which is given or taken in a corrupt business relationship. Other variants of bribery include “kick backs”, “brown envelopes”, “gratuities” “grease money”, “facilitation payment” “expediting fees”, “PR”, “family support programme”, “social responsibility”,

“sorting”, the “needful”, “appreciation” and “egunje”, among others (Osuagwu, 2012). However, the patterns of executing different forms of corruption are largely heterogeneous and/or depend on the industry type. For example, in the telecommunication sector, the pattern may involve trickery charges, extortion and swindling using deceitful/enticing packages. As per Osuagwu (2012), extortion in business organizations is a component of corrupt practices, exchanges or transactions in which money or other things are silently extracted from unwilling individuals by persons who have the power and technological know-how to execute such practices.

According to Ndikumana (2013), corruption in the private sector is typically facilitated by weaknesses in the regulatory and institutional framework that make it difficult to monitor the enforcement of rules and fraud deterrent mechanisms. It operates through three key mechanisms. The first is the manipulation of pricing mechanisms to gain monopoly profits through mispricing in international trade and transfer pricing involving transactions within subsidiaries of the same corporation. Transfer pricing allows corporations to benefit from operations which may be legal in principle but are nonetheless illicit from a moral perspective. The mispricing of imports and exports leads to heavy losses in foreign exchange and trade tax revenue. It is estimated that over the period 1970-2010, exports misinvoicing in Sub-Saharan Africa amounted to \$859 billion (Boyce & Ndikumana 2012). The second channel is exploitation of insider information, which is most prevalent in the financial sector. Here, private operators derive monopoly profits by selling or banking on information gained from their privileged positions as decision makers or employees within a particular financial institution. The issue of insider trading has gained attention in the wake of the global financial crisis which originated from irresponsible unchecked decision making in the investment banking and mortgage sectors. In the case of African countries, Nigeria has experienced severe problems of speculative decision making that brought a dozen banks to their knees in 2009 (Apati 2011).

The third channel is capital flight and money laundering, two related by different phenomena. Capital flight involves unrecorded outflow of funds for the purposes of either evading public scrutiny on the origin of the funds or for avoiding taxation by keeping assets abroad. Money laundering involves various mechanisms through which dirty money, or funds obtained from the sale of illegal goods such as drugs, human trafficking, or smuggling of legal goods, and all forms of fraud and corruption, is integrated into the formal banking system. African countries have suffered massive financial hemorrhage through capital flight and money laundering for a long time and the phenomenon shows no sign of abatement. It is estimated that between 1970 and 2010, Africa lost up to \$1.3 trillion in real terms in the form of capital flight or \$1.7 trillion including foregone interest earnings (Ndikumana & Boyce 2012). This is especially troublesome given the massive financing gaps faced by the continent and the slow progress in reaching national development goals.

Another important reason for the attention on private sector corruption is that even in countries that have experienced an expansion of the private sector, primarily led by resource booms, this has not translated in commensurate improvements in social development. For example, Zambia was recently reclassified as a middle-income country, thanks to large revenues from its vast mineral wealth (gold, copper, emeralds, silver and others). However, despite this natural resource bonanza, poverty levels remain stubbornly high. An important reason is that the country has not received its fair share in the resource bonanza, a large share going to the multinational companies engaged in resource extraction and trade. This may also be the case of Nigeria whose telecommunication sector is largely dominated by foreign companies. As elaborated by Ndikumana (2013), corrupt practices in the private sector are largely inherent in profit maximization-focused organisations and are facilitated by a number of factors including: 1) asymmetric information between business operators and the regulator whereby private actors are

able to leverage inside information, business or industry specific information that may not be accessible to the regulator, the consumer, the worker, and the public in general to secure above-normal profits; 2) the complexity of business transactions that makes it difficult for the regulator and the law enforcement agencies to monitor and access the legality of transactions.

This is especially the case in sectors that are highly specialized such as the financial system, information technology, and commodities trading. It is also the case where the sheer volume of transactions makes it impossible for the often under-resourced and under-equipped government enforcement agencies to keep track with the transactions. The third factor includes globalisation, the increasing integration of trade and finance, and the increasing sophistication of corporate structures that blurs the boundaries of ownership and domiciliation. Corporations are able to take advantage of these complexities to make ‘strategic’ decisions on the location of production and services, the destination of trade, and portfolio management to benefit from preferential treatment of business and investment across territories.

2.2.4 Telecommunication in Nigeria

In pre-colonial times in Nigeria, most communities have diverse ways and peculiar means of communication such as the talking drums, metal gong, lung blown horns, drum beats and emissaries – majority of which are still in use in many rural communities till date (Osemeka, 2014). However, the establishment of the Nigerian telecommunication could be traced back to the colonial era when the colonial masters had to establish communication services with their home government in London (Adediran, *et al.* 2016). Specifically, the telegraph cable was introduced in 1886 and connected colonial offices in Lagos, Freetown and Accra to London. The main objective for its establishment was to facilitate communication between the various administrative stations in British West Africa, which were jointly administered at the time.

Telephone services were later made available to government offices in 1893, and later extended to the hinter land such as Ilorin and Jebba.

The first commercial trunk telephone service between Calabar and Itu was established in 1923; a steady development of telecommunication in the country thus began. From a few coastal locations in West Africa, telegraph cables and telephone lines were extended to interior towns. Between 1923 and 1952, telephone lines were extended from Lagos to Oshogbo, Kaduna, Kano, Benin and Enugu (Ajayi, Salawu & Raji, 1999). The equipment used were changed- small to medium capacity systems that employ the use of VHF and UHF radios were introduced, and also the use of Strowger exchanges as against manual pegboards. These telecom infrastructures were put in place by the colonial masters and they were intended to help in administrative functions and not mainly for socio-economic development of the country (Ajayi *et al.*, 1999).

According to Osemeka (2014), Nigeria, with a population of about 40 million in 1960 had a Tele-density of 0.5 lines to 1000 people. There were also 18,724 lines and 121 Exchanges and these were grossly insufficient (Ijewere & Gbandi, 2012). The inadequacy of telephone services was such that it required several days to receive telegraph messages while telephones and other related services were mainly available at post offices and other government establishments. Nigeria's urban areas benefitted the most in comparison to the rural areas. Towns like Lagos, Calabar, Kano, Port Harcourt, Enugu, Kaduna and Ibadan. These towns were regional administrative centers during the colonial period and as such, benefitted from the development of telecommunication infrastructure. Even so, not many urban dwellers had access to telecommunication services. Ownership of a telephone line was one of the indicators of wealth and was generally associated with successful entrepreneurs and top government officials. As a result, a majority relied more on conventional methods of communication such as the rail system, waterways, road transportation, letter writing and telegraphs.

In the face of this reality, four national development plans were executed towards the improvement of the current state of the network and infrastructure, and they were supervised by the Ministry of Communications. Some of the intended objectives were: installation of additional telephone lines, expansion of trunk dialling facilities to link the major urban centers, and the establishment of an institution in the sector Nigerian External Telecommunications (NET) Limited (Ajayi *et al.*, 1999). These objectives were not totally achieved, but some level of improvements were recorded such as, the connection of major cities via microwave radio transmission system, the establishment of NET, increase in the number of lines in the telephone network from 52,000 to 241,000 lines, building of satellites that boosted external coverage, a microwave link connecting Nigeria and Benin Republic, and installation of an International Telephone Switching Center (ITSC). There were certain factors that limited the development of the telecom sector at this period such as inadequate funds, poor coordination of projects, interruptions such as the civil war of 1967-1970, and insufficient skilled labor force to manage the additional equipment (Chidozie, Lawal & Ajayi, 2015).

Up until 1985, the institutions in the telecommunication sector were the Department of Posts and Telecommunications (P&T) which was responsible for the internal network; and the Nigerian External Telecommunication (NET) Limited which was a Limited Liability Company responsible for the external network. By 1986, access to telecommunication services in Nigeria began to widen leading to the establishment of the Post and Telecommunication Department (P&T) and the Nigerian External Communication (NET). The P&T was later reconstituted to form the Nigerian Postal Services while the NET, was merged with a new Limited Liability Company referred to as, Nigerian Telecommunication (NITEL). NITEL was established to supply to the Nigerian state efficient telecommunication services, and this required sufficient resources - financial and technical, as well effective planning and co-ordination, as it was to

merge the responsibilities of planning and coordinating internal and external telecommunications, and ensure these services were affordable and accessible. With this restructuring in the telecom sector, the country's telephone lines increased to 20,000 lines in 1986 (Ijewere & Gbandi, 2012).

NITEL was able to provide 60% of the N12 billion that was invested in the provision of certain infrastructures such as digital exchanges and transmission links, from internally generated revenues. This was a big credit to the institution. The institution also engaged in Research and Development (RD) to develop system components that suit the environment, develop solutions to technical problems and introduce new services. In 1993, NITEL introduced the voice mail, the paging system, trunked radio and phone card. The Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) ensured the availability of services such as electronic mail, video telephone, telefax and many more. NITEL was also able to provide telecommunication services to local governments in the country (Odukoya, 2007).

However, NITEL was faced with problems of corruption, mismanagement, inefficiency in service delivery in terms of quality; the telephone system was congested, erratic, non-customer friendly and expensive. The immediate result of these was the public outcry for state intervention to remedy the epileptic telephony services of NITEL. Consequently, the Decree of 1992 led to the establishment of the regulatory body in the sector- Nigerian Communication Commission (NCC) as part of state reaction to the challenges of NITEL. The sector received a further boost after the establishment of the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC) in 1992. The NCC commenced operation in 1993 with the inauguration of the first commission, however full deregulation began in 2000. The NCC was charged with the responsibility of monitoring the evolution of competition in the sector, preventing hostility against new entrants by those already existing in the market, and protection of the public against the manipulation of

the market by the firms via practices such as inflated prices, reduced quality and quantity of services provided (Sadiq, Oyelade & Ukachukwu, 2011).

The NCC is also in charge of licensing telecommunications operators, engendering of private sector participation and investment, tariff regulation, interconnection disputes, supervision of technical and operational standards and practices for network, and other matters affecting the industry; and it is meant to perform these functions without bias and with all sense of autonomy, on the basis of transparency, equity and fairness. The NCC granted licenses to three GSM service providers in 1999- Econet, MTN and MTel, a Second National Operator in 2002, which is Globacom, and another operator in 2008, Etisalat. In 2006, the Universal Access Service licenses were issued to provide fixed telephony, VSAT and internet services (Alabi, 1996).

According to Chidozie, *et al.* (2015), the rationale behind the deregulation of the telecommunication sector include: the inability of the government to support the sector with subsidy; the need to reduce the burden on the government, the demand for efficient and current facilities, low rate of infrastructure growth, low access especially in the rural areas, and poor service delivery. The commercialization of the operations of the state enterprise in the late 1980's marked the beginning of the deregulation process. However, with the announcement of the Nigeria Communication Commission (NCC) Act 2003, telecom was divided into 2, with a part left in the hands of NITEL exclusively, while the other sector was opened to private sector participation. NITEL thus kept her monopoly over areas such as Exchange and Trunks and International Services. Section 10(a) of the Decree made provision for only Nigerians to participate in the sector, but this was amended in 1998 spelling out the criteria for being licensed – leading to the NCC issuing the aforementioned licenses to 7 fixed telephony providers and activated 90,000 additional lines, 35 internet service providers with a customer base of 17,000

and -9 payphone services. Efforts to expand telecommunication infrastructure continued and in 1998 when the number of lines increased to 40,000 with a population of about a 100 million (Chidozie, *et al.* 2015).

Even with the expansion, the teledensity was only a 0.4 to 1000. Consequently, it was still customary to find long queues at NITEL offices throughout the country. In 1999, the then President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo made it a priority to privatize the sector totally, involving the Global System of Mobile Communications (GSM) service providers. Some private companies received licenses, but no operation took place until 2001 when three operators got digital mobile licenses auctioned by the NCC; the operators include Econet, MTN and MTEL. After this, there was a great explosion in the sector; by 2007 the number of telephone lines in the country grew to 38 million as against 450,000 that was in place as at 1999, and 85 million by April 2010, due largely to the mobile network, which made the country the world's fastest growing teledensity (Okonjo-Iweala, 2012).

The Telecommunication Act of 2003 encouraged more entry into the sector, engendering competition, and strengthened the role of the NCC. This paved way for the entry of the Second National Carrier which was GLOBACOM, and this has increased the intensity of competition in the sector, as each company introduces competitive and innovative packages, in order to gain the greater share of the market. As at 2004, the following had been achieved in the sector: a teledensity of 3.9% as against 0.4% at 2001; average of 45% of the population in an area of about 156,200km, 3.8 mobile lines connected in less than 3 years; 4 licensed service providers, including two National Operators; increased access to mobile phones by the people; reduction in acquisition costs of new lines; reduction in cost of internet access; employment generation on the path of the companies and the “umbrella people” (Ndukwe, 2005).

Furthermore, NCC, issued licenses to Internet Service Providers (ISP's). The policy led to the proliferation of Cyber Cafes and Call Centers in many Nigerian urban centers where telecom services hardly existed. Even with the reforms, internet services were initially available at a high cost and only corporate organizations and wealthy individuals could subscribe. Ownership of a mobile was' still a wealth indicator in the early years of its introduction. For instance, between 2001 and 2003, mobile phone lines cost between N 17,000 and N20, 000 while the cheapest telephone sets cost between N10,000 and N 15,000. With the entry of more mobile phone companies into the telecoms industry, prices of phone lines and Air Time dropped considerably. Between 2009 and 2012 the cost of phone lines dropped from about N500 to N200.

According to the Nigeria Bureau of Statistics 2018, the telecommunication industry has gone past telephony as there are quite a number of mobile service providers such as MTN, Airtel, Globacom, Etisalat (9mobile) which provide a range of services that include internet, Small Messaging Services (SMS), multimedia services, internet access and mobile banking. The cost of phone lines (SIM cards) has further dropped drastically to the extent that some service providers sell it out at no cost, subject to registering and purchasing call cards (airtimes). With such development, new challenges are also arising such as ensuring conformity to best quality of service delivery; upgrading of infrastructures to meet international standard; security and maintenance of facilities, especially in the remote areas; ensuring the framework of broadband that can be accommodated by the ecosystem; and security of data in this digital world.

2.3 Nature of Corrupt Practices by Telecommunications Service Providers

Owing to the high revenue generation potential it commands, the not-too-long-ago liberalized telecommunications industry is considered vulnerable to corruption due to the multiple actors involved and the industry's complex governance structures that imply constant interaction between the public and private sectors with regard to the awarding of licenses, monitoring and regulation, as well as import/export activities (Sutherland 2012). According to Berg, Jiang and Lin (2012), corruption in the telecommunications industry can take place in various forms, such as between telecommunications service providers and politicians, between telecom companies and the regulator, between telecom companies and companies from other sectors who want to obtain better services, and between service providers and service users/customer services (as the focus of this study). The following sub-sections look at the natures of corrupt practices in the telecommunication sector:

2.3.1 Corruption in Customer Services

In respect of corruption at the level of customer services, (Berg, 2011) noted that most telecommunications companies obtain bribes and illegal payments from companies from other sectors who want to obtain better or exclusive services, as the detriment of other private users. This would then be referred to as commercial bribery. Corruption can also occur between service providers and individual service users who then need to pay more than the official price to get connected. This situation has similar results to the illegitimate price inflation referred to above. Corruption here takes the form of extortion (Berg, 2011).

Another dimension of corrupt practices in this category can be likened by the incident that broke out in May, 2012 involving the regulator and the four major telecom service providers in Nigeria (MTN, Glo, Airtel & Etisalat) – where the former discovered that the four aforementioned operators failed to meet the agreed Key Performance Indicators, KPI, for the months of March and April of that particular year (NCC, 2018). The KPI was set to monitor the

quality of service rendered to the Nigerian telecom subscribers which are gauged on four parameters (Call Set-up Success Rate, Call Completion Rate, Drop Call Rate & Traffic Channel Congestion). These are some of the areas by which the telecom customers are exploited. Subsequently, the commission concluded that the telecoms companies have failed to meet the minimum standard of quality of service. Thus, the four (4) major telecommunication service providers fell under the hammer of the regulator which slammed a collective N1.17 billion fine (\$7.3m) on them. The regulator also gave a stipulated time of two weeks for the operators to pay up the fine or risk additional N2.5million penalty that would attract every single day of default.

2.3.2 Corruption in Licensing

The licensing process is also particularly prone to corruption and undue influence because of its strategic importance and complexity. For example, as the ITU World Radiocommunications Conference (WRC) unexpectedly changed the 700 MHz band from being exclusively for broadcasting to a shared assignment with mobile telecommunications (El-Moghazi, Whalley & Irvine, 2016). In the closing days of the Jonathan Administration, MTN was the sole bidder for a large part of these frequencies, paying NGN 34 billion to the National Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) (Adepoju, 2015; Garba & Adepetun, 2015). Its Director General was questioned by the EFCC, since the sale was considered outside his powers; the spectrum ought to have been returned for auctioning by NCC (Southwood, 2016). A significant allegation was that NGN 3.4 million, a 10 per cent broker fee, had been paid to a consultant, in effect a bribe. The current Buhari Administration recognised the sale, but exclusively for use for digital television (DTV, 2015). The EFCC arraigned four (4) persons (including a former Director-General of NBC, a formerly Director-General of NBC, and two other persons) on fifteen charges of money laundering and procurement fraud. The charged NBC officials had allegedly transferred millions of dollars into accounts of companies owned by the two

businessmen, subsequently transferred to their own private accounts. The trial has since commenced, and then adjourned.

2.3.3 Corruption in Adhering to Regulations

Corruption is also a problem seen in regulation as well as price-setting monitoring. From an economic perspective many segments of the telecommunications sector are prone to network and scale effects and continuous technological disruption, all of which makes the establishment of competitive markets, the determination of fair prices and the setting of public interest-oriented regulations are usually very difficult to impose and adhere to. This also means that policies and regulatory actions that have been corrupted by special interests are often difficult to identify. In common with many African countries, Nigeria, through the NCC, introduced mandatory registration for Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) (GSMA, 2016). The registration exercise of current SIM cards was officially concluded on June 30, 2013, with the NCC (2011) requiring biometric details of SIM-card holders, including a photograph and finger prints. After long negotiations with MTN over registration of its customers, the NCC fined it USD 1,000 for each unregistered SIM-card (Tshabalala, 2015). There followed further discussions between MTN and NCC (Aginam & Udofia, 2015), with President Buhari accusing MTN of allegedly supplying SIM-cards to terrorists (Sotubo, 2016). Eric Holder, a former US Attorney General, successfully negotiated the fine be halved (Brock & Laessing, 2016). Even with all that consideration, MTN, however, has not been able to either recover from the effect of the fine or clear the payments till today

2.3.4 Money Laundering

The recent scandal involving the MTN telecommunications company and a serving Nigerian Senator provides a good example of possible money laundering in the communication sector. It happened that in 2016, the aforementioned company was again assailed, in another allegation of illegally repatriating \$13.92billion by a serving (then APC) Kogi State Senator. Part of the allegation was that: "MTN, facilitated by some banks and Minister of Trade & Investments, Dr Okechukwu Enelamah fraudulently exported up to \$13.92billion out of Nigeria as payments to shareholders and other offshore Special purpose vehicles, SPVs, owned by its shareholders between 2001 and 2006. However, MTN refuted all allegations, claiming that its activities were guided by a comprehensive governance framework and an unequivocal Code of Conduct put in place to ensure compliance with the highest ethical standards, as well as full observance of local laws, policies and directives. In September 2016 the Senate agreed to investigate if the telecoms firm unlawfully repatriated the said amount from Nigeria. However, a report a report of the investigation was first presented to the Senate in July, 2017 exonerating MTN of wrong doing but the Senate immediately withdrew it and asked the committee to do more work on the report because it did not capture possible infractions by all stakeholders. But sometime in November of that year, Vanguard gathered, that the upper chamber of the National Assembly eventually approved the report but requested Central Bank of Nigeria, CBN, to sanction Stanbic IBTC Bank "for improper documentations in respect of capital repatriation and loan repayments" on behalf of MTN.

2.3.5 Labour-Related Corruption

Issues relating to work ethics, nepotism and cronyism are also widespread in the telecommunications sector. Sutherland (2012) uses the term “crony-capitalism” in the telecommunications industry to illustrate situations in which public officials and decision-makers place their cronies and relatives in strategic positions in oversight and regulatory bodies, or

favours telecommunications companies owned by their allies and families. Wickberg (2014) argue that former Member of Parliament and minister of communications in South Africa. A typical example of labour-related issues occurred recently in Nigeria (in July, 2018) where the Nigerian Labour Congress, NLC hit the MTN with massive picketing exercise covering almost all its offices in the country. The NLC and its affiliates crippled activities of MTN nationwide over alleged unfair labour practices, including casualisation of workers and refusal to allow workers join union, contrary the Trade Union Act and section 40 of the Nigeria's constitution. Although the company also denied the allegations in all entirety, it did not come off it without burnt fingers as it complained having lost a whopping N12 billion in the four days that the picketing lasted.

2.4 Corrupt Practices and Efficiency of Telecommunications Services in Nigeria

Despite the fact that telecommunication sector in Nigeria has become one of the fastest-growing industries in the country with available indices showing its significant impact on the overall economic growth of the country, some schools of thought (e.g. Sassoulas 2012) still hold the view that the rate of telecommunications infrastructure expansion in the rural areas is still lagging behind and analysts (Wickberg, 2014) are convinced that the key to sustainable future economic growth is the improvement of both the quantity and quality of the entire telecommunication infrastructure – in order to enhance the overall efficiency of telecom-related services. In spite of the lack of sufficient literature to drive-down the intended points, this subsection tries to link how corrupt practices by the telecommunication service providers in Nigeria could affect the overall efficiency and service delivery of the operators in terms of (i) service availability, (ii) quality of service and (iii) cost of service.

2.4.1 Corrupt Practices and Service Availability

Berg *et al.* (2012) note that one common nature of corruption in the telecommunications industry can take between service providers and service users - where the latter need to pay side-payments to get connected. As a result of this, most service providers may harbour limited incentive in extending their network mast to communities with less economic activities leading to poor service availability (level of telephone penetration) in some rural areas. One major goal of universal telecommunication access, according to Bello, Opadiji, Faruk, and Adediran (2016), is to make telecommunication infrastructure available to everyone irrespective of their geographical location, income level, age, gender or other discriminatory parameters. However, most developing countries still encounter daunting challenges in making strong telecommunication access truly universal, especially in rural communities. The recent study of Bello *et al.* (2016), focusing on a south-western state in Nigeria portrayed the above scenario.

Another Nigerian researcher (Hassan, 2011) examined the service availability by measuring the level of telephone penetration in Nigeria between 2001 and 2010. The outcome of his fieldwork showed steady telephone subscribers growth in Nigeria from 1999 and only a slight fall in the rate of growth in 2007 which indicates an unexhausted growth potential of the market. However, provision of telecommunications access to the rural communities in Nigeria has, at various times, suffered setbacks due to corruption and monstrous creations of the past governments (Adediran *et al.*, 2016). Recent anecdotal evidence suggests that not all rural communities and highways in Nigeria have strong mobile network services – which often lead to call drops, poor connectivity, among others. Although an effective coverage of all parts of the Federation (including rural areas) in the supply of telecommunications services depend on resource availability and effective planning and co-ordination of the systems network as well as efficient management and technical operations, it also depends on the economic benefits derivable from engaging in such ventures – since majority of the service providers are foreign

companies which are largely profit-minded. This makes it difficult for ordinary customers to get strong connections outside the big cities and commercial areas (Allison, 2013).

Some studies have also been carried out with respect to rural telecommunication access in Nigeria. In a study conducted by Pyramid Research (2010), the impact of mobile communications on social and economic activities in Nigeria was extensively discussed. The research details how mobile phones have redefined the way people interact. The effects of these interactions on Nigeria's macroeconomic indices were also mentioned. Opata (2013) made a case for the use of rural telecommunication access in engineering sustainable growth of the Nigerian economy. The economic profile of a rural community allows one to describe the feasibility of implementing a rural telecommunication access scheme in such a community. This economic outlook determines the level of returns on investment and economic sustainability for a rural telecommunication access scheme by providing information for cost and revenue modelling (Nayan *et al.*, 2012). In Nigeria, despite a high economic growth rate of an average of about 7% annually (DFID, 2012), more than two-thirds of the population live below the poverty level, earning less than US\$1 a day. With half of Nigeria's population living in the rural areas (World Bank, 2014), it is evident that the larger percentage of the low income earners in the country is in the rural communities. This poses a major challenge to the deployment of rural telecommunication infrastructure in Nigeria because of the purchasing power of rural dwellers. As a result of these, there may be lower incentive to invest hugely in rural areas. The ultimate question here is: do the corrupt practices of service providers (such as extortions in form of serial deductions for unsolicited caller tunes, unsolicited short messages and promotional internet subscriptions, etc) influence the level of service availability of telecommunication.

2.4.2 Corrupt Practices and Quality of Service

According to Sutherland (2011), corruption in the telecommunications industry can obstruct people's access to these sorts of services by hampering fair competition and the proper regulation of prices, consequently making the latter excessive and detached from actual costs. Moreover, given the level of power and influence that the industry and technology has reached, corruption in the sector can significantly contribute to the control of access to information as well as to censorship and limitation of freedoms. As in other markets, corruption in the telecommunications sector is generally seen as distorting healthy market competition, creating barriers to trade and having a negative impact on free and fair competition as well as quality of service (Transparency International, 2009).

Corruption, nepotism in decision-making and conflicts of interest can discourage competitors and prevent them from entering the market (OECD, 2014). In SADC, corruption is seen as one of the main obstacles to trade in general, together with heavy and inefficient bureaucracy and customs regulations (Bertelsmann-Scott 2012). It limits access to the market to corrupt service providers, which in turn reduces the quality of services and infrastructure. When the allocation of licenses is not based on objective qualitative criteria but on personal relations or bribery, telecommunications companies have fewer incentives to properly train their staff or invest in high-quality infrastructure, research and innovative development.

In the study of Hassan (2011), evidence shows that there was an increase in range of telecommunication services in Nigeria, but the quality of service was observed to be in need for much improvement. As regards the issue of quality of service, over 50% of the respondents (telephone users) surveyed by Hassan (2011) identified not fewer than ten different problems (such as network failure, call drops, inability to recharge, and check balance, or call other networks, network congestion, etc) as dominantly frustrating the use of mobile phones in their localities. With respect to the Internet, most users complained of slow download and connection

drops as the most frequently encountered problems related to ‘quality of service’. Although there may be other external factors leading to such ugly experiences such as poor power supply and lack of adequate security to ‘man’ some of the sophisticated telecom equipment, the unambiguous fact is that much is still desired in terms of service quality by telecommunication providers in Nigeria. At most, some of the causes of the poor service quality could be inadequate transmission infrastructure in congested areas and operators’ penchant for adding more subscribers than their networks can accommodate, these cannot be adjudged to be the responsibility of the government or the end users, unlike the issue of power supply.

As a follow up to the above conjecture, NCC (2007) earlier identified poor power supply in Nigeria to be responsible for at least 70% of the poor service quality by telecommunication providers, while theft of generating sets and vandalism of infrastructure by restive youths were among the security factors identified as partly affecting service quality of telecommunication in Nigeria. Going by the above, one may be quick to suggest that both government and operators have significant roles to play in ensuring improved quality of telephone and Internet services in Nigeria. However, infusing the issue of corruption and related practices, there may be cases where the service providers allow few infrastructures in densely populated areas thereby increasing the problem of call drops and other network congestion, while continuing massive deductions in unsolicited services. This, kind of, support the view of Chidozie *et al.* (2015) who opined that the dominance of foreign bourgeoisies in the telecommunication business in Nigeria may have increased the bane of corrupt practices, as profit maximization may override satisfying the quality-needs of the end users.

However, the study of Sukhtankar (2014), which empirically investigated the effect of the corrupt sale of spectrum licenses to ineligible firms on the wireless telecom market in India, contracts the above conjecture. Although in a different market, Sukhtankar found evidence that

the corrupt allocation of telecom licenses had zero impact on the number of subscribers, prices, usage, revenues, competition, and measures of quality. What this portends is that the magnitude of corrupt practices inherent in the bidding and licensing processes does not affect the quality of service rendered by the eventually successful telecom services providers. This provides the avenue for this study to examine if the public users' perception on how service providers' customer-targeted corrupt practices influence the quality of service.

2.4.3 Corrupt Practices and Cost of Service

According to Blackman and Srivastava (2011), regulatory authorities in the telecommunications sector have a duty to protect customers and ensure the smooth functioning of the market. One of their tasks is to intervene if the prices are set too high or in an anticompetitive manner. Without adequate price regulation, dominant companies can abuse their market power and increase prices unduly, harming their customers. For example, most telecommunications companies were owned by the high profile politicians and powerful influential businessmen. Due to their influence and connections, they may be allowed to alter prices/tariff rates without fear of regulatory intervention. As a result, consumer prices for telecommunications services in Nigeria to this day did not reduce in the same proportion as the cost of telephone lines (SIMs). According to a survey by Hassan (2011), while the cost of telephone connection fell by as much as 99% (from about N14,500 to N150), tariff rates (off net) only fell by 24% (which is largely disproportional). This buttresses the above point.

Similarly, a new study carried out by the Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Department (CMED) of the Nigerian Communications Commission (NCC) has discovered that major mobile network operators lack accurate database of approved tariff plan for the billing of their subscribers. The subscribers said GSM operators are ripping off customers using mobile phones to browse and called on the NCC to investigate how mobile operators bill subscribers

who use smart-phones to browse, especially those on Android and other smart-phones that do not have unlimited bandwidths (Uzoma, 2016). The Commission periodically rises and stabilizes tariff plans, which are often times systematically thwarted by the network providers in their launches of new promos. The NCC has since 2013 had several reductions on the tariff plans for voice calls in the country, both intra and inter networks. The Termination Rates for voice services provided by New Entrants and Small Operators in Nigeria, irrespective of the originating network was fixed at: N6.40 (six naira forty kobo) from April 1st, 2013; N5:20 (five naira twenty kobo) from April 1st 2014; and N3:90 (three naira ninety kobo) from 1st April, 2015. But the plans last for as long as their attentions are still on the new directives, then the network providers turn to their former status quo. Allied to this, is the preserved failure of the network users to organize and fight their exploiters. These are all components of corrupt practices by telecommunication service providers which the study conjectures will affect the cost of telecommunication services.

2.5 Empirical Review of Related Studies

There are numerous empirical studies on corruption and corrupt practices in literature. However, majority of them are focused on the public sector (Acho & Abuh, 2016), and only few (such as Sutherland, 2018) studied the incidences of corrupt practice in telecommunication service providers. This sub-section reviews the few previous studies related to the study topic - both those by foreign authors and their Nigerian counterparts:

Sutherland (2018) examined the cases of bribery and corruption in the telecommunication sector. The study took a case study approach with special focus on Nigeria telecommunication industry. He realised from the case studies analysis that the telecommunications sector is one window into the corruption cronyism and prebendalism of the Nigerian state, illustrating the failures of institutions and of governance, and illuminates the consistently awful rankings in the

Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), with a pattern of bribes, cronyism, deceit and fraud. He also admitted that research on telecommunication policy in Nigeria has been piecemeal and often looking at problems of narrow scope and avoiding bigger issues, especially questions of beneficial ownership and corruption. He then recommended further studies in that regards which this study is one of such endeavours.

Odunlami and Awolusi (2015) examined the extent to which MNCs have spurred up economic development in Nigeria via investments in private sector such as the telecommunication industry. Their study took an exploratory design approach focusing in Nigeria and discovered that, although, the multinational corporations have contributed to the economic development via FDI, the extent of technology internalization and transfers still remains a mirage, while some of the MNCs still engage in unethical business (corrupt) practices that soils their image and the image of Nigeria. They also discovered that corruption increases the cost of doing business and discourages FDI inflows as foreign investors prefer to invest in countries with lower rates of corruption. They recommended that Nigeria should improve telecommunications infrastructures in order to further attract inward FDI from developed and newly industrialized countries.

Sukhtankar (2014) empirically investigates the effect of corrupt sale of licenses to ineligible firms on the telecommunication market in India. He argued that that the market-based transfer of licenses to competent firms different from original awardees, combined with fierce competition in the telecommunication sector, and may have mitigated potential deleterious impacts of corruption on consumers. Using a survey design approach, his results suggest that the original corrupt allocation did not matter. He concluded that the corrupt allocation of licenses had, at worst, impacted insignificantly on service quality, cost of services/tariffs, subscription base (number of subscribers), revenue base and level of usage.

Folorunso (2014) examined the citizen's assessment of the several privatization programmes in Nigeria between 1999 and 2011, including telecommunication sector. Adopting a critical review approach, he discovered that although there are significant increases in competition and efficiency of some of the privatized sectors as evidenced in the telecommunication, petroleum and -banking sectors, however, the services of majority of commercialized enterprises have equally deteriorated – such as Power and Railways. In all, he concluded that the privatization policy had negative perceived implications on the political participation, and quality of lives of the citizens, citing majorly the other sectors aside the telecommunication sector.

Hassan (2011) analysed the corrupt practices leading to the inefficiency and ineffectiveness that characterised the Nigerian telecommunications sector prior to its privatization. He specifically used trend analysis in examining the effects of the competition on availability, quality and cost of telecommunications services in Nigeria in 10 years of the reform (2001 – 2010). He found among others that teledensity has increased from 0.45 to 58.52 implying a high telephone penetration, while the cost of telephone connection has fallen by as much as 99%, with tariffs only falling by about 24%. His analysis also revealed that there was an increase in range of services but the quality of which desired much improvement. He recommended that there is need for more regulatory measures and provision of certain network infrastructure by the NCC in order to enhance competition, improve service quality and as well bring down tariffs.

2.6 Theoretical Framework

The idea behind this study is explained from two theoretical perspectives – the Public Choice Theory and Dialectical Materialist Theory of Corruption. The idea behind the former, as put forward by James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock in 1962 and Buchanan in 1975 (Lucia and Thomas, 2015), is that there two types of goods in the society, the public and private goods. The public goods are to be provided by the government, such as education, health and security; while private goods (usually profit driven) are allowed to be propelled by the market forces in the state. As observed by Holland (2014), the proponents of public choice are conscious of outright transferring of the provision of public goods and services into private individuals. That full privatization will give room to over concentration of state resources in the hands of few individuals’ especially foreign hands instead of being accessible to the down trodden masses. The idea of public choice theory corroborates the remarks of Adeyemo and Salami (2008) that for a long period of time, the Nigeria government has carried more than enough responsibilities regarding public service delivery which has often led to high level of public sector deficits that are financed through substantial borrowing. Thus, the implication of privatizing of the telecommunications sector is to give the state the breathing space in terms of spending by reducing its participation in the enterprise that can be managed by the private sector. Given this backdrop, that led to the privatization of the telecoms sector which has been a big success, and massive improvement to socio-economic development of Nigeria compared to when the sector was under the control of the government. However, despite the liberalization of the sector, the government still has a role to play in terms of monitoring and this remains crucial as suggested by the theory (Adeyemi, Jedin, &Subhan, 2017). It is when such roles are played effectively that the public would not be short-changed by the private operators via corrupt means.

This leads to the second theoretical underpinning of the study – the Dialectical Materialist Theory of Corruption as developed, according to by Karl Marx (1818-1883) and

Fredrick Engels (1770-1831) (Karl, 1977). Dialectical materialism is a philosophy that rejects the idealist explanation of social and other phenomena and suggests that all phenomena are material. The notion of dialectics, expresses the view that development depends on the clash of contradictions and the creation of a new, more advanced synthesis out of these classes. The dialectical materialist theory of corruption, therefore, sees corruption and corrupt practices as aspects of class exploitation which can only be explained and understood in terms of the general structures of capitalist development. By linking corruption with the specific socio-economic structures of society, the theory brings out very clearly, the implications of the various strategies of development on the level of corruption (Nkom, 1983). According to this theory capitalist ideology recognizes the private accumulation of wealth as the highest form of human endeavour and therefore institutionalizes exploitation and materialistic tendencies. The dialectical materialist theory of corruption argues that capitalism encourages and perpetuates corruption by extolling precisely those bourgeois instincts of man which are associated with corruption such as greed, materialism and the desire to take advantage of other people (Akor, 2016). The dialectical materialist theory of corruption is particularly useful in this study in helping us understand and by extension, be able to classify the corrupt practices by service providers as ‘taking advantage’ of the uninformed subscribers in an attempt to enrich the anonymous others. It then demands further enquiry in order to understand whether some of the unsolicited deductions are actually the company’s policy as a whole or are they perpetrated by certain groups of staffs for personal gain.

2.7 Summary of Gap in Literature

It is observable from the review that, although a lot of studies have been conducted on corruption and corrupt practices in different organizations in Nigeria, only a few have examined its nature in the private sector – especially the telecommunication industry. In both literature and observable evidence, there are strong indications that the deregulation of the telecommunication industry has yielded the desired benefits in terms of its contribution to the overall growth of the Nigerian economy. Be that as it may, there are still evidences of poor service delivery and massive extortions by some of the service providers – for which most can be classified as corrupt practices. The available literature appears not to have beamed its searchlight in this direction, save for those (e.g. Sutherland, 2018) that focused on the corrupt practiced allegedly perpetrated during the bidding and awarding of licenses to the service providers. Specifically, none of the previous studies have sampled the opinions of the public users on their perception of the corrupt practices of the telecommunication service providers in Nigeria. This study intends to contribute to existing knowledge from the above stated dimension.

CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter was to describe the methods and procedures which the researcher intends to adopt for the purpose of achieving the specific objectives of the study. The chapter contains the research design, population and sample size determination, source of data, validity and reliability of the data, model specifications and method of data analyses.

3.2 Research Design

This research adopts the cross-sectional survey research design which is one of the most important designs in area of measurement in applied social/management researches. This design is often used in observational and case-study descriptive studies where the researcher tends to observe a phenomenon by soliciting for information from a sample respondents of a population at a specific point in time. With this design, the researcher gathered data for the study based on the perception of eligible participants through a field survey.

3.3 Population and Sampling Technique

The target population of the study consisted of all active telecommunication users (subscribers) in the six (6) south-south states in Nigeria (i.e. Akwa-Ibom = 3,102,760; Bayelsa = 1,102,570; Cross-River = 2,274,165; Delta = 5,328,096; Edo = 5,169,076 and Rivers State = 6,270,011), totalling 23,246,678 subscribers (i.e. GSM and others) as at the second quarter (Q2) of 2018 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2018). The sampling frame was limited to the capital City of each of the States (Benin-city, Uyo, Yenagoa, Calabar, Asaba and Port-Harcourt) - as the major economic hubs of each of the six States respectively. Considering that studying the entire population may be unrealistic, the study adopted the Yaro Yamani's formula in systematically determining the actual sample size of the study.

The Yamani (1967) formula is stated thus:

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e)^2} \dots\dots\dots (1)$$

$$n = 23,246,678$$

Where:

n = is the sample size

N = is the population

e = is the error limit (the study proposes 0.05 (5%) on the basis of 95% confidence level)

Incorporating the relevant statistics into the equation (1), we have:

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + N(e^2)} = \frac{23,246,678}{1 + 23,246,678 (0.05^2)} = 399.9931 \cong 400$$

Based on the outcome of the above computation, a total of four hundred (400) subscribers made up the sample size of the study. The respondents were chosen randomly from phone and internet users in the aforementioned capital Cities of the selected States for convenient sake in order to increase the chances of selecting subscribers from the four (4) major service providers in Nigeria (MTN, Glo, Airtel and 9mobile) spread around the states. The researcher made use of five research assistants in speeding up the questionnaire administration and retrieval processes.

3.4 Sources of Data Collections

This study was based on primary data that were generated through the use of a survey questionnaire targeted at the telecommunication subscribers in the sampled cities who are knowledgeable about the perceived corrupt practice of different service providers in Nigeria. A total of four hundred (400) multi-item structure questionnaires was produced (see copy in appendix one) and distributed for that purpose.

3.5 Research Instrument

The study made use of questionnaire as the major data collection instrument. The questionnaire was designed to reflect five (5) sections encompassing both close and open-ended questions. The first section (Section A) focused on the demographic characteristics of the would-be respondents. The second section (Section B) was constructed in a five – Point Likert scale addressing questions required in ascertaining the pattern and level of corrupt practice by the telecommunication service providers. Section C also has three (3) questions and also designed in a five point likert scale ranging from in order to gauge the perception of the respondents in terms of service quality, availability and cost of service by their network operators. Section D provides questions that were used to ascertain the challenges of curbing the corrupt practices by the operators. The last section (Section E) is completely in an open-ended form and was used to elicit the respondents' recommendations on the major issue of discuss.

3.6 Validity and Reliability of the Instrument

The instrument was validated by the thesis supervisor and two other research experts in the department. Their suggestions were incorporated appropriately in the final draft of the research instrument in order to ensure that the content validity of the research instrument is appropriate in pursuing the objectives of the study.

Also, to ensure that the internal consistency of the instrument is assured, the reliability test of the research instrument was determined using the test-re-test method. For the pilot testing, the instrument was administered to 20 respondents, who were part of the sampling frame but not part of the eventual sample size; it was retrieved and re-administered in the following week to same respondents and classified as X & Y respectively. The average responses were subjected to the Cronbach alpha (α) test via SPSS 24 software. A value of 0.796 was achieved (see result in Table

3 below) which was considered appropriate for the purpose of the study in line with Cronbach (1951).

Table 3. Reliability Result

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
.796	32

Source: SPSS 24, 2021

3.7 Model Specification

The models were modified by the researcher for the purpose of achieving the objectives of the study. The effects of corrupt practices on the efficiency of telecommunication industry are operationalized into a functional mathematical equation as shown below:

$$Y_1 = f(\text{Level of Corrupt practices}) \dots\dots\dots (2)$$

Where Y_1 is the Efficiency of the telecommunication industry (dependent variable) and will be proxied as (i) service availability, (ii) quality of service and (iii) cost of service. On the right hand, we have the independent variable (level of corrupt practice). The implication of the above functional model is that the study was executed using three (3) simple linear regression models.

In econometric form, the three (3) simple linear regression models go thus:

$$SA = \beta_0 + \beta_1 CP + \varepsilon \dots\dots\dots (3)$$

$$QS = \Upsilon_0 + \Upsilon_1 CP + \varepsilon \dots\dots\dots (4)$$

$$CS = \Omega_0 + \Omega_1 CP + \varepsilon \dots\dots\dots (5)$$

Where;

β_0 = Intercept

ε = error term

β_1 , Υ_1 , Ω_1 = the slopes which represents the degree at which the average dependent variable changes as the level of corrupt practice change by one unit.

Dependent variables:

SA= Service availability

QS = Quality of service

CS = Cost of service

CP = level of corrupt practices (Independent variable)

Apriori expectations: $\beta_1 < 0$; $\Upsilon_1 < 0$; and $\Omega_1 > 0$.

*The variables in the study were obtained from the research questionnaire as operationalised

Table 3.1.

Table 3.1 Operationalisation of the Variables

s/ n	Variable	Definition	Type of Variable	Measurement	Source
1.	SA	Service availability	Dependent	Coded average cumulative responses to the Likert –Scale question 24 (section C) of the research instrument.	Hassan (2011)
2.	QS	Quality of service	Dependent	Coded cumulative average responses to the Likert –Scale question 23 (section C) of the research instrument.	Hassan (2011)
3.	CS	Cost of service	Dependent	Coded cumulative average responses to the Likert –Scale question 22 (section C) of the research instrument.	Hassan (2011)
4.	CP	Level of corrupt practices	Independent	Average cumulative responses to the Likert -Scale questions 1-20 (i.e. Section B) of the research instrument.	Chidozie <i>et al.</i> (2015); Hassan (2011); Suktankar (2014)

Source: Researcher’s Compilation (2021)

3.8 Method of Data Analysis

The study used a combination of quantitative descriptive and inferential statistics in presenting and analysing the data to be obtained from the questionnaire administration. The former (i.e. descriptive, including graphical analysis) was used in analysing the demographic characteristics of the respondents as well as research questions 1, 3, and 4. The latter, on the other hand, was used for the purpose of the research question 2. To that effect, the simple linear regression analysis technique was used in analysing the research hypotheses since it offers explanation as to the relationships between two continuous (quantitative) variables (i.e. dependent and independent variable). The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) version 24 software was used for the analysis.

CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSES

4.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the analysis and interpretation of the primary data obtained through questionnaire administration. The responses were analysed using frequency counts, percentages and descriptive statistics while the hypotheses were tested using regression analysis techniques run using the SPSS version 24.

4.2 Data Presentation

A total of four hundred (400) copies of the structured questionnaire were produced for the purpose of this study. The researcher, assisted by five research assistants, administered the questionnaire directly to the respondents in the six selected cities (across six states) leading to an overall successful retrieval rate of 86%. Table 4.1 below throws more light:

Table 4.1. Questionnaire administration in each of the sampled cities

s/n	Cities	No of questionnaire distributed	Total Number retrieved	External decline rate	Number Invalid	Internal decline rate	Valid questionnaires analysed	Overall successful retrieval rate
1	Uyo	65	61	6.2%	4	0.07%	57	88%
2	Yenagoa	65	55	15.4%	3	0.05%	52	80%
3	Calabar	65	50	23.1%	7	0.15%	43	66%
4	Warri	65	64	1.5%	3	0.05%	61	94%
5	Benin City	75	72	4%	0	0%	72	96%
6	Port-Harcourt	65	62	4.6%	2	0.06%	60	92%
	Total	400	364	Average 9.1%	19	Average 0.06%	345	Average 86%

Source: Field Survey, 2021

As observed from Table 4.1, out of the 400 copies of questionnaire administered, only thirty-six (36) were not retrieved, amounting to an external decline rate of just about 9% (i.e. 364 were retrieved). However, among the 364 retrieved questionnaires, nineteen (19) were not properly filled and were thus expunged. This amounted to an internal decline rate of about 0.6%. The final percentages of valid usable questionnaire returned per State were 88%, 80%, 66%, 94%, 95% and 92% for Uyo (AkwaIbom), Yenagoa (Bayelsa), Calabar (Cross River), Asaba (Delta), Benin City (Edo) and Port-Harcourt (Rivers) respectively. In all, the overall average retrieval rate of 86% was considered adequate for the purpose of this study. All the ensuing analyses are based on the responses of a total of three hundred and forty-five (345) respondents which now constitutes the final (post-field work) sample size of the study.

Table 4.2. Characteristics of the Respondents' Telecommunication Usage

Characteristics	Categories	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Type of Users	Individual user	328	95.1
	Institution/Corporate body	17	4.9
	Total	345	100
No of years since using Telecom	Less than 5yrs ago	54	15.7
	More than 5yrs ago	111	32.2
	About 10yrs ago	88	25.5
	More than 15yrs	92	26.7
	Total	345	100
Main Line	MTN	236	68.4
	Airtel	60	17.4
	Etisalat/9mobile	16	4.6
	GLO	33	9.6
	Total	345	100
Second Line	None (No 2nd line)	47	13.6
	MTN	67	19.4
	Airtel	70	20.3
	Etisalat/9mobile	67	19.4
	GLO	94	27.2
	Total	345	100

Source: Field Survey, (2021)

Table 4.2 provides more information on the field survey by presenting the characteristics of the respondents' telecom usage. As observed, about 95% (i.e. 328 out of the 345 respondents) are individual telecom users. Only 54 respondents (i.e. 15.7%) can be considered as 'newbies' among the sampled respondents - having used telecom lines for periods below 5 years. All the other 84.3% respondents can be considered as 'old users' – having owned and used telecom lines for period above five years. Specifically, about 27% of the respondents have owned and made use of telecommunication lines for periods above 15 years. It can also be observed that among the four major network service providers in the country, MTN has the highest number of subscribers (i.e. 68.4%) among our sample who uses the network as their main telecom lines. Only 4.6% uses Etisalat/9mobile as their main lines while 9.6 per cent uses the only indigenous network service provider in the country (GLO) as their main telecom line. However, from the last row of the Table, it can be observed that subscribers (respondents) that use GLO as their second/alternative telecom line are in the majority among the sample (i.e. 27.2%), while 13.6% have no second telephone number.

4.3 Data Analyses on the Nature of Corrupt Practices by Network Providers

As part of the secondary objective of the study, and to understand the pattern of corrupt practices and/or exploitative services by the telecom service providers among the sampled states, the respondents' responses to the factor items in Section B (Questions 1-20) of the research instrument are presented in this sub-section. The essence of this is to identify the nature of corrupt practices or exploitative services that is mostly experienced by the sampled telecommunication users. The outcome is presented in Table 2.

Table 4.3. Nature of corrupt practices/exploitative services by service providers

s/n	Items	Mean	Std. Dev.	Rank
1.	Unsolicited renewal of caller tunes	3.19*	1.344	7 th
2.	Deductions for unsolicited short messages (SMS)	3.08	1.33	13 th
3.	Deductions for undelivered messages (SMS/MMS)	2.46	1.234	19 th
4.	Deductions for unsolicited caller tunes	3.13	1.374	11 th
5.	High call drop rates	3.42	1.23	3 rd
6.	Charges for calling customer service	2.2	1.238	20 th
7.	Inability to recharge/check balance	2.61	1.062	18 th
8.	Unexplained disappearance of credit/airtime	2.91	1.321	15 th
9.	Persistent traffic channel congestions	3.09	1.099	12 th
10.	Inability to make calls/get network signals from certain locations	3.77	1.066	1 st
11.	Charges for failed/incomplete file downloads	3.16	1.249	10 th
12.	Allocation of bogus but unusable bonus internet data	3.46	1.275	2 nd
13.	Deceptive auto-migration to an unfavourable promotional package by requesting subscribers to press a certain number	3.17	1.385	9 th
14.	Exorbitant call and internet data bundle rates	3.41	1.203	4 th
15.	Neglect of hazardous effects of telecom installations	3.2	1.313	6 th
16.	Inability to change tariff plan or to activate an offered service	2.74	1.245	17 th
17.	Inability of opting out from an unfavourable package	3.01	1.328	14 th
18.	Call misdirection to an unintended number	2.84	1.323	16 th
19.	Automated calls from network providers even in odd hours	3.19	1.286	8 th
20.	Ever busy/unreachable customer care lines	3.36	1.372	5 th

Source: Field Survey (2021) *Mean calculation is based on the coding scale of 5= (Very Often), 4 = (Often), 3 = (Not too Often), 2 = (Seldom Happens); and 1 = (Never Happened)

In Table 4.2, the study presents the cumulative responses of the sampled respondents on the extent to which they have experienced each of the 20 aforelisted corrupt practices and/or exploitative services by network providers. As can be observed from the rankings, inability to make calls/get network signals from certain locations, allocation of bogus unusable bonus internet data and high call drop rates are the three most experienced exploitative services by the Nigerian service providers. On the other hand, the three least experienced factors are inability to recharge/check balance, deductions for undelivered messages (SMS/MMS) and charges for calling customer care service.

As a follow-up to Table 4.3, which was designed in a close-ended form in the research instrument, the respondents were given the opportunity (in an open-ended form) to describe other forms of corrupt practice(s) or exploitative service(s) they have experienced with their network service providers. The provision for this was made in the ‘open-ended’ question number 21 of the research instrument. All the responses/comments were captured and categorised (in terms of the frequency the mentions) and presented in Table 4.

Table 4.4. Other forms of corrupt practices or exploitative services

s/n	Open-ended responses	Mode
i	Collection of unused data	Mostly experienced**
ii	Difficulty in reaching customer care agents when faced with service operational difficulties	
iii	Inability to call other networks using available call bonuses	
iv	Hoarding information on unfavourable parts of a promotional package	
v	Charges on services and promotional packages not rendered such as caller tunes	
vi	Highly exorbitant charges and deductions when a network user borrows airtime or data bundle.	
vii	High rate of charges in making calls to foreign numbers.	
viii	Highers call rates when calling other networks	
ix	Frequent automated call from network providers and persuasions (upon answering) to subscribe to unsolicited service plans	
x	Indiscriminate and unsolicited credit deductions from account balance of subscribers	Not frequently experienced
xi	High call divert rates	
xii	Failure of service network providers to curtail network criminal activities	
xiii	Recycling of old numbers without complete termination of the old subscribers	
xiv	Exploitative and deceptive data/call package offered to subscribers	
xv	High internet browsing rate and excessive drainage of data bundle	
xvi	Manipulation of promotional packages by service provider	

Source: Field Survey (2021)

**Based on the number of mentions by the respondents

The first nine factors in the upper part of Table 4 – ranging from ‘collection of unused data’ to ‘frequent automated call from network providers and persuasions to subscribe to unsolicited service plans’ – were the most corrupts or exploitative services experienced by the sampled respondents. On the other hand, the seven factors in the lower part of the Table 4 were the least

mentioned corrupts or exploitative services based on the open-ended comments of the respondents to question number 21 of the research instrument.

4.4 Data Analyses on challenges to the elimination of corrupt practices by service providers

Asides identifying the nature of corrupt practices and, or exploitative services by the network service providers, the research instrument provided some probable challenges (i.e. questions 25-30 in Section D) as observed from literature (in a close-ended form) for which the respondents also gave their opinions. Figure 2 presents the graphical analysis outcome:




Figure 4.1 Challenges inhibiting the elimination of corrupt practices by service providers

Source: Field Survey (2021)

*Figures represent the average (mean) responses coded in terms of SA=5, A=4, UD=3, D=2, and SD=1 [Benchmark mean value = $5+4+3+2+1 \div 5 = 3$]

Based on the high mean values of the six proffered probable challenges in Figure 4.1 (i.e. all greater than the benchmark value of 3), it can be summarized that a domineering majority of the respondents agree that each of factor items in questions 25-30 encourages corrupt and exploitative services among the network providers. Specifically, ‘lack of awareness of what constitutes a breach of consumer rights on the part of the subscribers’ with a mean value of 4.1 and ‘lack of proper channels for short-changed subscribers to seek redress’ (mean value = 4) are the two most agreed challenges. On the other hand, ‘diplomatic interventions by parent countries of foreign service providers’ (e.g. as experienced during MTN vs NCC saga), was the least agreed factor with a mean value of 3.22. As a follow-up to Figure 2, Table 5 presents the summarised responses to the open-ended question 31 of the research instrument.

Table 4.5. Factors encouraging corrupt practices by telecom service providers

s/n	Open-ended responses	Category
i	Dominance of foreign service providers in the country	Most mentioned factors**
ii	Slack regulations and indifference on the part of the government and concerned agencies	
iii	Different working structure of service providers and too much profit-oriented goal of the service providers	
iv	Exploitation of telecom services providers by governmental agencies through high taxation	
v	Lack of government-owned telecom network service	
vi	Poor infrastructures and lack of necessary technological tools for effective network availability	
vii	Illiteracy and lack of awareness on the part of the subscribers	
viii	Lack of political will to put a check on the excesses of the service providers	Least mentioned factors
ix	Low productivity of network providers at the expense of the subscribers monetary cost	
x	Not the fault of service providers, most customers dump their sim cards for long periods and/or use them for dubious activities	
xi	Poor knowledge of customers’ rights by the network users and subscribers	
xii	Lack of proper location for signals in certain locations	
xiii	Excessive number of operating network providers in the country	
xiv	Lack of healthy competition among the network providers and denial of subscribers’ rights	

Source: Field Survey (2021)

**Based on the number of mentions by the respondents

From Table 4.5, the respondents were asked to give their opinion (in an open-ended form) on the possible factors (not captured in Figure 2) encouraging corrupt practices and/or exploitative services by telecom service providers in the country. Their opinions/comments were categorised and factored into the fourteen (14) factor items presented in the above Table 5. As can be observed, the seven factors in the top rows – ranging from ‘dominance of foreign service providers in the country’ and ‘illiteracy and lack of awareness on the part of the subscribers’ – are the most mentioned factors encouraging the identified exploitative services. On the other hand, the remaining seven factors in the lower rows of the Table were the least mentioned factors accordingly.

As a follow-up to the above, the respondents were requested to suggest possible ways of curtailing/eliminating the corrupt practices/ exploitative services by the telecommunication service providers in country. The avenue for this was created in the section E part of the research instrument. Their open-ended suggestions were collated and pooled into the 12 factors presented in Table 6.

Table 4.6 Suggested possible ways of curtailing corrupt practice by service providers

s/n	Open-ended suggestions	Frequency
i	Network providers engaging in corrupt practices should be sanctioned and/or have their licence withdrawn.	Mostly suggested factors
ii	Licences should be issued more to indigenous telecommunication companies	
iii	Government should reintroduce and revitalise the use of land telephone lines.	
iv	Service providers should beef up their installations to neutralise network congestions especially during festive periods	
v	All the terms and conditions of tariff plans and packages should be unambiguously spelt out for the subscribers to make informed decisions.	
vi	There is need for the tariff plans to be regulated	
vii	The network providers should create more mini-customer care offices to make it easier for customers in remote areas to get assistance.	Least suggested factors
viii	Enlightenment of subscribers should be carried out via television and radio platforms	
ix	Proper channels should be put in place for subscribers to seek redress when short-changed by network providers.	
x	Only corporate bodies should operate more than 2 sim cards in order to reduce abuse and fraudulent activities by some users.	
xi	The regulatory bodies, e.g. NCC, should rise up to their responsibilities	
xii	Network providers should shorten the time of answering when a customer calls customer care lines.	

Source: Field Survey (2021)

**Based on the frequency of the mentions by the respondents

The twelve suggestions presented in Table 4.6 were proffered by the respondents as possible ways of either reducing or elimination corrupt and exploitative services by the telecom service providers in the country. Among the most mentioned suggestions includes: that the network providers engaging in corrupt practices should be sanctioned and/or have their licence withdrawn; that licences be issued more to indigenous telecommunication companies; and that government should reintroduce and revitalise the use of land telephone lines. On the other hand, the

enlightenment of subscribers and shortening the time of picking customers' calls during complaints were among the least proffered suggestions.

In order to achieve the three specific objectives of this study as stated in the first chapter and also test the corresponding hypotheses; this sub-section presents the analysis of the section C part of the research instrument in respect to the efficiency of telecom services. To that effect, Table 7 presents the analysis of the responses to questions 22-24 which bothers on the three selected proxies of efficiency of telecom services (Cost of service, Quality of service and Service availability) which also represents the three dependent variables of the study.

Table 4.7. Responses on the Efficiency of Telecommunication Services

	Cost of Service (tariffs):	Very High	High	Moderate	Low	Very Low	Mean±SD
1.	How can you describe the call/internet tariff/rate of your network provider?	88 (25.5)*	138 (40)	106 (30.7)	13 (3.8)	0 (0)	3.87±0.836
	Quality of Service:	Very Highly Satisfied	Highly Satisfied	Satisfied	Undecided	Not satisfied	Mean±SD
2.	Indicate your level of satisfaction concerning the quality of services rendered to you by your service provider(s)	15 (4.3)	52 (15.1)	173 (50.1)	44 (12.8)	61 (17.7)	2.76±1.05
	Service Availability:	Very Strong	Strong	Moderate	Poor	Very Poor	Mean±SD
3.	Describe the current level of network availability in your locality.	35 (10.1)	107 (31)	156 (45.2)	32 (9.3)	15 (4.3)	3.3±0.935

Source: Field Survey (2021)

*Figures in parentheses represent the percentages (%)

As shown in Table 4.7, only about 31% of the respondents are of the opinion that the call rates of their network are moderate, 25.5% and 40% felt it was 'very high' and 'high' respectively. On the quality of service, more than half of the respondents appeared to be satisfied, while only about 18% were not. On service availability in the different locations of the respondents, about

14% jointly describes it as poor, while more than 40% of the respondents agreed that telecom network was strong in their locations. Comparing the mean values of each of three proxies of telecom efficiency, it can be observed that ‘quality of service’ has the lowest mean value of 2.76 while ‘cost of service’ possesses the highest mean value at 3.87. What this implies is that majority of the sampled respondents are jointly more satisfied with cost of service and its availability more than they are with the quality of the telecom service.

4.5 Correlation Analysis

The correlation matrix result in Table 8 is used to present the strength and direction of the associations among the variables used in the study. All the measures were computed based on 5point Likert scales, but were pooled together according to the grouped factor items in order to form the variables. For example (in line with the operationalisation of the variables in the previous chapter): questions 1-20 was used for the variable of corrupt practices (CP) while 22-24 formed the variables of service availability, quality of service and cost of service.

Table 4.8. Result of the Correlation Matrix

		CS	QS	SA	CP
CP	Pearson Correlation	.343**	-0.024	0.031	1.000
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	0.663	0.562	
CS	Pearson Correlation	1.000	-0.059	0.014	.343**
	Sig. (2-tailed)		0.277	0.801	0.000
QS	Pearson Correlation	-0.059	1.000	0.601**	-0.024
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.277		0.000	0.663
SA	Pearson Correlation	0.014	0.601**	1.000	-0.031
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.801	0.000		0.562
	N	345	345	345	345

Source: SPSS 24 (2019)

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

From Table 4.8, it could be observed that while CS (cost of service) is positively associated with CP (level of corrupt practices), QS (quality of service) and SA (service availability) are negatively associated with CP. However, only the association between CS and CP were statistically significant owing to the probability value of 0.000 (p-value < 0.01). This suggests that higher level of corrupt practices and/or exploitative services moves in same direction with cost of service in the telecom industry. As one goes up, so will the other. Further, there is also an acceptable reliability on the research variables since none of the correlation coefficient values were up to the value of 0.80 which would have been a sign of multicollinearity issues among the series.

Table 4.9. Regression Results

Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
Dependent Variable: Service Availability (SA)			Dependent Variable: Quality of Service (QS)			Dependent Variable: Cost of Service (CS)		
Variables	Coefficient	t-stat (Sig)	Variables	Coefficient	t-stat (Sig)	Variables	Coefficient	t-stat (Sig)
(Constant)	3.199	13.54 (0.000)	(Constant)	2.870	10.81 (0.000)	(Constant)	2.561	12.9 (0.000)
CP	-0.002	-0.58 (0.56)	CP	-0.002	-0.44 (0.66)	CP	0.021	6.76 (0.000)**
R-squared		0.001	R-squared		0.001	R-squared		0.118
Adjusted R ²		-0.002	Adjusted R ²		-0.002	Adjusted R ²		0.115
F-stat (Sig)		0.34 (0.56)	F-stat (Sig)		0.19 (0.66)	F-stat (Sig)		45.7 (0.00)**
Durbin-Watson		1.287	Durbin-Watson		1.493	Durbin-Watson		1.834

Source: Compiled from SPSS 24 output (2021)

NB: The p-values are in brackets; **.Significant at 1% level

From Table 9, it can be deduced from the first model that the independent variable of CP has a negative coefficient sign of -0.002 and an insignificant probability value of 0.56. This implies that CP has an inverse insignificant impact on the dependent variable of service availability (SA). The R-squared value is very low at 0.001 implying that only about 0.01% of variance in SA can be explained by the variable of CP. The model was also not significant owing to the low F-statistic value of 0.38 and the adjoining probability value of 0.56 which is far greater than 5%.

In the second model, which captures the same equation using a different dependent variable (i.e. QS), it can be observed that the independent variable of CP showed the same negative coefficient sign (as in model 1) but was also not statistically significant. This goes to show that the explanatory variable of CP was not able to explain the variations in the dependent variable of quality of service (QS). Similarly, the low f-statistic value (0.19) and the corresponding probability value of 0.66 (p-value > 0.05) are indications that, although possessing the projected negative coefficient sign, no significant relationship could be established between level of corrupt practices (CP) and quality of service (QS).

From the third column representing model 3, it can be observed that, unlike the first two columns, the independent variable of CP showed a positive coefficient sign and which is also statistically significant at the 1% level. This is due to the positive coefficient sign of 0.021 and a low probability value of 0.000 (< 0.01). What this implies is that a unit increase in level of corrupt practices will lead to about 2% increase in cost of service of telecommunication among the sample. The adjusted r-squared of 0.115 suggests that CP explained about 11.5% of variance in cost of service, while the high f-stat value (45.7) and an overall significant p-value are indications of strong linear relationship between CP and CS.

4.5.1 Test of Hypotheses

In order to answer the research questions, the three (3) null hypotheses formulated in the first chapter of the study are tested in this sub-section. The decision rule is to accept the null hypothesis if the probability value (p-value) is greater than 0.05 or when the calculated t-statistic is less than 2.0. Reversely, the null hypothesis will be rejected if the p-value value is less than 0.05 and or the t-statistic is ≥ 2 . The summary of the hypotheses results are presented in Table 10 below:

Table 4.10. Summary of Hypotheses Testing

	Hypotheses	Prediction	Actual Result	Decision
H₀₁	Corrupt practices by telecom service providers do not significantly affect the service availability of telecommunications in Nigeria.	Significantly negative	Negative – Insignificant (p-value=0.56)	Accept null
H₀₂	Corrupt practices by telecommunication service providers do not significantly affect the quality of service of telecommunications in Nigeria.	Significantly negative	Negative – Insignificant (p-value=0.66)	Accept null
H₀₃	Corrupt practices by telecommunication service providers do not significantly affect the cost of service of telecommunications in Nigeria.	Significantly positive	Positive – Significant (p-value=0.000)	Reject null

Source: Researcher’s compilation (2021)

4.6 Discussion of Findings

The outcome of the first hypothesis test shows that the corrupt practices have a negative relationship with service availability - which aligns with the apriori expectation of the study. However, non-significant nature of their relationship is an indication that neither corrupt practices nor exploitative services by the telecom service providers’ affects telecom service availability in Nigeria. This buttresses the position of Wickberg (2014) that improvement of the

quantity, quality and efficiency of telecom-related services lie on the availability of the required telecommunication infrastructure. In other words, service availability is more of a function of having the required infrastructures and less of corruptive tendencies of the providers. This result also supports Odunlami and Awolusi (2015) which examined the extent to which MNCs have spurred up economic development in Nigeria via investments in telecommunication industry and found that some of the MNCs engage in unethical business (corrupt) practices that soils their image and the image of the country, thereby discouraging FDI inflows and implicationally reduces the availability of telecom services.

On the second hypothesis test, the result showed that the variable of corrupt practices (CP) is negatively related to the dependent variable of quality of service (QS), howbeit insignificantly. This is due to the high probability value of 0.66 (66%) which is far greater than the 5% benchmark. This led to the acceptance of the null hypothesis two (Ho2). This result is similar to that of Hassan (2011) who used trend analysis in examining the inefficiency and ineffectiveness in the quality of service that characterised the telecommunications sector prior to its privatization and found evidence that corrupt practices as among the leading causation factors. Also, the insignificant relationship can be related to the study by Sukhtankar (2014), which empirically investigated the effect of the corrupt sale of licenses to ineligible firms on the wireless telecom market in India and found evidence that the corrupt allocation of telecom operation rights had no meaningful impact on the quality and prices of telecom services.

In the third hypothesis, the result showed that the independent variable of corrupt practices (CP) has a significant positive coefficient sign, meaning that its effect on cost of service (CS) is positive and statistically significant. This is due to the low probability value of 0.000 which is less than 0.05 (5%). By the virtue of this result, the third hypothesis was rejected. This implies

that there is strong relationship between corrupt practices by telecom service providers and the cost (tariffs) of their services. Although this result tallies with our expectation as earlier projected in the previous chapter, it however negates the result of Sukhtankar (2014) which found that the corruption in the operation of telecom services had zero impact on costs of telecom service. On the other hand, our result can be related to those of Blackman and Srivastava (2011) which showed evidence of setting tariff price too high or in an anticompetitive manner when the market is dominated by high profile politicians and powerful influential businessmen who use their influence and connections to alter prices/tariff rates under the guise of launching new promos without fear of regulatory intervention. This can be related to the Nigerian situation. The result also supports Hassan (2011) who found evidence of disproportionality between the reductions in the cost of telephone lines (SIMs) and calls tariff rates which he attributed to dominance of powerful and influential foreign network providers who often reel out exploitative promos in order to hike average call rates.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 Introduction

This chapter summarises the major findings of this research work, draws conclusion thereon and makes policy recommendations. The chapter also provides the implications of the research findings and suggestions for possible further studies.

5.2 Summary of Findings

Flowing from the empirical analysis and the discussion of the findings in the previous chapter, the major findings of the study can be summarised as follows:

- i. There is an inverse and non-significant relationship between level of corrupt practices and telecom service availability. This implies that higher levels of corrupt practice by telecom operators have the tendency of reducing telecom service availability, but not significantly.
- ii. There is a non-significant negative relationship level of corrupt practices and quality of telecom service. This implies that corrupt practices by telecom operators do not have any meaningful impact on the telecom service quality in the country.
- iii. The relationship between level of corrupt practices and cost of service is positive and statistically significant meaning that higher level of corrupt practice by telecom network providers is strongly associated with high cost of telecom services (tariffs).

5.3 Conclusion

The current administration's (at the Federal level) resolve to tackle corruption and its elements in all spheres of the economic have increase the research interest on the effects of corruption in different sectors of the Nigerian economy. Research-wise, there has been much focus on the public sector, undermining the possibility that corrupt practices in the private sector may likely be equated with those in the public sector. The telecommunication industry, being one of most successful sector that benefited from the Nigerian government's deregulation exercise in the beginning of year 2000, is one sector largely dominated by foreign players and thus considered a fertile ground for this empirical exercise. This study was thus designed to examine the nature and pattern corrupt practices by the telecom service providers in Nigeria and its effect on the efficiency of the telecommunication services in the country.

In order to achieve this purpose, the study conducted a field survey focusing on randomly selected telecom network users in six major cities (Uyo, Yenagoa, Calabar, Asaba, Benin City, and Port-Harcourt) adopted from the six (6) States that make up the South-South region of Nigeria. A structured questionnaire was designed to that effect and targeted at four hundred (400) scientifically selected participants, out of which three hundred and forty-five (345) were successfully retrieved and used for the analysis.

Findings from the descriptive statistics showed that the mostly experienced corrupt practices and or exploitative services by the network service providers' ranges from frequent call drops, inability to assess network in certain locations, allocation of bogus unusable bonuses and difficulty in reaching customer care line/agents when faced with operational difficulties. These, among others, the respondents attributed to: the institutionalised corruption syndrome in the country, lack of awareness of what constitutes breach of customers rights, lack of proper

channels for short-changes subscribers to seek redress, lack of political will by government and regulatory bodies, among others.

Findings from the regression analysis showed that whereas the level of corrupt practices has negative influence on service availability and quality of service, its influence on cost of service is positive and statistically significant. It can thus be concluded that in terms of the impacts of corrupt practices on the efficiency of telecommunication services in Nigeria, in the context at which it was proxied in this study, the major variable of interest is the cost of the service (tariffs). It can also be concluded, by the virtue of the findings, that the level of corrupt practices by telecom network providers is not associated with the quality and availability of the telecommunication service in Nigeria.

5.4 Recommendations

Flowing from the findings of this study, the following recommendations are being proffered:

- i. Stiffer sanctions, such as withdrawal of licence, should be meted out to network providers found to be engaging in corrupt practices and/or exploitative services capable of short-changing the subscribing public.
- ii. Government should consider the reintroduction and revitalisation of the land telephone line and government-owner mobile network service provider in order to encourage health competition among the existing private operators and beef up service quality and availability.
- iii. The relevant regulatory bodies should consider the regulation of cost of telecom services (tariffs and call rates) and also check-mate the term and conditions of different promotional packages usually being reeled out by network providers.

- iv. Licences should be issued more to indigenous telecommunication companies and government should develop policies that will encourage new local investors into the telecom industry.

5.5 Contributions to knowledge

- i. In the Nigerian setting, this study contributes to the existing knowledge by studying the impacts of corrupt practices by telecom service providers on the efficiency of telecommunication services in the country. None of the existing Nigerian studies, to the best of my knowledge, have examined the effects of corrupt practice from the above stated dimension.
- ii. The study also contributes to existing knowledge by sampling the entire six states that made up the south-south region in Nigeria. This is considered useful for policy and generalization purposes.

5.6 Suggestions for Further Studies

- i. The outcome of this study is as result of a survey focusing more on individual telecom users, further studies can expand the scope to cover corporate telecom and internet users. There is likelihood that the treatment given to the high-spending corporate users may vary with the treatments faced by low-spending individual phone users.
- ii. Similarly, since the survey captures only six major cities across six States among the thirty-six States of the Federation, further studies can increase the scope to cover other major cities in remaining five regions of the country. This will go a long way in enhancing the generalization potentials of the outcome.
- iii. Other factors that could influence service availability, quality of service and cost of service such as inadequate transmission, lack of adequate infrastructure, government

policies, lack of adequate security. Network failures, power supply should be included and considered. This will enhance the outcome.

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Appendix One: (QUESTIONNAIRE)

Cover Letter

Department of Accounting,
Faculty of Management Science,
University of Benin,
Benin City.
January, 2019.

Dear Sir/Madam,

REQUEST FOR THE COMPLETION OF QUESTIONNAIRE

I am a postgraduate (M.Sc) student of the above named department, undertaking a research study tagged “Corrupt practices by communication service providers: A case study of public users’ perception in Benin City, Nigeria”. Kindly assist in completing this study by answering the attached questions by ticking your opinion/answers in the blank spaces as they correspond to your perception on the various issues.

Be assured that your responses will be treated with utmost confidentiality and shall be used solely for academic purpose as stipulated.

Thank you for your anticipated cooperation.

Yours faithfully,

Christopher Osas EHIZOBA
(Researcher)

Questionnaire

Section A:

1. State: Edo () Delta () CrossRiver () Bayelsa () Rivers () AkwaIbom ()
2. Indicate your Town/City.....
3. **Type of User:** Individual () Institution/Corporate body ()
4. **No of years since using Telecom/GSM:** Less than 5yrs ago () More than 5yrs ago ()
About 10yrs ago () More than 15yrs ago ()
5. **Indicate your main telecom line?** MTN () Airtel () Etisalat/9mobile () GLO () Others (please indicate).....
6. **Indicate your second line, if any:** None () MTN () Airtel () Etisalat/9mobile () GLO () Others (please indicate).....

Section B: (Corrupt practices by service providers)

INSTRUCTION: In questions 1-20, kindly indicate/rate (√) the extent to which you experience each of the following corrupt practices and/or exploitative services from your network provider - using the scoring keys; **5 = (Very great extent), 4 = (High extent), 3 = (Moderate extent), 2 = (Low extent); and 1 = (Not at all)**

s/n	Factor Items	Very Great Extent (Very often)	High Extent (Often)	Moderate extent (Not too often)	Low extent (Seldom happens)	Not at all (Never happened)
1	Unsolicited renewal of caller tunes					
2	Deductions for unsolicited short messages (SMS)					
3	Deductions for undelivered messages (SMS/MMS)					
4	Deductions for unsolicited caller tunes					
5	High call drop rates					
6	Charges for calling customer service					
7	Inability to recharge/check balance					
8	Unexplained disappearance of credit/airtime					
9	Persistent traffic channel congestions					
10	Inability to make calls/get network signals from certain locations					
11	Charges for failed/incomplete file downloads					
12	Allocation of bogus but un-useable bonus internet data					
13	Deceptive auto-migration to an unfavourable promotional package by requesting subscribers to press a number					

14	Exorbitant call and internet data bundle rates					
15	Neglect of hazardous effects of telecom installations					
16	Inability to change tariff plan or to activate an offered service					
17	Inability of opting out from an unfavourable package					
18	Call misdirection to an unintended number					
19	Automated calls from network providers even in odd hours					
20	Ever busy/unreachable customer care lines					

21. Kindly indicate any other pattern /form of corrupt practice(s) or exploitative service(s) you have experienced with your service provider and rate its occurrence(s) using the same metric above.....
.....
.....

Section C:

INSTRUCTION: The section contained three (3) questions which are meant to provide information about the efficiency of the telecommunication services as perceived by the users/subscribers.

In question 22 below, how can you describe the call/internet tariff/rate of your network provider? Please tick your perception in any of the boxes as it applies.

	Factor Item	Very High	High	Moderate	Low	Very Low
22	Cost of service (tariffs)					

In question 23 (below) please indicate your level of satisfaction concerning the quality of services rendered to you by your service provider(s) by ticking in any of the boxes as appropriate.

	Factor Item	Very Highly Satisfied	Highly Satisfied	Satisfied	Undecided	Not satisfied
23	Quality of Service					

In question 24, you are kindly required to describe the level of network availability in your locality by ticking any of the boxes as it best describes the current situation.

	Factor Items	Very Strong	Strong	Moderate	Poor	Very Poor
24	Service Availability					

Section D:

INSTRUCTION: The section seeks to identify the challenges inhibiting the elimination of corrupt practices by telecommunication service providers in Nigeria. Kindly indicate/rate (√) the extent to which you agree or disagree with the given statements by ticking the appropriate option using the following keys:

SA -Strongly Agree; **A** – Agree; **UD**-Undecided; **D**-Disagree; **SD**-Strongly Disagree

s/n	Factor Items	SA	A	U D	D	SD
25.	High operational costs is due to poor infrastructural availability (e.g. power)					
26.	The institutionalised corruption syndrome in the country is responsible					
27.	Lack of political will by government and regulatory bodies is responsible					
28.	Diplomatic interventions by parent countries of foreign service providers					
29.	Lack of proper channels for short-changed subscribers to seek redress					
30.	Lack of awareness of what constitutes a breach of consumer rights on the part of the subscribers					

31. In your opinion, kindly list any other challenge(s) encouraging corrupt practices by telecommunication service providers – that is (are) not captured above.....

Section E:

GUIDE: Kindly suggest the possible way(s) of curtailing/eliminating the corrupt practice by telecommunication service providers in Nigeria:

.....

Thank You for your time!

Appendix Two: (RESULTS)

```

CORRELATIONS
/VARIABLES=CP CS QS SA
/PRINT=TWOTAIL NOSIG
/MISSING=PAIRWISE.
    
```

Correlations

Notes

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Resources	Processor Time 00:00:00.00 Elapsed Time 00:00:00.01

[DataSet1]

Correlations

		CP	CS	QS	SA
CP	Pearson Correlation	1	.343**	-.024	.031
	Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.663	.562
	N	345	345	345	345
CS	Pearson Correlation	.343**	1	-.059	.014
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000		.277	.801
	N	345	345	345	345
QS	Pearson Correlation	-.024	-.059	1	.601**

	Sig. (2-tailed)	.663	.277		.000
	N	345	345	345	345
	Pearson Correlation	-.031	.014	.601**	1
SA	Sig. (2-tailed)	.562	.801	.000	
	N	345	345	345	345

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Regression

Notes

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	Cases Used	Statistics are based on cases with no missing values for any variable used.
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		/MISSING LISTWISE
		/STATISTICS COEFF
		OUTS R ANOVA
		/CRITERIA=PIN(.05)
		POUT(.10)
		/NOORIGIN
		/DEPENDENT SA
		/METHOD=ENTER CP
		/RESIDUALS DURBIN.
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[DataSet1]

Variables Entered/Removed^a

Model	Variables Entered	Variables Removed	Method
1	CP ^b	.	Enter

- a. Dependent Variable: SA
- b. All requested variables entered.

Model Summary^b

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	.031 ^a	.001	-.002	.93580	1.287

- a. Predictors: (Constant), CP
- b. Dependent Variable: SA

ANOVA^a

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	.295	1	.295	.337	.562 ^b
	Residual	300.371	343	.876		
	Total	300.667	344			

- a. Dependent Variable: SA
- b. Predictors: (Constant), CP

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	3.199	.236		13.543	.000
	CP	-.002	.004	-.031	-.581	.562

- a. Dependent Variable: SA

Residuals Statistics^a

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	3.2626	3.3935	3.3333	.02930	345
Residual	-2.35644	1.68285	.00000	.93444	345
Std. Predicted Value	-2.414	2.055	.000	1.000	345
Std. Residual	-2.518	1.798	.000	.999	345

- a. Dependent Variable: SA

```
REGRESSION
  /MISSING LISTWISE
  /STATISTICS COEFF OUTS R ANOVA
  /CRITERIA=PIN(.05) POUT(.10)
  /NOORIGIN
```

/DEPENDENT QS
 /METHOD=ENTER CP
 /RESIDUALS DURBIN.

Variables Entered/Removed^a

Model	Variables Entered	Variables Removed	Method
1	CP ^b	.	Enter

- a. Dependent Variable: QS
 b. All requested variables entered.

Model Summary^b

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	.024 ^a	.001	-.002	1.05164	1.493

- a. Predictors: (Constant), CP
 b. Dependent Variable: QS

ANOVA^a

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	.210	1	.210	.190	.663 ^b
	Residual	379.338	343	1.106		
	Total	379.548	344			

- a. Dependent Variable: QS
 b. Predictors: (Constant), CP

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	2.870	.265		10.810	.000
	CP	-.002	.004	-.024	-.436	.663

- a. Dependent Variable: QS

Residuals Statistics^a

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	2.7057	2.8162	2.7565	.02472	345
Residual	-1.77938	2.29427	.00000	1.05011	345
Std. Predicted Value	-2.055	2.414	.000	1.000	345
Std. Residual	-1.692	2.182	.000	.999	345

- a. Dependent Variable: QS

Variables Entered/Removed^a

Model	Variables Entered	Variables Removed	Method
1	CP ^b	.	Enter

a. Dependent Variable: CS

b. All requested variables entered.

Model Summary^b

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Durbin-Watson
1	.343 ^a	.118	.115	.78638	1.834

a. Predictors: (Constant), CP

b. Dependent Variable: CS

ANOVA^a

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	28.280	1	28.280	45.731	.000 ^b
	Residual	212.109	343	.618		
	Total	240.388	344			

a. Dependent Variable: CS

b. Predictors: (Constant), CP

Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	2.561	.199		12.901	.000
	CP	.021	.003	.343	6.762	.000

a. Dependent Variable: CS

Residuals Statistics^a

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation	N
Predicted Value	3.1802	4.4616	3.8725	.28672	345
Residual	-1.94903	1.39265	.00000	.78524	345
Std. Predicted Value	-2.414	2.055	.000	1.000	345
Std. Residual	-2.478	1.771	.000	.999	345

a. Dependent Variable: CS

Frequencies

Notes

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Syntax	Cases Used	Statistics are based on all cases with valid data.
		FREQUENCIES
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	Elapsed Time	00:00:00.01

[DataSet1]

Statistics

		Type of User	No of years since using Telecom	Main line	Second line
N	Valid	345	345	345	345
	Missing	0	0	0	0

Frequency Table

Type of User

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Individual user	328	95.1	95.1	95.1
	Institution/Corporate body	17	4.9	4.9	100.0
	Total	345	100.0	100.0	

No of years since using Telecom

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Less than 5yrs ago	54	15.7	15.7	15.7
	More than 5yrs ago	111	32.2	32.2	47.8
	About 10yrs ago	88	25.5	25.5	73.3

More than 15yrs	92	26.7	26.7	100.0
Total	345	100.0	100.0	

Main line

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid MTN	236	68.4	68.4	68.4
Airtel	60	17.4	17.4	85.8
Etisalat/9mobile	16	4.6	4.6	90.4
GLO	33	9.6	9.6	100.0
Total	345	100.0	100.0	

Second line

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid None (No 2nd line)	47	13.6	13.6	13.6
MTN	67	19.4	19.4	33.0
Airtel	70	20.3	20.3	53.3
Etisalat/9mobile	67	19.4	19.4	72.8
GLO	94	27.2	27.2	100.0
Total	345	100.0	100.0	

```
FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16
Q17 Q18 Q19 Q20 Q22 Q23 Q24 Q25 Q26 Q27 Q28 Q29 Q30
/STATISTICS=STDDEV MEAN
/ORDER=ANALYSIS.
```

Frequencies

Notes

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Weight	<none>

	Split File	<none>
	N of Rows in Working Data File	345
Missing Value Handling	Definition of Missing	User-defined missing values are treated as missing.
	Cases Used	Statistics are based on all cases with valid data.
Syntax		<pre> FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8 Q9 Q10 Q11 Q12 Q13 Q14 Q15 Q16 Q17 Q18 Q19 Q20 Q22 Q23 Q24 Q25 Q26 Q27 Q28 Q29 Q30 /STATISTICS=STDDEV MEAN /ORDER=ANALYSIS. </pre>
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	Elapsed Time	00:00:00.02

Statistics

		Unsolicited renewal of caller tunes	Deductions for unsolicited short messages (SMS)	Deductions for undelivered messages (SMS/MMS)	Deductions for unsolicited caller tunes	High call drop rates
N	Valid	345	345	345	345	345
	Missing	0	0	0	0	0
Mean		3.19	3.08	2.46	3.13	3.42
Std. Deviation		1.344	1.330	1.234	1.374	1.230

Statistics

		Charges for calling customer service	Inability to recharge/check balance	Unexplained disappearance of credit/airtime	Persistent traffic channel congestions	Inability to make calls/get network signals from certain locations
N	Valid	345	345	345	345	345
	Missing	0	0	0	0	0
Mean		2.20	2.61	2.91	3.09	3.77
Std. Deviation		1.238	1.062	1.321	1.099	1.066

Statistics

		Charges for failed/incomplete file downloads	Allocation of bogus but unusable bonus internet data	Deceptive auto-migration to an unfavourable promotional package by requesting subscribers to press a number	Exorbitant call and internet data bundle rates	Neglect of hazardous effects of telecom installations
N	Valid	345	345	345	345	345
	Missing	0	0	0	0	0
Mean		3.16	3.46	3.17	3.41	3.20
Std. Deviation		1.249	1.275	1.385	1.203	1.313

Statistics

		Inability to change tariff plan or to activate an offered service	Inability of opting out from an unfavourable package	Call misdirection to an unintended number	Automated calls from network providers even in odd hours	Ever busy/unreachable customer care lines
N	Valid	345	345	345	345	345
	Missing	0	0	0	0	0
Mean		2.74	3.01	2.84	3.19	3.36
Std. Deviation		1.245	1.328	1.323	1.286	1.372

Statistics

		Cost of service (tariffs)	Quality of Service	Service Availability	High operational costs is due to poor infrastructural availability (e.g. power)	The institutionalised corruption syndrome in the country is responsible
N	Valid	345	345	345	345	345
	Missing	0	0	0	0	0
Mean		3.87	2.76	3.33	3.42	3.64
Std. Deviation		.836	1.050	.935	1.351	1.231

Statistics

		Lack of political will by government and regulatory bodies is responsible	Diplomatic interventions by parent countries of foreign service providers	Lack of proper channels for short-changed subscribers to seek redress	Lack of awareness of what constitutes a breach of consumer rights on the part of the subscribers
N	Valid	345	345	345	345
	Missing	0	0	0	0
Mean		3.94	3.22	4.00	4.10
Std. Deviation		1.054	1.145	1.027	.950

Frequency Table

Unsolicited renewal of caller tunes

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Never happened	54	15.7	15.7	15.7
	Seldom Happens	49	14.2	14.2	29.9
	Not Too Often	92	26.7	26.7	56.5
	Often	77	22.3	22.3	78.8
	Very Often	73	21.2	21.2	100.0
	Total	345	100.0	100.0	

Deductions for unsolicited short messages (SMS)

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Never happened	57	16.5	16.5	16.5
	Seldom Happens	64	18.6	18.6	35.1
	Not Too Often	76	22.0	22.0	57.1
	Often	91	26.4	26.4	83.5
	Very Often	57	16.5	16.5	100.0
	Total	345	100.0	100.0	

Deductions for undelivered messages (SMS/MMS)

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent	
Valid	Never happened	104	30.1	30.1	30.1
	Seldom Happens	72	20.9	20.9	51.0
	Not Too Often	96	27.8	27.8	78.8
	Often	52	15.1	15.1	93.9
	Very Often	21	6.1	6.1	100.0
	Total	345	100.0	100.0	

Deductions for unsolicited caller tunes

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent	
Valid	Never happened	65	18.8	18.8	18.8
	Seldom Happens	43	12.5	12.5	31.3
	Not Too Often	85	24.6	24.6	55.9
	Often	85	24.6	24.6	80.6
	Very Often	67	19.4	19.4	100.0
	Total	345	100.0	100.0	

High call drop rates

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent	
Valid	Never happened	21	6.1	6.1	6.1
	Seldom Happens	74	21.4	21.4	27.5
	Not Too Often	69	20.0	20.0	47.5
	Often	100	29.0	29.0	76.5
	Very Often	81	23.5	23.5	100.0
	Total	345	100.0	100.0	

Charges for calling customer service

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Never happened	147	42.6	42.6
	Seldom Happens	51	14.8	57.4
	Not Too Often	98	28.4	85.8
	Often	29	8.4	94.2
	Very Often	20	5.8	100.0
	Total	345	100.0	100.0

Inability to recharge/check balance

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Never happened	44	12.8	12.8
	Seldom Happens	136	39.4	52.2
	Not Too Often	94	27.2	79.4
	Often	52	15.1	94.5
	Very Often	19	5.5	100.0
	Total	345	100.0	100.0

Unexplained disappearance of credit/airtime

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Never happened	45	13.0	13.0
	Seldom Happens	112	32.5	45.5
	Not Too Often	87	25.2	70.7
	Often	31	9.0	79.7
	Very Often	70	20.3	100.0
	Total	345	100.0	100.0

Persistent traffic channel congestions

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Never happened	32	9.3	9.3

Seldom Happens	67	19.4	19.4	28.7
Not Too Often	116	33.6	33.6	62.3
Often	99	28.7	28.7	91.0
Very Often	31	9.0	9.0	100.0
Total	345	100.0	100.0	

Inability to make calls/get network signals from certain locations

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Never happened	16	4.6	4.6	4.6
Seldom Happens	22	6.4	6.4	11.0
Not Too Often	82	23.8	23.8	34.8
Often	130	37.7	37.7	72.5
Very Often	95	27.5	27.5	100.0
Total	345	100.0	100.0	

Charges for failed/incomplete file downloads

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Never happened	44	12.8	12.8	12.8
Seldom Happens	54	15.7	15.7	28.4
Not Too Often	109	31.6	31.6	60.0
Often	79	22.9	22.9	82.9
Very Often	59	17.1	17.1	100.0
Total	345	100.0	100.0	

Allocation of bogus but un-useable bonus internet data

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Never happened	29	8.4	8.4	8.4
Seldom Happens	63	18.3	18.3	26.7
Not Too Often	62	18.0	18.0	44.6
Often	104	30.1	30.1	74.8

Very Often	87	25.2	25.2	100.0
Total	345	100.0	100.0	

Deceptive auto-migration to an unfavourable promotional package by requesting subscribers to press a number

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Never happened	39	11.3	11.3	11.3
Seldom Happens	93	27.0	27.0	38.3
Not Too Often	77	22.3	22.3	60.6
Often	41	11.9	11.9	72.5
Very Often	95	27.5	27.5	100.0
Total	345	100.0	100.0	

Exorbitant call and internet data bundle rates

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Never happened	29	8.4	8.4	8.4
Seldom Happens	49	14.2	14.2	22.6
Not Too Often	88	25.5	25.5	48.1
Often	108	31.3	31.3	79.4
Very Often	71	20.6	20.6	100.0
Total	345	100.0	100.0	

Neglect of hazardous effects of telecom installations

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Never happened	44	12.8	12.8	12.8
Seldom Happens	66	19.1	19.1	31.9
Not Too Often	83	24.1	24.1	55.9
Often	81	23.5	23.5	79.4
Very Often	71	20.6	20.6	100.0
Total	345	100.0	100.0	

Inability to change tariff plan or to activate an offered service

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Never happened	65	18.8	18.8	18.8
	Seldom Happens	91	26.4	26.4	45.2
	Not Too Often	92	26.7	26.7	71.9
	Often	61	17.7	17.7	89.6
	Very Often	36	10.4	10.4	100.0
	Total	345	100.0	100.0	

Inability of opting out from an unfavourable package

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Never happened	67	19.4	19.4	19.4
	Seldom Happens	49	14.2	14.2	33.6
	Not Too Often	95	27.5	27.5	61.2
	Often	82	23.8	23.8	84.9
	Very Often	52	15.1	15.1	100.0
	Total	345	100.0	100.0	

Call misdirection to an unintended number

		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Never happened	68	19.7	19.7	19.7
	Seldom Happens	84	24.3	24.3	44.1
	Not Too Often	73	21.2	21.2	65.2
	Often	75	21.7	21.7	87.0
	Very Often	45	13.0	13.0	100.0
	Total	345	100.0	100.0	

Automated calls from network providers even in odd hours

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Never happened	39	11.3	11.3	11.3
Seldom Happens	80	23.2	23.2	34.5
Not Too Often	64	18.6	18.6	53.0
Often	101	29.3	29.3	82.3
Very Often	61	17.7	17.7	100.0
Total	345	100.0	100.0	

Ever busy/unreachable customer care lines

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Never happened	39	11.3	11.3	11.3
Seldom Happens	63	18.3	18.3	29.6
Not Too Often	81	23.5	23.5	53.0
Often	58	16.8	16.8	69.9
Very Often	104	30.1	30.1	100.0
Total	345	100.0	100.0	

Cost of service (tariffs)

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Low	13	3.8	3.8	3.8
Moderate	106	30.7	30.7	34.5
High	138	40.0	40.0	74.5
Very High	88	25.5	25.5	100.0
Total	345	100.0	100.0	

Quality of Service

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent

	Not Satisfied	61	17.7	17.7	17.7
	Undecided	44	12.8	12.8	30.4
Valid	Satisfied	173	50.1	50.1	80.6
	Highly Satisfied	52	15.1	15.1	95.7
	Very Higly Satisfied	15	4.3	4.3	100.0
	Total	345	100.0	100.0	

Service Availability

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Very Poor	15	4.3	4.3
	Poor	32	9.3	9.3
	Moderate	156	45.2	45.2
	Strong	107	31.0	31.0
	Very Strong	35	10.1	10.1
	Total	345	100.0	100.0

High operational costs is due to poor infrastructural availability (e.g. power)

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	37	10.7	10.7
	Disagree	70	20.3	20.3
	Undecided	41	11.9	11.9
	Agree	106	30.7	30.7
	Strongly Agree	91	26.4	26.4
	Total	345	100.0	100.0

The institutionalised corruption syndrome in the country is responsible

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Strongly Disagree	20	5.8	5.8
	Disagree	61	17.7	17.7
	Undecided	41	11.9	11.9

Agree	123	35.7	35.7	71.0
Strongly Agree	100	29.0	29.0	100.0
Total	345	100.0	100.0	

Lack of political will by government and regulatory bodies is responsible

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	3	.9	.9	.9
Disagree	47	13.6	13.6	14.5
Undecided	42	12.2	12.2	26.7
Agree	127	36.8	36.8	63.5
Strongly Agree	126	36.5	36.5	100.0
Total	345	100.0	100.0	

Diplomatic interventions by parent countries of foreign service providers

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	32	9.3	9.3	9.3
Disagree	53	15.4	15.4	24.6
Undecided	114	33.0	33.0	57.7
Agree	99	28.7	28.7	86.4
Strongly Agree	47	13.6	13.6	100.0
Total	345	100.0	100.0	

Lack of proper channels for short-changed subscribers to seek redress

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	8	2.3	2.3	2.3
Disagree	28	8.1	8.1	10.4
Undecided	50	14.5	14.5	24.9
Agree	130	37.7	37.7	62.6
Strongly Agree	129	37.4	37.4	100.0
Total	345	100.0	100.0	

Lack of awareness of what constitutes a breach of consumer rights on the part of the subscribers

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Strongly Disagree	2	.6	.6	.6
Disagree	33	9.6	9.6	10.1
Undecided	28	8.1	8.1	18.3
Agree	146	42.3	42.3	60.6
Strongly Agree	136	39.4	39.4	100.0
Total	345	100.0	100.0	